Firtash & Wikileaks або by “the laws of the streets.”
10/ SECRET
Controversial Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash, best known as co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), called upon the Ambassador on December 8. Firtash did not explicitly state why he requested the meeting, nor did he ask the USG for anything, but he spoke at length about his business and politics in a visible effort to improve his image with the USG. The soft-spoken billionaire, arguably one of Ukraine’s most powerful people, expressed strong support for President Yushchenko and equally strong contempt for Prime Minister Tymoshenko. He claimed that he had thwarted a coalition between BYuT and the Party of Regions (PoR) at the last minute, and was now working to build a coalition between Yushchenko’s supporters and the PoR. In a lengthy monolog, Firtash described his evolution as a businessman from his beginnings as a food trader to the creation of RUE. Firtash claimed that Tymoshenko was working with Russia to eliminate RUE, and cited examples meant to prove that she was making political concessions to Russia to gain its support to do so. He acknowledged ties to Russian organized crime figure Seymon Mogilevich, stating he needed Mogilevich’s approval to get into business in the first place. He was adamant that he had not committed a single crime when building his business empire, and argued that outsiders still failed to understand the period of lawlessness that reigned in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He said he cared truly about Ukraine, and saw Russian business interests overtaking the economy as the biggest threat to the country’s security. Comment: Firtash’s arguments and allegations are clearly self-interested; he sees Tymoshenko as a clear threat to his business... Firtash answered that many Westerners do not understand what Ukraine was like after the break up of the Soviet Union, adding that when a government cannot rule effectively, the country is ruled by “the laws of the streets.” He noted that it was impossible to approach a government official for any reason without also meeting with an organized crime member at the same time. Firtash acknowledged that he needed, and received, permission from Mogilievich when he established various businesses, but he denied any close relationship to him.
11/ CONFIDENTIAL
Hence, it is still too early to write off RUE, or the concept of shady intermediaries as a whole. Some commentators are speculating that the sides may even agree to replace RUE with another, recently established company called KazUkrEnergo
12/ CONFIDENTIAL
He later broke into the gas trade and established himself as an intermediary through connections to key Ukrainian officials and reportedly to Russian organized crime figure Semyon Mogilevich. As co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), Firtash is widely believed to be serving as a front man for far broader interests. In the case of Nadra, Firtash is sufficiently cash-rich to finance the purchase on his own, but the suspicion remains that in his major business dealings he remains at least politically indebted to the forces that helped him rise so quickly.
13/ CONFIDENTIAL
With only five parties in the Rada, and Vitrenko forced to reprise her role as a street-protest gadfly, the Ukrainian political scene may actually be more stable than many had feared leading up to the election, even though the same intra-Orange squabbling and Orange-Blue battles are almost guaranteed to continue in 2006 and beyond
14/ CONFIDENTIAL
xxxxxxxxxxx appeared to deliver his message not in anger, but in sincere sorrow for the country and frustration at his inability to convince Tymoshenko to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the economic crisis for reform. Instead, xxxxxxxxxxxx said Tymoshenko wasted the opportunity in favor of populism and asimple desire for all-embracing power.
15/ CONFIDENTIAL
In contrast to the 2004 elections, issues of national security and defense remain notable by their absence in this year's presidential campaign. Ukrainians are focused on the economic crisis and the election's potential for reconfiguring Ukraine's political power relationships.
16/ CONFIDENTIAL
Moscow analysts view bilateral relations as hostage to Ukrainian domestic political games, where different forces vie for a better position in next year's presidential election through attempts to gain an upper hand over deals with Russia.
17/ CONFIDENTIAL
Solzhenitsyn repeated to the Ambassador his objection to independence for Kosovo. Why, he asked rhetorically, should the Serbs be held responsible for the sins of Milosevic? He was critical of plans to move Ukraine closer to NATO, although he didn’t belabor the point.
18/ SECRET/NOFORN
Aldred observed that, depending on the result of Ukraine’s elections, Ukraine may not have a government come the ministerial, temporarily mooting the question of a MAP for Ukraine.
19/ SECRET/NOFORN
ENI's view of the European energy situation was disturbingly similar to that of GAZPROM and the Kremlin, and at times laced with rhetorical flourishes reminiscent of Soviet-era double-speak: according to ENI, the real threat to Western Europe's energy security is not Russia -- it is Ukraine. The real solution to Europe's energy insecurity, according to ENI, lies in more direct pipeline connections to Russian gas fields and a need for pipelines that do not go through Ukraine - the rationale for the South Stream and Nord Stream pipelines
20/ CONFIDENTIAL
(C) After almost two years of tandem leadership, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin govern based on a still-evolving division of labor. Medvedev, the junior partner, has been a steady advocate of modernization -- economic, political and technological. Constitutionally, he has the lead in foreign policy, but makes no major decisions without some form of consultation with Putin, most of which is obscure to the outside world. In addition to governing behind the scenes, Putin has been visible in tackling recent crises such as the conflict with Georgia, gas supply negotiations with Ukraine, and localized unrest due to the economic crisis. Although there is evidence that their closest advisors spar privately over policies and personnel matters, the two leaders appear united and project complete ease with one another in the media. Medvedev has yet to make major changes to the senior staff he inherited from Putin. Putin remains more popular than Medvedev... After the "color" revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, Russian security services stepped up their efforts against the U.S. and other Western powers, whom they blame for inciting the protests and overthrowing the governments in Tbilisi and Kyiv. Their officers maintain constant vigilance against the U.S. government representatives through active surveillance and they have sought to stifle U.S. humanitarian programs in the North Caucasus.
