Would an Indian Attack on Pakistan Be "Crazy?"
Introduction
I've heard it argued by more than one person that, because Pakistan has nuclear weapons, India must simply suffer terrorist attacks from Pakistan without doing anything in response which could decisively end the terrorist threat -- that it would be strategically crazy to start a potentially nuclear war. Still less should India try to take out the Pakistani nuclear arsenal on the ground, because Pakistan could launch at least some of its weapons and inflict grievous harm on India.
I propose to examine these premises -- and the alternatives.
I. National Comparisons
A. Population and Economy
India has a population of over 1 billion and a GNP of over 4 trillion, for roughly $4000 per capita. Pakistan has a population of over 150 million and a GNP of around $450 billion, which is roughly $3000 per capita. Hence, India has more than 6 times as many people as Pakistan, who are roughly 34% more productive each, generating a whopping total of almost 25 times as much national product -- with all that implies for the ability to expand militarily in a prolonged war.
It may be objected that 150 million of the Indian population is actually Muslim. In reality, few of these Muslims would be willing to fight for a Pakistani victory, but even if you added the Muslim populations of Pakistan and India, that would still be 850 million non-Muslims to 300 million Muslims.
This is both an argument that the Indians would inevitably win any protracted war, whether it be nuclear or otherwise, and an argument against India launching such a war. The reason why is that the superior Indian population and productivity means that their economy will over time enjoy the benefits of a compounded advantage, growing even bigger, and hence supporting the construction of sufficient ABM's to make a nuclear war in the future be less destructive than one at the present.
This, I believe, ignores the Pakistani advantages of proximity. If one believes that the Pakistanis are insane, and willing to launch countervalue now in response to a counterforce strike despite the fact that the Indian response would be successful genocide of Pakistan, then the Pakistanis will presumably continue to build an offensive nuclear force until they have the capability to kill most Indians upon a successful strike (which they currently lack). The fact that India in part within SRBM and wholly within IRBM range of Pakistan gives the Pakistani attacker a cost advantage: they don't have to buy expensive ICBM's or SSBN's with SLBM's to hit their foe. And the ultimate Indian threat to Pakistan cannot get worse than it is -- you cannot annihilate a nation more than once.
B. Strategic Forces
India has possessed nuclear weapons since 1974. As of 2005 India had 100-140 warheads, and was engaged in a program to expand the force to 500 or more by 2015. We may therefore reasonably assume that India has around 150 nuclear weapons at present. India has enough plutonium to build about 2000 weapons, if necessary. These weapons are deliverable by a wide variety of missiles -- India is spaceflight-capable.
Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since 1998. As of 2005 India had about 60 warheads, but was engaged in an aggressive program of expansion. However, this program is limited by production equipment bottlenecks. Pakistan probably has a slightly larger arsenal now -- I'll guess "75" for the sake of neat division, though it could be rather higher or lower than that.
India thus has roughly twice as many nuclear warheads than Pakistan. India also has the signfiicant advantage of strategic depth, which means that much of the Indian arsenal can be based at a sufficient distance from the border that a Pakistani first strike would not be able to hit it before it could launch; Pakistan has much less capability in this regard.
When we get to air force matchups, you will see another advantage. India, with the bigger air force, can take out quite a lot of Pakistani targets by air -- Pakistan can only do this readily in the border region. Air superiority is very strategically important when one borders one's foe. This means that India need not allocate nuclear missiles to every Pakistani launch site, but can instead take some of them out with conventional air strikes.
In terms of a countervalue duel, India's 150 warheads compared to Pakistan's 150 million population means 1 Indian warhead per million Pakistanis, while Pakistan's 75 million warheads compared to India's 1000 million population means 1 Pakistani warhead per 13 million Indians. It's much more complex than that, because of questions of population density and locations, but, essentially what this means is that India could wipe out almost every Pakistani who lived in a town or larger conurbation, while Pakistan could not do the same to India, even if every Pakistani warhead was launched, penetrated Indian defenses, hit its target and worked (an improbably effective strike efficiency!).
In other words, an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would not be "Mutually Assured Destruction," and assumptions based upon MAD would not apply well to the war.
