Из доклада эстонских спецслужб. Россия против Эстонии
Russia’s so-called compatriots
policy
Both direct and indirect threats can
undermine the constitutional order of
a state. Indirect threats include attacks
aimed at undermining a state’s sovereignty
and/or international position.
Sovereignty means that a state is able
to make important decisions on its
own and in the interests of its people
as foreseen by the Constitution. Covert
attempts by either a foreign country or
an aggressive interest group to influence
these decisions, either illegally
or secretly, by targeting authorised
decision-makers or the wider public,
qualify as attacks against a state’s sovereignty.
The Estonian Constitution guarantees
basic rights and freedoms to all people
living in Estonia and prohibits discrimination
on the basis of nationality,
race, colour, sex, ethnic origin, religion,
political and other convictions,
also based on material and social status
or other factors. Indeed, this is the
case in all democratic countries. Estonian
citizens have the right to elect
the Riigikogu. Yet unlike many other
countries, Estonia allows citizens of
other countries and individuals with
no citizenship but who have lived in
Estonia for a number of years, to participate
in local elections.
In Estonia, compatriots are either citizens
of Estonia or all of the people who
live in Estonia. Any attempt to try to
limit the definition of a compatriot
according to nationality, language,
ethnicity or convictions would be perceived
as odd or even anti-constitutional.
Russia, on the other hand, defines a
‘compatriot’ as a resident of another
country who is not necessarily even a
Russian citizen, but who for historical
reasons has special status according to
Russian law. This differs significantly
from Estonia’s definition. Russia’s aim
is not to maintain cultural links with
these people nor invite them to return
to Russia. Rather its goal is to influence
the sovereign decisions of other
countries and to divert attention away
from its own problems through the
manipulation of these groups.
As international attention towards
problems of human rights and political
freedoms in Russia increases, authorities
in Moscow are being provided with
additional resources for issues related
to the rights and defence of so-called
compatriots in Russia’s near abroad.
On 25 May 2011, according to a law of
the President of the Russian Federation,
a national fund was established
for the defence and support of the
rights of Russian compatriots living
abroad. The fund was founded by the
Russian Foreign Ministry and the affiliated
national agency ‘Rossotrudnitchestvo’
that handles relations with CIS
countries, compatriots living abroad
and international humanitarian cooperation.
The fund receives most of
its financing from the Russian state
budget.
The fund, which started operating in
January 2012, is, among other things,
responsible for monitoring the observance
of the rights of compatriots in
various countries. The fund also provides
legal and material assistance,
including legal assistance in cases
where Russia believes that the rights
of its compatriots abroad have been
violated. In the past, similar monitoring
exercises have produced clearly
biased reports. For example, the Russian
Foreign Ministry’s first human
rights report published in December
2011 focuses only on the United States
and European Union countries. Russia’s
accusations towards the Baltic
states are dealt with in a separate section,
underlining yet again that Russia
views Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as
a region where it has special interests.
Meeting of Russian Citizens Union in Narva on 26 October 2011. Russia’s compatriots
policy is based on the Soviet Union’s legacy
Russia’s aim is not to maintain cultural links with these people nor
invite them to return to Russia. Rather its goal is to influence the
sovereign decisions of other countries
10
The fund’s main partners are meant
to be the Russian state organised coordination
councils of Russian compatriots
and ‘compatriots’ organisations
that have been created to control and
direct Russian compatriots abroad.
Many high-level Russian officials have
mentioned that one of the fund’s assignments
is ‘to support the ethno-cultural
rights of compatriots.’ It has also
been repeatedly stressed that Russia
aims, above all, to support those ‘compatriots’
who show initiative in standing
up for their rights.
All of this is closely linked to the special
focus placed on the status of the
Russian language abroad. Last year, in
particular, this issue received a lot of
attention at a number of events organised
in Russia, including the annual
worldwide compatriots conference in
Moscow on 17-18 October 2011. At the
conference, it was decided that Russian
‘compatriots’ living in European
Union countries would establish national
citizens’ committees and that
under the European citizens’ initiative,
they would launch a campaign to seek
official EU status for the Russian language
(the European citizens’ initiative
is applicable as of 1 April 2012). Support
was also given to those Russian
compatriots organisations that plan
to carry out campaigns to win official
status for the Russian language in their
country of residence.
