Mar 26, 2007 23:35
07-0001
____________________________________________________________
In the
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
____________________________________________________________
River Camp Estates Homeowners' Association,
Petitioner,
v.
Chalke and Rachael Deaton,
Respondents.
____________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF PETITIONER,
RIVER CAMP ESTATES HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION
____________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Petitioner
JOLLY-RYAN & CHASE
0000 Nunn Drive
Cold Spring, Kentucky 41076
(859) 000-0000
FAX: (859) 000-0000
Attorneys for Respondents
SIMON, THEODORE & ALVIN
2015 Winston Road
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 926-1466
FAX: (512) 000-0000
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether as a matter of law Respondents' otters violate the "household pets" clause of Article 4.17 of the Declaration of Covenants, by which Respondents are bound.
II. Whether as a matter of law Respondents' are using their otters for a "commercial purpose," under Article 4.17 of the Declaration of Covenants, by which Respondents are bound.
OPINION BELOW
The Order Granting Summary Judgment of the District Court of Blanco County, State of Texas has not been officially reported and is set out in Appendix A, pages two (2) through eight (8) of the Appellate Record. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, State of Texas, which likewise is not officially reported, is also set out in Appendix A on pages nine (9) through ten (10) of the Appellate Record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner River Camp Estates Homeowner's Association brought suit in the District Court of Blanco County, Texas to enforce restrictive covenants and enjoin Respondents from possessing two wild otters at their home located at 1435 Dry Creek Way. (R. 2). At trial, Petitioner prevailed. (R. 7). The District Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, enjoining Respondents from possession of their wild otters. (R. 7). On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed. (R. 9). Now, before the Supreme Court of Texas, Petitioner requests relief so as to enjoin Respondents from possession of their wild otters.
Petitioner Homeowners' Association represents about fifty homeowners in River Camp Estates. (R. 2). River Camp is an upscale, affluent community, in which Respondents' Dry Creek residence is located. (R. 2). Petitioner alleges that, in possessing their wild river otters, Respondents are in breach of Article 4.17 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. (R. 2). Article 4.17 reads as follows: "Animals: No animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any Lot, except that a reasonable number of dogs, cats, or other household pets may be kept, provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose." (R. 15). Respondents do not dispute that they are bound by the Declaration, nor do they dispute the legal validity of the Declaration. (R. 2). Along these lines, Petitioner's acknowledge Respondent's authority to enforce the Declaration. (R. 2).
Petitioner Homeowners' Association seeks to enforce Article 4.17 of the Declaration, noting that the otters are not "household pets." Petitioner initiated suit when, seven months ago, Respondents' otters terrorized the River Camp community, going on what some neighbors describe as a "rampage." (R. 4). Respondents acknowledge that their otters snarled and growled at children, destroyed property of neighbors, and attacked and traumatized neighbors by means of their pungent odor (which otters release, much like a skunk). (R. 4). Because of the otters' rampage, River Camp residents insist that these wild otters are not "household pets."
Furthermore, with regards to "commercial purpose," Petitioner notes that Respondents have been using their wild otters for a commercial purpose, in violation of the Article. While residing at River Camp, Respondents have sold numerous t-shirts featuring their particular otters, the proceeds from which have gone toward river otter repatriation. (R. 4). Respondents concede their otters are, in fact, "local celebrities," having visited local schools and various civic clubs, in addition to appearing on a number of local a statewide television programs. (R. 4). For their appearances, Respondents have received funds, which they have similarly channeled to river otter repatriation programs. (R. 4). Because Respondents are using the otters for commercial purpose, and because they are again in violation of Article 4.17, Petitioner seeks an injunction against Respondents.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that relief be granted, and that Respondents be enjoined from keeping their wild otters at River Camp Estates.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Wild otters do not belong in River Camp Estates. Today, Petitioner Homeowners' Association asks this Court to permanently enjoin Respondents from keeping their wild otters at River Camp, a residential community. Petitioner does not have adequate legal remedy and will be irreparably injured if Respondents are not enjoined.
