Bush isn't being honest, but scaring the american people.
(The following is prepared for a message board, but ezboard is down right now. Just ignore the references to the board.)
Here. I picked some things apart. I'm not trying to start a argument or anything, just trying to put some information out. The IAEA statements are really long. I'm new to posting in politics so be patient with me.
1.
Bush says,
[quote]
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. (Applause.) And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.
[/quote]
IAEA says,
[quote]I. BACKGROUND
2. In resolution 687 (1991), the IAEA was tasked with mapping out and destroying, removing or rendering harmless, the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. It was also tasked with ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under that and other relevant resolutions. The IAEA's plan for such ongoing monitoring and verification (the OMV Plan) was approved by the Security Council in resolution 715 (1991). Among the other relevant resolutions is resolution 707 (1991), pursuant to which Iraq is prohibited from engaging in any nuclear activities, except the use of radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes, until such time as the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), and the IAEA determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the Agreement between Iraq and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement).
3. On 16 December 1998, IAEA inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. This action was taken after the decision by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), on whose logistic support the IAEA's activities in Iraq were dependent, to withdraw all of its personnel from Iraq, and out of concern for the safety and security of our personnel in anticipation of imminent military action.
4. By the time the inspectors were withdrawn, the IAEA had been able to draw a comprehensive and coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme, and to dismantle the programme. The IAEA had destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all of the physical capabilities of Iraq to produce amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. The IAEA had concluded with respect to Iraq's past nuclear programme that:
a. There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had been successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons.
b. All nuclear material of significance to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was verified and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) was removed from Iraq.
c. Iraq had successfully concentrated uranium from its own ore and produced industrial quantities of feed material (UCl4) for electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS). There were no indications that the production of feed material for centrifuge enrichment (UF6) went beyond laboratory level.
d. Iraq had been at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of high enriched uranium through the EMIS process and the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines. However, there were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material through its indigenous processes.
e. Iraq had explored several other enrichment routes, including gaseous diffusion, chemical enrichment and laser enrichment without achieving any significant progress.
f. Iraq had made major progress in the area of weaponisation, but still had significant hurdles to overcome before being able to complete the fabrication of a first nuclear implosion device.
g. There were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.
h. There were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD) submitted by Iraq to the IAEA, pursuant to resolution 707 (1991), in 1996, and supplemented in 1998.
5. As of December 1998, there were no key outstanding disarmament issues in the nuclear area, although there were a number of questions and concerns about Iraq's past nuclear programme the clarification of which by Iraq would have reduced the uncertainty in the completeness of the IAEA's knowledge and understanding. These remaining questions and concerns related to: the uncertainty about the progress made in weapons design and centrifuge development due to the lack of relevant documentation; the extent of external assistance from which Iraq benefited; and the lack of evidence that Iraq had abandoned definitively its nuclear programme.
6. In the four years following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors, the IAEA's activities in Iraq were limited to annual verification, pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement, of the nuclear material (several tons of yellow cake and other natural uranium and some low enriched and depleted uranium) that remained in Iraq under IAEA seal.
7. During that intervening period, the Security Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999), which, inter alia, established UNMOVIC, reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, established procedures and time frames for the implementation by the IAEA and UNMOVIC of their respective mandates and provided for the possibility of the suspension of sanctions in Iraq.
8. On 16 September 2002, the Foreign Minister of Iraq informed the Secretary-General that Iraq had decided to "allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions". On that basis, talks were held in Vienna on 30 September and 1 October 2002 between representatives of Iraq on the one hand and the IAEA and UNMOVIC on the other on practical arrangements necessary for the resumption of inspections.
9. On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted resolution 1441 (2002). In paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council demanded that Iraq confirm, within seven days of notification by the Secretary-General of the adoption of the resolution, "its intention to comply fully with" that resolution. The Council demanded further that Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA." In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 13 November 2002, Iraq stated that it would "deal with resolution 1441 (2002)", and that it was "ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties and ascertain that Iraq has produced no weapons of mass destruction in their absence from Iraq since 1998".
