Happy Flight
[This is a long overdue entry; supposed to have been posted 2 weeks ago but busy stuff got in the way, not to mention HK and what happened to me there, owwww....]
I know it's just a movie, but if this is the way ANA command trainees fly, I'd think more than twice before I ever fly ANA! Seriously, if your pilot behaved like that, you will fly meh?
Anyway, since it's a rather obscure film, for the benefit of those who have no watched the movie, there is a plot synopsis here. In short, it's centred on an ANA flight from Tokyo to Honolulu, which goes awry first when the aircraft develops an instrument problem a couple of hours into the flight due to a bird strike, then when a typhoon threatens Tokyo after the plane turns back. It's funny how the online synopses/reviews mention that the emergency is due to a new computer system malfunctioning; in the movie, the pitot tubes broke away so they lost their airspeed indications-it has nothing to do with computer systems!
Anyway the movie is really a good insight into the commercial aviation world, providing a sneak peek into the everyday life of the airline industry: from aircraft maintenance, air traffic control (both tower and terminal), weather forecasters, flight dispatchers/ops centre team, ground check-in team and even to the bird strike man! The bulk of the movie is centred around the technical crew (pilots) and cabin crew of the airliner-which include a First Officer on his last check ride as a command trainee before he qualifies for captaincy and a group of stewardesses on their first international flight flying under a purser with a fearsome reputation-along with some of the challenges and stress that comes with the job.
Being a Japanese dramedy, I was expecting some hilarious exploits bordering on the realm of disbelief, along with exaggerated cutesy antics. I attribute most of the inaccuracies and exaggerations to this reason so I don't exactly regard them as faults or negative points about the movie. After all, it is meant to be entertaining-which it is. However, one thing that I thought was rather inappropriate were the antics of the pilot. I mean, I wondered whether people would actually find it unbelievable that a qualified pilot (on a B744 nonetheless) would be that klutzy, that irreverent, and react in such a flustered manner when put on the hot seat, but I'm surprised that ANA allowed their pilots to be portrayed in that way. I had expected hilarious situations to occur to a hapless crew while still maintaining the poise and decorum of the profession. After all, it is true that in emergencies, pilots are expected to be the calmest and coolest minds on board.
On the whole, the movie is rather entertaining and enjoyable. I know I will probably sound biased (because I am) but I will still rate this movie one of the best that I've seen this year. If you base it on how many movies this year I have voluntarily paid to watch more than once, then it would be the best movie of the year, haha! Needless to say, I will probably get the DVD when it comes out.
I think it's rather cute that Japanese pilots still fly with pristine white gloves
Friends who have watched Happy Flight have commented on how accurate some of the procedures portrayed in the movie seem, especially with regard to jargon, and that the movie gives the impression that they appear to be very faithful to what happens in reality. So they have asked me to watch it and provide a breakdown of what is true and what is not. Of course I was more than happy to do that, being ever eager to dispel myths and increase awareness about what actually happens in my most misunderstood profession! I must stress again that what is not true should not be regarded as mistakes, but more along the lines of dramatisation for the purposes of making the movie more entertaining and engaging. Also, some of the points that I have marked as not true may in fact be due to differing procedures by ANA which I am obviously not familiar with. If anyone is familiar with ANA procedures, comments are more than welcome! In addition, since I do not have any experience on the B747-400 aircraft, if anyone knows this aircraft well, please feel free to correct me!
[Info crosschecked with the following B747-400 documents that were in effect today: Flight Crew Operations Manual Vols 1 & 2, Flight Crew Training Manual, Flight Planning & Performance Manual, Quick Reference Handbook, Minimum Equipment List. Most links are to photographs or Wikipedia articles to provide additional elaboration.]
True
Callouts from the pilots are accurate, e.g. V Speeds ("V1, VR, V2"), "Positive", Approaching Minimum", "Minimum", "500 feet, stabilised". We actually call "Rotate" instead of "VR", but I think Japanese airlines call "VR". "Positive" refers to positive rate of climb, meaning that the wheels have left the ground and the landing gear can be raised. I was rather surprised that they call "stabilised" at 500 feet above the airfield (in such bad weather it would be more prudent to ensure the approach is stable by 1000 feet). However, I was very impressed with the "80 knots... check"-it's a level of detail not commonly known.
The aural warning sounds used, such as the master warning siren and master caution beeper are correct.
Jargon is correct, e.g. terms such as "to avoid CB" [CumulonimBus or thunderstorm clouds], "request right heading 330", "vectors for ILS 34 Right", "RVR touchdown zone 800 metres", "autopilot centre command", "Information Echo", "Wind 260 at 23".
ILS refers to the Instrument Landing System airliners use for landing guidance at major airports. ILS terminology, such as "Localiser captured" and "Glideslope captured", along with their associated indications on the Primary Flight Display, are accurate. RVR is Runway Visual Range, a measurement of visibility along the runway. Information stands for the ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service), a radio frequency where an automated voice constantly reads out current weather conditions for the aerodrome; each change is identified by a letter, in this case, Echo. "260 at 23" means the wind is coming from 260° at 23 knots. In the scene where the Ops Control Centre (OCC) is checking the weather for Haneda, the dispatcher punches in 'RJTT', which is the correct ICAO code for Haneda Airport.