The annual conference of Russian
compatriots policy activists living in
Estonia was held in Tallinn on 27 May
2011. The main issues that came up in
conference statements and resolutions
were the defence of the rights of Russian
compatriots and Russian language
education in Estonia. The Russian Embassy
was directly involved in organising
the compatriots conference - they
put together the agenda, chose speakers
and shaped its overall tone. Russian
Ambassador Jury Merzlyakov even
told the conference attendees that Russian
compatriots must consolidate and
coordinate their positions, particularly
on the issue of preserving Russian-language
education and the status of the
Russian language in Estonia.
Non-governmental organisations established
by the Russian state also
known as GONGOs (Governmentorganised
non-governmental organisations)
are an important part of the
compatriots policy as outlined in the
Russian Foreign Ministry’s three-year
work plan (2012-2014). With the help
of GONGOs the aim for the future is to
be more active in individual countries
as well as on the international stage.
The use of GONGOs in meeting Russian
foreign policy goals is outlined in
more detail in the chapter on information-
based activities.
Exploitation of Russianlanguage
gymnasiums
The partial transition to Estonian-language
teaching in Russian-language
gymnasiums began in Estonia in
2007. In autumn 2010, some teachers
and parents who objected to the transition
founded a non-governmental
organisation called ‘Russian School in
Estonia’ to express their opinions. The
organisation, however, did not gain
widespread support from the Russian
community.
Prior to the Riigikogu elections in
2011, Yana Toom, Deputy Major of
Tallinn responsible for educational
and cultural issues, took up the antitransition
cause. In cooperation with
the Human Rights Information Centre,
which takes active part in implementing
Russian compatriots policy
in Estonia, Yana Toom started pressuring
Tallinn’s Russian schools to
submit applications to the Tallinn
City Council calling for the continuation
of Russian-language education
after 1 September 2011. 1 September
2011 was the deadline after which
Russian-language gymnasiums had
to start teaching 60% of subjects in
Estonian.
Thanks to pressure exerted by Mikhail
Stalnukhin, five Russian-language
gymnasiums in Narva submitted similar
applications. After Yana Toom was
elected to the Riigikogu, the new Deputy
Major of Tallinn Mikhail Kõlvart
continued in his predecessor’s footsteps
by working against the transition
both publicly and through hidden
activities. Kõlvart’s goal was to consolidate
Russian-speaking youth and
demonstrate that they are opposed to
the transition. On 1 September 2011,
he launched a white ribbon campaign
supported by Nochnoi Dozor (Night
Watch) members in Tallinn and other
cities. Wearing a white ribbon was
supposed to demonstrate opposition
to having studies in the Estonian-language
but the initiative was not met
with widespread support and understanding.
The white ribbon became
much better known among Russians
as the symbol of those fighting against
election fraud in the Russian elections
held at the end of 2011.
Kõlvart, who took control over the
‘Russian School in Estonia’ organisation
in autumn 2011, organised a
signature-gathering campaign in support
of Russian-language schools. The
expectation was that the campaign
would be as successful as in Latvia,
Ambassador told the conference attendees that Russian compatriots
must consolidate and coordinate their positions, particularly
on the issue of preserving Russian-language education and
the status of the Russian language in Estonia
11
Russia’s so-called compatriots policy
where over 180 000 signatures were
gathered in support of the Russian
language in November 2011. The results
in Estonia, however, were much
weaker despite the visibility that the
campaign received in the Tallinn City
Government sponsored newspaper
Stolitsa and the Russian-speaking TV
channel PBK.
With assistance from members of
the extremist group Nochnoi Dozor,
Kõlvart organised a number of demonstrations
in Tallinn in October,
November and December 2011. Tens
of students were included in the demonstrations
thanks to the extremists,
yet the events were nevertheless dominated
by individuals well-known to
the Security Police. Only a minority of
those who took part in the demonstrations
actually belonged to their main
target group - students and their parents.
