Double barrel, second shot
In the character of a human, we find three influencing parts, three powers, which play roles in the decisions that an individual makes. The first two of these are on more or less equal footing; both are ultimately subsumed under the third function which determines between and above them - though this third power may itself be temporarily subsumed under one of the two lesser powers. These three elements are rationality, irrationality, and choice.
Our first power of rationality is the embodiment of system. Its primary concern is that of causality and effects. Determining certain effects to be beneficial or detrimental, rationality seeks to establish the causes or origins of these effects so that they may be sought or avoided respectively. The temporal orientation of rationality is therefore the future, aiming to produce through itself one that has been judged beneficial by itself. The future is therefore the domain of the system, which takes the past as a store of information and the present as a field of action on which to effect its aims on reality. Rational ethics proceed naturally from the system, with their a priori determinations. Rationality sorts the available information of the past relative to the effects desired in the future as determined by its value assumptions and then produces a suggestion. The system is therefore bent towards drawing conclusions as recommendations for action dependent upon the perceived or projected causality of events, which it seeks to incorporate into its own structure by exerting control over.(A) This means that rationality is characterized by a concern for perfection within its own defined borders and achieving this perfection through action in accordance to itself (a future endeavor).
The second power is that of irrationality or the emotive. Irrationality is not concerned with causality (at least not directly). Its primary interest is sensation, which is an immediate state of affairs. It could be said that irrationality’s concerns are symptomatic rather than causal, situational rather than systematic. In this sense, then it may be said that irrationality has a lesser self-awareness than rationality, as it concerns itself with nothing other than its present state. That said, it is clear that the temporal orientation of the situational is the present. This present may be the immediate situation, or the past or future treated as an immediate situation. The situational is the basis of emotive ethics, which are based on reactions to different situations. They do no include plans or avoiding situations which would elicit negative reactions or pursuing those that would elicit positive ones (as that would be the system), they merely stand to respond to various situations and decide at that time how to classify the situation based on those responses. As such, the irrational does not concern itself with perfection in an established conceptual system and may therefore work outside the constraints of such a system, but will do so by being an un-informed reaction to the situation rather than a plan on how to assimilate it to assumed values.
To present these two as images, imagine that there is a cliff to jump off of. Rationality is the path that will lead us to the cliff’s edge and suggest that we jump; whereas irrationality is the urge we feel, should we happen to find ourselves at the edge, to do so. One is a systematic recommendation, the other is a situational response. Note, however, that neither is an inevitable cause of our jumping from the ledge of consideration (rational or irrational) into the void of action. For this, we require another power to accompany either of the two. This is our third power of choice. Choice, to be fair, may be motivated by rationality or irrationality. However, these two remain impetuses and not necessary causes in themselves. If either of them were necessary, irresistible causes, choice would cease to exist, as would freedom.
If rationality was an inevitable cause, then we would be unable to resist the demands of a system, regardless of how much the irrational may militate against it. Imagine a scenario in which we are required to kill an innocent and unrelated individual for the purposes of the system’s requirements. Imagine that this requirement is not a misapplication of the system’s internal logic, but is truly required. What then do we do? Carry out the act, saying we had no choice in the matter, that it was necessary and inevitable per the system?(B) If the system is inevitable, then resistance or rebellion is impossible. But, we know that we can reject one system in favor of another with differing value assumptions, or even for the sake of an irrational response to this first system - which we could not even call unjust without first referencing another system. This matter reveals to us the ultimate supremacy of choice over system. But what of situation, or irrationality?
Imagine that we have been (of feel ourselves to have been) slighted by another. Insult leads to anger; anger, to a desire for reprisal. Were irrationality inevitable, then we would be unable to refrain from the counter-quip when insulted or the counter-blow when assaulted. “Eye for an eye” would cease to by systematic and would become automatic. But we can be stopped from this by reference to rationality, which would classify our harm within a specific system and advise us whether or not we were justified in an act of retribution. But, as we have already seen above, it is choice that is invoked in the process of referencing any system and thus the mitigation of irrationality via rationality is achieved ultimately by means of choice, as is the mitigation of rationality via irrationality. But let us assume further that we make no such reference to system to mitigate our irrationality. We are slighted, we feel the insult, we burn to visit the affront back on those who perpetrated it, but we simply do not. Perhaps another part of us feels irrationally the inappropriateness of the revenge, not from any reference to a system which advocates such an opinion, but simply from what we would commonly call a gut feeling or instinct. We thus have two opposing irrationals which, if both inevitable, cannot be decided between on their own merits and reference to an external (choice) is therefore necessary - as reference to rationality would simply lead to a repetition of the problem, as noted above.