10. The Security Council also decided, in paragraph 3 of that resolution, that, in addition to submitting the biannual declarations required under the OMV Plans of the IAEA and UNMOVIC, Iraq was to provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Security Council, not later than 30 days from the date of the resolution, "a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems
Here. I picked some things apart. I'm not trying to start a argument or anything, just trying to put some information out. The IAEA statements are really long. I'm new to posting in politics so be patient with me.
1.
Bush says,
[quote]
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. (Applause.) And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.
[/quote]
IAEA says,
[quote]I. BACKGROUND
2. In resolution 687 (1991), the IAEA was tasked with mapping out and destroying, removing or rendering harmless, the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. It was also tasked with ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under that and other relevant resolutions. The IAEA's plan for such ongoing monitoring and verification (the OMV Plan) was approved by the Security Council in resolution 715 (1991). Among the other relevant resolutions is resolution 707 (1991), pursuant to which Iraq is prohibited from engaging in any nuclear activities, except the use of radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes, until such time as the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), and the IAEA determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the Agreement between Iraq and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement).
3. On 16 December 1998, IAEA inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. This action was taken after the decision by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), on whose logistic support the IAEA's activities in Iraq were dependent, to withdraw all of its personnel from Iraq, and out of concern for the safety and security of our personnel in anticipation of imminent military action.
4. By the time the inspectors were withdrawn, the IAEA had been able to draw a comprehensive and coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme, and to dismantle the programme. The IAEA had destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all of the physical capabilities of Iraq to produce amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. The IAEA had concluded with respect to Iraq's past nuclear programme that:
a. There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had been successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons.
b. All nuclear material of significance to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was verified and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) was removed from Iraq.
c. Iraq had successfully concentrated uranium from its own ore and produced industrial quantities of feed material (UCl4) for electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS). There were no indications that the production of feed material for centrifuge enrichment (UF6) went beyond laboratory level.
d. Iraq had been at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of high enriched uranium through the EMIS process and the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines. However, there were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material through its indigenous processes.
e. Iraq had explored several other enrichment routes, including gaseous diffusion, chemical enrichment and laser enrichment without achieving any significant progress.
f. Iraq had made major progress in the area of weaponisation, but still had significant hurdles to overcome before being able to complete the fabrication of a first nuclear implosion device.
g. There were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.
h. There were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD) submitted by Iraq to the IAEA, pursuant to resolution 707 (1991), in 1996, and supplemented in 1998.
5. As of December 1998, there were no key outstanding disarmament issues in the nuclear area, although there were a number of questions and concerns about Iraq's past nuclear programme the clarification of which by Iraq would have reduced the uncertainty in the completeness of the IAEA's knowledge and understanding. These remaining questions and concerns related to: the uncertainty about the progress made in weapons design and centrifuge development due to the lack of relevant documentation; the extent of external assistance from which Iraq benefited; and the lack of evidence that Iraq had abandoned definitively its nuclear programme.
6. In the four years following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors, the IAEA's activities in Iraq were limited to annual verification, pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement, of the nuclear material (several tons of yellow cake and other natural uranium and some low enriched and depleted uranium) that remained in Iraq under IAEA seal.
7. During that intervening period, the Security Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999), which, inter alia, established UNMOVIC, reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, established procedures and time frames for the implementation by the IAEA and UNMOVIC of their respective mandates and provided for the possibility of the suspension of sanctions in Iraq.
8. On 16 September 2002, the Foreign Minister of Iraq informed the Secretary-General that Iraq had decided to "allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions". On that basis, talks were held in Vienna on 30 September and 1 October 2002 between representatives of Iraq on the one hand and the IAEA and UNMOVIC on the other on practical arrangements necessary for the resumption of inspections.
9. On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted resolution 1441 (2002). In paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council demanded that Iraq confirm, within seven days of notification by the Secretary-General of the adoption of the resolution, "its intention to comply fully with" that resolution. The Council demanded further that Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA." In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 13 November 2002, Iraq stated that it would "deal with resolution 1441 (2002)", and that it was "ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties and ascertain that Iraq has produced no weapons of mass destruction in their absence from Iraq since 1998".
10. The Security Council also decided, in paragraph 3 of that resolution, that, in addition to submitting the biannual declarations required under the OMV Plans of the IAEA and UNMOVIC, Iraq was to provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Security Council, not later than 30 days from the date of the resolution, "a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems