Де Заяс про вермахт, военные преступления СССР во время 2МВ
Очередной раз перечитывая доклад Алфрeда де Заяс по поводу военных преступлений СССР во время 2МВ, вызванную выставкой в 2004м году про военные преступления Вермахта (DIE WEHRMACHT UND DAS VOELKERRECHT, Hamburg, den 27. Februar 2004 Staats- und Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft e.v., VORTRAG von Professor Dr.iur.et phil. Alfred de Zayas, Genf), обратил внимание, что де Заяс, мягко говоря выборочно цитирует даже те же материалы нюрнбергских процессов. В частности
де Заяс утверждает, что
Die Frage der Gültigkeit des Kriegsrechts zwischen der Sowjetunion und dem Deutschen Reich wurde seinerzeit viel diskutiert, zumal das Völkerrecht auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht. Vertragsverpflichtungen bestehen zwischen Vertragsparteien, weil sie beide gebunden sind. Wenn ein Staat eine Konvention ratifiziert, der andere aber nicht, so besteht zwischen diesen Staaten keine formelle Verpflichtung. Und wenn beide Staaten Vertragsverpflichtungen haben, eine Partei aber gegen Geist und Buchstaben des Vertrages verstößt, so kann die andere Partei aus diesem Grunde das Vertragswerk kündigen. [07]
...
[07] Prof. Reinhard Maurach verfaßte für die Gesamtverteidigung im OKW-Prozeß ein Gutachten über einige zwischen der UdSSR und dem Deutschen Reich obwaltende juristische Besonderheiten (Dok. 79, Fall XII, Gesamtverteidigung). Maurach legte dar, daß die Wehrmacht im Rußlandfeldzug nicht an die Haager Landkriegsordnung gebunden gewesen sei. Die UdSSR habe dieses Vertragswerk nicht unterzeichnet. Auch zählten die darin niedergelegten älteren Kriegsbräuche nicht, „weil die Sowjetunion ein ungeschriebenes Völkerrecht nicht anerkennt und überhaupt nach ihrer Grundauffassung vom Sowjetstaat, seinen Zielsetzungen und seinem Verhältnis zur übrigen Staatsgewalt als außerhalb der das Völkerrecht tragenden Ideengemeinschaft stehend zu betrachten ist.“
Зная, что де Заяс уж раз ссылался на то, что нигде кроме его онлайнересурса не находится, решил я кой-что уточнить. До библиотеки было даЛеко, посему решил я онлайн-материалы OKW-процесса (Процесс по делу военного командования Германии ), упоминаемого де Заяс, просмотреть, на немецком в свободном доступе не нашлось как и на русском, зато на английском нашлись (два тома
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-X.pdf
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf
, каждый по 60 Мегабайт)( с учетом англоязычного варианта названия:...
Dass der so genannte High Command Case im allgemeinen deutschen Sprachgebrauch als OKW-Prozess übersetzt wurde, ...).
И что же выяснилось? Де Заяс, во-первых, лишь часть проблемы отобразил. Да, Прф. Маурах дал оценку ситуации в связи с Женевскими конвенциями, ( при этом Маурах обратил внимания на несколько иной смысл Конвенции в зависимости от языка (английского, немецкого, французского) Так в
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT GENERAL DEFENSE DEFENSE EXHIBIT 79 SUPPLEMENT TO EXPERT LEGAL OPINION BY PROFESSOR REINHART MAURACH* [UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH), SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE IN CASE NO. 12),
в частности сказано,
Herewith the expression "fuer" [for], implying an absolute sense. in the German translation is replaced by the relative expression "entre" in the authoritative French text, and by the corresponding expression "between" in the English translation. Here is the result of the purely reciprocal effect of the obligation. In the case of the participation of the U.S.S.R.• in hostilities from 1939-1945. the Geneva Convention was to be applicable in relations between the German Reich on the one hand and the Western Powers on the other, but not, however, between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R.
Однако в том же документе говорится, что:
"The attitude of the U.S.S.R., however, indicates a symptomatic significance. For one can deduce therefrom that the Geneva Convention should apply only in the "limited-absolute" sense, in line with the statements under III, 1: not "for", but "between"."