A ‘nation-wide parents’ meeting’ was
also organised by the Tallinn City Government
(more precisely by Kõlvart)
at the request of ‘Russian School in
Estonia’ (more precisely by Kõlvart). It
was mainly attended by elderly people,
including many well-known Kremlinminded
extremists.
The Russian-language educational
system and the special status of the
Russian language were established as
part of the Soviet Union’s Russification
policy. Preserving them is a priority
of Russian influence operations.
The Russian Embassy in Estonia supports
these activities through the Russian
compatriots coordination council
in Estonia. Mikhail Kõlvart has had
both public and secret contact with the
Russian Embassy diplomat Jury Tsetkov
who may be using these contacts
to influence and direct Kõlvart. It is
regrettable that the Russian Federation
attempts to use young people as
instruments in its influence operations
as the future of young Russians in Estonia
and Europe depends, above all,
on them receiving a competitive education.
Russian informationbased
influence operations
On 28 December 2011, the Russian
Foreign Ministry published a ‘Report
on the Situation with Human Rights in
Certain States,’ that can be viewed as a
response to the United States of America’s
annual and often Russian-critical
human rights report. The Russian
Foreign Ministry’s document contains
complaints and warnings directed at
the US and many European countries,
in particular, the Baltic states. The accusations
made in the report are the
same as those used year after year in
Russian information-based influence
operations against Estonia.
As usual, the Russian Foreign Ministry
stresses the ‘massive problem of statelessness
in Estonia and the consequent
violation of the rights of the Russianspeaking
minority.’ It also points out
that the Russian language has not been
awarded status as an official language
in Ida-Virumaa. The legal situation of
non-citizens is described as the ‘particular
invention’ of the Estonian authorities
who seek to avoid the application
of international conventions to
these individuals. According to Russia,
the Estonian authorities are aiming
to assimilate their ‘compatriots.’ On
the other hand, it is not mentioned in
the report that the number of stateless
persons in Estonia has consistently decreased
since the restoration of independence.
In 1992, 32 percent of individuals
living in Estonia were stateless.
By 1999, this figure had dropped to 13
percent. Today, less than 9 percent of
people living in Estonia are without
citizenship.
Accusations of neo-Nazism and xenophobia
continue to dominate in Russian
anti-Baltic rhetoric. According
to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s
human rights report, the Kremlin is
Handing over history books to a diplomat of another country is not a crime, but gives rise to unanswered questions
The Russian-language educational system and the special
status of the Russian language were established as part of
the Soviet Union’s Russification policy. Preserving them is
a priority of Russian influence operations
12
particularly worried about the supposed
revision of Second World War
history, public meetings by Waffen SS
legionnaires, the violation of war memorials,
nationalistic youth marches
and camps, the persecution of veterans,
the equating of Nazi and Soviet
crimes and attempts to portray Nazis
and their local henchmen as heroes.
The international military-sporting
competition Erna Raid and the annual
commemoration event marking the
battles at Sinimäe in 1944 are impassively
defined as dangerous neo-Nazi
manifestations. The displacement of
the Bronze soldier statue from central
Tallinn in 2007 is also mentioned in
this context.
These angry attacks against Estonia
and, more generally, against Europe’s
approach to history, can be explained
by the increasingly consistent efforts
of the Russian authorities to revive Soviet
traditions and historiography. On
17 November 2011, the Russian Foreign
Ministry published a document
outlining Soviet foreign policy prior to
the USSR’s Great Patriotic War. It justifies
the occupation of territories that
fell within the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact’s sphere of influence and fully denies
the occupation of the Baltic states.
‘The majority of the population in the
Baltic states did not support the policies
of the ruling classes and after parliamentary
elections in these countries
in July 1940, forces loyal to the Soviet
Union came to power,’ affirms the
Russian Foreign Ministry. ‘The highest
legislative organs in the Baltic states
asked the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
to admit their countries into the USSR
and in 1940 these requests were met.’