Respondents violate two clauses of the Declaration of Covenants, particularly Article 4.17. First, Respondents' otters are not "household pets," in violation of the Article, and second, Respondents' otters are being used for "commercial purposes in violation of the Declaration. The language of the Declaration is plain in forbidding Respondents from keeping their wild otters. Thus, Respondents must be enjoined. Still, in the alternative, if the Court construes the language of the Declaration as ambiguous, the intent of the framers must be used in interpreting the Declaration; such intent makes equally evident that Respondents are in violation of the Declaration.
For these reasons, and because Respondents have done nothing to remedy the situation, Petitioners are entitled to relief as a matter of equity.
ARGUMENT
Respondents are in violation of Article 4.17 of the Declaration of Covenants, by which they are legally bound. Restrictive covenants should be generally viewed "as creating a valid contractual relationship so long as they are not contrary to public policy or law or are not unreasonably or arbitrarily enforced." Ridgewood Homeowners' Ass'n v. Mignacca, A.2d 2001 WL 873004 (Sup. Ct. R.I. July 13, 2006); see Herbert v. Polly Ranch Homeowners' Ass'n, 943 S.W.2d 906, 906 (Tex. App. 1997). At trial, Respondents did not argue the Declaration contravenes public policy, nor did Respondents argue that the covenants were unreasonably or arbitrarily enforced. Therefore, these covenants should be viewed as creating a valid contractual relationship between parties.
Petitioner Home Owners' Association contends that, as a matter of equity, Respondents should be enjoined from keeping their wild otters. Developers filed the Declaration of Covenants for the purpose of maintaining the character of the River Camp neighborhood. Such purpose is noted in the ALR: "The courts are in general agreement that the intent behind a residential restrictive covenant is a desire to preserve the residential character of the neighborhood and to make the neighborhood more attractive for residential purposes…" 1 A.L.R.6th 135 (2005). Restrictive covenants ensure that the character of a particular neighborhood is maintained, in that they contractually binds lot-owners to one another: "The court has long recognized that when recorded plat-lot restrictions appear intended to provide for a uniform development and use of platted subdivision lots, any one of the plat-lot owners may seek judicial assistance to compel compliance of another lot owner with restrictive covenants." Ridgewood Homeowners' Ass'n, A.2d, 2001 WL 873004 (Sup. Ct. R.I. July 13, 2006). The same explanation of restrictive covenants is set forth in Cavaliere: "Purchaser of land covered by a bill of assurance is entitled to have the reciprocal obligations of restrictions enforced against the owners and purchasers of other lands subject to the same bill of assurance." Cavaliere v. Skelton, 40 S.W.3d 844, 845 (Ark Ct. App. 2001). Here, Petitioner Homeowners' Association is acting on behalf of the other homeowners in River Camps Estates, seeking to enforce the reciprocal obligations on the part of Respondents, specifically seeking to enjoin Respondents from keeping their wild river otters. Petitioner represents homeowners, who have acquired their lots on the strength of restrictions, and naturally wish to preserve the character of River Camp Estates.
Petitioner's argument is relatively straightforward. Petitioner argues that Respondents are in violation of Article 4.17, which reads, "Animals: No animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any Lot, except that a reasonable number of dogs, cats, or other household pets may be kept, provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose." (R. 15). In two distinct ways, Respondents violate the Article: 1) Respondents' otters are not "household pets" under 4.17, and 2) Respondents are using their otters for "commercial purposes," in violation of 4.17.
This case turns on how Article 4.17 is interpreted. Under Texas law, there are two methods that the court may use in interpreting a restrictive covenant. First, if a covenant is unambiguous, the court must give the covenant its plain or manifest meaning. Dyegard Land P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. App. 1997); see Gebauer v. Lake Forest Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 723 So. 2d 1288, 1288 (Ala. 1998). Second, if a covenant is ambiguous, the court must construe a covenant liberally, so as to give effect to the purpose intended by the framers of the covenant. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.003(a); see Highlands Mgmt. Co. v. First Interstate Bank of Texas, N.A., 956 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App. 1997). Therefore, because Article 4.17 is said to be violated in two distinct ways, each way is to be discussed in terms of the two methods of interpretation of the Article.