Де Заяс, конечно же про "limited-absolute" sense" почему-то не упомянул в комментарии [7]. Кроме того, если только комментарий де Заяс читать, возможно предположить, что цитата "Auch zählten die darin niedergelegten älteren Kriegsbräuche nicht, „weil die Sowjetunion ein ungeschriebenes Völkerrecht nicht anerkennt und überhaupt nach ihrer Grundauffassung vom Sowjetstaat, seinen Zielsetzungen und seinem Verhältnis zur übrigen Staatsgewalt als außerhalb der das Völkerrecht tragenden Ideengemeinschaft stehend zu betrachten ist.“"
Проф. Маураху принадлежит, хотя это не так. Данная цитата содержится в материалах Защиты на Н.П. а именно в EXTRACTS FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT VON ROQUES,
следует заметить, что в данных "фрагментах" снова таки цитируется Маурах с его тезисом о возможности применения Женевских конвенций в ограниченно-адаптированном варианте <к СССР>
""a. The methods of warfare employed by the states bound by the conventions may in principle be adapted to those employed by the state which stands outside international law. There is, however, a definite limit which must not be overstepped. This limit is set off by the so-called elementary rights of the nonparticipants and innocent parties (soldiers, prisoners, wounded, and the civilian population). These rights must not be violated."
Все это упускает де Заяс. Он упусакет и дальнейший анализ проблематики (см The Hague and Geneva Conventions-_________________________ 532 <стр.>)
Да и про возможность осуждения военных нацистских преступников, хотя СССР не подписал Женевскую конвенцию 1929 года, умалчивает Де Заяс. Хотя тот же Райнхарт Маурах (Die Kriegsverbecherprozesse gegen deutsche Gefangene in der Sowjetunion.) и Мартин Ланг (Stalin's Strafjustiz gegen deutsche Soldaten. Die Massenprozesse gegen deutsche Kriegsgefangene in den Jahren 1949 und 1950 in historischer Sicht) подобное утверждали (цитировано из Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945: A Critical Assessment By Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär)
Ниже: выдержки из PDFов по High Command Case-процессу
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT GENERAL DEFENSE DEFENSE EXHIBIT 79
SUPPLEMENT TO EXPERT LEGAL OPINION BY PROFESSOR REINHART
MAURACH* [UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH), SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF
THE DEFENSE IN CASE NO. 12
I
In my legal opmlOn, which· was submitted to the defense in May 1948, in Case No. 12, I held the opinion that the provisions
• Professor Maurach. who before World War II was instructor (Dozent) at Koenigsberg University, is the author, among other works, of the following: HAnfaenge eines Voelkischen Schutzes im Alt-russischen Judenstrafrecht" ("Beginnings of Racial Protection in the Old [Czarist] Russian Criminal Law concerning Jews") in: Journal of the Academy for German Law. 1940. pp. 267-279; "Die Siedlungszonengesetzgebung des Russischen Reiches und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Ostjudenproblem" ("Legislation concerning Zonal Settlement in the Russian Empire, and its Significance for Eastern Jewry"), in the symposium uJudenviertel Europas" ("The Jewish Quarter of Europe">' edited by H. Hinkel, Essen, 1939; "Russische Judenpolitik" ("Russian Policies concerning Jews") Berlin, 1939~ 44
of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929, were binding
upon every signatory power regardless whether its enemy in war
had become a party to the convention or not.
On the other hand, the defense maintains that the provisions of
this convention do not apply to a signatory power in cases in
which it has been involved in war with a country not a party to
the convention. In substantiation of this opinion the defense
submitted material to me, following the completion of my legal
opinion, which was unknown to me at the time I wrote my opinion.
This material is of such decisive importance that it makes imperative
a re-examination of the legal questions as outlined in paragraph
1.