Many Russian opinion leaders and
political figures have also started to
Attacks against Estonia and, more generally, against Europe’s
approach to history, can be explained by the increasingly
consistent efforts of the Russian authorities to revive Soviet
traditions and historiography
13
Russia’s so-called compatriots policy
actively promote this neo-Stalinist approach
to history. On 18 June 2011,
Maxim Shevchenko, the ‘Perviy Kanal’
presenter of a talk show ‘The Edge of
the Week’ shown on the Russian television
channel RTV and member of the
Public Chamber of the Russian Federation,
claimed that only 3500-4000
individuals - not thousands - were deported
from the Baltic states before the
outbreak of the Second World War. In
Shevchenko’s opinion, ‘the fact that
during the war a significant part of
the Baltic intelligentsia defected to
the Nazi side,’ demonstrates that the
methods used by the Soviet authorities
were, if not right, then at least justified.
The Soviet authorities were able
to diminish the base of Nazi minions.
According to Shevchenko, there are
many more tragic fates than the one
suffered by the Balts, ‘whom the Soviet
authorities treated like children.’
A couple of days later in Tallinn, on 20
June, the non-governmental organisation
Impressum, a so-called international
media club, organised a public
meeting ‘Russia and Estonia: what
stands in the way of us being friends?’
The special guest Shevchenko was introduced
to the audience as an erudite,
professional and patriotic journalist.
Alongside the continued justification
and tempering of Communist repressions,
Russian information-based influence
operations continue to focus
on negating the Soviet occupation
of the Baltic states. On 17 June 2011,
the information agency Regnum published
a lengthy interview with Renald
Simonyan, director of the Northern
European and Baltic Studies Center at
the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow
State Institute of International
Relations (MGIMO). In 2004, Simonyan,
who is also Director of the Russian-
Baltic Center at Russia’s Academy
of Science’s Sociological Institute,
received the Republic of Estonia’s state
decoration - the Cross of Terra Mariana
(4th Class) - for the first part of
his book ‘Russia and the Baltic States’
and for promoting academic relations
between Estonia and Russian. In the
interview, Simonyan observes that according
to international law, there was
no Soviet occupation because occupation
implies a military conflict between
two sides. Simonyan also claims that
the theory of Soviet occupation has
no substantive justification as the Soviet
Union invested generously in the
Baltic republics and in fact increased
the standard of living in this region.
In Simonyan’s opinion, the Soviet occupation
is simply an emotional view
put forth by the Baltic states.
The use of GONGOs¹ as
means of gaining influence
While Russia employs various opinion
leaders in its information-based influence
operations, it also makes active
use of government organised non-governmental
organisations - GONGOs.
Their main aim is to replace and, if
necessary, completely displace genuine
non-governmental organisations
that tend to closely scrutinise governments
and their activities. GONGOs
are trustworthy and more or less secret
collaborators to the Russian authorities.
They help implement domestic
and foreign policy and thwart attacks
by opponents.
‘World Without Nazism,’ a self-proclaimed
international legal rights
movement, has in recent years risen
to be one of the most influential GONGOs
used to defend Russian foreign
policy interests.
‘World Without Nazism’ is led by Boris
Shpigel, head of the Civil Society
Committee in the Russian Federation
Council. At the founding forum of
‘World Without Nazism’ on 22 June
2010 in Kiev, the well-know extremist
from Estonia Andrei Zarenkov
was elected to the organisation’s presidium.
The like-minded Dmitri Linter
and Maxim Reva were appointed as
board members. The Security Police
has described the earlier activities
of all three in several annual reviews
since 2005. Linter and Reva became
widely known for orchestrating, with
the help of Russian state-controlled
media, massive disorder on the streets
of Tallinn in 2007.
According to the organisers, representatives
from tens of countries
have joined ‘World Without Nazism.’
Most of these representatives, however,
belong to either the Russian diaspora
or are clearly Kremlin-minded.