The important question of warhead yields has not been addressed yet. When considering this, please understand that due to the geometry of explosions and of targets, twice the yield is not twice the effectiveness -- it is more like 1.25 the effectiveness, assuming an infinite target size, and probably less (which is why most strategic H-bombs are designed to yield 0.5 to 2 MT even though they could theoretically be designed to yield 5-100 MT with current technology).
The newer Indian warheads are thermonuclear (i.e. "H-bombs") and probably have a yield of about 500+ KT per warhead. (1000 KT = 1 MT). Older Indian warheads are mostly plutonium implosion devices (i.e. "A-bombs") and probably have a yield of about 10-100 KT per warhead. Because India is rapidly expanding its arsenal, we may assume that this means 30-45 H-Bombs and around 100-120 A-Bombs. Strategically, H-bombs would probably be targeted on Pakistani cities (1 H-bomb can destroy any but the largest city, and badly damage even the largest ones) and A-bombs on Pakistani missile sites.
There is some doubt as to whether or not the Pakistanis have yet managed to gain thermonuclear weapons capability. It is possible that all 75 or so Pakistani warheads are 15-30 KT yield A-bombs. A single bomb of that size would NOT destroy a large city such as Mumbai or New Delhi, though of course it would destroy whatever neighborhood of the city it hit. (For historical reference, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki were "large" cities by modern standards).
In other words, the Indian strategic forces advantage is even greater than a direct comparison of warhead numbers would imply. Even the Indian A-bombs probably have higher yields than their Pakistani counterparts -- and the Pakistani cities are geographically smaller.
The only strategic nuclear advantage possessed by Pakistani is insanity. A full-out exchange between India and Pakistan, with no intercepts, misses or duds on either side (improbable, as even the American nuclear dud rate is probably 10-25%), would badly hurt India -- and utterly destroy Paksitan.
C. Conventional Forces
(1) - Airpower
India has around 170,000 air force personnel and 768 warplanes. Major constituents of this force include Su-30K fighters, Mirage2000's and MiG-29's. There is also a large number of old MiG-21's, which would still have some capability against Pakistan's older strike aircraft, and any level bombers. Jaguar's and MiG-27's form the main component of India's strike force.
Air defenses include a number of Akash SAM's, which are roughly comparable in accuracy (but not range) to the American Patriot. As point-defense systems, they might be able to intercept some Pakistani SRBM's, and would have considerable capability against Pakistani manned bombers. There are also numerous older SAM's available, including a lot of SA-3's.
Pakistan has around 65,000 air force personnel and 550 warplanes. The main threat comes from F-16 Falcons and JF-17 Thunders (American and Chinese respectively), but most of the force consists of F-7's (MiG-21's) and Mirage 5's, which are inferior to most of the Indian warplanes. The smaller number of support personnel has bad implications for the Pakistani ability to conduct a protracted air campaign.
The Pakistanis have recently begun acquiring some extremely advanced air defense systems. This might give them a limited anti-SRBM capability, and would definitely make operating in Pakistani airspace very dangerous for any non-Stealth capable aircraft (neither Power has any Stealth aircraft). They also have large numbers of older SAM systems.
India has the advantage in the air, but only a small one -- in raw numbers about 40-50%, and with quality factored in maybe 75-100%. This suggests that the early phase of an Indo-Pakistani War would see extensive air combat with serious losses on both sides, but that as the campaign progressed, India would gain air superiority (though perhaps not full air supremacy).
(2) - Navies
The Indians have a very powerful navy, with 55,000 personnel and 155 vessels. The fleet includes 2 aircraft carriers (1 45,000-ton and 1 25,000-ton); 9 destroyers, 12 frigates, 20 corvettes, and a number of older units not fitted with modern naval missiles; 13 squadrons of naval aircraft (mostly helicopters); and 16 submarines (all diesel).
The Pakistanis have 24,000 personnel but only a few real warships, the vast majority of the fleet being comprised of gunboats and patrol vessels. Their force includes 10 missile frigates and 4-6 missile boats on surface; 5 submarines, and a few helicopter squadrons.
As can be seen, the Indian navy is several times the strength of, and in wartime would probably quickly bottle up, the Pakistani. Historically, India has won almost all her naval battles with Pakistan.