II
In drawing up my legal opinion, I proceeded less from the text of the convention, which was capable of misinterpretation at that time, than from the origin of the agreement. The tendency of the Geneva Convention aimed at obviating the disadvantages inherent in the all-participation clause upon which the Hague Convention of 1899-1907 was based. From the very outset it aimed at greater universality. The contractual, and hence the relative, point of view was supposed to step aside in favor of a humanitarian, and hence an absolute point of view. This explains the abolition of the all-participation clause of Article 2 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and its replacement by Article 82, paragraph 2 of the Convention of 1929. This conception was also clearly expressed
in the German translation of the agreement, which reads as follows:
"If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the conventions,
their provisions shall, nevertheless, be binding for the belligerents who are parties thereto."
This embodies-by reason of the prevalence of the efforts in
Geneva of those having decisive authority-an absolute obligation
for every party to the convention. Reasons of humanity demand
that prisoners of war, in other words the victims of war, be treated
in accordance with the convention, even if the native country of
these prisoners of war has not been a party to the Geneva Convention.
No one-sided or intolerable imposition arose for the signatory
.power by virtue of this fact. For apart from the fact that it was .obliged to act not on the basis of the relative maxim do ut des, but in accordance with the absolute principles of humanity, the Geneva Convention could proceed from the fact, as· stated in the legal opinion, that the country which had not become a signatory to the convention would also observe the customary legal regula45
tions of intemational law, so that in principle the obligations of
the two parties were thus offset. The Geneva Convention did not
anticipate a case where a country which denied the principles of
international law would become a belligerent.
This interpretation-namely, an absolute and not only a relative
obligation of the convention-arises from events which led to its
origin, and, in particular, its antithesis to. the Hague Convention.
My legal opinion was also based on this interpretation.
III
However, it must be admitted that this "historic interpretation",
which was of decisive importance in drawing my conclusions,
cannot simply claim validity, and that it can, with justification,
be opposed with divergent opinions. This point must now be discussed.
1. In formulating the text of the agreement the principle of absolute obligation was not clearly and unequivocally expressed. One can even infer the principle of limited-absolute obligation, in other words: through the participation in hostilities of nonsignatory
powers, the agreement per se should not be affected, but rather it should have further application (absolute obligation) ; however, its provisions should only be applicable between those belligerent which were parties to the convention (limitation of the principle of absolute obligation). This interpretation follows from the French (authentic) text of Article 82, paragraph 2:
"Au cas, ou, en temps de guerre, un des belligerants ne serait pas partie ala convention, ses dispositions. demeureront neanmoins
obligatoires entre les belligerants qui y participent".
And likewise the English "Manual of Military Law" (though not an authentic version of the agreement, but in any event of material
importance for the interpretation) adopts the authentic version
in the verbatim translation in Chapter XIV (Amendments, No. 12, sec. 6, par. 3) :
"If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the conventions,
their provisions shall, nevertheless. be binding as between
all the belligerents who are parties thereto".
Herewith the expression "fuer" [for], implying an absolute sense. in the German translation is replaced by the relative expression
"entre" in the authoritative French text, and by the corresponding expression "between" in the English translation. Here is the result of the purely reciprocal effect of the obligation. In the case of the participation of the U.S.S.R.• in hostilities from 1939-1945. the Geneva Convention was to be applicable in relations
between the German Reich on the one hand and the Western
46
Powers on the other, but not, however, between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R.
2. Of even greater importance are the arguments which the defense submits concerning the negotiations between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R., with respect to the application of the Geneva Convention. The defense submits the following:
"When Germany, at the outbreak of war, attempted to initiate negotiations concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, the U.S.S.R., is supposed to have stated [habe ***erklaert] that it att.ached no importance to the treatment of its prisoners in accordance
with the principles of the convention, since they regarded
these prisoners as traitors, and in addition did not wish to impose any restrictions upon itself with respect to the treatment
of German prisoners of war."
The defense will presumably submit the proof of this statement to the Court. If one assumes that this will be proved, this constitutes
further important substantiation for this interpretation in line with the legal opinion of the defense. The question should not be examined here whether the homeland's renunciation of the application of the convention is admissible and operative (the question would have to be answered in the negative in substantiating
the above-mentioned absolute or humanitarian standards). The attitude of the U.S.S.R., however, indicates a symptomatic significance. For one can deduce therefrom that the Geneva Convention
should apply only in the "limited-absolute" sense, in line with the statements under III, 1: not "for", but "between".