I. RESPONDENTS' OTTERS ARE NOT "HOUSEHOLD PETS" UNDER ARTICLE 4.17.
Respondents' otters are not "household pets," under 4.17. Article 4.17 states, "No animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any Lot, except that a reasonable number of dogs, cats, or other household pets…" (R. 15). The limitation as to "household pets" is plainly narrow enough to exclude otters. Still, in liberally construing the language of the Article 4.17, it is evident that wild animals are not to be kept at River Camp, as the framers of the Declaration would never have intended for animals to ravage the community.
A. The Plain Language of Article 4.17 Precludes Otters from the River Camp Estates Subdivision.
The limitation as to "household pets" is plainly narrow enough to exclude otters. It is well-established principle that, "Where language in a restrictive covenant is clear and unambiguous, it will be given its manifest meaning…" Dyegard, 39 S.W.3d at 300; see Gebauer, 723 So.2d at 1288. At trial, Respondents did not argue that Article 4.17 was ambiguous. (R. 7). Therefore, "household pets" must be interpreted in terms of its manifest or plain meaning. The trial court, in examining the plain meaning of the Article, found the following:
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.) defines a "pet" as "a domesticated animal…" The same source defines the verb "domesticate" as meaning to tame, to reclaim (an animal or a plant) from a wild state." Thus, "domestic" and "wild" are antonyms; by definition a wild animal is not domesticated. Otters are almost exclusively found in the wild and are not "domesticated." They cannot, therefore, be considered to be "pets."
(R. 7). Indeed, domesticated animals are not wild animals, and otters (including Respondents') are not domesticated.
Webster's and the trial court opinion are not the only sources that corroborate the plain language distinction between wild and domestic animals. Section 506 of the Restatement reads as follows: "Wild Animal and Domestic Animal Defined: (1) A wild animal… is an animal that is not by custom devoted to the service of mankind… (2): A domestic animal is an animal that is by custom devoted to the service of mankind…" Restatement (Second) of Torts §506 (1979). Otters are not customarily devoted to the service of mankind. Therefore, according to the Restatement, otters are wild animals and not domestic animals. Otters cannot be construed as household pets, if they are not domestic animals. Along these lines, Black's Law Dictionary defines "animal" as follows: "Domestic animal: An animal that is customarily devoted to the service of humankind; Wild animal: An animal that, as a matter of common knowledge, is naturally untamable, unpredictable, dangerous, or mischievous." Black's Law Dictionary 712 (8th ed. 2004). As a matter of common knowledge, otters are untamable, unpredictable, dangerous, and mischievous. The otters' demonstrated their untamable, unpredictable, dangerous, and mischievous nature when, just a few months ago, they went on a rampage throughout River Camp Estates. (R. 4). Moreover, parties stipulated at trial that otters "are energetic and can be destructive" (R. 4). Both the Restatement and Black's Law Dictionary indicate that Respondents' otters are not household pets, in violation of the Article.
But perhaps the most compelling source of information in determining whether otters are "household pets" is Corpus Juris Secundum. C.J.S. again corroborates the legal distinction between domestic and wild animals: "Generally, the law divides animals into classes: domitae naturae - tame animals, and ferae naturae - wild animals." 3B C.J.S. Animals §2 (2007). Still, C.J.S. provides a test for determining whether an animal is in fact domestic or wild: "the test is whether the animals are, as a class, recognized as devoted to the service of humans…" Id. Otters, as a class, are not recognized as devoted to the service of humans. As the trial court noted, "Otters are almost exclusively found in the wild and are not 'domesticated.'" (R. 7). Therefore, otters are wild animals. But C.J.S. elaborates,
Domestic animals are those that are naturally tame and gentle, or that by long association with humans have become thoroughly domesticated and are now reduced to such a state of subjection to their will that they no longer possess the disposition or inclination to escape. Wild animals are those that possess a wild nature or disposition and so require to be reclaimed and made tame by art, industry, or education, or else must be kept in confinement to be brought within the immediate power of the owner.
