Me, Mine
To My Invisible Audience,
Once again the road I walk reverses, once again the journey returns to a beginning - I return to a topic I have discussed before, the topic of suicide. The long hiatus between my previous musing and the current delusion is regrettable, yet necessary - my intellect is ill-suited for the rigors of any subject that is even remotely philosophical in it's grounding. In a sense, I feel quite like a fish out of water - so very uncomfortable outside my own element, yet forced by circumstances to evolve and adapt to my situation. After all, I am not being very presumptuous when I describe this self-examination as difficult - while what I do now may seem easy to some, it is always a dark and lonely path for the traveller who journeys without knowing his final destination. Where will this path of inquiry take me? I can honestly say that I do not know.
Suicide is an interesting topic - it seems that, while society at large seems to have trouble coming to terms with the morality of the act, so many philosophers deem it as so self-evidently immoral that it is almost universally condemned. Of course, there are always madmen, such as the insane emulator of Peregrinos mentioned by Camus, but such people can hardly be described as the mainstream of modern philosophy. Over the course of my wanderings, I have come across a rather interesting argument against suicide that seems to crop up from time to time - the argument that, since the self is merely the steward of the body God gave to us, the self has no right to commit suicide. Being the philosophical bumpkin that I am, I can always appreciate a good argument - it's just that I also have a tendency to knock on the wood, just to see if the foundation will collapse. After all, if everything stood forever, the lack of change would be very boring for a person like me.
I begin by formulating the opposing argument and, of course, hoping that I will not commit the straw-man fallacy - I doubt that it would happen, but one can never be sure. From what I have read, the argument seems to be as follows: "The human body and the human life belongs to God - during the duration of it's existence on Earth, the care and responsibility of the body is in the trusteeship of the self. To damage or harm the body would be damaging or harming something that does not belong to us. Therefore, suicide is immoral." Of course, there are a myriad of different approaches that may be used to examine this argument - an attempt to disprove the existence God is an obvious approach, yet this philosophical problem seems to have been argued since the beginning of time and I think that the likelihood of this feeble little mind contributing anything significant is ridiculously slim. An examination of contract law also seems to be a valid alternative, yet I am at loathe to engage this problem from such an angle - I do not think myself competent at examining the intricacies of legal processes, nor do I wish to risk making the mistake of seeing modern contract law as applicable to all times and situations.
How then may I proceed to analyze this problem? An obvious source of inspiration would be the philosophical realm of metaphysics, yet I feel much trepidation at the thought of delving into the arcane systems that seem to constitute the foundations of philosophy - if I claim to be no philosopher, I most certainly do not claim to be very proficient in metaphysics! Of course, it has often been said that fools rush in where angels fear to tread - as a fool, I presume that this is true for me as well, for I charge headlong into the realm of metaphysics where I do not belong.
Amidst the cobwebbed depths of my memories, I dimly recall the existence of a distinction between the body and the mind. Where the body is the physical representative of the human being, the mind is the cognitive aspects of the human being - our capacity for sense-perception and abstract thinking. What I find problematic is the argument that, because one may conceive of the mind and the body separately, they must therefore be separate. Granted, it is perfectly possible to conceive of a body without the mind - one need only enter a hospital to encounter the tragedy of a physical shell devoid of mind. However, I have trouble accepting the notion that the mind can exist without the body.
I have read enough about the world at large to know that damage to the body could impair the functioning of the mind - the medical cases involving brain damage should be reasonable proof that damage to the physical organ known as the brain would impede the functioning of the mind. Similarly, if an aspect of the mind is its ability for sense-perception, then the only logical conclusion is an affirmation of the body's importance to the proper functioning of the mind - there can be no sense-perception if there was no organ to do the sensing. Logically then, if the physical organ known as the brain either did not exist or was lifeless, there cannot be that particular, associated mind in existence. This (admittedly less-than-philosophical) examination of mine points me to two conclusions: One, it is conceivable to imagine a body without a mind, and, two, it is inconceivable to imagine a mind without the body.