(3) - Armies
India has an army of about 1.3 million with 1.2 million in reserve, and fields 34 divisions. Pakistan has an army of about 620 thousand with 528 thousand in reserve, and fields 10 corps (about 30 divisions). Quality of forces is roughly similar. India's immediate ground advantage is hence a marginal one, far less than the 3:1+ needed to generate offensive momentum, and the early phase of an Indo-Pakistani War would see a stalemate on the frontiers.
However, that is not the whole story. Remember India's much-larger population and economy? This means that in a protracted war, India would be able to mobilize a larger and larger army, until she eventually achieved sufficient numbers to break Pakistan's lines and drive into the Pakistani interior. If I had to guess, I would say that India could support an army of about 10-50 million long-term, while Pakistan would have difficulty keeping her current army-plus-reserves of 1 million supplied in a prolonged conflict.
India, in short, could support a big enough armed force to form a sizable minority of the civilian population of Pakistan, which means that once the Pakistani lines were broken, India would have a free hand in terms of occupation policy. Conquest, regime change, colonization, and even genocide would be militarily possible.
Pakistan could not do the same no matter how big an army she fielded. If the entire Indian Army magically vanished tomorrow, the Pakistani maximum army of about 1.5 million would be inadequate to keep the Indian civilian population from forming militias capable of contesting an occupation.
II. Strategic Implications
A. Course of the War
In all categories, therefore, the Indians have the advantage -- whether decisive (naval), sizable (strategic, conventional airpower) or long-term (ground strengths). There is no way for the Indians to lose a war with Pakistan save by incompetence or a failure of nerve. It is, therefore, incompetence or a failure of nerve on which any semblance of a sane Pakistani strategy must rest.
The obvious Pakistani threat is "Attack us and we'll nuke you." However, when we compare the strategic forces, this boils down to "attack us and we'll hurt you badly even though we all die and lose our nation forever in the process." This is a very weak threat, save for the factor of Pakistani insanity. And even with Pakistani insanity factored in, successful execution of this threat requires that the Pakistanis strike first -- if India strikes first, the threat is modified to "Attack us and we'll hurt you slightly even though we all die and lose our nation forever in the process," which is almost a laughable threat.
India thus occupies a very strong diplomatic position and should push it hard, no matter what Pakistan threatens. If it comes to actual fighting, India's worst mistake would be to not execute a pre-emptive counterforce strike on the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, because in failing to do so, the Pakistani nuclear threat becomes far more potent.
Furthermore, if it comes to war, India must avoid the temptations to go easy on Pakistan, and to quickly seeking a ceasefire. Limiting the scope of the war is utterly to Pakistan's advantage (because India has the larger force), and so is a quick ceasefire (because India has the long-term force expansion advantage). A ceasefire or treaty should only be allowed to the Pakistanis at a considerable price -- India could keep the war going for as long as she has to keep it going.
My hope here is that India's newfound increased hatred of Pakistan will trump her tradition of diplomatic reasonableness. A protracted war with Pakistan will not only prove victorious, but will burn up almost entirely a whole generation of Pakistan's young manhood, gravely impairing Pakistan's future demographic and economic growth. If coupled with a strategic bombardment of Pakistan -- even a purely-conventional one -- the last quarter-century of Pakistani economic progress might be destroyed. Thus, even without an actual conquest of Pakistan, the country could be reduced to a negligible threat in the future. What is even better, the same would not happen to India, which has vast reserves of both blood and treasure.
B. American Involvement
This assumes that America is neutral or, at best, a friendly neutral toward India. (An American alliance with Pakistan against India is politically impossible at present, regardless of the old CENTO pact). If America, instead, allies with India against Pakistan, the strategic position both of America and India immeasurably improve.
Strategically, the US Air Force could use Stealth aircraft to unplug the whole Pakistani air defense system, and to take out Pakistani nuclear missiles before they could be launched. Air-Borne Lasers could shoot down some or all of the launching missiles in the boost phase. If the US deployed Patriot batteries to India, the few Pakistani missiles that survived this attrition would never strike their targets. Pakistan might score no nuclear hits on India.
(Please note that this would be very much a victory for humanitarian concerns. If Pakistan hits an Indian city with a nuclear missile, the annihilation of Pakistan as a nation is practically assured).
US naval airpower could give the Indian Air Froce a decisive edge, allowing the Indians to gain air superiority over Pakistani territory in the first days of fighting. This would in turn give the Indians a major ground advantage, allowing Indian mechanized breakthroughs within the first month or two. US Marines could seize Pakistani ports, and then the US Army itself, redeploying from Iraq, could surge in, flanking the Pakistani lines and causing a complete enemy military collapse.
