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Опубликовали отчет специального прокурора Дарема:
... С. Investigative Referral of Possible Clinton Campaign Plan
1. Factual background
The Office also considered as part of its investigation the government's handling of certain intelligence that it received during the summer of 2016. That intelligence concerned the purported "approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services." 391 We refer to that intelligence hereafter as the "Clinton Plan intelligence.'' DNI John Ratcliffe declassified the following information about the Clinton Plan intelligence in September 2020 and conveyed it to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
• In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee.
The IC does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.
• According to his handwritten notes, CIA Director Brennan subsequently briefed President Obama and other senior national security officials on the intelligence, including the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services."
The Office also considered as part of its investigation the government's handling of certain intelligence that it received during the summer of 2016. That intelligence concerned the purported "approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services." 391 We refer to that intelligence hereafter as the "Clinton Plan intelligence.'' DNI John Ratcliffe declassified the following information about the Clinton Plan intelligence in September 2020 and conveyed it to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
• On 07 September 2016, U.S. intelligence officials forwarded an investigative referral to FBI Director James Corney and Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok regarding "U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering U.S. elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private mail server." 392
The Clinton Plan intelligence was relevant to the Office's investigation for two reasons. First, the Clinton Plan intelligence itself and on its face arguably suggested that private actors affiliated with the Clinton campaign were seeking in 2016 to promote a false or exaggerated narrative to the public and to U.S. government agencies about Trump's possible ties to Russia. Given the significant quantity of materials the FBI and other government agencies did in fact receive during the 2016 presidential election season and afterwards that originated with and/or were funded by the Clinton campaign or affiliated persons (i.e., the Steele Dossier reports, the Alfa Bank allegations, and the Yotaphone allegations), the Clinton Plan intelligence prompted the Office to consider (i) whether there was in fact a plan by the Clinton campaign to tie Trump to Russia in order to "stir[] up a scandal" in advance of the 2016 presidential election, and (ii) if such a plan existed, whether an aspect or component of that plan was to intentionally provide knowingly false and/or misleading information to the FBI or other agencies in furtherance of such a plan. 393
393 To be clear, the Office did not and does not view the potential existence of a political plan by one campaign to spread negative claims about its opponent as illegal or criminal in any respect.
As prosecutors and the Court reminded the jury in the Sussmann trial, opposition research is commonplace in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere, is conducted by actors of all political parties, and is not a basis in and of itself for criminal liability. Rather, only if the evidence supported the latter of the two conditions described above-i.e., if there was an intent by the Clinton campaign or its personnel to knowingly provide false information to the government-would such conduct potentially support criminal charges.
Second, the Clinton Plan intelligence was also highly relevant to the Office's review and investigation because it was part of the mosaic of information that became known to certain U.S. officials at or before the time they made critical decisions in the Crossfire Hurricane case and in related law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Because these officials relied, at least in part, on materials provided or funded by the Clinton campaign and/or the DNC when seeking FISA
warrants against a U.S. citizen (i.e., the Steele Dossier reports) and taking other investigative steps, the Clinton Plan intelligence had potential bearing on the reliability and credibility of those materials. Put another way, this intelligence-taken at face value-was arguably highly relevant and exculpatory because it could be read in fuller context, and in combination \vith other facts, to suggest that materials such as the Steele Dossier reports and the Alfa Bank allegations (discussed
below and in greater detail in Section IV.E. l) were part of a political effort to smear a political opponent and to use the resources of the federal government's law enforcement and intelligence agencies in support of a political objective.
The Office therefore examined whether, and precisely when, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials became aware of the Clinton Plan intelligence; whether they vetted and analyzed the intelligence to understand its potential significance; and whether those officials, in turn, incorporated the intelligence into their decision-making regarding the investigation of individuals who were part ofthe Trump campaign and had possible ties to Russian election interference efforts.