IV
To sum up, the arguments of the defense appear to me to be of such significance that they justify an opinion in opposition to mine.
For the sake of completeness, however, may I point out that in the final analysis my legal opinion coincides with that of the defense. For, whereas the defense has rejected the formal legal validity of the Geneva Convention as applied to the GermanRussian
war, I held the view in my legal opinion that the agreement,
in accordance with Article 82, paragraph 2, binds the enemy
.of a nonsignatory power also as far as the formal wording of the agreement is concerned; but that, however, is only the case in the event of a war between two countries which adhere to the principles
of international law. If one of the partners, consistent with . its politics and dynamics, remains outside the community observing
international law, then the Geneva provisions, for material
47
reasons, are not applicable. In this respect, reference is made to
the statements in the legal opinion under IV.
Diessen/Ammersee, 22 July 1948
Signed: MAURACH
(Prof. Dr. Reinhart Maurach)
..................................
F.
Extracts from Closing Briefs of the Defense________________ 398
...
5.
Defendant von Roques 416
5. EXTRACTS FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT VON ROQUES
******
1. The extent of the executive power in the Eastern Campaign
...............................
The Hague Rules of Land Warfare of 1907, as was explained to the Tribunal by Professor Dr. Maurach's (General Defense 79, General Defense Ex. 79) expert opinion, do not apply to the Russian
area. Soviet Russia had not joined the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. As a matter of fact the provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare could not claim applicability in Russia, sinCe the U.8. S. R. herself had placed herself outside the community of nations observing international law. This being the case, in Russia only that minimum of unwritten rights was applicable which every civilian population of an occupied country has always had to be accorded by the occupying power throughout the ages.
But even under the provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, the population of an occupied country may demand of the occupying power only the observance of that legal state which it has been accorded under its own national laws. Article 43 of the Annex to the Convention on the Application of the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare requires the occupying party to make all provisions for the restoration and maintenance of public order and public life, unless there exists an unsurmountable obstacle, under observance of the national law.
In other words, no national of an occupied country may claim better treatment under an occupying power, than he enjoyed under his national government prior to the occupation. Accordingly .in going into the question whether measures taken by the German occupying power in Russia constituted violations of international
431
law, it will be of decisive importance to ascertain whether or not the legal state under the occupation implied a considerable deterioration
compared with the legal state prior to the occupation. In his opinion, Professor Maurach gave the following standard formulation
of this legal principle (General Defense 79, General Defense
Ex. 79) :
"In determining the limits of permissible conduct in a war against a state which stands outside the community of nations observing international law, the following two points must be taken into consideration:
"a. The methods of warfare employed by the states bound by the conventions may in principle be adapted to those employed by the state which stands outside international law. There is, however, a definite limit which must not be overstepped. This limit is set off by the so-called elementary rights of the nonparticipants
and innocent parties (soldiers, prisoners, wounded, and the civilian population). These rights must not be violated.
The adaptation of the methods of warfare thus does not mean the admissibility of methods based solely on wartime expediency ** *.
"b. The nature of the so-called elementary rights is not determined
in accordance with the law of the state accused of violating
these rights, nor in accordance with the regulations of the war conventions, but it is determined by the domestic (national) law of the state' to which the categories of persons in question belong. In other words, whether or not the employment of prisoners
of war for munitions production, the conscription of civilians for compulsory labor, etc., is permissible, is determined in such a case only by the domestic law of the Soviet Union II< II< •
The occupying state has neither the occasion nor the legal possibility
to impose its own legal system upon the population of the occupied enemy territory. The population continues in principle to be governed by its own national law. That is a generally recognized tenet of international law, which is also stressed in the occupation regulations of the Rules for Land Warfare. ***
"The occupation regime may not cause the population being given more rights through the occupation than it possessed hitherto. All it [the population] can demand is that its position does not deteriorate essentially in comparison with conditions under the previous sovereignty."
On these principles it must be examined and decided whether the basic orders, such as they were issued for the occupied Russian
territory, brought about a considerable deterioration in the
432
position of the civilian population as compared with that under the law of its own national government. In posing this question I have consciously disregarded the subjective aspect.