Depiction of crew ranks is accurate: 3 stripes denote (Senior) First Officer, 4 stripes denote a Captain. Usually the captain sits on the left hand seat, but in this case, the First Officer is undergoing command training so it is possible for him to sit on the left.
During takeoff, the captain's hand remains on the thrust levers until V1 (takeoff decision speed, above which the takeoff must be continued) so that he can reject the takeoff immediately if needed (kind of like an emergency brake on the runway). The captain takes his hand off the thrust levers at V1 as a physical reminder that the thrust levers cannot be retarded and the takeoff must be continued from that point onward. BUT, rejecting the takeoff is solely the captain's prerogative so the First Officer should not be doing it even if he is a command trainee.
The concern about crosswind and tailwind limits for landing is correct: every aircraft has maximum takeoff and landing tailwind as well as crosswind limits. The standard tailwind limit for the B747-400 is 15 knots and maximum demonstrated crosswind is 30 knots.
The scene where the pilot makes a PA announcement over the radio: due to the many different people pilots have to speak to (ATC, pax PA, cabin crew, OCC, ground engineer) there is always a possibility that they might accidentally transmit on the wrong frequency or on the wrong channel if they don't take the trouble to check which transmit switch is pressed. That is why we always use the cabin handset to make PA announcements, never the headset!
Speaking of radio calls, most of the RT in the movie was accurate, such as "request pushback" and "contact Tokyo Tower". BUT, when transferring aircraft to another agency, the frequency must always be read and must also be read back by the pilot; the correct radio call should be "All Nippon 1980, contact Tokyo Tower 124.35" and the response should be "124.35, All Nippon 1980".
9 is not pronounced "nine" in radio telephony but "niner"; less distinctive is 5, which is pronounced 'fife'.
Most technical details of the B747-400 aircraft are correct.
In the takeoff scenes, the thrust levers are advanced slightly until the engines stabilise at 1.1 EPR/55% N1, and this switch called the TO/GA switch is pushed, which activates the autothrottle and automatically advances the engines to takeoff thrust. BUT, after TO/GA is pushed, we only follow through the levers instead of pushing them. This is not apparent in the movie until just before the end, where we actually see the pilot pushing the TO/GA, so the other takeoff scenes give the impression that the thrust levers are manually advanced. TO/GA stands for 'TakeOff/Go Around'.
The scenes where the landing runway is programmed into the FMS are correct, as well as the setting of the autobrakes to max, and the arming of the spoilers to automatically extend on touchdown. In the landing scene, the spoiler lever moving automatically to 'Extend' on touchdown, as well as the operation of the thrust reversers, are correct. BTW, the spoiler lever only moves automatically in Boeing aircraft; nothing in the Airbus cockpit moves.
In the scene where the engineer brings a pitot tube to the OCC, the description of how a pitot tube works is accurate.
The scene in the dispatcher's office is quite real: pilots do check their flight plans and get a detailed weather briefing of the departure and arrival airports, along with enroute weather.
Engineers cannot leave tools lying around and any single missing item could be potential FOD so it must be found. There is therefore a culture to place tools only in their proper holding receptacles.
What the station manager said is true: the chances of being involved in an aviation accident are statistically really once every 400 years! (But do remember that this is also largely dependant on how good the pilots in front and the maintenance on the aircraft are! :P )
In the scene where the aircraft doors are closed, the ground crew does have to ensure that the door seals as well as the handle are flush against the fuselage.
When the aircraft doors are armed, the thumbs-up sign is correct. The cabin crew will arm the doors, then crosscheck that the opposite door is also armed, and then flash the thumbs-up to the purser to indicate that the door has been armed.
In the scene where the terminal ATC control room (the dark room with many radar screens), the depiction of the display is quite accurate. Also, the ATC strips shown in the Terminal Control and the Tower are accurate: controllers use these strips to keep track of which aircraft is where and what they are supposed to be doing as they guide them through controlled airspace. The part where the controllers are lining up the chocolates and one mentions to ensure 5 miles of in-trail separation in between planes is true. This is due to the wake vortex caused by large aircraft and it is not strictly 5 nautical miles (nm) but dependant on what category of aircraft is following which.
The report given by the pilots of the preceding flight on narrowly encountering birds is accurate; pilots will usually update ATC on such abnormalities on departure/approach, such as near birdstrikes, windshear, or any other hazards so that any aircraft following them are warned.
The duties of the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) are mostly accurate: the PF is responsible for the aircraft flight path (even when autopilot is engaged) while the PM monitors all other aspects of the aircraft, assists the PF with secondary controls such as flaps and gear, and is responsible for handling all radio calls. In later scenes the PF is seen to respond to some radio calls by pushing on the glareshield mic button even though he is hand-flying. This is not only inaccurate but rather silly because there is a mic button located on the outboard 'horn' of the control column, which is at your fingertip should you be hand-flying.
When hand-flying, the PF flies the aircraft while the PM will set the Flight Director on the Mode Control Panel. The crew will also crosscheck all changes/settings on the MCP, BUT usually it is the pilot making the change who will call the changes he has made and the other pilot will crosscheck, unlike in the movie where the captain changed the heading, the FO called the change, and the captain responded, "Check".
In the scene where the right pitot tube froze over after flying above the freezing level, it is correct that switching the air data source to the left when the right pitot tubes are feeding false data to the air data computer will restore correct air data indications, BUT the proper solution is not to switch both Captain's and FO's air data to LEFT but rather the left hand seat should switch to CENTRE and the right hand seat to LEFT.