3B C.J.S. Animals §2 (2007). As evidenced by the otters' rampage, the Respondents' otters possess an inclination to escape. (R. 4). Moreover, Respondents admit that, in a failed attempt to tame their otters, they "imprinted" themselves as the otters' parents: that by means of art, industry, and education, Respondents intended to bring the otters into their power. (R. 3). Therefore, both the otters' rampage and the Respondents attempt to imprint themselves as parents indicate the wild nature of these animals. Still, C.J.S. speaks to otters, in particular. The source provides a list of domestic and wild animals: "Domestic animals have been found to include cats, dogs, horses, oxen, and cattle. Wild animals include bees, doves, feral hogs, mink, monkeys, otters, and rats." Id. Here, otters are definitively categorized as wild animals. C.J.S. cites State v. House, the first sentence of which reads, "An otter belongs to the class of animals known as ferae naturae [wild animals]." State v. William House, 65 N.C. 315 (N.C. 1871). In this way, C.J.S. explains that Respondents' otters are not domestic, and that Respondents are in violation of the Article.
Finally, American Jurisprudence (2d) again reports the plain language distinction between wild animals and domestic animals, reporting that the distinction "has been recognized from the earliest date of recorded history." 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals §2 (2007). American Jurisprudence endorses the plain meaning approach to interpreting whether an animal is domestic or wild:
[T]he words 'domestic animals' and 'any domesticated animal' are not technical words which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, and are therefore to be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. In ordinary speech, sanctioned as well by the dictionaries, "domestic" means belonging to the home or household…
Id.; see Commonwealth v. Flynn, 188 N.E. 627, 627 (Mich. 1934). In this way, American Jurisprudence joins the Restatement, Black's Law Dictionary, and C.J.S., all of which agree that Respondents' otters are wild animals, that they are not domesticated, and that they are not, therefore, household pets under the Article.
For the reasons set forth, otters plainly do not belong in households. Indeed, it is contrary to the nature of people to live with otters, just as it is contrary to nature of otters to live in a yard busy with the incidents of suburban life. And there may be something to be said that no case of record has been found by either party in which a river otter has been kept as a pet. The overwhelming weight of authority indicates these animals are plainly wild.
B. Framers of the Declaration of Covenants Did Not Intend for the Keeping of Wild Animals at River Camp Estates.
Supposing pro arguendo that "household pets" is considered ambiguous an ambiguous term, the court must look to the intent of the framers to interpret a covenant. The Texas Legislature has written into statute that, "The court must liberally construe a covenant's language to give effect to its purposes and intent…" Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.003(a). In other words, "[T]he covenant should NOT be hedged about with strict construction, but give a liberal construction to carry out its evident purpose." Highlands Mgmt. Co., 956 S.W.2d at 749, 751; see Indeed, given the common law emphasis on unrestricted land use and free alienability, this may be difficult for a court to accept. However, the Benard court explains the legislative intent, and helps clarify what is required of the court:
The Legislature, in enacting statute requiring that restrictive covenants be liberally construed, intended that they be construed in a manner which may occasionally run hard afoul of strict common law requirements, i.e., strict construction favoring grantee, and strict construction against the drafter. [Nonetheless,] we must give liberal construction to the covenants language, seeking to insure that its provisions are given effect.
Benard v. Humble, 990 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tex. App. 1999). In the instant case, it is evident that the framers did not intend to allow the keeping of wild animals at River Camp Estates. At trial, the court concluded the following:
In reading the Declaration as a whole, the court determines that the evident purpose of the framers of the Declaration was to create and preserve an upscale residential neighborhood that harmonized with its peaceful rural surroundings. The court finds that possession of wild animals is inconsistent with this purpose.
(R. 7). Restrictive covenants are generally made so as to preserve the character of a neighborhood: "Courts judicially know that the purpose of [restrictive covenants]… is to enhance the value of such lots…" Briggs v. Hendricks, 197 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex. App. 1946). In the instant case, Respondents stipulate that River Camp is indeed an upscale, affluent community, and Respondents are likely to agree that the Declaration of Covenants has helped River Camp maintain its affluence. (R. 2). The particular framer of the Declaration of Covenants was River Camp Estates Developers, Inc., a Texas corporation. (R. 11). Indeed, it is a matter of common sense that, as a corporation, River Camp Estates Developers wrote the Declaration to establish an upscale residential community, so as to increase the value and saleability of their property, and to maximize its profits from the development. Allowing wild animals into River Camp Estates would go directly against Developers' purpose: wild animals could potentially decrease property values, and decrease potential profit. For this reason, the court must find that Developers never intended their Declaration to allow wild otters in River Camp Estates. Indeed, even using a more liberal approach to Article 4.17, Respondents are still in violation of the Article, and must be enjoined from keeping their wild otters.
