Hulk Logan
MEMORANDUM
Privileged Attorney Work Product
TO: Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Senior Partner
FROM: #1077, Associate
DATE: October 13, 2006
RE: Hulk Logan: False Imprisonment Charge (File # 02-525)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 18, 2006 Mr. Hulk Logan hosted a slumber party for his son’s fourteenth birthday. One of Mr. Logan’s six guests was twelve-year-old Steven Trainor. On August 19, the day after the party, Mr. Logan was arrested and charged with falsely imprisoning young Steven Trainor. Mr. Logan has been released on bail, and, given the arrest, he has now contacted our firm seeking counsel.
The apparent incident at issue occurred when - at the slumber party - a tired Trainor wished to leave the Logan house. Other boys had been teasing Trainor about his weight, and so Trainor said he wanted to leave. Mr. Logan, having overheard Trainor’s statement, went to his family room, where the party had been taking place. He stood in the doorway of the room, pretending to see if the boys needed anything. According to Logan, he empathized with Trainor, because he too was overweight as a child. When Trainor repeated - this time directly to Logan - that he wished to leave, Logan, a retired wrestler (standing 6’6” and weighing near 300 pounds), responded by flexing his muscles, ripping off his tank top, pounding his chest, and saying in his ‘wrestling’ voice, “Brother, you want some of this? Grrrrrr.” Logan then asked the boys if he could show them some of his wrestling moves, or if they might be interested in watching some of his wrestling videos. Logan’s son, at that point, told his father to “stop being a dork,” and asked Steven to rejoin the party. Steven rejoined the party, and Mr. Logan left the boys alone.
It seems from that point, Mr. Logan did not have contact with Trainor until the next morning, at which time Trainor said to Logan he was glad that he stayed at the party because he had a good time. Steven Trainor’s father, however, after picking his son up from the Logan home and upon learning of what Mr. Logan’s behavior, became quite aggravated: he insisted that the police arrest Mr. Logan, and that he was acting on behalf of his young son.
ISSUE
Under Florida statute 787.02, is our client, Mr. Hulk Logan, criminally liable for false imprisonment when, at his son’s birthday party, Mr. Logan responded to a twelve-year-old attendee’s request to go home by standing in a doorway, flexing his muscles, ripping off his tank top, pounding his chest, and saying in his ‘wrestling’ voice, “Brother, you want some of this?”
BRIEF ANSWER
Probably; given the first two elements of the statute, it seems highly likely that Mr. Logan will be found liable for false imprisonment, because he acted in a manner that will be construed as forceful or threatening, and because the young Steven Trainor was - at least to some and to the requisite extent - confined.
DISCUSSION
The statute at issue is 787.02(1)(a), which defines false imprisonment as follows: “The term ‘false imprisonment’ means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will.” Fla. Stat. §787.02 (West 2006). But before discussing the elements of the statute that may or may not be disputed, the Brunelle case should first be discussed, as it helps clarify how the statute should be read and interpreted. Brunelle v. State, 260 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1978). See also Jane v. State, 362 So.2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
In Brunelle, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute at bar, claiming it was “vague, indefinite, and ambiguous.” Brunelle, at 71. The Florida Supreme Court responded, denying defendant’s claim and reasoning that the false imprisonment statute is indeed constitutional. Id. According to the Court, the statute is written in the “disjunctive,” meaning that any adverb (“forcibly, by threat, or secretly”) may modify any verb in the statute (“confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining”), so as to meet the requisite for false imprisonment. Id. The Court held that the statute was sufficiently explicit so that an ordinary person was given notice as to what conduct renders an individual liable. Id. Therefore, with regards to the instant case, the prosecution will be able to argue that Mr. Logan confined, abducted, imprisoned, or restrained Steven Trainor, and that he did so in a manner that was by forceful, by threat, or secretive.
Undisputed Elements
Two elements in the instant action are not likely to be in dispute. One such element is “secretly”: it is highly unlikely the prosecution will argue Mr. Logan acted secretly. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a secret is “something that is kept from the knowledge of others or shared only with those concerned.” 287 (2nd pocket ed. 2001). Because Mr. Logan acted in front of a crowd of seven boys, and because each of the boys’ parents knew where their child was on the night of the incident at issue, Mr. Logan did not act in a particularly secretive manner.