The scene which showed the flight controls check prior to takeoff is correct: before every takeoff all flight controls (elevator, aileron/spoileron/flaperon, rudder) must be checked that they move in the correct sense to their full traverse without obstruction.
For taxying on the ground, big jets use a tiller for nosewheel steering; as shown in the movie, it is a rotating handle used to steer the aircraft.
Airports do use a bird scarer whose job is to scare away birds with blanks and other pyrotechnics, not to shoot and kill them.
For the scene just after the birdstrike, it is accurate for the captain to consult the cabin crew at various doors for a status update. This is known as Crew Resource Management. It is also accurate for the purser to be seated at Door 1L (as Yamasaki was). However, the captain's dictatorial style of management makes for rather poor CRM in my opinion!
Inflight, it is true that both members of the technical crew cannot eat the same meals, in the event that one of the meals causes food poisoning, they will not both be incapacitated.
Cabin crew are indeed expected to do a walkabout in any kind of non-normal situation to check on the status of pax, e.g. in turbulence, even after an emergency decompression! It is true that airsickness pills are available in the daily use first aid kit, so the next time you fly, if you need them, do ask.
When the OCC duty manager asks the captain if he wishes to declare an emergency, the entire room suddenly hushes to await the result, and the moment an emergency is declared, they start scrambling. This is correct as a declaration of emergency is very important in aviation. In 1990, Avianca Flight 52 crashed due to fuel starvation, and one of the causes was attributed to the fact that while the pilots declared that they were low on fuel and asked for "priority" to land, they never declared an emergency.
In the scene where the FO is suggesting to descend to a lower altitude to unfreeze the pitot tube (which will work), what the captain says is true: flight at lower altitudes will burn more fuel due to the increased density of the air providing more air resistance. Similarly, what the captain said about increasing speed to melt the pitot tube is correct: increasing airspeed results in increased temperature ram rise.
In the scene where the aircraft is struck by lightning, it is true that lightning does no real damage to the aircraft (maybe unless you're an Airbus, hehehe....)
When the captain is discussing the approach with the FO, he mentions that they will try to descend to catch the glideslope at Kisarazu. There is really a VOR-DME along the extended centreline of 34R called Kisarazu [KZE 114.5]; capturing the glideslope there would be at 3000 feet on the ILS Z Rwy 34R approach and the last possible glideslope intercept point. The glideslope is on a 3° angle. The captain mentioned that they could make it with a 5° descent angle. This angle would equate to 540 feet per nm. At 180 knots this would translate as a 1600 fpm descent. It is strange that he would dive down to try to catch the glideslope from above instead of requesting an orbit to lose altitude and have a better shot at an approach by capturing the glideslope from below (which is the norm).
When the pilot descended below the clouds but the windshield was obscured by rain and the runway could not be seen, the captain is heard to ask the FO to consider a "go around". This is known as the Missed Approach Procedure, where the aircraft is guided down to a minimum height above the ground by the ILS, at which point the minimum visibility required must be attained and the pilot must have visual sighting of the runway or the approach lighting system. This is known as the 'landing minima'. Should the runway not be in sight, the minimum visibility is almost certainly not adequate and the pilot must immediately execute the missed approach by applying thrust and climbing back up in accordance with the procedure stated on the instrument approach chart. The decision whether to continue to land or to go around is made at that minimum height and that is why it is known as the DH, or Decision Height, and that is why the captain calls out "Minimum" with a heightened air of seriousness. Reaching the DH is known as reaching the minimum allowed altitude and that is the 'minimum' referred to by the callouts "Approaching Minimum" and "Minimum".
The landing minimum is observed to be 200 feet above the aerodrome-which makes it a Cat I ILS approach. However, Rwy 34R does have a Cat II approach where the minimum is 100 feet above ground [the ILS Z approach; the chart I linked above]. Why they did not choose this approach where conditions were hovering at Cat I minima, I don't know. Perhaps the runway centreline lighting was inop, because I didn't see the centreline lights on when the aircraft was at short final, so that would mean they would have to use Cat I minima of 200 feet and RVR 750 metres (NB: the RVR was stated earlier at 800 metres-just above the minimum required).
For the emergency landing scenes: the "Brace! Brace!" call and the constant repetition of "Heads Down!" by the cabin crew is correct. Cabin crew should not stop calling "Heads Down!" until the aircraft has come to a complete stop because the moment they stop doing so, pax will start to look up from the brace position. It is also true that part of the emergency landing preparation is the removal of all hard objects and ties/scarves.
The scenes where the aircraft is on final approach, the depiction of the PAPI lights (mappleleaf's 2 red 2 white) are accurate, as is the crabbing method of crosswind landings, BUT I don't think it takes that long to straighten out on the runway!
It is also true that if the runway is ungrooved, in heavy rain the stopping distance will be significantly increased. According to the FAA, the wet-to-dry stopping distance ratio for an ungrooved runway is 2:1, as opposed to that for a grooved runway being 1.15:1. For info, the maximum crosswind limit for a wet ungrooved runway is 5 knots, not 20 knots.