Controversial Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash, best known as co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), called upon the Ambassador on December 8. Firtash did not explicitly state why he requested the meeting, nor did he ask the USG for anything, but he spoke at length about his business and politics in a visible effort to improve his image with the USG. The soft-spoken billionaire, arguably one of Ukraine’s most powerful people, expressed strong support for President Yushchenko and equally strong contempt for Prime Minister Tymoshenko. He claimed that he had thwarted a coalition between BYuT and the Party of Regions (PoR) at the last minute, and was now working to build a coalition between Yushchenko’s supporters and the PoR. In a lengthy monolog, Firtash described his evolution as a businessman from his beginnings as a food trader to the creation of RUE. Firtash claimed that Tymoshenko was working with Russia to eliminate RUE, and cited examples meant to prove that she was making political concessions to Russia to gain its support to do so. He acknowledged ties to Russian organized crime figure Seymon Mogilevich, stating he needed Mogilevich’s approval to get into business in the first place. He was adamant that he had not committed a single crime when building his business empire, and argued that outsiders still failed to understand the period of lawlessness that reigned in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He said he cared truly about Ukraine, and saw Russian business interests overtaking the economy as the biggest threat to the country’s security. Comment: Firtash’s arguments and allegations are clearly self-interested; he sees Tymoshenko as a clear threat to his business... Firtash answered that many Westerners do not understand what Ukraine was like after the break up of the Soviet Union, adding that when a government cannot rule effectively, the country is ruled by “the laws of the streets.” He noted that it was impossible to approach a government official for any reason without also meeting with an organized crime member at the same time. Firtash acknowledged that he needed, and received, permission from Mogilievich when he established various businesses, but he denied any close relationship to him.
11/ CONFIDENTIAL
Hence, it is still too early to write off RUE, or the concept of shady intermediaries as a whole. Some commentators are speculating that the sides may even agree to replace RUE with another, recently established company called KazUkrEnergo
12/ CONFIDENTIAL
He later broke into the gas trade and established himself as an intermediary through connections to key Ukrainian officials and reportedly to Russian organized crime figure Semyon Mogilevich. As co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), Firtash is widely believed to be serving as a front man for far broader interests. In the case of Nadra, Firtash is sufficiently cash-rich to finance the purchase on his own, but the suspicion remains that in his major business dealings he remains at least politically indebted to the forces that helped him rise so quickly.
13/ CONFIDENTIAL
With only five parties in the Rada, and Vitrenko forced to reprise her role as a street-protest gadfly, the Ukrainian political scene may actually be more stable than many had feared leading up to the election, even though the same intra-Orange squabbling and Orange-Blue battles are almost guaranteed to continue in 2006 and beyond
14/ CONFIDENTIAL
xxxxxxxxxxx appeared to deliver his message not in anger, but in sincere sorrow for the country and frustration at his inability to convince Tymoshenko to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the economic crisis for reform. Instead, xxxxxxxxxxxx said Tymoshenko wasted the opportunity in favor of populism and asimple desire for all-embracing power.
15/ CONFIDENTIAL
In contrast to the 2004 elections, issues of national security and defense remain notable by their absence in this year's presidential campaign. Ukrainians are focused on the economic crisis and the election's potential for reconfiguring Ukraine's political power relationships.
16/ CONFIDENTIAL
Moscow analysts view bilateral relations as hostage to Ukrainian domestic political games, where different forces vie for a better position in next year's presidential election through attempts to gain an upper hand over deals with Russia.
17/ CONFIDENTIAL
Solzhenitsyn repeated to the Ambassador his objection to independence for Kosovo. Why, he asked rhetorically, should the Serbs be held responsible for the sins of Milosevic? He was critical of plans to move Ukraine closer to NATO, although he didn’t belabor the point.
18/ SECRET/NOFORN
Aldred observed that, depending on the result of Ukraine’s elections, Ukraine may not have a government come the ministerial, temporarily mooting the question of a MAP for Ukraine.
19/ SECRET/NOFORN
ENI's view of the European energy situation was disturbingly similar to that of GAZPROM and the Kremlin, and at times laced with rhetorical flourishes reminiscent of Soviet-era double-speak: according to ENI, the real threat to Western Europe's energy security is not Russia -- it is Ukraine. The real solution to Europe's energy insecurity, according to ENI, lies in more direct pipeline connections to Russian gas fields and a need for pipelines that do not go through Ukraine - the rationale for the South Stream and Nord Stream pipelines
20/ CONFIDENTIAL
(C) After almost two years of tandem leadership, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin govern based on a still-evolving division of labor. Medvedev, the junior partner, has been a steady advocate of modernization -- economic, political and technological. Constitutionally, he has the lead in foreign policy, but makes no major decisions without some form of consultation with Putin, most of which is obscure to the outside world. In addition to governing behind the scenes, Putin has been visible in tackling recent crises such as the conflict with Georgia, gas supply negotiations with Ukraine, and localized unrest due to the economic crisis. Although there is evidence that their closest advisors spar privately over policies and personnel matters, the two leaders appear united and project complete ease with one another in the media. Medvedev has yet to make major changes to the senior staff he inherited from Putin. Putin remains more popular than Medvedev... After the "color" revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, Russian security services stepped up their efforts against the U.S. and other Western powers, whom they blame for inciting the protests and overthrowing the governments in Tbilisi and Kyiv. Their officers maintain constant vigilance against the U.S. government representatives through active surveillance and they have sought to stifle U.S. humanitarian programs in the North Caucasus.