In my opinion, these two legal points of view will have to be given precedence, if a correct decision in regard to the conduct of the indicted military commanders and, in particular, of my client is to be reached.
...
The Hague and Geneva Conventions-_________________________ 532
де Заяс утверждает, что
Die Frage der Gültigkeit des Kriegsrechts zwischen der Sowjetunion und dem Deutschen Reich wurde seinerzeit viel diskutiert, zumal das Völkerrecht auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht. Vertragsverpflichtungen bestehen zwischen Vertragsparteien, weil sie beide gebunden sind. Wenn ein Staat eine Konvention ratifiziert, der andere aber nicht, so besteht zwischen diesen Staaten keine formelle Verpflichtung. Und wenn beide Staaten Vertragsverpflichtungen haben, eine Partei aber gegen Geist und Buchstaben des Vertrages verstößt, so kann die andere Partei aus diesem Grunde das Vertragswerk kündigen. [07]
...
[07] Prof. Reinhard Maurach verfaßte für die Gesamtverteidigung im OKW-Prozeß ein Gutachten über einige zwischen der UdSSR und dem Deutschen Reich obwaltende juristische Besonderheiten (Dok. 79, Fall XII, Gesamtverteidigung). Maurach legte dar, daß die Wehrmacht im Rußlandfeldzug nicht an die Haager Landkriegsordnung gebunden gewesen sei. Die UdSSR habe dieses Vertragswerk nicht unterzeichnet. Auch zählten die darin niedergelegten älteren Kriegsbräuche nicht, „weil die Sowjetunion ein ungeschriebenes Völkerrecht nicht anerkennt und überhaupt nach ihrer Grundauffassung vom Sowjetstaat, seinen Zielsetzungen und seinem Verhältnis zur übrigen Staatsgewalt als außerhalb der das Völkerrecht tragenden Ideengemeinschaft stehend zu betrachten ist.“
Зная, что де Заяс уж раз ссылался на то, что нигде кроме его онлайнересурса не находится, решил я кой-что уточнить. До библиотеки было даЛеко, посему решил я онлайн-материалы OKW-процесса (Процесс по делу военного командования Германии ), упоминаемого де Заяс, просмотреть, на немецком в свободном доступе не нашлось как и на русском, зато на английском нашлись (два тома
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-X.pdf
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf
, каждый по 60 Мегабайт)( с учетом англоязычного варианта названия:...
Dass der so genannte High Command Case im allgemeinen deutschen Sprachgebrauch als OKW-Prozess übersetzt wurde, ...).
И что же выяснилось? Де Заяс, во-первых, лишь часть проблемы отобразил. Да, Прф. Маурах дал оценку ситуации в связи с Женевскими конвенциями, ( при этом Маурах обратил внимания на несколько иной смысл Конвенции в зависимости от языка (английского, немецкого, французского) Так в
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT GENERAL DEFENSE DEFENSE EXHIBIT 79 SUPPLEMENT TO EXPERT LEGAL OPINION BY PROFESSOR REINHART MAURACH* [UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH), SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE IN CASE NO. 12),
в частности сказано,
Herewith the expression "fuer" [for], implying an absolute sense. in the German translation is replaced by the relative expression "entre" in the authoritative French text, and by the corresponding expression "between" in the English translation. Here is the result of the purely reciprocal effect of the obligation. In the case of the participation of the U.S.S.R.• in hostilities from 1939-1945. the Geneva Convention was to be applicable in relations between the German Reich on the one hand and the Western Powers on the other, but not, however, between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R.
Однако в том же документе говорится, что:
"The attitude of the U.S.S.R., however, indicates a symptomatic significance. For one can deduce therefrom that the Geneva Convention should apply only in the "limited-absolute" sense, in line with the statements under III, 1: not "for", but "between"."