What the pilot said about "landing it hard and laying on the brakes" is accurate. For landings when the Landing Distance Required is in doubt, the method to bring the aircraft to a stop in as little distance as possible is to land firmly, extend spoilers, apply reverse thrust, and step manually on the brakes as soon as possible as opposed to using the autobrakes (this is known as 'max manual braking'). Especially for wet runways where there is risk of hydroplaning, it is important that the aircraft must be placed FIRMLY on the ground upon touchdown. It is not an often known fact but the best landings are not the ones where "the passengers don't even feel it"; Boeing designed their aircraft to be placed firmly on the ground, not greased on.
I wouldn't be surprised if some cabin crew are really that bimbotic.
Not True
The B747-400 has a 3-way landing gear lever: it must be placed in OFF after being moved to UP, but I did not see them do this in all of the takeoffs.
In the first scene when they were in the sim and the windshear warning came on, the windshear escape manoeuvre involves pushing the TO/GA to get full-rated thrust as well as to aggressively apply maximum thrust, simultaneously rotating to a pitch attitude of 15° nose up. Instead, the 2 pilots freaked out and only manually advanced the thrust levers later. Also, windshear warnings will inhibit GPWS warnings, so we should not be hearing both concurrently.
When they realised that they had unreliable airspeed indications, the pilot mentioned that the alternator was fine before takeoff. Airspeed readings have nothing to do with the alternator. When you have unreliable airspeed readings on takeoff, you also do not reset the circuit breaker (which should only be reset once so the other pilot should not even suggest resetting it again); instead you fly by holding the normal pitch attitude and thrust setting, then crosscheck with your standby instruments to see if you can determine a reliable airspeed data source, failing which you go to your Flight With Unreliable Airspeed Table to determine the appropriate pitch attitude and thrust for that weight and phase of flight. The aircraft would not end up in the ocean like that if they flew by thrust setting and pitch attitude.
The pilot also mentioned that the airspeed was dropping. If the pitot was blocked, on takeoff, the airspeed should be seen to be abnormally rising as the aircraft climbs away; if the static port was blocked instead, the airspeed would indeed appear to drop, but the altimeter would also be stuck as well.
Finally, the pilots should not freak out like that when you have an air data instrument failure (especially in the sim! If I performed like that on my base check, I'd surely fail and be suspended from flying, but this is after all a movie....) The longer you freak out, the more likely you are to die-especially the PM, who did nothing except freak out (instead of ensuring maximum thrust, etc.) and asked if he should make a PA to the passengers. Like... for what??? He forgot the golden mantra of flying: Aviate first, then Navigate, then Communicate, in that order!
When the ground engineer is describing the pitot heater problem, he mentions that the right main pitot heater is unserviceable, but the other pitot on the right is a standby and does not provide airspeed data; later the OCC mentions that this standby pitot input only goes to "elevator feel". There is no such thing as 'elevator feel'; the standby pitot provides airspeed data to the standby airspeed indicator (the centre one of the 3 round gauges). It makes no sense to have a standby pitot that doesn't provide airspeed data at all! Nevertheless, what is true is that according to the Minimum Equipment List, with 1 pitot heater unserviceable out of the 4, it is still a 'go item'.
Given that the standby pitot would have been heated and not frozen over, the entire scenario would not have been half as bad because with both left pitots broken and the right main pitot frozen over, the standby pitot would still be providing accurate airspeed data to the standby airspeed indicator.
It is interesting that the lead actress did not know what her duties were upon boarding the aircraft as the chief stewardess should have briefed everyone on their pre-flight duties during the pre-dispatch briefing. The cabin crew asked each other why the co-pilot was doing the walk-around. The walk-around is usually done by the FO, not the captain. Peak caps should also not be worn on the apron as they pose an FOD risk as well.
When the FO gets nervous and accidentally switches on the wiper instead of the aircon pack, both wipers are observed to come on. However, there are separate knobs for the left and right wipers (you can see this in the later scene when they are landing in heavy rain and the captain flicks 2 knobs to switch on the wipers on both sides). In reality though, the right wiper control knob and AC Pack 1 knob are really almost right next to each other.
During boarding, the cabin crew should not be leaving the cabin door unattended to stow luggage, therefore allowing pax to board the aircraft without verification of their boarding passes. Also, whether a hand-carry bag is within size should be checked latest by the departure gate, not at the aircraft door. If a passenger runs out of the aircraft and refuses to fly, what is more plausible is that her luggage will be offloaded instead of the station manager persuading her to return to the aircraft.
The aircraft should not be commencing taxy when the overhead luggage bins have not been properly closed.
When the aircraft was lining up for takeoff, the cockpit could hear the cabin PA announcement given by the purser; this is not possible.
Birdstrike is a very, very, VERY serious event. If an aircraft actually hit a bird, it should turn back and not continue on.
In the scene where the captain remarked that "right is clear", all airliner flights are IFR flights, so there is no need to check clear before turning. Of course, in a busy terminal environment there is no harm in doing so either.
The purser should not be asking the technical crew to switch off the seatbelt sign. The cockpit should not be interrupted until the seatbelt sign is switched off as this is the busiest period for the tech crew (aside from the approach and landing). In addition, the seatbelt sign on takeoff is a safety consideration and cabin crew should not be instructing the tech crew to switch it off so that they can commence their duties. In any case, the seatbelt sign should automatically switch off once the aircraft climbs past 10,300 feet.
When control is handed over for meals, yes the handing-over pilot says "you have control" and the taking-over pilot responds with "I have control", but there is no need for the taking-over pilot to hold the control column because the autopilot is engaged! The phrase "I have control/you have control" is said between both pilots is so that it is at any one time unambiguous who has control of the aircraft.