Choice, being external to rationality and irrationality, is concerned with and dependent upon nothing that they are; in other words, nothing external to itself. Choice is a manifestation of will. When will becomes self-aware by freeing itself of incidental, external influences, it recognizes itself as non-causal. This is opposed to both rationality and irrationality, which are within the causal realm.(C)
To revisit our image: rationality may lead us to the edge and irrationality may motivate us to jump, but only choice will send us flying into the realm of action.
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Special case - forgiveness
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A special notice should be made here of the disposition of the act of forgiveness with relation to the three powers. Rational forgiveness is no such thing. Forgiveness is an act of will from the forgiver, not a response to facts present in the one to be forgiven. Forgiveness does not require contrition, repentance, or recompense. Thus, it is not rational and subject to system. One might then say by contrast that irrational forgiveness is therefore possible, as it would not seek to fulfill a requirement, as rational forgiveness would. However, this assertion assumes a limited forgiveness which is dependent on a response of the would-be forgiver - which clashes with our non-contingent definition. It may be difficult to see the difference between (in the irrational realm) of wanting to forgive and thus doing so or not wanting to forgive and thus not doing so and (in the realm of choice) choosing to forgive and thus doing so or not choosing to forgive and thus not doing so. The difference lies in this - we may irrationally not want to forgive and yet do it anyway, per our choice to do so.(D) As stated above, forgiveness is an act of will from ourselves. This does not mean from our constituent rational or irrational parts; rather “from” means the sense of “issuing forth out of”, with ourselves as the point of origin.
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Notes
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Aside A - The inevitable result of holding a line of thought sincerely is to attempt to put it into action and thus have the world conform to the construct we have created of it. All philosophies are normative.
Aside B - That we were “only following orders”?
Aside C - Because of the deciding element which choice exercises over rationality and irrationality, an individual possessed of a clear will is more ethically flexible, being able to strike a balance between the demands of universal system and unique situation,
Aside D - This reveals a crucial point to remember in relation to choice: it is not equivalent with desires as such. We may choose that which we don’t want irrationally or don’t agree with rationally. The freedom of our will includes a freedom from ourselves.(E)
Aside E - Imagine the scenario of someone causing us some sort of harm. We have no desire (for whatever cause, rational or irrational) to forgive this person, but we do nonetheless. Some may argue that the forgiveness is not real because we maintain those negative feelings towards the individual (or, at least, the offending action). If our forgiveness was true, they argue, we would change our feelings as well. This, however, is ridiculous. Our choices do not define our feelings, simply the actions we take with regard to them. Forgiving a particular harm does not mean forgetting it. As long as the past remains to be remembered as a present event in the process of recollection, so will the possibility of reacting to the past situation with the same irrational feeling (even at the same magnitude) continue to exist - though the forgiveness will continue as well (assuming we accept it to be so). However, while the choice itself will not change the first feelings, it may create a set of circumstances in which even if the situation is recalled, or irrational reaction changes due to the influence of rational or irrational effects (supported by choice) that were made possible by the set of circumstances so created.(F)
Aside F - In other words, our choice may lead to a state of changed emotions though we neither intended or expected for this to be so.(G)
Aside G - We can see this phenomenon also in the example of affection or love. At some point, the people we love, we have chosen. We very well may not be aware of this choosing, given the possibility of unconscious choice. Thus, we may come to have affection for a person on the basis of a choice we were not aware of making. Herein lies the problem.
Being an unconscious choice, it is terribly vulnerable to having been contingent upon something, as its disposition has not been vouchsafed by our consciousness of it. Thus, one of two acts is necessary. The first is to trace back to the choice’s being made and determine its disposition with respect to contingency (is it or is it not?). Failing this (which is very likely due to the difficulty of tracking the choice or in finding it to have been contingent once having tacked it down), we are required to make at the present a conscious and non-contingent decision that whatever is so, we will it to be such.
This is acceptance, affirmation, of what has existed and assimilates its object via functional autonomy into itself as a now-non-contingent entity. This second, fully aware choosing may yet not be perceived as a decision on the part of the chooser, but rather as a revelation of the situation (the epiphany-declaration of having discovered one’s loving of another). While not recognized as a choice, the state of loving is now brought into our direct conscious awareness. And once something has come into our direct conscious awareness, it must be decided upon one way or another - and it is this deciding-for that allows the declaration of loving to be possible, non-contingent, and true.