Should We Pull Out of South Korea?
Doug Bandow, in "Seoul Searching" (posted on National Interest)
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218
makes the argument that we should. He points out that
South Korea is a helpless international dependent no longer. The South ranks among the world’s top-dozen economies and is the third most important geopolitical player in East Asia. Also, the ROK long ago raced past the North in every measure of national power. South Korea has twice the population, upwards of forty times the GDP, a vast technological edge, and far more allies and friends. Seoul’s military budget approaches the DPRK’s entire GDP.
Which is certainly true, and very unlike the situation that originally compelled us to commit ourselves to the defense of South Korea.
He also argues that
Moreover, the North’s one-time military allies, Russia and China, both recognized Seoul as the cold war concluded. The ROK now does more business with Beijing than with America. The likelihood of either Moscow or Beijing backing North Korea in any new war is somewhere between infinitesimal and zero. The rest of East Asia would unreservedly stand behind South Korea.
which is less certainly true, but is also probably true. Both Russia and China would be killing a goose laying golden eggs for them by invading South Korea; both Powers are rational enough actors that it is improbable that either would do so simply to please Kim Jong Il, who is more of an albatross to them than a valuable ally. It is highly debatable whether any East Asian Powers would "unreservedly stand behind South Korea" as Bandow claims: I think that Bandow, from the safety of an oceanic separation, underestimates the degree to which a Russian or Chinese invasion would intimidate countries that actually have to live on (or just offshore) the same continent. But he's mostly right, so I'll grant him the point.
This is the kicker that I think cements his case:
And yet, Seoul has spent the last decade subsidizing the North. Providing aid to and investing in one’s enemy is a curious strategy for dealing with a supposed security threat. If the ROK actually fears the North, it should have redirected some of the aid money to its military budget.
Bingo. Now, one could argue that South Korea has done so largely out of fear of the exceedingly-irrational Kim Jong Il, but still -- it's been many years now. South Korea has had plenty of time to build up her defenses, plenty of time to build atomic weapons of her own, plenty of time even to develop ballistic missile defenses. For a country as rich and powerful as South Korea to claim to need American protection from a weaker Power smacks of a scam.
Perhaps it would be better for South Korea to survive on her own. Though Bandow doesn't mention it, the South Korean people have repeatedly complained of our presence: then let us rid them of this bothersome presence, and let South Korea ramp up her own defense budget to make up the difference. There's no good reason for America to subsidize a rich and recalcitrant "ally" who is simultaneously subsidizing the enemy against whom that alliance was directed.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218
makes the argument that we should. He points out that
South Korea is a helpless international dependent no longer. The South ranks among the world’s top-dozen economies and is the third most important geopolitical player in East Asia. Also, the ROK long ago raced past the North in every measure of national power. South Korea has twice the population, upwards of forty times the GDP, a vast technological edge, and far more allies and friends. Seoul’s military budget approaches the DPRK’s entire GDP.
Which is certainly true, and very unlike the situation that originally compelled us to commit ourselves to the defense of South Korea.
He also argues that
Moreover, the North’s one-time military allies, Russia and China, both recognized Seoul as the cold war concluded. The ROK now does more business with Beijing than with America. The likelihood of either Moscow or Beijing backing North Korea in any new war is somewhere between infinitesimal and zero. The rest of East Asia would unreservedly stand behind South Korea.
which is less certainly true, but is also probably true. Both Russia and China would be killing a goose laying golden eggs for them by invading South Korea; both Powers are rational enough actors that it is improbable that either would do so simply to please Kim Jong Il, who is more of an albatross to them than a valuable ally. It is highly debatable whether any East Asian Powers would "unreservedly stand behind South Korea" as Bandow claims: I think that Bandow, from the safety of an oceanic separation, underestimates the degree to which a Russian or Chinese invasion would intimidate countries that actually have to live on (or just offshore) the same continent. But he's mostly right, so I'll grant him the point.
This is the kicker that I think cements his case:
And yet, Seoul has spent the last decade subsidizing the North. Providing aid to and investing in one’s enemy is a curious strategy for dealing with a supposed security threat. If the ROK actually fears the North, it should have redirected some of the aid money to its military budget.
Bingo. Now, one could argue that South Korea has done so largely out of fear of the exceedingly-irrational Kim Jong Il, but still -- it's been many years now. South Korea has had plenty of time to build up her defenses, plenty of time to build atomic weapons of her own, plenty of time even to develop ballistic missile defenses. For a country as rich and powerful as South Korea to claim to need American protection from a weaker Power smacks of a scam.
Perhaps it would be better for South Korea to survive on her own. Though Bandow doesn't mention it, the South Korean people have repeatedly complained of our presence: then let us rid them of this bothersome presence, and let South Korea ramp up her own defense budget to make up the difference. There's no good reason for America to subsidize a rich and recalcitrant "ally" who is simultaneously subsidizing the enemy against whom that alliance was directed.