It would be a brilliant victory. Does Obama have the courage to attempt it?
C. Other Involvement
The countries likely to sympathize with Pakistan in such a war, and in a position to do something about it, would be Russia, China and Iran.
Russia and China would both be limited to either supplying Pakistan by air (sea would presumably be impossible if the Indians blockade Pakistan) or launching their own strategic forces. The former would not be decisive, and the latter is improbable -- neither Russia nor China have enough at stake in an Indo-Pakistani War to risk war against the United States of America -- or even, really, to risk the damage they would suffer from a nuclear exchange with India.
Iran could intervene with all sorts of conventional forces. However, such an intervention would be both logistically difficult and strategically unwise. If America was not yet an active Indian ally, Iran would be risking an American intervention, and if Iran had transferred sizable forces west, the American strike might smash into very thinly-defended Iranian positions and break their lines. If America was already an active Indian ally, Iran would be almost certain to suffer such an attack. The logistical difficulty derives from the fewness and poorness of the communications across Iran's eastern border.
III. The Diplomatic Option
Of course, India could simply choose to not attack Pakistan. Presumably, this would mean limiting active anti-terrorist operations to raids on training camps in Pakistani territory (which India hasn't yet even started to do), and improving port, border and internal security.
The obvious aim would be to buy time in which the Indian economy could continue to grow, the Indian armed forces to build-up, and any sane Pakistanis organize to reform their country and prevent a future war. Let us examine this alternative.
It is true that India has better long-term prospects for growth than Pakistan. If the current relative growth rates continue, in another 25-50 years, India will be strong and wealthy enough to deploy extensive missile defenses so that Pakistan can no longer pose a credible nuclear threat. And, of course, if Civilized elements in Pakistan are able to take back the armed forces from the Terrorists, no war would even be necessary.
The problem with this is that it assumes Pakistani inertia. And that can't be counted upon.
First of all, repeated attacks such as the Parliament bombing and the Mumbai massacre will severely cut into economic growth. No one wants to invest in a country which experiences frequent large-scale terrorist attacks. This could abort the Indian economic growth which is making it a Great Power and could in time make it a Superpower.
Secondly, the terrorist attacks could grow larger. What would prevent the Pakistanis from equipping their terrorists with biological, chemical or even nuclear devices? Over time, this could do as much damage as a strategic nuclear exchange, and to stop this one would have to have the exchange anyway.
Thirdly, Pakistan is aggressively expanding its own nuclear strike force, and is focusing on the construction of defense-penetrating systems like nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Because India borders Pakistan, this is a credible threat to all but the deepest-placed targets.
Fourthly, there is Pakistani politics to consider. If the Pakistani terrorists are able to strike into India without any bad consequences to Pakistan, then a pro-Terrorist diplomatic position will become ever more politically-attractive. Keep in mind that, to the Pakistanis, killing non-Muslims is a morally good thing, in and of itself.
Fifthly, there is Indian credibility in Pakistani eyes to consider. If India continues to suffer these attacks without significant retaliation -- retaliation at a level that might provoke a nuclear response anyway -- India confirms her weakness to Pakistan, and Pakistan will thus be tempted to launch even more attacks, and even more severe ones.
Finally, there is Indian politics to consider. These attacks radicalize the Indian population toward Hindu nationalism. The next Indian government might come to power on a straight-out "kill all the Muslims" platform -- and it might not distinguish between Indian and Pakistani Muslims, let alone Pakistani military vs. civilians.
Conclusion
For all these reasons, I would advise India to strike now, to strike hard, and to strike in the assumption that this is the beginning of a protracted conventional war which must end either in a Pakistani suit for peace with offer of materially-valuable terms, or the destruction of Pakistan. Failing to do so risks a bigger and more destructive war, later.
Furthermore, I would advise India to strike at Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from the beginning of the war, with the objective of destroying both Pakistan's arsenal and her nuclear weapons production capability as rapidly as possible. Pakistan needs to be de-fanged, and the risk that Pakistan may launch rather than lose their remaining weapons is less than the risk that they may launch anyway, at full strength.
