I have re-read your essay and, yes, perhaps, I did concentrate on the negative points, but it was the underlying negativity which struck me: To paraphrase, Hephaestion ‘may not have been in the front line, but…’ rather smacks of special pleading!
It was the statement "meticulously kept away from combat command" that particularly struck me as negative. This is a qualitative judgement of Hephaestion’s abilities; that he didn’t quite measure up to Alexander’s other commanders, that Alexander was aware of his short-comings and protected him from being exposed. Such preferential treatment as your statement implies would have attracted attention and would have eroded respect for Hephaestion’s command, and I would prefer to think that Alexander, who promoted on merit, picked the best man available for any given job, and that for some commands Hephaestion would have been 4th or 5th on the list, but first for other commands. As you said, the Macedonian army wasn’t as highly specialised as modern armies, and for a pitched battle Hephaestion would not have been the first choice to command a battalion, but he must have seen his fair share of combat.
For example, if Hephaestion commanded an advance column during the Mallian siege as you point out, he was advancing into unknown and hostile territory. He must have expected to encounter, and probably did encounter, armed resistance, however sporadic and disorganised. Yet this must have been the nature of the vast majority of combat during Alexander’s expedition, although of course the big set pieces like battles and sieges receive most attention in the sources.
Secondly, I believe you have reclassified Hephaestion’s command of the Sogdiana column as being non-combat, which I don’t think you did in your thesis. This, and the redating of his appointment to the Seven Bodyguards, are reductions in Hephaestion’s importance. No matter how vitally important consolidation after conquest is, it is still of secondary importance as it depends upon the initial effort of conquest. If conquest and consolidation are done by separate commanders, a hierarchy of dominant alpha males who will see themselves as the heroes and the others as the drones is likely to develop. Alexander would have been aware of the discipline and morale problems this would have caused, and I’m not sure his commanders would have tolerated such a division of labour.
Is there any hint of this in the sources? I would argue not, as Apollodorus, the Greek left in charge of the garrison at Babylon, feared Hephaestion and the King. This is not ‘behind the scenes’ power, but suggests that Hephaestion had real power, governmental and physical, to back up any threat. Perhaps as chiliarch it was his function to investigate any claims of wrongdoing in high-ranking officials, or inspect how they had fulfilled their role. Plutarch says that Alexander became harsh in his judgements because he had so much to do, and perhaps Alexander did delegate some cases to Hephaestion, but Apollodorus would have had Alexander as his judge, even if Hephaestion acted as prosecutor - ample reason to fear both!
Could I just make one further point that part of the bias against supply and logistics - which I don’t doubt was Hephaestion’s chief, but not only, role - may be due to the 19th century origins of modern Alexander studies? This, I think, would have had the British army in the Empire as its background against which to judge the way Alexander’s army was organised and functioned. There is a hint of class warfare in the division of supply and combat. Combat would have been the province of heroes such as Gordon of Khartoum, but supply would have been closely associated with the quarter-master sergeants who, perhaps being from the lower social classes, would popularly have been seen as being ‘on the make’, bending the rules to line their own pockets behind their superiors’ backs while controlling vital supplies with miserly efficiency. Shopkeepers getting their revenge on the non-paying aristocrats!
Sorry, I’ve gone on for far too long. I’m sure you have much better things to do than listen to my ramblings!
It was the statement "meticulously kept away from combat command" that particularly struck me as negative. This is a qualitative judgement of Hephaestion’s abilities; that he didn’t quite measure up to Alexander’s other commanders, that Alexander was aware of his short-comings and protected him from being exposed. Such preferential treatment as your statement implies would have attracted attention and would have eroded respect for Hephaestion’s command, and I would prefer to think that Alexander, who promoted on merit, picked the best man available for any given job, and that for some commands Hephaestion would have been 4th or 5th on the list, but first for other commands. As you said, the Macedonian army wasn’t as highly specialised as modern armies, and for a pitched battle Hephaestion would not have been the first choice to command a battalion, but he must have seen his fair share of combat.
For example, if Hephaestion commanded an advance column during the Mallian siege as you point out, he was advancing into unknown and hostile territory. He must have expected to encounter, and probably did encounter, armed resistance, however sporadic and disorganised. Yet this must have been the nature of the vast majority of combat during Alexander’s expedition, although of course the big set pieces like battles and sieges receive most attention in the sources.
Secondly, I believe you have reclassified Hephaestion’s command of the Sogdiana column as being non-combat, which I don’t think you did in your thesis. This, and the redating of his appointment to the Seven Bodyguards, are reductions in Hephaestion’s importance. No matter how vitally important consolidation after conquest is, it is still of secondary importance as it depends upon the initial effort of conquest. If conquest and consolidation are done by separate commanders, a hierarchy of dominant alpha males who will see themselves as the heroes and the others as the drones is likely to develop. Alexander would have been aware of the discipline and morale problems this would have caused, and I’m not sure his commanders would have tolerated such a division of labour.
Is there any hint of this in the sources? I would argue not, as Apollodorus, the Greek left in charge of the garrison at Babylon, feared Hephaestion and the King. This is not ‘behind the scenes’ power, but suggests that Hephaestion had real power, governmental and physical, to back up any threat. Perhaps as chiliarch it was his function to investigate any claims of wrongdoing in high-ranking officials, or inspect how they had fulfilled their role. Plutarch says that Alexander became harsh in his judgements because he had so much to do, and perhaps Alexander did delegate some cases to Hephaestion, but Apollodorus would have had Alexander as his judge, even if Hephaestion acted as prosecutor - ample reason to fear both!
Could I just make one further point that part of the bias against supply and logistics - which I don’t doubt was Hephaestion’s chief, but not only, role - may be due to the 19th century origins of modern Alexander studies? This, I think, would have had the British army in the Empire as its background against which to judge the way Alexander’s army was organised and functioned. There is a hint of class warfare in the division of supply and combat. Combat would have been the province of heroes such as Gordon of Khartoum, but supply would have been closely associated with the quarter-master sergeants who, perhaps being from the lower social classes, would popularly have been seen as being ‘on the make’, bending the rules to line their own pockets behind their superiors’ backs while controlling vital supplies with miserly efficiency. Shopkeepers getting their revenge on the non-paying aristocrats!
Sorry, I’ve gone on for far too long. I’m sure you have much better things to do than listen to my ramblings!
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