Proposal for a social psychology experiment:
We'll use four separate, sizable groups of people, say 75 people in each group. (Not that I know if that amount is any good or not, or if we want our overall pool to be similar socioeconomically. I'm not a statistician.)
Ask each member of Group One:
What arguments would you use to try and persuade an
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It seems like rock critics -- including me -- are often members of a tribe pretending to do anthropology on other tribes. This is (in part) what makes them "lousy anthropologists" -- they're reconfirming the boundaries of their in-groups rather than (somewhat dispassionately) exploring the various dynamics at work. If their experience with music and social relationships was anything like mine, they don't have a research question; they have instead inchoate needs to confirm their participation in a particular group. That's part of what led me to the music convo in the first place, and my somewhat radical departure from in-group-ism (or at least a more selective view of what counts as "in-group") was largely due to a sense that I was being conned, that this group wasn't right for me. ("No group is right for me" is a pretty strongly anti-ethnocentric position, I would think. It means that my blindnesses, though often apparent, are not always predictable, and that I'm fairly likely to accept a good counter-argument. I think I'm also prone to mentorism, striving to find a particular model rather than an accepting group.)
Tip of the iceberg -- quick scan on Google Scholar led to this highly-cited study from the 90s -- don't know enough about social psychology stuff to dig much further (for now). The abstract:
This study investigated the processing consequences of receiving non-membership-relevant persuasive messages from in-group or out-group members. Students were given two-sided messages ostensibly from an in-group or out-group source. The position advocated in the message was announced either before or after message arguments were presented, and position-consistent arguments were either strong or weak. In-group messages were more likely to receive content-focused processing (as indicated by lager processing times and differential persuasion to strong and weak arguments) when position advocacy followed rather than pre ceded message presentation. Prior knowledge of the in-group position produced acceptance of the in-group position regardless of message quality, particularly of the counter attitudinal message. Out-group appeals produced almost no attitude change, even with strong arguments.
The subjects here were likely university students (as are many social psychology experiments). Knowing the position going in led to less engagement in the content of the message, though I don't know how much less from the abstract. (This might be a Dead Lester problem, too, that we're usually fairly sure of the position going in.) And out-group persuasive appeals -- even high-quality ones -- usually do little to convince an in-group of an alternative position. Though you would likely find more frustration and confusion in using "Cheryl" instead of "an atheist," I'm not sure what one would do to actually counteract the assumptions that your participants will likely bring to the table. Recognizing one's ignorance in the moment is one thing, but doing something about it is another (and beyond the scope of your social experiment, but not beyond the scope of Dead Lester).
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*Yes, this is not very good sourcing or fact-checking.
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The phrases "in-group identification" and "out-group identification" - does the former mean that you identify something or someone as belonging to your group (and identify yourself as belong to that entity's or person's group?), and the latter that you identify something or someone as belonging to a group you're at odds with or outside of (and identify yourself as outside of and at odds with that group)?
The trouble is that when I see the phrase "out-group identification" my immediate impulse isn't to think, "I'm identifying them as part of a group I'm outside of and at odds with," but rather, "I identify myself as belonging to this particular out-group." The phrase "group-identification" usually refers to what the subject identifies with, not to where the subject locates someone or something else.
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You can identify with a group that others consider an out-group, but you probably wouldn't call that an "out group" unless you were referring to the position of some other group of people "Jewish" is historically seen as an "out group" from some perspectives; my wife considers it an in group, but though I might be considered as part of the "out group" by others -- meaning if I were born in Germany in the 1920s like my grandfather was I'd be identified as part of the group -- I don't identify as Jewish.
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But more to the point, when you say "Frank's out-group identification," you're sending a signal that you're talking about what out group Frank identifies with, not what out group Frank slots other people into.
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But I'm not sure if this particular book addresses this facet of identification -- they're more interested in general statements disparaging or marginalizing others as "out groups" while identifying as "in groups." But I could be wrong.
(When you identify with a marginalized group, though, you're still generally identifying in-group, even though you can see that other people slot you into the out group category. "Out grouping" is an act of differentiation and exclusion.)
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This doesn't mean that you shouldn't talk about an "in group of punks," or an "in group of transvestites," or whatever. Just don't ever use the phrase "out-group identification" for what these particular in groups are defining themselves against. Don't use that phrase at all. Instead, say something like, "characteristics that the in group of punks assign to groups they define themselves against" or "people the in group of punks assign to groups the punks define themselves against" or whatever particular point you're trying to make at the moment.
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This is in part where the "more or less ethnocentric" stuff probably comes in -- and of course I'll have more to say about it when I've actually finished the book (what a concept!). I would guess that given the authors' definition and measures of ethnocentrism, most atheists and agnostics would be generally more tolerant of lots of different groups, hence "less ethnocentric" and likely also less likely to identify strongly with or against a group. But again these are just my guesses, not what the book says. (I'm using this comment thread somewhat selfishly to get thoughts that have been flitting around for a week out somewhere.)
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If there's an in group at an office, it doesn't follow that there are necessarily out groups, just outsiders. Or if there was, let's say, an in group of punks in London in early 1976, there wasn't necessarily a set of groups they defined themselves against. There may have been ("hippies," metal heads, pub rockers), but there didn't have to be. And the punks probably felt themselves way outside the mainstream, but I doubt they thought of "the mainstream" as a group. They wouldn't have identified with the Greater London Commerce Association (if there ever was such an organization; I made up the name), but if someone introduced himself to Johnny Rotten as representing the Greater London Commerce Association, Johnny would likely have felt a social chasm between them - the group name identifying the fellow as mainstream, even though Johnny'd never heard of and had no previous opinion on the group. Defining yourself against others isn't the same thing as defining yourself against other particular groups. (Not going into it here, but that's why the actual functioning of "social class" is hard to get a grip on, since people tend not to congregate and aggregate in what we normally think of as social classes.)
*Or will bring value if anyone other than you and me and Mark actually decides to think about what I said. I'd say more to the point is that the antirockists projected their own authenticity impulses onto the supposed "rockist" but in stupid form, and then skewered the "rockist" for his stupidity, thereby achieving a cheap victory over an imaginary foe while leaving unexamined all the actual social and class issues that swirled about those authenticity impulses. (Not that everyone who decried "rockism" was doing this.) Anyhow, none of this means that people saw "rockists" as constituting a group.
What I'm saying here is all pretty tangential to the interesting stuff you wrote upthread; I'm thinking the Kinder-Kam dynamics might apply to vaguely conceived others, not just to particular, identifiable groups (or to identified groups, anyway, even if the groups aren't as coherent as those defining themselves against them think).
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