The time for war is now. Pakistan has started it. Let India finish it.
END.
I've heard it argued by more than one person that, because Pakistan has nuclear weapons, India must simply suffer terrorist attacks from Pakistan without doing anything in response which could decisively end the terrorist threat -- that it would be strategically crazy to start a potentially nuclear war. Still less should India try to take out the Pakistani nuclear arsenal on the ground, because Pakistan could launch at least some of its weapons and inflict grievous harm on India.
I propose to examine these premises -- and the alternatives.
I. National Comparisons
A. Population and Economy
India has a population of over 1 billion and a GNP of over 4 trillion, for roughly $4000 per capita. Pakistan has a population of over 150 million and a GNP of around $450 billion, which is roughly $3000 per capita. Hence, India has more than 6 times as many people as Pakistan, who are roughly 34% more productive each, generating a whopping total of almost 25 times as much national product -- with all that implies for the ability to expand militarily in a prolonged war.
It may be objected that 150 million of the Indian population is actually Muslim. In reality, few of these Muslims would be willing to fight for a Pakistani victory, but even if you added the Muslim populations of Pakistan and India, that would still be 850 million non-Muslims to 300 million Muslims.
This is both an argument that the Indians would inevitably win any protracted war, whether it be nuclear or otherwise, and an argument against India launching such a war. The reason why is that the superior Indian population and productivity means that their economy will over time enjoy the benefits of a compounded advantage, growing even bigger, and hence supporting the construction of sufficient ABM's to make a nuclear war in the future be less destructive than one at the present.
This, I believe, ignores the Pakistani advantages of proximity. If one believes that the Pakistanis are insane, and willing to launch countervalue now in response to a counterforce strike despite the fact that the Indian response would be successful genocide of Pakistan, then the Pakistanis will presumably continue to build an offensive nuclear force until they have the capability to kill most Indians upon a successful strike (which they currently lack). The fact that India in part within SRBM and wholly within IRBM range of Pakistan gives the Pakistani attacker a cost advantage: they don't have to buy expensive ICBM's or SSBN's with SLBM's to hit their foe. And the ultimate Indian threat to Pakistan cannot get worse than it is -- you cannot annihilate a nation more than once.
B. Strategic Forces
India has possessed nuclear weapons since 1974. As of 2005 India had 100-140 warheads, and was engaged in a program to expand the force to 500 or more by 2015. We may therefore reasonably assume that India has around 150 nuclear weapons at present. India has enough plutonium to build about 2000 weapons, if necessary. These weapons are deliverable by a wide variety of missiles -- India is spaceflight-capable.
Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since 1998. As of 2005 India had about 60 warheads, but was engaged in an aggressive program of expansion. However, this program is limited by production equipment bottlenecks. Pakistan probably has a slightly larger arsenal now -- I'll guess "75" for the sake of neat division, though it could be rather higher or lower than that.
India thus has roughly twice as many nuclear warheads than Pakistan. India also has the signfiicant advantage of strategic depth, which means that much of the Indian arsenal can be based at a sufficient distance from the border that a Pakistani first strike would not be able to hit it before it could launch; Pakistan has much less capability in this regard.
When we get to air force matchups, you will see another advantage. India, with the bigger air force, can take out quite a lot of Pakistani targets by air -- Pakistan can only do this readily in the border region. Air superiority is very strategically important when one borders one's foe. This means that India need not allocate nuclear missiles to every Pakistani launch site, but can instead take some of them out with conventional air strikes.
In terms of a countervalue duel, India's 150 warheads compared to Pakistan's 150 million population means 1 Indian warhead per million Pakistanis, while Pakistan's 75 million warheads compared to India's 1000 million population means 1 Pakistani warhead per 13 million Indians. It's much more complex than that, because of questions of population density and locations, but, essentially what this means is that India could wipe out almost every Pakistani who lived in a town or larger conurbation, while Pakistan could not do the same to India, even if every Pakistani warhead was launched, penetrated Indian defenses, hit its target and worked (an improbably effective strike efficiency!).
In other words, an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would not be "Mutually Assured Destruction," and assumptions based upon MAD would not apply well to the war.
The important question of warhead yields has not been addressed yet. When considering this, please understand that due to the geometry of explosions and of targets, twice the yield is not twice the effectiveness -- it is more like 1.25 the effectiveness, assuming an infinite target size, and probably less (which is why most strategic H-bombs are designed to yield 0.5 to 2 MT even though they could theoretically be designed to yield 5-100 MT with current technology).