Drinks should not be served over the centre pedestal to avoid short-circuiting the avionics in event of spillage. Also, whenever 1 pilot leaves the cockpit for a moment, there is no need to don the oxy mask like what the FO did.
When the aircraft uncommanded motion occurs, the airspeed appears to be dropping into the red barber pole (i.e. below stick shaker speed) but the stick shaker doesn't activate. Instead we hear the master warning siren (which sounds in an overspeed condition, not a low speed one).
What happened is probably when the left pitot tubes broke off, the loss of airspeed data caused the air data computer to think that the airspeed has dropped dramatically and thus the autopilot adjusted the pitch attitude to compensate. When airspeed drops suddenly at high altitude for no apparent reason even though pitch attitude and thrust setting are correct, then unreliable airspeed should be suspected. Once again, the autopilot system should be disengaged and flown manually to hold pitch and thrust. However, this should not be at the expense of departing from the assigned flight level, especially in RVSM airspace! Since the air data computer thinks the airspeed has dropped, the autothrottle would increase thrust automatically to compensate, resulting in an overspeed condition. The resultant vibration throughout the airframe is mach buffet, and this is portrayed rather accurately.
As a gauge, the correct attitude and thrust for unreliable airspeed readings for a FL350 cruise would be pitch 2.0° nose up, thrust at 1.14 EPR/83% N1.
These figures need not be memorised but are referred to in a very important manual known as the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), which is always kept right next to each pilot and contains checklists for handling non-normal situations, as well as important inflight reference data such as these. The QRH is usually designed in a way that it incorporates multiple bookmark tabs, colour codes, and a quick action index to help pilots quickly locate the checklist or data they require. In any non-normal situation, aside from immediate memory items, the first thing pilots pull out would be the QRH.
However, not once in the entire movie did the pilots refer to the QRH. In fact, in the earlier scene when the right pitot tube froze over and caused multiple caution messages on the EICAS such as IAS DISAGREE, instead of simply deciding to switch the air data source to LEFT, the pilots should have taken out the QRH for reference. In fact, it is stressed that any non-normal situation should always be handled with reference to the QRH even if you know how to do it on your own because that is precisely what the QRH is there for, and forgetting something you thought you knew/remembered could have disastrous consequences.
It is interesting that the captain refers to the problem as an air data computer (ADC) error because the ADC supplies not just airspeed data but also altitude and vertical speed. Only airspeed depends on the pitot tube so the altimeter and vertical speed indicator should be working fine, indicating that there is no problem with the ADC.
In the scene where they declared an emergency, no mention was made of setting the transponder to 7700, the code which highlights to ATC and on their displays that this aircraft is in an emergency.
When they started to turn back to Haneda and the water in the glass was seen to tilt, banking that steeply at high altitude will actually stall the aircraft. The lift vector is greatly reduced by bank angles at high altitude due to the reduced density of air.
I find it highly amusing that the FO was so shocked and distressed when the captain asked him to fly the aircraft back to Haneda. As a command trainee, he should know that on his final line check he is expected to act as the commander of the flight. If he deferred to the check captain in an actual emergency even when control was given to him, he would've failed for sure.
Similarly, when lightning hit the OCC and the computers went down, I thought that they were supposed to have a fully redundant computer backup that kicks in within 1 sec. But then again, I'm not very familiar with the airport side of operations....
Nevertheless, I wonder: why on earth did they need the entire airport model for? Surely they could have done the same with a paper map?
In the scene when they were coming in high and fast, the FO was observed to lower his landing gear first before calling for Flaps 1 quite a while later. In the OCC, it is explained that the additional drag from the landing gear would increase their rate of descent. This is true, but it would make a lot more sense to start extending your flaps first before your gear, or at least both at the same time, or use spoilers to slow down before you start configuring.
Later, they lower flaps to 20, but no mention of lowering flaps to 30, which is the normal landing flap setting. When the Landing Distance Required is in doubt, the aircraft should land with fully extended flaps to come in with the lowest possible landing reference speed (VREF).
For info, the maximum flap placarded speeds (VFE)are: Flaps 1 - 280 knots, 5 - 260 knots, 10 - 240 knots, 20 - 230 knots; the maximum gear extension speed (VLO) is 270 knots or M.82. The recommended method for a fully configured approach in the B747-400 is to extend flaps to 10 to intercept the localiser, flaps 20 and gear down when the glideslope comes alive, then landing flaps 25/30 on glideslope capture.
When Tokyo Approach tells the pilot to contact Tokyo Tower, the scene briefly shows the captain's finger toggling the frequencies on the Radio Tuning Panel. The Approach frequency is correctly listed [119.1] but the Tower frequency should be 124.35 instead of 123.45.
Similarly, when the captain requests a change of heading to avoid the thunderstorm clouds, he is shown turning the heading selector on the Mode Control Panel-but the symbol that moves on the Navigational Display is the track bug, not heading bug.
On final approach, the EICAS shows the reference thrust as TO (takeoff) when it should read GA (go around). However, in the takeoff scenes, the EICAS messages are accurate: Pax Signs On, Autobrakes RTO, reference thrust is TO.
On reaching minimums, the FO called "visual". However, the PM (in this case the captain) should be the one calling "visual/no contact", and the PF will give the decision call, either "landing" or "go around".