However, if I accept my conclusions as valid, I am faced with a conundrum - if the mind requires the body in order to exist, how then can God give the mind trusteeship over the body? To make such an argument, one would have to argue that the mind may exist prior to the contingent condition necessary for its existence - to a humble mind like mind, such an argument would be so very strange and perplexing that I would thus be forced to end my argument right there. After all, how would my puny mind possibly comprehend an argument that posits the existence of an effect before its cause?
Perhaps my opponent would point to a sacred text, hollering - "All things are possible for God! If he could create the universe out of nothing, then surely he could create a puny mind prior to the creation of its body!" Well, when faced with such an argument, I am not quite sure how I should respond, for I would be completely confused - granted, if such a feat was possible, it would certainly have to be a divine miracle, and a mind would most certainly be created through the divine power. However, my confusion then comes from another question - a mind has been created, but I don't understand how that particular mind could be me.
It is certainly plausible that my lack of philosophical training leads me astray here, but I would certainly find it hard to accept any argument that tries to define me without any regard of my history and past experiences. Every incident that had happened to me in the past, every person that I had ever met, every piece of knowledge I have ever read or assimilated - all these historical factors contribute to create the composite individual known as me. Could there exist a me if my past was different? Most certainly! But that me would not be this current me typing in front of his computer - that particular me differs from this current me in the same way that the me of the past was different from the me of the present, and the me of the future will be different from the me of the present.
However, how can there be a history without the existence of a physical body? History is, by definition, a temporal process - it most certainly cannot be suspended in the ether of eternity. Nor can my experiences truly be my own if my physical body does not exist - the plethora of incidents that make up the basis of my experiences all require the application of senses as well as the interaction between my physical self and other physical beings. In a way, what I call experience can also be defined as knowledge of the past - it is the necessary pre-requisite that allows the mind to utilize its capability for abstraction-based thinking. Here, I find it necessary to emphasize the distinction between the mind's ability to engage in abstraction-based thinking, which is a characteristic innate to its definition, and that which is necessary for the mind to utilize this ability. Although the mind has the capability for abstraction-based thinking, it cannot do so if there is no knowledge for it to abstract. It is not irrational for me to suggest then that the body is absolutely necessary to the process of abstraction-based thinking, for the existence of a body is necessary in the procurement of knowledge and experience.
At this point, we seem to be back where we started - in order for either the mind or for me to exist, my body must necessarily exist. If the existence of my mind or my individuality is contingent upon the existence of my body, then it must necessarily exist prior to my mind or my individuality. However, if the body had existed prior to the mind or to the individuality, how then can something that does not exist be given anything? It seems to me that, since such a statement cannot be logically true, it is simply quite impossible for the mind to have been entrusted with the care of the body, and if the mind was not entrusted with the care of something that belongs to another, then suicide cannot possibly be a sin in that particular aspect, for the claimed obligation simply does not actually exist.
Of course, I suppose it is possible for someone to make the claim that, if there was a God and He was inclined to do so, we would not need our bodies in order to have a history - all the memories and experiences can simply be bequeathed by God to the mind in question. However, I would find such a notion extremely disturbing - it is one thing to argue that suffering and pain exists in the world because God does not wish to impede our capacity of free will, but it is a very different thing entirely to argue that God would torture us with false memories of non-existent events and suffering in a way that we would believe as true. Such a strange notion would most certainly run contrary to the claim that God is a benevolent deity, He certainly cannot be so if he actively engages in the mental torture of his creations! On a similar note, if all our memories are false, then I doubt if I can be held culpable for any heinous crime I commit - while we have free will, our ability to decide and utilize it is based on our experiences; if my experiences are false and never happened, then the creature that committed the active act of inserting false memories should be punished rather than my reactive act that was based upon the lies that I had been told.
I guess that this rambling discourse must end at some point in time, the interesting little argument that I had come across seems to have lost its luster - I can only assume that it no longer interests me. On this note, I take my bow while wishing you adieu!