Де Заяс, конечно же про "limited-absolute" sense" почему-то не упомянул в комментарии [7]. Кроме того, если только комментарий де Заяс читать, возможно предположить, что цитата "Auch zählten die darin niedergelegten älteren Kriegsbräuche nicht, „weil die Sowjetunion ein ungeschriebenes Völkerrecht nicht anerkennt und überhaupt nach ihrer Grundauffassung vom Sowjetstaat, seinen Zielsetzungen und seinem Verhältnis zur übrigen Staatsgewalt als außerhalb der das Völkerrecht tragenden Ideengemeinschaft stehend zu betrachten ist.“"
Проф. Маураху принадлежит, хотя это не так. Данная цитата содержится в материалах Защиты на Н.П. а именно в EXTRACTS FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT VON ROQUES,
следует заметить, что в данных "фрагментах" снова таки цитируется Маурах с его тезисом о возможности применения Женевских конвенций в ограниченно-адаптированном варианте <к СССР>
""a. The methods of warfare employed by the states bound by the conventions may in principle be adapted to those employed by the state which stands outside international law. There is, however, a definite limit which must not be overstepped. This limit is set off by the so-called elementary rights of the nonparticipants and innocent parties (soldiers, prisoners, wounded, and the civilian population). These rights must not be violated."
Все это упускает де Заяс. Он упусакет и дальнейший анализ проблематики (см The Hague and Geneva Conventions-_________________________ 532 <стр.>)
Да и про возможность осуждения военных нацистских преступников, хотя СССР не подписал Женевскую конвенцию 1929 года, умалчивает Де Заяс. Хотя тот же Райнхарт Маурах (Die Kriegsverbecherprozesse gegen deutsche Gefangene in der Sowjetunion.) и Мартин Ланг (Stalin's Strafjustiz gegen deutsche Soldaten. Die Massenprozesse gegen deutsche Kriegsgefangene in den Jahren 1949 und 1950 in historischer Sicht) подобное утверждали (цитировано из Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945: A Critical Assessment By Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär)
Ниже: выдержки из PDFов по High Command Case-процессу
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT GENERAL DEFENSE DEFENSE EXHIBIT 79
SUPPLEMENT TO EXPERT LEGAL OPINION BY PROFESSOR REINHART
MAURACH* [UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH), SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF
THE DEFENSE IN CASE NO. 12
I
In my legal opmlOn, which· was submitted to the defense in May 1948, in Case No. 12, I held the opinion that the provisions
• Professor Maurach. who before World War II was instructor (Dozent) at Koenigsberg University, is the author, among other works, of the following: HAnfaenge eines Voelkischen Schutzes im Alt-russischen Judenstrafrecht" ("Beginnings of Racial Protection in the Old [Czarist] Russian Criminal Law concerning Jews") in: Journal of the Academy for German Law. 1940. pp. 267-279; "Die Siedlungszonengesetzgebung des Russischen Reiches und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Ostjudenproblem" ("Legislation concerning Zonal Settlement in the Russian Empire, and its Significance for Eastern Jewry"), in the symposium uJudenviertel Europas" ("The Jewish Quarter of Europe">' edited by H. Hinkel, Essen, 1939; "Russische Judenpolitik" ("Russian Policies concerning Jews") Berlin, 1939~ 44
of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929, were binding
upon every signatory power regardless whether its enemy in war
had become a party to the convention or not.
On the other hand, the defense maintains that the provisions of
this convention do not apply to a signatory power in cases in
which it has been involved in war with a country not a party to
the convention. In substantiation of this opinion the defense
submitted material to me, following the completion of my legal
opinion, which was unknown to me at the time I wrote my opinion.
This material is of such decisive importance that it makes imperative
a re-examination of the legal questions as outlined in paragraph
1.
II
In drawing up my legal opinion, I proceeded less from the text of the convention, which was capable of misinterpretation at that time, than from the origin of the agreement. The tendency of the Geneva Convention aimed at obviating the disadvantages inherent in the all-participation clause upon which the Hague Convention of 1899-1907 was based. From the very outset it aimed at greater universality. The contractual, and hence the relative, point of view was supposed to step aside in favor of a humanitarian, and hence an absolute point of view. This explains the abolition of the all-participation clause of Article 2 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and its replacement by Article 82, paragraph 2 of the Convention of 1929. This conception was also clearly expressed
in the German translation of the agreement, which reads as follows:
"If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the conventions,
their provisions shall, nevertheless, be binding for the belligerents who are parties thereto."