An aircraft should not be stopped on an active runway unless it is an emergency landing. Although an emergency was declared in the movie, the emergency was not related to anything that would threaten the safety of the aircraft that would necessitate an emergency evacuation immediately upon touchdown. The aircraft was also able to move under its own power, so once it was apparent that they could safely slow down to taxy speed, they should exit the runway and then stop there.
It is really quite impractical to bake dessert on board in mid-air, I think...!
I would also question the crew's decision to return to Haneda. In the movie, it was mentioned that they have been flying for 2½ hours. In still air, this would translate to a point roughly 1150 nm from Haneda (possibly more, given that it was mentioned that there was a 108 knot headwind on returning, so outbound they would have had a tailwind). From this point, it is 900 nm to Wake Island Airfield and 1000 nm to Midway. Granted that repair facilities, along with replacement aircraft and crew, are not available at either Wake Island or Midway, in an unreliable airspeed situation, you would still want to land as soon as practicable. Not to mention too the questionable wisdom of turning back to an aerodrome that is being hit by a typhoon, where cloud base and visibility could well dip below approach minima.
JA8096, the B747-400 used in the movie
Yup that's it! If anyone is curious about anything they have seen or which I've said that they require further explanation, I'd be glad to elaborate! Anyway a lot of this is written from memory so I will certainly be editing this entry should I obtain the DVD one day and realise that I've remembered wrongly!
Happy landings!
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I know it's just a movie, but if this is the way ANA command trainees fly, I'd think more than twice before I ever fly ANA! Seriously, if your pilot behaved like that, you will fly meh?
Anyway, since it's a rather obscure film, for the benefit of those who have no watched the movie, there is a plot synopsis here. In short, it's centred on an ANA flight from Tokyo to Honolulu, which goes awry first when the aircraft develops an instrument problem a couple of hours into the flight due to a bird strike, then when a typhoon threatens Tokyo after the plane turns back. It's funny how the online synopses/reviews mention that the emergency is due to a new computer system malfunctioning; in the movie, the pitot tubes broke away so they lost their airspeed indications-it has nothing to do with computer systems!
Anyway the movie is really a good insight into the commercial aviation world, providing a sneak peek into the everyday life of the airline industry: from aircraft maintenance, air traffic control (both tower and terminal), weather forecasters, flight dispatchers/ops centre team, ground check-in team and even to the bird strike man! The bulk of the movie is centred around the technical crew (pilots) and cabin crew of the airliner-which include a First Officer on his last check ride as a command trainee before he qualifies for captaincy and a group of stewardesses on their first international flight flying under a purser with a fearsome reputation-along with some of the challenges and stress that comes with the job.
Being a Japanese dramedy, I was expecting some hilarious exploits bordering on the realm of disbelief, along with exaggerated cutesy antics. I attribute most of the inaccuracies and exaggerations to this reason so I don't exactly regard them as faults or negative points about the movie. After all, it is meant to be entertaining-which it is. However, one thing that I thought was rather inappropriate were the antics of the pilot. I mean, I wondered whether people would actually find it unbelievable that a qualified pilot (on a B744 nonetheless) would be that klutzy, that irreverent, and react in such a flustered manner when put on the hot seat, but I'm surprised that ANA allowed their pilots to be portrayed in that way. I had expected hilarious situations to occur to a hapless crew while still maintaining the poise and decorum of the profession. After all, it is true that in emergencies, pilots are expected to be the calmest and coolest minds on board.
On the whole, the movie is rather entertaining and enjoyable. I know I will probably sound biased (because I am) but I will still rate this movie one of the best that I've seen this year. If you base it on how many movies this year I have voluntarily paid to watch more than once, then it would be the best movie of the year, haha! Needless to say, I will probably get the DVD when it comes out.
I think it's rather cute that Japanese pilots still fly with pristine white gloves
Friends who have watched Happy Flight have commented on how accurate some of the procedures portrayed in the movie seem, especially with regard to jargon, and that the movie gives the impression that they appear to be very faithful to what happens in reality. So they have asked me to watch it and provide a breakdown of what is true and what is not. Of course I was more than happy to do that, being ever eager to dispel myths and increase awareness about what actually happens in my most misunderstood profession! I must stress again that what is not true should not be regarded as mistakes, but more along the lines of dramatisation for the purposes of making the movie more entertaining and engaging. Also, some of the points that I have marked as not true may in fact be due to differing procedures by ANA which I am obviously not familiar with. If anyone is familiar with ANA procedures, comments are more than welcome! In addition, since I do not have any experience on the B747-400 aircraft, if anyone knows this aircraft well, please feel free to correct me!
[Info crosschecked with the following B747-400 documents that were in effect today: Flight Crew Operations Manual Vols 1 & 2, Flight Crew Training Manual, Flight Planning & Performance Manual, Quick Reference Handbook, Minimum Equipment List. Most links are to photographs or Wikipedia articles to provide additional elaboration.]
True
Click to viewILS refers to the Instrument Landing System airliners use for landing guidance at major airports. ILS terminology, such as "Localiser captured" and "Glideslope captured", along with their associated indications on the Primary Flight Display, are accurate. RVR is Runway Visual Range, a measurement of visibility along the runway. Information stands for the ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service), a radio frequency where an automated voice constantly reads out current weather conditions for the aerodrome; each change is identified by a letter, in this case, Echo. "260 at 23" means the wind is coming from 260° at 23 knots. In the scene where the Ops Control Centre (OCC) is checking the weather for Haneda, the dispatcher punches in 'RJTT', which is the correct ICAO code for Haneda Airport.