As was declassified and made public previously, the purported Clinton Plan intelligence was derived from insight that "U.S. intelligence agencies obtained into Russian intelligence analysis." 394 Given the origins of the Clinton Plan intelligence as the product of a foreign adversary, the Office was cognizant of the statement that DNI Ratcliffe made to Senate Judiciary Chairman Lindsey Graham in a September 29, 2020 letter: "The [intelligence community] does
not know the accuracy ofthis allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.'' 395
Recognizing this uncertainty, the Office nevertheless endeavored to investigate the bases for, and credibility of, this intelligence in order to assess its accuracy and its potential implications for the broader matters within our purview.
Given the significance of the Clinton Plan intelligence, and the need to protect sources and methods of the Intelligence Community, we report the results of our investigation in bifurcated fashion. More specifically:
(I) This section describes in unclassified form the circumstances in which U.S. officials received and acted on ( or failed to act upon) the Clinton Plan intelligence, as well as the nature and significance oftheir reactions to it;
(2) The Classified Appendix to this report provides further information about (i) the details of the Clinton Plan intelligence; (ii) facts that heightened the potential relevance of this intelligence to the Office's inquiry; and (iii) the Office's efforts to verify or refute the key claims found in this intelligence.
a. Relevant facts
Before addressing the U.S. government's receipt and handling of the Clinton Plan intelligence, we reiterate below the description of that intelligence as declassified by the DNI in his September 29, 2020 letter to Chairman Graham. Ratcliffe's letter stated, in part, as follows:
In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee. 396
As described herein and in the Classified Appendix, U.S. officials described the Clinton Plan intelligence in various other ways in their official notes and documents. As described more fully in the Classified Appendix, there were specific indications and additional facts that heightened the potential relevance ofthis intelligence to the Office's inquiry.
i. Receipt of the Clinton Plan intelligence
The Intelligence Community received the Clinton Plan intelligence in late July 2016. 397
The official who initially received the information immediately recognized its importanceincluding its relevance to the U.S. presidential election- and acted quickly to make CIA leadership aware of it. 398 Materials obtained from former Director Brennan's office holdings reflect that he personally received a copy ofthe intelligence.399 When interviewed, Brennan generally recalled reviewing the materials but stated he did not recall focusing specifically on its assertions regarding the Clinton campaign's purported plan. 400 Brennan recalled instead focusing on Russia's role in hacking the DNC. 401
On July 28, 2016, Director Brennan met with President Obama and other White House personnel, during which Brennan and the President discussed intelligence relevant to the 2016 presidential election as well as the potential creation of an inter-agency Fusion Cell to synthesize and analyze intelligence about Russian malign influence on the 2016 presidential election. 402
Brennan's recollection was that he spoke with Director Comey on the morning of July 29, 2016, to brief him on his July 28th meeting with the President. 403 Brennan could not recall when he actually saw the Clinton Plan intelligence, but he did not think he had the information when he spoke to Comey on that morning.
Immediately after communicating with the President, Comey, and DNI Clapper to discuss relevant intelligence, Director Brennan and other agency officials took steps to ensure that dissemination of intelligence related to Russia's election interference efforts, including the Clinton Plan intelligence, would be limited to protect sensitive information and prevent leaks.404
Brennan stated that the inter-agency Fusion Cell, a team to synthesize and analyze pertinent intelligence on Russian malign influence activities related to the presidential election, was put in motion after his meeting with President Obama on July 28th. Email traffic and witness interviews conducted by the Office reflect that at least some CIA personnel believed that the Clinton Plan intelligence led to the decision being made to set up the Fusion Cell. 405
ii. White House briefing
On August 3, 20 I 6, within days ofreceiving the Clinton Plan intelligence, Director Brennan met with the President, Vice President and other senior Administration officials, including but not limited to the Attorney General (who participated remotely) and the FBI Director, in the White House Situation Room to discuss Russian election interference efforts. 406
According to Brennan's handwritten notes and his recollections from the meeting, he briefed on relevant intelligence known to date on Russian election interference, including the Clinton Plan intelligence. 407 Specifically, Director Brennan's declassified handwritten notes reflect that he briefed the meeting's participants regarding the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on 26 July of a proposal from one of her [campaign] advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services."408
iii. FBI awareness
The Office was unable to determine precisely when the FBI first obtained any of the details of the Clinton Plan intelligence (other than Director Comey, who attended the August 3, 2016 briefing). It appears, however, that this occurred no later than August 22, 2016. On that date, an FBI cyber analyst ("Headquarters Analyst-2") emailed a number of FBI employees, including Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Brian Auten and Section Chief Moffa, the most senior intelligence analysts on the Crossfire Hurricane team, to provide an update on Russian intelligence materials. 409
The email included a summary of the contents of the Clinton Plan intelligence. 410
The Office did not identify any replies or follow-up actions taken by FBI personnel as a result of this email.