Most Humbly,
Kahlyban.
Once again the road I walk reverses, once again the journey returns to a beginning - I return to a topic I have discussed before, the topic of suicide. The long hiatus between my previous musing and the current delusion is regrettable, yet necessary - my intellect is ill-suited for the rigors of any subject that is even remotely philosophical in it's grounding. In a sense, I feel quite like a fish out of water - so very uncomfortable outside my own element, yet forced by circumstances to evolve and adapt to my situation. After all, I am not being very presumptuous when I describe this self-examination as difficult - while what I do now may seem easy to some, it is always a dark and lonely path for the traveller who journeys without knowing his final destination. Where will this path of inquiry take me? I can honestly say that I do not know.
Suicide is an interesting topic - it seems that, while society at large seems to have trouble coming to terms with the morality of the act, so many philosophers deem it as so self-evidently immoral that it is almost universally condemned. Of course, there are always madmen, such as the insane emulator of Peregrinos mentioned by Camus, but such people can hardly be described as the mainstream of modern philosophy. Over the course of my wanderings, I have come across a rather interesting argument against suicide that seems to crop up from time to time - the argument that, since the self is merely the steward of the body God gave to us, the self has no right to commit suicide. Being the philosophical bumpkin that I am, I can always appreciate a good argument - it's just that I also have a tendency to knock on the wood, just to see if the foundation will collapse. After all, if everything stood forever, the lack of change would be very boring for a person like me.
I begin by formulating the opposing argument and, of course, hoping that I will not commit the straw-man fallacy - I doubt that it would happen, but one can never be sure. From what I have read, the argument seems to be as follows: "The human body and the human life belongs to God - during the duration of it's existence on Earth, the care and responsibility of the body is in the trusteeship of the self. To damage or harm the body would be damaging or harming something that does not belong to us. Therefore, suicide is immoral." Of course, there are a myriad of different approaches that may be used to examine this argument - an attempt to disprove the existence God is an obvious approach, yet this philosophical problem seems to have been argued since the beginning of time and I think that the likelihood of this feeble little mind contributing anything significant is ridiculously slim. An examination of contract law also seems to be a valid alternative, yet I am at loathe to engage this problem from such an angle - I do not think myself competent at examining the intricacies of legal processes, nor do I wish to risk making the mistake of seeing modern contract law as applicable to all times and situations.
How then may I proceed to analyze this problem? An obvious source of inspiration would be the philosophical realm of metaphysics, yet I feel much trepidation at the thought of delving into the arcane systems that seem to constitute the foundations of philosophy - if I claim to be no philosopher, I most certainly do not claim to be very proficient in metaphysics! Of course, it has often been said that fools rush in where angels fear to tread - as a fool, I presume that this is true for me as well, for I charge headlong into the realm of metaphysics where I do not belong.
Amidst the cobwebbed depths of my memories, I dimly recall the existence of a distinction between the body and the mind. Where the body is the physical representative of the human being, the mind is the cognitive aspects of the human being - our capacity for sense-perception and abstract thinking. What I find problematic is the argument that, because one may conceive of the mind and the body separately, they must therefore be separate. Granted, it is perfectly possible to conceive of a body without the mind - one need only enter a hospital to encounter the tragedy of a physical shell devoid of mind. However, I have trouble accepting the notion that the mind can exist without the body.
I have read enough about the world at large to know that damage to the body could impair the functioning of the mind - the medical cases involving brain damage should be reasonable proof that damage to the physical organ known as the brain would impede the functioning of the mind. Similarly, if an aspect of the mind is its ability for sense-perception, then the only logical conclusion is an affirmation of the body's importance to the proper functioning of the mind - there can be no sense-perception if there was no organ to do the sensing. Logically then, if the physical organ known as the brain either did not exist or was lifeless, there cannot be that particular, associated mind in existence. This (admittedly less-than-philosophical) examination of mine points me to two conclusions: One, it is conceivable to imagine a body without a mind, and, two, it is inconceivable to imagine a mind without the body.