The newer Indian warheads are thermonuclear (i.e. "H-bombs") and probably have a yield of about 500+ KT per warhead. (1000 KT = 1 MT). Older Indian warheads are mostly plutonium implosion devices (i.e. "A-bombs") and probably have a yield of about 10-100 KT per warhead. Because India is rapidly expanding its arsenal, we may assume that this means 30-45 H-Bombs and around 100-120 A-Bombs. Strategically, H-bombs would probably be targeted on Pakistani cities (1 H-bomb can destroy any but the largest city, and badly damage even the largest ones) and A-bombs on Pakistani missile sites.
There is some doubt as to whether or not the Pakistanis have yet managed to gain thermonuclear weapons capability. It is possible that all 75 or so Pakistani warheads are 15-30 KT yield A-bombs. A single bomb of that size would NOT destroy a large city such as Mumbai or New Delhi, though of course it would destroy whatever neighborhood of the city it hit. (For historical reference, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki were "large" cities by modern standards).
In other words, the Indian strategic forces advantage is even greater than a direct comparison of warhead numbers would imply. Even the Indian A-bombs probably have higher yields than their Pakistani counterparts -- and the Pakistani cities are geographically smaller.
The only strategic nuclear advantage possessed by Pakistani is insanity. A full-out exchange between India and Pakistan, with no intercepts, misses or duds on either side (improbable, as even the American nuclear dud rate is probably 10-25%), would badly hurt India -- and utterly destroy Paksitan.
C. Conventional Forces
(1) - Airpower
India has around 170,000 air force personnel and 768 warplanes. Major constituents of this force include Su-30K fighters, Mirage2000's and MiG-29's. There is also a large number of old MiG-21's, which would still have some capability against Pakistan's older strike aircraft, and any level bombers. Jaguar's and MiG-27's form the main component of India's strike force.
Air defenses include a number of Akash SAM's, which are roughly comparable in accuracy (but not range) to the American Patriot. As point-defense systems, they might be able to intercept some Pakistani SRBM's, and would have considerable capability against Pakistani manned bombers. There are also numerous older SAM's available, including a lot of SA-3's.
Pakistan has around 65,000 air force personnel and 550 warplanes. The main threat comes from F-16 Falcons and JF-17 Thunders (American and Chinese respectively), but most of the force consists of F-7's (MiG-21's) and Mirage 5's, which are inferior to most of the Indian warplanes. The smaller number of support personnel has bad implications for the Pakistani ability to conduct a protracted air campaign.
The Pakistanis have recently begun acquiring some extremely advanced air defense systems. This might give them a limited anti-SRBM capability, and would definitely make operating in Pakistani airspace very dangerous for any non-Stealth capable aircraft (neither Power has any Stealth aircraft). They also have large numbers of older SAM systems.
India has the advantage in the air, but only a small one -- in raw numbers about 40-50%, and with quality factored in maybe 75-100%. This suggests that the early phase of an Indo-Pakistani War would see extensive air combat with serious losses on both sides, but that as the campaign progressed, India would gain air superiority (though perhaps not full air supremacy).
(2) - Navies
The Indians have a very powerful navy, with 55,000 personnel and 155 vessels. The fleet includes 2 aircraft carriers (1 45,000-ton and 1 25,000-ton); 9 destroyers, 12 frigates, 20 corvettes, and a number of older units not fitted with modern naval missiles; 13 squadrons of naval aircraft (mostly helicopters); and 16 submarines (all diesel).
The Pakistanis have 24,000 personnel but only a few real warships, the vast majority of the fleet being comprised of gunboats and patrol vessels. Their force includes 10 missile frigates and 4-6 missile boats on surface; 5 submarines, and a few helicopter squadrons.
As can be seen, the Indian navy is several times the strength of, and in wartime would probably quickly bottle up, the Pakistani. Historically, India has won almost all her naval battles with Pakistan.
(3) - Armies
India has an army of about 1.3 million with 1.2 million in reserve, and fields 34 divisions. Pakistan has an army of about 620 thousand with 528 thousand in reserve, and fields 10 corps (about 30 divisions). Quality of forces is roughly similar. India's immediate ground advantage is hence a marginal one, far less than the 3:1+ needed to generate offensive momentum, and the early phase of an Indo-Pakistani War would see a stalemate on the frontiers.