This embodies-by reason of the prevalence of the efforts in
Geneva of those having decisive authority-an absolute obligation
for every party to the convention. Reasons of humanity demand
that prisoners of war, in other words the victims of war, be treated
in accordance with the convention, even if the native country of
these prisoners of war has not been a party to the Geneva Convention.
No one-sided or intolerable imposition arose for the signatory
.power by virtue of this fact. For apart from the fact that it was .obliged to act not on the basis of the relative maxim do ut des, but in accordance with the absolute principles of humanity, the Geneva Convention could proceed from the fact, as· stated in the legal opinion, that the country which had not become a signatory to the convention would also observe the customary legal regula45
tions of intemational law, so that in principle the obligations of
the two parties were thus offset. The Geneva Convention did not
anticipate a case where a country which denied the principles of
international law would become a belligerent.
This interpretation-namely, an absolute and not only a relative
obligation of the convention-arises from events which led to its
origin, and, in particular, its antithesis to. the Hague Convention.
My legal opinion was also based on this interpretation.
III
However, it must be admitted that this "historic interpretation",
which was of decisive importance in drawing my conclusions,
cannot simply claim validity, and that it can, with justification,
be opposed with divergent opinions. This point must now be discussed.
1. In formulating the text of the agreement the principle of absolute obligation was not clearly and unequivocally expressed. One can even infer the principle of limited-absolute obligation, in other words: through the participation in hostilities of nonsignatory
powers, the agreement per se should not be affected, but rather it should have further application (absolute obligation) ; however, its provisions should only be applicable between those belligerent which were parties to the convention (limitation of the principle of absolute obligation). This interpretation follows from the French (authentic) text of Article 82, paragraph 2:
"Au cas, ou, en temps de guerre, un des belligerants ne serait pas partie ala convention, ses dispositions. demeureront neanmoins
obligatoires entre les belligerants qui y participent".
And likewise the English "Manual of Military Law" (though not an authentic version of the agreement, but in any event of material
importance for the interpretation) adopts the authentic version
in the verbatim translation in Chapter XIV (Amendments, No. 12, sec. 6, par. 3) :
"If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the conventions,
their provisions shall, nevertheless. be binding as between
all the belligerents who are parties thereto".
Herewith the expression "fuer" [for], implying an absolute sense. in the German translation is replaced by the relative expression
"entre" in the authoritative French text, and by the corresponding expression "between" in the English translation. Here is the result of the purely reciprocal effect of the obligation. In the case of the participation of the U.S.S.R.• in hostilities from 1939-1945. the Geneva Convention was to be applicable in relations
between the German Reich on the one hand and the Western
46
Powers on the other, but not, however, between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R.
2. Of even greater importance are the arguments which the defense submits concerning the negotiations between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R., with respect to the application of the Geneva Convention. The defense submits the following:
"When Germany, at the outbreak of war, attempted to initiate negotiations concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, the U.S.S.R., is supposed to have stated [habe ***erklaert] that it att.ached no importance to the treatment of its prisoners in accordance
with the principles of the convention, since they regarded
these prisoners as traitors, and in addition did not wish to impose any restrictions upon itself with respect to the treatment
of German prisoners of war."
The defense will presumably submit the proof of this statement to the Court. If one assumes that this will be proved, this constitutes
further important substantiation for this interpretation in line with the legal opinion of the defense. The question should not be examined here whether the homeland's renunciation of the application of the convention is admissible and operative (the question would have to be answered in the negative in substantiating
the above-mentioned absolute or humanitarian standards). The attitude of the U.S.S.R., however, indicates a symptomatic significance. For one can deduce therefrom that the Geneva Convention
should apply only in the "limited-absolute" sense, in line with the statements under III, 1: not "for", but "between".
IV
To sum up, the arguments of the defense appear to me to be of such significance that they justify an opinion in opposition to mine.