II. RESPONDENTS ARE USING THEIR OTTERS FOR "COMMERCIAL PURPOSES," IN VIOLATION OF 4.17.
Respondents are in violation of Article 4.17, which forbids the keeping or maintenance of any animal for "commercial purposes." The Article reads as follows: "Animals: No animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any Lot, except that a reasonable number of dogs, cats, or other household pets may be kept, provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose." (R. 15). At trial, Respondents were found to have promoted their otters in schools, civic clubs, and on television. (R. 4). Respondents concede that, for the otters' appearances at these venues, Respondents have received funds. (R. 4). Moreover, Respondents have printed and sold t-shirts that feature their particular otters, conceding that, in fact their otters have become "local celebrities." (R.4). Because Respondents have received funds and engaged in commercial transactions with their otters, Petitioner Homeowners' Association seeks to enjoin Respondents from their keeping wild otters. Again, the same three rules of construction must be applied in interpreting this part of Article 4.17. In this way, the plain language of "commercial purpose" should so move the court that Respondents are in violation of the Article. Similarly, a liberal interpretation of "commercial purpose" should lead the court to the conclusion that Respondents' activities are in violation of the Article. Finally, and yet again, the Respondents' actions contravene the framers' intent in writing the Declaration, so that Respondents must be found in violation of the Declaration.
A. The Language in the Declaration of Covenants Plainly Forbids the Keeping of an Animal for Commercial Purpose.
The language of 4.17 prohibits the keeping an animal for commercial purpose: "Animals: No Animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any Lot, except that a reasonable number of dogs, cats, or other household pets may be kept, provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose." (R. 15). In the instant case, Respondents are both keeping and maintaining otters, in violation of Article 4.17. Respondents concede they have raised their otters from the time they were "pups." (R. 3). Moreover, Respondents concede they supply these otters an intricate diet: "fish supplemented by a blend of ground sirloin, mink meal, cod liver oil, egg, shredded carrots, and tomato juice." (R. 3-4). In this way, Respondents keep and maintain their wild otters, in violation of the Article.
In addition to Article 4.17, which prohibits "commercial purpose" with regards to animals, the Declaration of Covenants contains Article 4.01. Article 4.01 prohibits any non-residential usage whatsoever: "Article 4.01: Residential Use Only: All lots shall be used for single-family residential purposes only." (R. 14). In this way, Article 4.01 reinforces 4.17. And indeed, just as restrictive covenants prohibiting wild animals, the Briggs court notes that, "Restrictions [of commercial purpose] are enforceable, and in the case of violation or threatened violation, in a proper case, any lot owner has such an equity as will entitle him to an injunction, is seasonably sought, to restrain such violation or threatened violation." Briggs, 197 S.W.2d at 511. Therefore, under the Declaration of Covenants, Respondents use of the otters is plainly and expressly forbidden, and Petitioners are entitled to an injunction against Respondents.