Depiction of crew ranks is accurate: 3 stripes denote (Senior) First Officer, 4 stripes denote a Captain. Usually the captain sits on the left hand seat, but in this case, the First Officer is undergoing command training so it is possible for him to sit on the left.
9 is not pronounced "nine" in radio telephony but "niner"; less distinctive is 5, which is pronounced 'fife'.
In the takeoff scenes, the thrust levers are advanced slightly until the engines stabilise at 1.1 EPR/55% N1, and this switch called the TO/GA switch is pushed, which activates the autothrottle and automatically advances the engines to takeoff thrust. BUT, after TO/GA is pushed, we only follow through the levers instead of pushing them. This is not apparent in the movie until just before the end, where we actually see the pilot pushing the TO/GA, so the other takeoff scenes give the impression that the thrust levers are manually advanced. TO/GA stands for 'TakeOff/Go Around'.
The scenes where the landing runway is programmed into the FMS are correct, as well as the setting of the autobrakes to max, and the arming of the spoilers to automatically extend on touchdown. In the landing scene, the spoiler lever moving automatically to 'Extend' on touchdown, as well as the operation of the thrust reversers, are correct. BTW, the spoiler lever only moves automatically in Boeing aircraft; nothing in the Airbus cockpit moves.
In the scene where the engineer brings a pitot tube to the OCC, the description of how a pitot tube works is accurate.
When the aircraft doors are armed, the thumbs-up sign is correct. The cabin crew will arm the doors, then crosscheck that the opposite door is also armed, and then flash the thumbs-up to the purser to indicate that the door has been armed.
The report given by the pilots of the preceding flight on narrowly encountering birds is accurate; pilots will usually update ATC on such abnormalities on departure/approach, such as near birdstrikes, windshear, or any other hazards so that any aircraft following them are warned.
When hand-flying, the PF flies the aircraft while the PM will set the Flight Director on the Mode Control Panel. The crew will also crosscheck all changes/settings on the MCP, BUT usually it is the pilot making the change who will call the changes he has made and the other pilot will crosscheck, unlike in the movie where the captain changed the heading, the FO called the change, and the captain responded, "Check".
For taxying on the ground, big jets use a tiller for nosewheel steering; as shown in the movie, it is a rotating handle used to steer the aircraft.
For the scene just after the birdstrike, it is accurate for the captain to consult the cabin crew at various doors for a status update. This is known as Crew Resource Management. It is also accurate for the purser to be seated at Door 1L (as Yamasaki was). However, the captain's dictatorial style of management makes for rather poor CRM in my opinion!
Cabin crew are indeed expected to do a walkabout in any kind of non-normal situation to check on the status of pax, e.g. in turbulence, even after an emergency decompression! It is true that airsickness pills are available in the daily use first aid kit, so the next time you fly, if you need them, do ask.
When the pilot descended below the clouds but the windshield was obscured by rain and the runway could not be seen, the captain is heard to ask the FO to consider a "go around". This is known as the Missed Approach Procedure, where the aircraft is guided down to a minimum height above the ground by the ILS, at which point the minimum visibility required must be attained and the pilot must have visual sighting of the runway or the approach lighting system. This is known as the 'landing minima'. Should the runway not be in sight, the minimum visibility is almost certainly not adequate and the pilot must immediately execute the missed approach by applying thrust and climbing back up in accordance with the procedure stated on the instrument approach chart. The decision whether to continue to land or to go around is made at that minimum height and that is why it is known as the DH, or Decision Height, and that is why the captain calls out "Minimum" with a heightened air of seriousness. Reaching the DH is known as reaching the minimum allowed altitude and that is the 'minimum' referred to by the callouts "Approaching Minimum" and "Minimum".
The landing minimum is observed to be 200 feet above the aerodrome-which makes it a Cat I ILS approach. However, Rwy 34R does have a Cat II approach where the minimum is 100 feet above ground [the ILS Z approach; the chart I linked above]. Why they did not choose this approach where conditions were hovering at Cat I minima, I don't know. Perhaps the runway centreline lighting was inop, because I didn't see the centreline lights on when the aircraft was at short final, so that would mean they would have to use Cat I minima of 200 feet and RVR 750 metres (NB: the RVR was stated earlier at 800 metres-just above the minimum required).
It is also true that if the runway is ungrooved, in heavy rain the stopping distance will be significantly increased. According to the FAA, the wet-to-dry stopping distance ratio for an ungrooved runway is 2:1, as opposed to that for a grooved runway being 1.15:1. For info, the maximum crosswind limit for a wet ungrooved runway is 5 knots, not 20 knots.
What the pilot said about "landing it hard and laying on the brakes" is accurate. For landings when the Landing Distance Required is in doubt, the method to bring the aircraft to a stop in as little distance as possible is to land firmly, extend spoilers, apply reverse thrust, and step manually on the brakes as soon as possible as opposed to using the autobrakes (this is known as 'max manual braking'). Especially for wet runways where there is risk of hydroplaning, it is important that the aircraft must be placed FIRMLY on the ground upon touchdown. It is not an often known fact but the best landings are not the ones where "the passengers don't even feel it"; Boeing designed their aircraft to be placed firmly on the ground, not greased on.