For the sake of completeness, however, may I point out that in the final analysis my legal opinion coincides with that of the defense. For, whereas the defense has rejected the formal legal validity of the Geneva Convention as applied to the GermanRussian
war, I held the view in my legal opinion that the agreement,
in accordance with Article 82, paragraph 2, binds the enemy
.of a nonsignatory power also as far as the formal wording of the agreement is concerned; but that, however, is only the case in the event of a war between two countries which adhere to the principles
of international law. If one of the partners, consistent with . its politics and dynamics, remains outside the community observing
international law, then the Geneva provisions, for material
47
reasons, are not applicable. In this respect, reference is made to
the statements in the legal opinion under IV.
Diessen/Ammersee, 22 July 1948
Signed: MAURACH
(Prof. Dr. Reinhart Maurach)
..................................
F.
Extracts from Closing Briefs of the Defense________________ 398
...
5.
Defendant von Roques 416
5. EXTRACTS FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT VON ROQUES
******
1. The extent of the executive power in the Eastern Campaign
...............................
The Hague Rules of Land Warfare of 1907, as was explained to the Tribunal by Professor Dr. Maurach's (General Defense 79, General Defense Ex. 79) expert opinion, do not apply to the Russian
area. Soviet Russia had not joined the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. As a matter of fact the provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare could not claim applicability in Russia, sinCe the U.8. S. R. herself had placed herself outside the community of nations observing international law. This being the case, in Russia only that minimum of unwritten rights was applicable which every civilian population of an occupied country has always had to be accorded by the occupying power throughout the ages.
But even under the provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, the population of an occupied country may demand of the occupying power only the observance of that legal state which it has been accorded under its own national laws. Article 43 of the Annex to the Convention on the Application of the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare requires the occupying party to make all provisions for the restoration and maintenance of public order and public life, unless there exists an unsurmountable obstacle, under observance of the national law.
In other words, no national of an occupied country may claim better treatment under an occupying power, than he enjoyed under his national government prior to the occupation. Accordingly .in going into the question whether measures taken by the German occupying power in Russia constituted violations of international
431
law, it will be of decisive importance to ascertain whether or not the legal state under the occupation implied a considerable deterioration
compared with the legal state prior to the occupation. In his opinion, Professor Maurach gave the following standard formulation
of this legal principle (General Defense 79, General Defense
Ex. 79) :
"In determining the limits of permissible conduct in a war against a state which stands outside the community of nations observing international law, the following two points must be taken into consideration:
"a. The methods of warfare employed by the states bound by the conventions may in principle be adapted to those employed by the state which stands outside international law. There is, however, a definite limit which must not be overstepped. This limit is set off by the so-called elementary rights of the nonparticipants
and innocent parties (soldiers, prisoners, wounded, and the civilian population). These rights must not be violated.
The adaptation of the methods of warfare thus does not mean the admissibility of methods based solely on wartime expediency ** *.
"b. The nature of the so-called elementary rights is not determined
in accordance with the law of the state accused of violating
these rights, nor in accordance with the regulations of the war conventions, but it is determined by the domestic (national) law of the state' to which the categories of persons in question belong. In other words, whether or not the employment of prisoners
of war for munitions production, the conscription of civilians for compulsory labor, etc., is permissible, is determined in such a case only by the domestic law of the Soviet Union II< II< •
The occupying state has neither the occasion nor the legal possibility
to impose its own legal system upon the population of the occupied enemy territory. The population continues in principle to be governed by its own national law. That is a generally recognized tenet of international law, which is also stressed in the occupation regulations of the Rules for Land Warfare. ***
"The occupation regime may not cause the population being given more rights through the occupation than it possessed hitherto. All it [the population] can demand is that its position does not deteriorate essentially in comparison with conditions under the previous sovereignty."
On these principles it must be examined and decided whether the basic orders, such as they were issued for the occupied Russian
territory, brought about a considerable deterioration in the
432
position of the civilian population as compared with that under the law of its own national government. In posing this question I have consciously disregarded the subjective aspect.
In my opinion, these two legal points of view will have to be given precedence, if a correct decision in regard to the conduct of the indicted military commanders and, in particular, of my client is to be reached.
...
The Hague and Geneva Conventions-_________________________ 532