Many members of the organisation’s
management board have previously
The Russian authorities use government sponsored non-governmental organisations or
GONGOs for implementing its projects
¹ Government organised non-governmental
organisation
The aims of World Without Nazism include turning it into the
most influential pro-Kremlin umbrella organisation worldwide
14
worked with the pro-Russian (socalled
antifascist) organisation ‘Future
Without Fascism.’ One of this organisation’s
instigators Josef Korens
is head of the Latvian Anti-Fascist
Committee and now also a member of
‘World Without Nazism’s’ presidium.
Other members of ‘World Without
Nazism’s’ management board include
Modest Kolerov, Editor-in-Chief of
the information agency Regnum and
former high-ranking official in the
Russian Presidential Administration,
Efraim Zuroff, director of the Simon
Wiesenthal Centre’s Jerusalem Office,
Johan Bäckman, leader of the Finnish
Anti-Fascist Committee, Tatyana
Zhdanoka, Latvian Member of the European
Parliament, Giulietto Chiesa,
Italian communist and former Member
of the European Parliament, Algirdas
Paleckis, leader of the Lithuanian
Socialist Popular Front and so on.
‘World Without Nazism’ was founded
two years ago and its new aims include
turning it into the most influential pro-
Kremlin umbrella organisation and
ensuring that it secures official partner
status with the Council of Europe. To
achieve this last aim, sub-organisations
need to first exist in different Council
of Europe member states. On 28
March 2011 a new non-governmental
organisation ‘Nazi-Free Estonia’ held
its founding meeting in Tallinn. The
event’s main organiser was Zarenkov,
leader of the Arnold Meri Public Union
Against Neo-Nazism and National
Hatred (the so-called Anti-Fascist
Committee of Estonia). Prior to the
meeting, Zarenkov changed the name
of the organisation and re-registered it
as ‘Nazi-Free Estonia,’ which fits better
with the World Without Nazism’ umbrella
organisation concept. No new
organisation was actually created.
At the end of 2011, ‘World Without
Nazism’ applied for registration as a
legal entity in Strasbourg. The step
was justified with the need to make
it more difficult for others to hinder
the activities of organisations affiliated
with ‘World Without Nazism’ in
their countries of residence. However,
it raises the inevitable question
of why would anyone want to hinder
the activities of an organisation that
stands for humane principles. ‘World
Without Nazism,’ despite its external
attributes and legal status, cannot be
considered an international organisation.
It is ‘international’ only so far as it
consolidates and coordinates Russian
compatriots policy activists in various
countries around the world. According
the organisation’s website, a total of 14
organisations from Estonia (including
Nochnoi Dozor, the Arnold Meri
Public Union Against New Nazism
and National Hatred, Molodoye Slovo,
Vmeste, the Russian portal baltija.eu,
the Russian-language television channel
NTV) have joined ‘World Without
Nazism.’ While initially this may seem
like a large number, there is actually
a lot of overlap in the membership of
these organisations. Their members
belong to a small, closely integrated
group of pro-Moscow activists and
lack a larger following in Estonia.
Leaders of ‘World Without Nazism’
constantly provide inconsistent information
on the organisation’s size
and the number of countries that
have joined the movement. Shpigel
has claimed in various statements
that representatives from 43 countries
have joined ‘World Without Nazism.’
His deputy Valery Engel, however,
confirmed in an interview on
21 October 2011 that ‘World Without
Nazism’cooperates with 28 countries,
mainly European ones, but also with
the United States of America and Israel.
‘World Without Nazism’ affiliates
have been founded in Russia, Ukraine,
the US, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Finland. As in Estonia, the affiliates
are for the most part pre-existing
re-named anti-fascist committees.
At a meeting with non-governmental
organisations in Moscow on 23 March
2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov stated that there is an acute
need for associations ready to forcefully
stand up to attempts to falsify
and re-write the history of the Second
World War. ‘Rossotrudnitchestvo’,
the agency in charge of CIS states,
compatriots living abroad and international
humanitarian cooperation,
the fund ‘Russkiy Mir’ and ‘World
Without Nazism’ were all mentioned
as positive examples in this field. The
Russian Foreign Ministry praised the
exhibition on the Great Patriotic War
organised by ‘World Without Nazism’
in January 2011 at the OSCE session
in Strasbourg. The conferences, where
Estonia and Latvia were falsely accused
of rewriting history and rehabilitating
Nazism, also received positive
mention.