Not True
When they realised that they had unreliable airspeed indications, the pilot mentioned that the alternator was fine before takeoff. Airspeed readings have nothing to do with the alternator. When you have unreliable airspeed readings on takeoff, you also do not reset the circuit breaker (which should only be reset once so the other pilot should not even suggest resetting it again); instead you fly by holding the normal pitch attitude and thrust setting, then crosscheck with your standby instruments to see if you can determine a reliable airspeed data source, failing which you go to your Flight With Unreliable Airspeed Table to determine the appropriate pitch attitude and thrust for that weight and phase of flight. The aircraft would not end up in the ocean like that if they flew by thrust setting and pitch attitude.
The pilot also mentioned that the airspeed was dropping. If the pitot was blocked, on takeoff, the airspeed should be seen to be abnormally rising as the aircraft climbs away; if the static port was blocked instead, the airspeed would indeed appear to drop, but the altimeter would also be stuck as well.
Finally, the pilots should not freak out like that when you have an air data instrument failure (especially in the sim! If I performed like that on my base check, I'd surely fail and be suspended from flying, but this is after all a movie....) The longer you freak out, the more likely you are to die-especially the PM, who did nothing except freak out (instead of ensuring maximum thrust, etc.) and asked if he should make a PA to the passengers. Like... for what??? He forgot the golden mantra of flying: Aviate first, then Navigate, then Communicate, in that order!
Given that the standby pitot would have been heated and not frozen over, the entire scenario would not have been half as bad because with both left pitots broken and the right main pitot frozen over, the standby pitot would still be providing accurate airspeed data to the standby airspeed indicator.
The aircraft should not be commencing taxy when the overhead luggage bins have not been properly closed.
When the aircraft was lining up for takeoff, the cockpit could hear the cabin PA announcement given by the purser; this is not possible.
Drinks should not be served over the centre pedestal to avoid short-circuiting the avionics in event of spillage. Also, whenever 1 pilot leaves the cockpit for a moment, there is no need to don the oxy mask like what the FO did.
What happened is probably when the left pitot tubes broke off, the loss of airspeed data caused the air data computer to think that the airspeed has dropped dramatically and thus the autopilot adjusted the pitch attitude to compensate. When airspeed drops suddenly at high altitude for no apparent reason even though pitch attitude and thrust setting are correct, then unreliable airspeed should be suspected. Once again, the autopilot system should be disengaged and flown manually to hold pitch and thrust. However, this should not be at the expense of departing from the assigned flight level, especially in RVSM airspace! Since the air data computer thinks the airspeed has dropped, the autothrottle would increase thrust automatically to compensate, resulting in an overspeed condition. The resultant vibration throughout the airframe is mach buffet, and this is portrayed rather accurately.
These figures need not be memorised but are referred to in a very important manual known as the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), which is always kept right next to each pilot and contains checklists for handling non-normal situations, as well as important inflight reference data such as these. The QRH is usually designed in a way that it incorporates multiple bookmark tabs, colour codes, and a quick action index to help pilots quickly locate the checklist or data they require. In any non-normal situation, aside from immediate memory items, the first thing pilots pull out would be the QRH.
However, not once in the entire movie did the pilots refer to the QRH. In fact, in the earlier scene when the right pitot tube froze over and caused multiple caution messages on the EICAS such as IAS DISAGREE, instead of simply deciding to switch the air data source to LEFT, the pilots should have taken out the QRH for reference. In fact, it is stressed that any non-normal situation should always be handled with reference to the QRH even if you know how to do it on your own because that is precisely what the QRH is there for, and forgetting something you thought you knew/remembered could have disastrous consequences.
When they started to turn back to Haneda and the water in the glass was seen to tilt, banking that steeply at high altitude will actually stall the aircraft. The lift vector is greatly reduced by bank angles at high altitude due to the reduced density of air.
Nevertheless, I wonder: why on earth did they need the entire airport model for? Surely they could have done the same with a paper map?
Later, they lower flaps to 20, but no mention of lowering flaps to 30, which is the normal landing flap setting. When the Landing Distance Required is in doubt, the aircraft should land with fully extended flaps to come in with the lowest possible landing reference speed (VREF).
For info, the maximum flap placarded speeds (VFE)are: Flaps 1 - 280 knots, 5 - 260 knots, 10 - 240 knots, 20 - 230 knots; the maximum gear extension speed (VLO) is 270 knots or M.82. The recommended method for a fully configured approach in the B747-400 is to extend flaps to 10 to intercept the localiser, flaps 20 and gear down when the glideslope comes alive, then landing flaps 25/30 on glideslope capture.
Similarly, when the captain requests a change of heading to avoid the thunderstorm clouds, he is shown turning the heading selector on the Mode Control Panel-but the symbol that moves on the Navigational Display is the track bug, not heading bug.
On reaching minimums, the FO called "visual". However, the PM (in this case the captain) should be the one calling "visual/no contact", and the PF will give the decision call, either "landing" or "go around".
JA8096, the B747-400 used in the movie
Yup that's it! If anyone is curious about anything they have seen or which I've said that they require further explanation, I'd be glad to elaborate! Anyway a lot of this is written from memory so I will certainly be editing this entry should I obtain the DVD one day and realise that I've remembered wrongly!
Happy landings!
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