However, that is not the whole story. Remember India's much-larger population and economy? This means that in a protracted war, India would be able to mobilize a larger and larger army, until she eventually achieved sufficient numbers to break Pakistan's lines and drive into the Pakistani interior. If I had to guess, I would say that India could support an army of about 10-50 million long-term, while Pakistan would have difficulty keeping her current army-plus-reserves of 1 million supplied in a prolonged conflict.
India, in short, could support a big enough armed force to form a sizable minority of the civilian population of Pakistan, which means that once the Pakistani lines were broken, India would have a free hand in terms of occupation policy. Conquest, regime change, colonization, and even genocide would be militarily possible.
Pakistan could not do the same no matter how big an army she fielded. If the entire Indian Army magically vanished tomorrow, the Pakistani maximum army of about 1.5 million would be inadequate to keep the Indian civilian population from forming militias capable of contesting an occupation.
II. Strategic Implications
A. Course of the War
In all categories, therefore, the Indians have the advantage -- whether decisive (naval), sizable (strategic, conventional airpower) or long-term (ground strengths). There is no way for the Indians to lose a war with Pakistan save by incompetence or a failure of nerve. It is, therefore, incompetence or a failure of nerve on which any semblance of a sane Pakistani strategy must rest.
The obvious Pakistani threat is "Attack us and we'll nuke you." However, when we compare the strategic forces, this boils down to "attack us and we'll hurt you badly even though we all die and lose our nation forever in the process." This is a very weak threat, save for the factor of Pakistani insanity. And even with Pakistani insanity factored in, successful execution of this threat requires that the Pakistanis strike first -- if India strikes first, the threat is modified to "Attack us and we'll hurt you slightly even though we all die and lose our nation forever in the process," which is almost a laughable threat.
India thus occupies a very strong diplomatic position and should push it hard, no matter what Pakistan threatens. If it comes to actual fighting, India's worst mistake would be to not execute a pre-emptive counterforce strike on the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, because in failing to do so, the Pakistani nuclear threat becomes far more potent.
Furthermore, if it comes to war, India must avoid the temptations to go easy on Pakistan, and to quickly seeking a ceasefire. Limiting the scope of the war is utterly to Pakistan's advantage (because India has the larger force), and so is a quick ceasefire (because India has the long-term force expansion advantage). A ceasefire or treaty should only be allowed to the Pakistanis at a considerable price -- India could keep the war going for as long as she has to keep it going.
My hope here is that India's newfound increased hatred of Pakistan will trump her tradition of diplomatic reasonableness. A protracted war with Pakistan will not only prove victorious, but will burn up almost entirely a whole generation of Pakistan's young manhood, gravely impairing Pakistan's future demographic and economic growth. If coupled with a strategic bombardment of Pakistan -- even a purely-conventional one -- the last quarter-century of Pakistani economic progress might be destroyed. Thus, even without an actual conquest of Pakistan, the country could be reduced to a negligible threat in the future. What is even better, the same would not happen to India, which has vast reserves of both blood and treasure.
B. American Involvement
This assumes that America is neutral or, at best, a friendly neutral toward India. (An American alliance with Pakistan against India is politically impossible at present, regardless of the old CENTO pact). If America, instead, allies with India against Pakistan, the strategic position both of America and India immeasurably improve.
Strategically, the US Air Force could use Stealth aircraft to unplug the whole Pakistani air defense system, and to take out Pakistani nuclear missiles before they could be launched. Air-Borne Lasers could shoot down some or all of the launching missiles in the boost phase. If the US deployed Patriot batteries to India, the few Pakistani missiles that survived this attrition would never strike their targets. Pakistan might score no nuclear hits on India.
(Please note that this would be very much a victory for humanitarian concerns. If Pakistan hits an Indian city with a nuclear missile, the annihilation of Pakistan as a nation is practically assured).
US naval airpower could give the Indian Air Froce a decisive edge, allowing the Indians to gain air superiority over Pakistani territory in the first days of fighting. This would in turn give the Indians a major ground advantage, allowing Indian mechanized breakthroughs within the first month or two. US Marines could seize Pakistani ports, and then the US Army itself, redeploying from Iraq, could surge in, flanking the Pakistani lines and causing a complete enemy military collapse.