And as it is unlikely the prosecution will dispute whether Logan acted secretly, it is just as unlikely that the prosecution will dispute whether Logan “abducted” the young Trainor. Again, as each of the boys’ parents - including the Trainors - knew where their child was on the night of the alleged incident, Mr. Logan did not abduct Steven. This element of the statute the prosecution is not likely to dispute or pursue.
Disputed Elements: Forcibly or by Threat
Many elements of false imprisonment, however, will and properly should be disputed. First, in determining if Mr. Logan is liable for false imprisonment, the court will have to decide if Mr. Logan used force. Returning to Black’s Law Dictionary, force is defined as “power, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing.” 287 (2nd pocket ed. 2001). The court has elaborated upon the requisite force for a false imprisonment charge: “Unlike some states, the Florida statute does not require that the force or the restraint be substantial.” Proko v. State, 566 So.2d 918, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In Proko, the defendant participated in what was described as a brief “tug-of-war” with his victim. Id. Though the victim was easily able to free herself, the court held that defendant had used force in restraint, because the victim had used reciprocal force to remove her hand. Id.
Given the definition of force and given the Proko decision, the court is likely to find Mr. Logan used force to restrain Steven Trainor. Force can manifest itself in a variety of ways: “power, violence, or pressure.” Black’s Law Dictionary 287 (2nd pocket ed. 2001). The prosecution is likely to argue that Logan used his authority as an adult (power), as well as his sheer mass (power/pressure) to restrain the young Trainor. The prosecution may also argue that, because Trainor would have needed to use force to pass Mr. Logan, a reciprocal force is implicit on the part of Logan. Indeed, because the Proko case indicates that force may be brief and need not be significant, and because the case suggests that reciprocal force is a measure of force having been used, Mr. Logan’s actions are likely to be construed as meeting the court’s requisite for force.
In response to the allegation that Logan used force, the defense may raise four arguments. First, they may argue that Proko is not an analogous case, in that there was no physical contact on the part of Mr. Logan with Steven Trainor. Second, the defense may argue that Mr. Logan’s actions were not directed at Steven Trainor individually, that his actions were not “directed at a person” as the definition of force requires, but that Logan acted simply to entertain the children as a group. Even still, the defense may argue that Mr. Logan’s standing in the doorway was not necessarily indicative of an unwillingness to move: Mr. Logan was standing and not blocking the doorway.
Nonetheless, despite arguments on the part of the defense, the court will likely find that Mr. Logan’s actions - his standing in the doorway, flexing his muscles, pounding his chest, and ripping his tank top - indicate the requisite use of force on Steven Trainor.
But just as easily as the prosecution may argue that Mr. Logan used force, they may argue that Mr. Logan falsely imprisoned Trainor by threat. The court will next look to see if Mr. Logan threatened Trainor. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a threat is “a communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another…” 287 (2nd pocket ed. 2001). Still, the Horton case helps to clarify this meaning: in Horton, the defendant became aggravated when a U.P.S. deliveryman explained to him company policy: the defendant locked the driver in a semi-enclosed area, he at one point approached the deliveryman with a letter-opener, and defendant stated in a phone call that he had a “prisoner.” State v. Horton, 442 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The court found that “fact questions exist as to whether a restraint or confinement… was accomplished by threat.” Id.
Because threat is defined in such a way and because Horton provides for a relatively liberal interpretation of threat, the court is also likely to find Mr. Logan restrained Steven Trainor by threat. Logan orally communicated with Trainor: “Brother, you want some of this? Grrrrrr…” And because Logan stood in a doorway, flexed, ripped off his tank top, and pounded on his chest, his body language communicated a seeming intent to inflict harm on Steven.
Again, the defense may respond to the charge of ‘by threat.’ To begin, the defense may argue that Horton is not an analogous case, in that defendant Horton was obviously aggravated and acted in a clearly inappropriate manner, while Logan was well meaning and his behavior- given the circumstances - is not so grossly inappropriate. This argument, however, is relatively weak: the case law indicates that intent or state of mind is irrelevant with regards to liability. In Graham, the court states outright, “The [false imprisonment] statute is designed to protect freedom from restraint or movement, and one who unlawfully obstructs, or deprives another of this freedom is liable for that interference no matter what his motives or purposes are.” State v. Graham, 468 So.2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Likewise, in Sanborn, the court notes that false imprisonment is a general intent statute - that kidnapping, by way of contrast, is the specific intent statute where motives and purposes affect findings of liability. State v. Sanborn, 533 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1988). In this way, the defense may argue that Logan did not threaten Trainor.
But once again, despite arguments on the part of defense counsel, the court will likely find Mr. Logan’s actions - particularly his having verbally communicated to Steven Trainor - were indicative of a threat and that they meet the requisite for false imprisonment.
Disputed Elements: Confining, Imprisoning, or Restraining Another
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, confine, imprison and restrain are essentially synonymous terms: each deals with limitation or prohibition of action on the part of another. 287 (2nd pocket ed. 2001). Revisiting Horton, it becomes clear that, to be falsely imprisoned, imprisonment need not be total or absolute: the U.P.S. deliveryman in the case was imprisoned in a motel lobby that was “all glass and fully visible to the street and sidewalk outside”; still, “There was another exit from the motel lobby into the Defendant’s living quarters which remained open and unlocked at all times the driver was present. The Defendant left the room through this exit on at least one occasion and tenants of the motel entered through this door to pick up their mail.” Horton, at 409. Horton also reminds us that no physical contact is necessary for liability to occur.
And so, given the Dictionary definitions and given Horton, the prosecution will easily argue that Mr. Logan confined Steven Trainor. Indeed, it would seem Mr. Logan limited/prohibited movement on the part of Trainor: each time Trainor said he was leaving - Mr. Logan continuing to stand in the family room doorway through which Steven was apparently attempting to leave. The prosecution will argue Logan blocked the doorway.
But once again, in defense of Mr. Logan, defense counsel has its options: there are at least three arguments that counsel may forward. First, the defense may argue that the family room in which Trainor was “confined” had alternate exits - though this is not provided for in the statement of facts, the room was likely to have other exits given Logan’s success as a wrestler. On the other hand, in light of Horton, this argument is relatively weak: again, confinement need not be absolute, and so Logan’s blocking the doorway is likely to be considered enough of a prohibition of movement. The second, perhaps stronger argument has already been discussed at length: that simply because Logan was standing in a doorway, he was not necessarily blocking that doorway. Finally, defense counsel may argue that the statutory language is too inclusive to distinguish an innocent action from a tortuous action: this is to say, anyone’s standing or positioning their physical selves anywhere excludes another from positioning themselves in the identical locale, and that this meets the requisite for the second element of the tort. This is however, another relatively weak argument, as the prosecution may argue that Logan was confining Trainor in a more ostensible manner.
Still, it seems that defenses to the element of restraint are relatively weak, given the remarkably scant burden on the part of the prosecution. In this way, Mr. Logan is likely to meet the requisite for having confined, imprisoned, or restrained young Steven Trainor.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our client, Mr. Hulk Logan will probably be held criminally liable for false imprisonment under Florida statute 787.02. Because Mr. Logan, at his son’s birthday party, responded to a twelve-year-old attendee’s request to go home by standing in a doorway, flexing his muscles, ripping off his tank top, pounding his chest, and saying in his ‘wrestling’ voice, “Brother, you want some of this?”, he is likely to meet the first two elements of the statute. The prosecution will show that Mr. Logan met the first element of the statute, in that he acted using the requisite force or acted by means of threat, used power and/or pressure or seemingly communicating an intent to harm. Still, the prosecution will easily show that Logan met the second element: Trainor was confined - at least to an extent - in the Logan’s family room, in that he was not allowed to exit a particular exit.
Mr. Logan should be informed of our findings as soon as possible so that may make the decisions he needs to regarding this matter and so that we may proceed in preparing our defense.