When interviewed by the Office, Auten recalled that on September 2, 2016 - approximately ten days after Headquarters Analyst-2's email - the official responsible for overseeing the Fusion Cell briefed Auten, Moffa, and other FBI personnel at FBI Headquarters regarding the Clinton Plan intelligence. 411
Auten did not recall any FBI "operational" personnel (i.e., Crossfire Hurricane Agents) being present at the meeting. 412
The official verbally briefed the individuals regarding information that the CIA planned to send to the FBI in a written investigative referral, including the Clinton Plan intelligence information. 413
Auten recalled thinking at the meeting that he wanted to see the formal Referral }4emo containing the Clinton Plan intelligence. 414 Separate and apart from this meeting, FBI records reflect that by no later than that same date (September 2, 2016), then-FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Bill Priestap was also aware of the specifics of the Clinton Plan intelligence as evidenced by his hand-written notes from an early morning meeting with Moffa, DAD Dina Corsi and Acting AD for Cyber Eric Sporre. 415
The Office was unable to determine the exact contours of Priestap's knowledge, however, in part, because he declined to be interviewed by the Office on this subject. 416 ...
https://www.justice.gov/storage/durhamreport.pdf
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Ну, то есть российская сторона по каналам спецслужб передала американцам данные по предвыборному "плану Клинтон" по фабрикации данных о связях Трампа с Россией. Как показали дальнейшие события, данные были точные, а тот политический ад, который разверзся был не в российских интересах.
"Ух-ты, как интересно", - решили американские коллеги/партнеры и утроили усилия по борьбе с российским влиянием на американские выборы по "плану Клинтон".
... С. Investigative Referral of Possible Clinton Campaign Plan
1. Factual background
The Office also considered as part of its investigation the government's handling of certain intelligence that it received during the summer of 2016. That intelligence concerned the purported "approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services." 391 We refer to that intelligence hereafter as the "Clinton Plan intelligence.'' DNI John Ratcliffe declassified the following information about the Clinton Plan intelligence in September 2020 and conveyed it to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
• In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee.
The IC does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.
• According to his handwritten notes, CIA Director Brennan subsequently briefed President Obama and other senior national security officials on the intelligence, including the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services."
The Office also considered as part of its investigation the government's handling of certain intelligence that it received during the summer of 2016. That intelligence concerned the purported "approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services." 391 We refer to that intelligence hereafter as the "Clinton Plan intelligence.'' DNI John Ratcliffe declassified the following information about the Clinton Plan intelligence in September 2020 and conveyed it to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
• On 07 September 2016, U.S. intelligence officials forwarded an investigative referral to FBI Director James Corney and Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok regarding "U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering U.S. elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private mail server." 392
The Clinton Plan intelligence was relevant to the Office's investigation for two reasons. First, the Clinton Plan intelligence itself and on its face arguably suggested that private actors affiliated with the Clinton campaign were seeking in 2016 to promote a false or exaggerated narrative to the public and to U.S. government agencies about Trump's possible ties to Russia. Given the significant quantity of materials the FBI and other government agencies did in fact receive during the 2016 presidential election season and afterwards that originated with and/or were funded by the Clinton campaign or affiliated persons (i.e., the Steele Dossier reports, the Alfa Bank allegations, and the Yotaphone allegations), the Clinton Plan intelligence prompted the Office to consider (i) whether there was in fact a plan by the Clinton campaign to tie Trump to Russia in order to "stir[] up a scandal" in advance of the 2016 presidential election, and (ii) if such a plan existed, whether an aspect or component of that plan was to intentionally provide knowingly false and/or misleading information to the FBI or other agencies in furtherance of such a plan. 393
393 To be clear, the Office did not and does not view the potential existence of a political plan by one campaign to spread negative claims about its opponent as illegal or criminal in any respect.