It would be a brilliant victory. Does Obama have the courage to attempt it?
C. Other Involvement
The countries likely to sympathize with Pakistan in such a war, and in a position to do something about it, would be Russia, China and Iran.
Russia and China would both be limited to either supplying Pakistan by air (sea would presumably be impossible if the Indians blockade Pakistan) or launching their own strategic forces. The former would not be decisive, and the latter is improbable -- neither Russia nor China have enough at stake in an Indo-Pakistani War to risk war against the United States of America -- or even, really, to risk the damage they would suffer from a nuclear exchange with India.
Iran could intervene with all sorts of conventional forces. However, such an intervention would be both logistically difficult and strategically unwise. If America was not yet an active Indian ally, Iran would be risking an American intervention, and if Iran had transferred sizable forces west, the American strike might smash into very thinly-defended Iranian positions and break their lines. If America was already an active Indian ally, Iran would be almost certain to suffer such an attack. The logistical difficulty derives from the fewness and poorness of the communications across Iran's eastern border.
III. The Diplomatic Option
Of course, India could simply choose to not attack Pakistan. Presumably, this would mean limiting active anti-terrorist operations to raids on training camps in Pakistani territory (which India hasn't yet even started to do), and improving port, border and internal security.
The obvious aim would be to buy time in which the Indian economy could continue to grow, the Indian armed forces to build-up, and any sane Pakistanis organize to reform their country and prevent a future war. Let us examine this alternative.
It is true that India has better long-term prospects for growth than Pakistan. If the current relative growth rates continue, in another 25-50 years, India will be strong and wealthy enough to deploy extensive missile defenses so that Pakistan can no longer pose a credible nuclear threat. And, of course, if Civilized elements in Pakistan are able to take back the armed forces from the Terrorists, no war would even be necessary.
The problem with this is that it assumes Pakistani inertia. And that can't be counted upon.
First of all, repeated attacks such as the Parliament bombing and the Mumbai massacre will severely cut into economic growth. No one wants to invest in a country which experiences frequent large-scale terrorist attacks. This could abort the Indian economic growth which is making it a Great Power and could in time make it a Superpower.
Secondly, the terrorist attacks could grow larger. What would prevent the Pakistanis from equipping their terrorists with biological, chemical or even nuclear devices? Over time, this could do as much damage as a strategic nuclear exchange, and to stop this one would have to have the exchange anyway.
Thirdly, Pakistan is aggressively expanding its own nuclear strike force, and is focusing on the construction of defense-penetrating systems like nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Because India borders Pakistan, this is a credible threat to all but the deepest-placed targets.
Fourthly, there is Pakistani politics to consider. If the Pakistani terrorists are able to strike into India without any bad consequences to Pakistan, then a pro-Terrorist diplomatic position will become ever more politically-attractive. Keep in mind that, to the Pakistanis, killing non-Muslims is a morally good thing, in and of itself.
Fifthly, there is Indian credibility in Pakistani eyes to consider. If India continues to suffer these attacks without significant retaliation -- retaliation at a level that might provoke a nuclear response anyway -- India confirms her weakness to Pakistan, and Pakistan will thus be tempted to launch even more attacks, and even more severe ones.
Finally, there is Indian politics to consider. These attacks radicalize the Indian population toward Hindu nationalism. The next Indian government might come to power on a straight-out "kill all the Muslims" platform -- and it might not distinguish between Indian and Pakistani Muslims, let alone Pakistani military vs. civilians.
Conclusion
For all these reasons, I would advise India to strike now, to strike hard, and to strike in the assumption that this is the beginning of a protracted conventional war which must end either in a Pakistani suit for peace with offer of materially-valuable terms, or the destruction of Pakistan. Failing to do so risks a bigger and more destructive war, later.
Furthermore, I would advise India to strike at Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from the beginning of the war, with the objective of destroying both Pakistan's arsenal and her nuclear weapons production capability as rapidly as possible. Pakistan needs to be de-fanged, and the risk that Pakistan may launch rather than lose their remaining weapons is less than the risk that they may launch anyway, at full strength.
The time for war is now. Pakistan has started it. Let India finish it.
END.