However, if I accept my conclusions as valid, I am faced with a conundrum - if the mind requires the body in order to exist, how then can God give the mind trusteeship over the body? To make such an argument, one would have to argue that the mind may exist prior to the contingent condition necessary for its existence - to a humble mind like mind, such an argument would be so very strange and perplexing that I would thus be forced to end my argument right there. After all, how would my puny mind possibly comprehend an argument that posits the existence of an effect before its cause?
Perhaps my opponent would point to a sacred text, hollering - "All things are possible for God! If he could create the universe out of nothing, then surely he could create a puny mind prior to the creation of its body!" Well, when faced with such an argument, I am not quite sure how I should respond, for I would be completely confused - granted, if such a feat was possible, it would certainly have to be a divine miracle, and a mind would most certainly be created through the divine power. However, my confusion then comes from another question - a mind has been created, but I don't understand how that particular mind could be me.
It is certainly plausible that my lack of philosophical training leads me astray here, but I would certainly find it hard to accept any argument that tries to define me without any regard of my history and past experiences. Every incident that had happened to me in the past, every person that I had ever met, every piece of knowledge I have ever read or assimilated - all these historical factors contribute to create the composite individual known as me. Could there exist a me if my past was different? Most certainly! But that me would not be this current me typing in front of his computer - that particular me differs from this current me in the same way that the me of the past was different from the me of the present, and the me of the future will be different from the me of the present.
However, how can there be a history without the existence of a physical body? History is, by definition, a temporal process - it most certainly cannot be suspended in the ether of eternity. Nor can my experiences truly be my own if my physical body does not exist - the plethora of incidents that make up the basis of my experiences all require the application of senses as well as the interaction between my physical self and other physical beings. In a way, what I call experience can also be defined as knowledge of the past - it is the necessary pre-requisite that allows the mind to utilize its capability for abstraction-based thinking. Here, I find it necessary to emphasize the distinction between the mind's ability to engage in abstraction-based thinking, which is a characteristic innate to its definition, and that which is necessary for the mind to utilize this ability. Although the mind has the capability for abstraction-based thinking, it cannot do so if there is no knowledge for it to abstract. It is not irrational for me to suggest then that the body is absolutely necessary to the process of abstraction-based thinking, for the existence of a body is necessary in the procurement of knowledge and experience.
At this point, we seem to be back where we started - in order for either the mind or for me to exist, my body must necessarily exist. If the existence of my mind or my individuality is contingent upon the existence of my body, then it must necessarily exist prior to my mind or my individuality. However, if the body had existed prior to the mind or to the individuality, how then can something that does not exist be given anything? It seems to me that, since such a statement cannot be logically true, it is simply quite impossible for the mind to have been entrusted with the care of the body, and if the mind was not entrusted with the care of something that belongs to another, then suicide cannot possibly be a sin in that particular aspect, for the claimed obligation simply does not actually exist.
Of course, I suppose it is possible for someone to make the claim that, if there was a God and He was inclined to do so, we would not need our bodies in order to have a history - all the memories and experiences can simply be bequeathed by God to the mind in question. However, I would find such a notion extremely disturbing - it is one thing to argue that suffering and pain exists in the world because God does not wish to impede our capacity of free will, but it is a very different thing entirely to argue that God would torture us with false memories of non-existent events and suffering in a way that we would believe as true. Such a strange notion would most certainly run contrary to the claim that God is a benevolent deity, He certainly cannot be so if he actively engages in the mental torture of his creations! On a similar note, if all our memories are false, then I doubt if I can be held culpable for any heinous crime I commit - while we have free will, our ability to decide and utilize it is based on our experiences; if my experiences are false and never happened, then the creature that committed the active act of inserting false memories should be punished rather than my reactive act that was based upon the lies that I had been told.
I guess that this rambling discourse must end at some point in time, the interesting little argument that I had come across seems to have lost its luster - I can only assume that it no longer interests me. On this note, I take my bow while wishing you adieu!
Most Humbly,
Kahlyban.