On 3-4 December 2011, a seminar
‘For a World Without Nazism: social
monitoring of the resurgence of neo-
Nazi tendencies in Russia and the near
abroad’ was held at the ‘World Without
Nazism’ Moscow headquarters.
Groups of activists in the Baltic states,
Ukraine and Moldova were tasked
with monitoring the media with a
view to gathering information on neo-
Nazism, the falsification of history and
the so-called rehabilitation or honouring
of Nazi collaborators.
In the coming years, Russia plans to significantly
intensify its influence operations
with the help of GONGOs. Upon
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s
‘Rossotrudnitchestvo’, ‘Russkiy Mir’ and ‘World Without Nazism’
were mentioned by the Russian MFA as positive examples of
cooperation
15
Russia’s so-called compatriots policy
orders, A Russian Council for International
Relations and a Public Diplomacy
Support Fund have been created.
Their task is to fund projects that will
help achieve national foreign policy
goals. Both of these organisations are
classical GONGOs that have been established
and funded by the state with
a view to implementing Russian foreign
policy by ‘soft power’ means.
Influence operations and
the media
The Russian Federation carries out
many of its information-based influence
operations with the help of its
own media landscape over which it has
full control. Attention is drawn away
from domestic problems by creating
foreign enemies. Estonia continues to
be depicted as an enemy and the main
propaganda points remain unchanged
- Estonia is accused of harbouring
Nazi sympathies and discriminating
the Russian-speaking population in
Estonia. Estonia is also depicted as a
failed or useless small state.
The transition of Russian-speaking
gymnasiums to an Estonian-language
curriculum has been used an example
of alleged discrimination of the Russian-
speaking population in Estonia. It
is also repeatedly claimed that the Soviet
Union’s most successful Soviet republic
is now one of the European Union’s
most underdeveloped countries.
In 2011, the Russian media paid the
most attention to the traditional gathering
of veterans of the 20th Estonian
Grenadiers Division held on 30 July at
Sinimäe in Vaivara, Ida-Virumaa. To
the disappointment of extremists and
the Russian media, the event passed
off peacefully and without incident.
Russian Federation television channels,
radio, internet websites and the
written press nevertheless reported
on the event by stressing that the commemoration,
tacitly sanctioned by the
Estonian authorities, was a glaring
example of Nazi glorification and neo-
Nazi and xenophobia promotion.
The Russian Federation owned television
channel RT (formerly known as
Russia Today) played an important
role in the reporting on the event. RT’s
head office is in Moscow but the channel
has a studio in Washington and
offices in Miami, Los Angeles, London,
Paris, New Delhi and Tel Aviv.
RT reports international news in Russian,
English, Spanish and Arabic. RT
correspondent Sara Firth was sent to
report on the event at Sinimäe. She
produced two English-language news
reports: Estonia keeps anti-fascists
away from SS veterans’ meeting and
Estonia openly supports Nazis.
Another RT film crew visited Estonia
in November 2011. RT reporter Aleksey
Yaroshevsky visited various Estonian
government agencies and gathered
material on many timely issues.
The result was three news reports in
English: Estonia: Nazi safe haven,
Language inquisition: Estonia gets
tough on Russian speakers, Fund Fiasco:
EU poorest state rescuing richer
members.
RT is not aimed at the domestic audience
in Estonia and Russia. Its target
group is the wider international public
not familiar with the situation in
Estonia and therefore more susceptible
to manipulation. The topics that
RT chooses and the manner in which
they are presented coincide with Russia’s
usual anti-Estonian rhetoric. The
structure, presentation and tone of RT
news reports have nothing to do with
the reality on the ground in Estonia
nor with the research carried out by
RT correspondents.
When good relations are not a priority, then propaganda is used to create foreign
enemies
RT’s target group is the wider international public not familiar with the
situation in Estonia and therefore more susceptible to manipulation
16