As prosecutors and the Court reminded the jury in the Sussmann trial, opposition research is commonplace in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere, is conducted by actors of all political parties, and is not a basis in and of itself for criminal liability. Rather, only if the evidence supported the latter of the two conditions described above-i.e., if there was an intent by the Clinton campaign or its personnel to knowingly provide false information to the government-would such conduct potentially support criminal charges.
Second, the Clinton Plan intelligence was also highly relevant to the Office's review and investigation because it was part of the mosaic of information that became known to certain U.S. officials at or before the time they made critical decisions in the Crossfire Hurricane case and in related law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Because these officials relied, at least in part, on materials provided or funded by the Clinton campaign and/or the DNC when seeking FISA
warrants against a U.S. citizen (i.e., the Steele Dossier reports) and taking other investigative steps, the Clinton Plan intelligence had potential bearing on the reliability and credibility of those materials. Put another way, this intelligence-taken at face value-was arguably highly relevant and exculpatory because it could be read in fuller context, and in combination \vith other facts, to suggest that materials such as the Steele Dossier reports and the Alfa Bank allegations (discussed
below and in greater detail in Section IV.E. l) were part of a political effort to smear a political opponent and to use the resources of the federal government's law enforcement and intelligence agencies in support of a political objective.
The Office therefore examined whether, and precisely when, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials became aware of the Clinton Plan intelligence; whether they vetted and analyzed the intelligence to understand its potential significance; and whether those officials, in turn, incorporated the intelligence into their decision-making regarding the investigation of individuals who were part ofthe Trump campaign and had possible ties to Russian election interference efforts.
As was declassified and made public previously, the purported Clinton Plan intelligence was derived from insight that "U.S. intelligence agencies obtained into Russian intelligence analysis." 394 Given the origins of the Clinton Plan intelligence as the product of a foreign adversary, the Office was cognizant of the statement that DNI Ratcliffe made to Senate Judiciary Chairman Lindsey Graham in a September 29, 2020 letter: "The [intelligence community] does
not know the accuracy ofthis allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.'' 395
Recognizing this uncertainty, the Office nevertheless endeavored to investigate the bases for, and credibility of, this intelligence in order to assess its accuracy and its potential implications for the broader matters within our purview.
Given the significance of the Clinton Plan intelligence, and the need to protect sources and methods of the Intelligence Community, we report the results of our investigation in bifurcated fashion. More specifically:
(I) This section describes in unclassified form the circumstances in which U.S. officials received and acted on ( or failed to act upon) the Clinton Plan intelligence, as well as the nature and significance oftheir reactions to it;
(2) The Classified Appendix to this report provides further information about (i) the details of the Clinton Plan intelligence; (ii) facts that heightened the potential relevance of this intelligence to the Office's inquiry; and (iii) the Office's efforts to verify or refute the key claims found in this intelligence.
a. Relevant facts
Before addressing the U.S. government's receipt and handling of the Clinton Plan intelligence, we reiterate below the description of that intelligence as declassified by the DNI in his September 29, 2020 letter to Chairman Graham. Ratcliffe's letter stated, in part, as follows:
In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee. 396
As described herein and in the Classified Appendix, U.S. officials described the Clinton Plan intelligence in various other ways in their official notes and documents. As described more fully in the Classified Appendix, there were specific indications and additional facts that heightened the potential relevance ofthis intelligence to the Office's inquiry.
i. Receipt of the Clinton Plan intelligence
The Intelligence Community received the Clinton Plan intelligence in late July 2016. 397
The official who initially received the information immediately recognized its importanceincluding its relevance to the U.S. presidential election- and acted quickly to make CIA leadership aware of it. 398 Materials obtained from former Director Brennan's office holdings reflect that he personally received a copy ofthe intelligence.399 When interviewed, Brennan generally recalled reviewing the materials but stated he did not recall focusing specifically on its assertions regarding the Clinton campaign's purported plan. 400 Brennan recalled instead focusing on Russia's role in hacking the DNC. 401
On July 28, 2016, Director Brennan met with President Obama and other White House personnel, during which Brennan and the President discussed intelligence relevant to the 2016 presidential election as well as the potential creation of an inter-agency Fusion Cell to synthesize and analyze intelligence about Russian malign influence on the 2016 presidential election. 402
Brennan's recollection was that he spoke with Director Comey on the morning of July 29, 2016, to brief him on his July 28th meeting with the President. 403 Brennan could not recall when he actually saw the Clinton Plan intelligence, but he did not think he had the information when he spoke to Comey on that morning.