Again and again, Texas courts have enforced covenants prohibiting commercial purpose, citing the language of the particular covenant, and interpreting such language at face value. Courts have found all the following purposes in violation of restrictive covenants: an animal hospital (Palfrey v. Killian, 27 S.W. 2d 462 [Mo. App. 1930]), a bakery (Arrington v. Cleveland, 242 S.W.2d 400 [Tex. App. 1951]), beauty shops (Vaccaro v. Rougeou, 397 S.W.2d 501 [Tex. App. 1965]; Baker v. Brackeen, 354 S.W.2d 660 [Tex. App. 1962]; Schoenhals v. Closet, 451 S.W.2d 597 [Tex. App. 1970]), a day car center (Mills v. Kubena, 685 S.W.2d 395 [Tex. App. 1985]), a dental office (Hoisington v. Boxt, 237 S.W.2d 1003 [Tex. App. 1951]), music schools (Sumerlin v. Cox, 344 S.W.2d 742 [Tex. App. 1961]; Park v. Baxter, 572 S.W.2d 794 [Tex. App. 1978]), a paint-supply store (Arrington, 242 S.W.2d at 400), and a trade office (Lee v. Powers, 446 S.W. 938 [Tex. App. 1969]). Along these lines, the courts have enjoined property-owners from renting in certain ways, when owners' homes are subject to residential use only covenants: Austin v. Richardson, 288 S.W. 180 (Tex. App. 1926)(wherein property-owner was enjoined from converting his single-family house into a duplex), and Benard, 990 S.W.2d at 929 (Tex. App. 1999)(wherein property-owner was enjoined from renting his home to vacationers on a week/weekend basis). In each of these cases, the courts based their decisions solely on the facial value of the restrictive covenant, disregarding most, if not all other considerations. In the music schools cases, the court held immaterial the fact that voice lessons were provided for education of students. Summerlin, 344 S.W.2d at 742; see Park, 572 S.W.2d at 794. Along these lines, the Schoenhals court held that, though the proceeds of beauty shop were given to charity, such a beauty shop violated restrictive covenants and enjoined the shop-owner from operating out of her home. Schoenhals, 451 S.W.2d at 597. Respondents similarly attempt to distract the court, arguing that their otters are for educational and charitable purposes (proceeds from the otters' t-shirt sales and their appearances have been channeled to river otter repatriation programs). (R. 4). On the other hand, the courts have found that no exemption be made for educational or charitable purposes, being that a commercial purpose still exists, in plain violation of the particular covenant. Thus, as the language in the Declaration of Covenants plainly forbids the keeping of an animal for "commercial purpose," Respondents should be enjoined from keeping their wild otters.
B. Framers of the Declaration of Covenants Did Not Intend Any Form of Commerce at River Camp Estates.
Supposing pro arguendo that "commercial purpose" is construed as an ambiguous term, the court must look to the intent of the framers to interpret a covenant. The argument set forth below closely mirrors that argument regarding liberal construction of "household pets." The Texas Legislature has written into statute that, "The court must liberally construe a covenant's language to give effect to its purposes and intent…" Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.003(a); see Highlands, 956 S.W.2d at 749, Herbert, 943 S.W.2d at 906.) However, in Briggs, the court deals specifically with residential use only covenants. Remarking on the intent or purpose of covenant framers, the Briggs court says,
Courts judicially know that the purpose of restricting lots to residential use is to establish an area free from commercial activity, and thereby enhance the value of such lots as residential property… The word 'residential' as used in a covenant restricting the use of property, is used in contradistinction to 'business' or 'commerce.'
Briggs, 197 S.W.2d at 511. Therefore, in the instant case, it is evident that the framers did not intend to business or "commercial purpose" at River Camp Estates. Again, we know the particular framer of the Declaration of Covenants was River Camp Estates Developers, Inc., a Texas corporation. (R. 11). And again, it is a matter of common sense that, as a corporation, River Camp Estates Developers wrote the Declaration to establish an upscale residential community, so as to increase the value and saleability of their property, and to maximize its profits from the development. Allowing businesses or any form of commerce would go directly against Developers' purpose: commerce could potentially decrease property values, and decrease potential profit. After all, potential homebuyers rely on covenants, hoping these covenants help maintain the value of their investment in a home. And so, because Developers never intended their Declaration to allow for commercial purpose in River Camp Estates, the court must find that Respondents are in violation of Article 4.17. Using this more liberal approach to the Article, Respondents are still in violation, and must be enjoined from keeping their wild otters.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Texas Court of Appeals must be reversed, and Respondents must be found in violation of Article 4.17 of the Declaration of Covenants and enjoined from keeping their wild otters.
Respectfully Submitted,
_______________________
#__, COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER,
RIVER CAMP ESTATES
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION
Texas Bar No. 000000
Jolly-Ryan & Chase
0000 Nunn Drive
Cold Spring, Kentucky 41076
(859) 000-0000
FAX: (859) 000-0000
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, River Camp Homeowners' Association was served on Bob Law, Bob Law & Associates, 0000 St. Rt. 27, Cold Spring, Kentucky 41076, counsel of record for Respondents, on March 23, 2007, by ordinary U.S. Mail.
_______________________
#__, COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER,
RIVER CAMP ESTATES
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION