The Reason for Formally Defining "Acts of War"

Dec 30, 2011 11:32

Introduction

I have noticed a certain misunderstanding regarding "acts of war" over my years of posting, and I think it's necessary to discuss this in some detail.

The misunderstanding takes this form. Country A does something to Country B, which I point out is an "act of war," and one severe enough and against a sufficiently-stronger Power that it both diplomatically and strategically merits a warlike reply. I am then accused of either

(A) Belligerence, in the sense that I am supposedly a warmonger for "wanting a war" between Countries A and B, or

(B) Naivete, in that I think that there can be an "act of war" unless it results in a formally-declared (or at least announced) state of war between Countries A and B.

I will now argue that there is such a thing as a formally-defined "act of war" committed by one country against another, and that it constitutes "war" (albeit a very short-lived and one-sided one) even if there is no further attack by the perpetrator or retaliation by the victim. In short, I am claiming that an act of war is such in itself, even if unacknowledged by either side.

Furthermore, the reason for defining an "act of war" in these terms is not to multiply the occurrence of war.


It is, instead, to prevent the outbreak of unintended wars, because when the nature of an act of war is understood, then a Power can avoid committing such acts unless it REALLY MEANS TO DO SO. Absent such an understanding, it is very easy for two Powers to drift into war through the commission of minor acts of war which then escalate, with both sides believing that the other side started it.

I. Sovereignity

A State (what Americans would call a "nation-state" or Power to avoid confusion with our federal divisions) is an entity which claims and is to some extent able to enforce absolute sovereignity over its own territory and limited sovereignity over its people and their possessions abroad. What "sovereignity" means is "ultimate authority." A sovereign state decrees the laws which prevail in its territory and over its people and possessions; this most especially includes the authorization (or lack thereof) of the use of force in such territory, or over its people and possessions, save where such people and possessions are either within the sovereignity of or infringing upon the sovereignity of another State.

This is formal language, but what it amounts to is the highest level (so far) of territoriality among human beings. Territoriality in animals is important because it prevents needless fighting between members of the same species: the animal whose "home" territory it is fights more fiercely and the invader more hesitantly, and hence unless the disparity in might be large, most intra-specific conflict is resolved by threat display rather than combat to the death (which might seriously wound and thus ultimately prove fatal even to the victor). Territoriality in humans is important for exactly the same reason, and even more important because humans wield weapons more destructive and deadly than any non-technological animal could hope to possess. This is not a new thing of the Atomic Age, either: it's been the case ever since humans started to hunt with Mesolithic tools (including most especially fire).

The importance of sovereignity between states is that it prevents constant conflict over the administration of laws. The armed and police forces of State A enforces the law on the territory of State A; they do not travel onto the territory of State B, let alone attempt to enforce the law there, without the permission of State B. State B likewise forbears to transgress the sovereignity of State A. This is the condition of "peace."

Complications can arise. What happens when citizens of State A peacefully travel to State B, and State B then alleges that these citizens have broken the law and proceeds to punish them? What happens if the suspects really HAVE broken the law? What if the law is different between State A and State B? A whole complex system of codified precedent has arisen in international law -- the field of law which deals with relations between States including issues of sovereignity -- to adjudicate such disputes with a mimimum of inter-State violence.

Another issue has to do with the territorial extent of one's sovereign claims. The most obvious one is where two States claim the same territory. Unless one State is willing to yield to another or both to a third-party arbitrator, war becomes likely, as both States will attempt to enforce their laws on this territory, and the armed and police forces of the two States probably come into conflict even without explicit orders to wage war.

A subtler problem arises when a State claims sovereignity over territory that it does not in fact control. Suppose that State A claims sovereignity over Territory Z, but lacks the might to enforce its law upon that territory. In Territory Z, the armed forces of Faction F gather, and launch attacks upon territory belonging to State B. Does State B have the right to (after an appropriate attempt to get State A to put down Faction F) enter Territory Z with its own armed and police forces to crush the aggressive Faction F?

Yes, and the reaon why is important. It is that a sovereign State only has sovereignity over that territory which it can in fact control. If a State's control over a territory is so weak that armed forces not authorized by thatsstate are forming and attacking other States, then those other States are not obliged to respect that State's claimed sovereignity and simply sit there and endure attacks: they are allowed to treat the territory as terra nullus (territory under no sovereignity) and defend themselves against the attacking forces, such defense including the occupation of that territory to prevent further attacks.

Needless to say, this specific situation is productive of many wars, since the state which claimed sovereignity will often not admit its weakness with good grace: it feels that its territory has been invaded and it may succeed in rousing itself to repel the "invader" as it was unable to rouse itself to put down the aggressive faction. Sometimes a State will merely claim that it can't put down the offending faction, using this as an excuse to wage a covert and deniable war against another State, which futher complicates matters.

II. Acts of War

The reason why I have defined "sovereignity" at some length is that it is essential to any definition of an "act of war." Broadly put, an "act of war" is a violation of a State's sovereignity. The violation need not be by another State: bandits, brigands, criminals, pirates, rebels and terrorists have all committed "acts of war" in the past, are doing so in the present, and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future. The important quality that makes an act "warlike" rather than merely "criminal" is sanction by another State.

"War" is a condition in which the parties to the "war" commit acts of war against each other. In a recognized war, the commission of acts of war against those on the other side is not merely permissible but laudable. In war, one endeavors to commit acts of war; to effectively destroy the enemy's persons and property.

"Peace," by contrast, is a condition in which there is no war. In peace, the commission of acts of war against persons and property belonging to a rival State is impermissible and despicable. In peace, one endeavors to avoid committing acts of war: one does not destroy the rival's pesons and property.

If one does not have and announce a definition of "acts of war," and respond appropriately, then one is not clearly explaining to others just what constitutes warlike acts. Consequently, it becomes extremely likely that what one State considers permissible and peaceful acts of rivalry will be considered by another State impermissible and warlike acts, and thus that two rival States will drift into war. What is worse, since each side will sincerely believe that the other side started it, the resultant war may be an especially cruel and fanatical one on both sides, with neither side being willing to yield ("appease the aggressor") or submit to third-party arbitration.

III. Implications

The theory of Natural Right asserts that there are certain basic social arrangements which work best for humans qua humans, and that when these are approximated societies work most beneficially for all their members. This is true internationally as it is for a single nation. Sovereignity derives from Natural Right; the definition of an act of war from Sovereignity, and hence it is possible for us to agree and hence "all get along" -- if we be of good will. The likelihood that this will actually happen is low, because it only takes one State with bad will to cause a war.

However, accidental war, and even to some extent wars of miscalculation (where one State overestimates its own might or underestimates the might of its rivals) can be largely avoided by keeping the definition of an "act of war" in mind, and avoiding their commission save when war is actually the intent. Wars of aggression will still occur from time to time, but if most nations adhere to these principles, aggressor States will tend to find themselves outnumbered and hence outmatched in the long run, and therefore overall international peace will prevail.

Conclusion

Thus, as I have briefly argued, a serious attention to the definition of acts of war can lead to an avoidance of their commission save by intent, and hence a reduction in the frequency and severity of warfare (the very reason for which thinkers such as Grotius evolved the doctrine of the Laws of War). Those who believe that paying attention to acts of war is unreasonably belligerent or naively legalistic have, basically, missed the whole larger social purpose of the definition: which is to agree on terms so as to avoid war by accident.

Peace, in short, is the purpose of the definition of acts of war.

diplomacy, legal, war, acts of war

Previous post Next post
Up