Immediately after communicating with the President, Comey, and DNI Clapper to discuss relevant intelligence, Director Brennan and other agency officials took steps to ensure that dissemination of intelligence related to Russia's election interference efforts, including the Clinton Plan intelligence, would be limited to protect sensitive information and prevent leaks.404
Brennan stated that the inter-agency Fusion Cell, a team to synthesize and analyze pertinent intelligence on Russian malign influence activities related to the presidential election, was put in motion after his meeting with President Obama on July 28th. Email traffic and witness interviews conducted by the Office reflect that at least some CIA personnel believed that the Clinton Plan intelligence led to the decision being made to set up the Fusion Cell. 405
ii. White House briefing
On August 3, 20 I 6, within days ofreceiving the Clinton Plan intelligence, Director Brennan met with the President, Vice President and other senior Administration officials, including but not limited to the Attorney General (who participated remotely) and the FBI Director, in the White House Situation Room to discuss Russian election interference efforts. 406
According to Brennan's handwritten notes and his recollections from the meeting, he briefed on relevant intelligence known to date on Russian election interference, including the Clinton Plan intelligence. 407 Specifically, Director Brennan's declassified handwritten notes reflect that he briefed the meeting's participants regarding the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on 26 July of a proposal from one of her [campaign] advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services."408
iii. FBI awareness
The Office was unable to determine precisely when the FBI first obtained any of the details of the Clinton Plan intelligence (other than Director Comey, who attended the August 3, 2016 briefing). It appears, however, that this occurred no later than August 22, 2016. On that date, an FBI cyber analyst ("Headquarters Analyst-2") emailed a number of FBI employees, including Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Brian Auten and Section Chief Moffa, the most senior intelligence analysts on the Crossfire Hurricane team, to provide an update on Russian intelligence materials. 409
The email included a summary of the contents of the Clinton Plan intelligence. 410
The Office did not identify any replies or follow-up actions taken by FBI personnel as a result of this email.
When interviewed by the Office, Auten recalled that on September 2, 2016 - approximately ten days after Headquarters Analyst-2's email - the official responsible for overseeing the Fusion Cell briefed Auten, Moffa, and other FBI personnel at FBI Headquarters regarding the Clinton Plan intelligence. 411
Auten did not recall any FBI "operational" personnel (i.e., Crossfire Hurricane Agents) being present at the meeting. 412
The official verbally briefed the individuals regarding information that the CIA planned to send to the FBI in a written investigative referral, including the Clinton Plan intelligence information. 413
Auten recalled thinking at the meeting that he wanted to see the formal Referral }4emo containing the Clinton Plan intelligence. 414 Separate and apart from this meeting, FBI records reflect that by no later than that same date (September 2, 2016), then-FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Bill Priestap was also aware of the specifics of the Clinton Plan intelligence as evidenced by his hand-written notes from an early morning meeting with Moffa, DAD Dina Corsi and Acting AD for Cyber Eric Sporre. 415
The Office was unable to determine the exact contours of Priestap's knowledge, however, in part, because he declined to be interviewed by the Office on this subject. 416 ...
https://www.justice.gov/storage/durhamreport.pdf
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Ну, то есть российская сторона по каналам спецслужб передала американцам данные по предвыборному "плану Клинтон" по фабрикации данных о связях Трампа с Россией. Как показали дальнейшие события, данные были точные, а тот политический ад, который разверзся был не в российских интересах.
"Ух-ты, как интересно", - решили американские коллеги/партнеры и утроили усилия по борьбе с российским влиянием на американские выборы по "плану Клинтон".