(no subject)
At issue during the outset of my research was the way in which rational characterizations of absolute privilege from defamation in Florida seem to come to cross purposes when compared to national and interstate authorities with respect to Stare Decisis and common sense. That is not to say that a given case in Florida, or even the emergent mass of dictum and legal theory, is composed of embarrassing, or faulty, or insufficient intelligence or logic or deference to proper precedent, or even far removed from the practical operations of daily life. Rather, the discussion is complicated by the sheer scope of the minutiae involved, and by the almost Derridaen undecidability of interpreting the legal language. As with most legal issues, the matter of interpretation is at the center of the debate, and the crux of the issue is therefore in how to apply the various interpretations given a loose or literal foundation.
I gingerly settled into the inchoate unknown of absolute privilege with an uneasy sense that defamation, maliciously employed by a local community legislator or councilman, should not be absolutely privileged. With the honest admission of this bias as an inherent motivator, I set out to argue that the effective communication of ideas in a community meeting does not require the freedom to be immune from recrimination, as has clearly been outlined by the US Supreme Court in Barr v. Mateo, and put into great effect in Iowa, Nebraska, Oregon, Ohio, Missouri, Maine, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and elsewhere. My perference, in summation, was that the immunity of absolute privilege not extend to “inferior deliberative bodies”.
That same bias left me, as a fledgling scholar, incredulous of the merits of absolute privilege in general (an embarrassing indication of my ignorance of the complexity of the issue). Absolute privilege serves an amazing purpose in many aspects of the law, from judicial proceedings to allowing state legislators the peace of mind to communicate their ideas and beliefs openly and for the sake of their constituents. Of course, any research can demonstrate that in practicality this is not always the case, but that does not diminish the fact that the aims of the immunity are almost always effectively realized by the actions they protect, and therefore pragmatically of great value to society.
Still, as I learned more and began to understand the scope of the intentions of the legislation, the initial hypothetical of a city councilman being able to maliciously, knowingly, intentionally defame another for personal or political reasons stuck with me. Was this really the case? Was this absolutely consistent with case law in Florida?
“Statements made by officials of all branches of government in connection with their official duties are absolutely privileged.” This is from Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So.2d 6 Fla.,1970. Then there was McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla.1966), which more than any other case established the totalitarian nature of this entrenched doctrine.
“It seems to be well settled in this State that words spoken or written by public servants in judicial and legislative activities are protected by absolute privilege from liability for defamation. However false or malicious or badly motivated the accusation may be, no action will lie therefor in this State. Nor is it questioned that such absolute immunity in this State extends to county and municipal officials in legislative or quasi-legislative activities as well as to members of the State Legislature and activities connected with State legislation,” (italics added for emphasis).
In Saxon v. Knowles, 185 So.2d 194 Fla.App.4.Dist.,1966 it was established that “Any defamatory publications made by city manager acting within scope of his employment, regardless of whether they were intentionally or negligently made, were absolutely privileged as publications made by executive governmental official in connection with performance of duties and responsibilities of his office.” This has the unfortunate consequence of establishing the legal notion that inherent to the nature of this city manager’s duties and responsibilities is the ability to be intentionally defamatory and negligent. One cannot have it both ways when it comes to absolute privilege, clearly. The almost offensive freedom from defamation that is afforded by this privilege is therefore something that, to our minds, should be limited to those most in position to make use of it for social good. At a time when the internet can broadcast something defamatory around the globe in seconds, and television signals are sent into the depth’s of space and time, someone’s reputation can clearly by ruined with great effectiveness by an intentionally malicious and vindictive council member.
I gingerly settled into the inchoate unknown of absolute privilege with an uneasy sense that defamation, maliciously employed by a local community legislator or councilman, should not be absolutely privileged. With the honest admission of this bias as an inherent motivator, I set out to argue that the effective communication of ideas in a community meeting does not require the freedom to be immune from recrimination, as has clearly been outlined by the US Supreme Court in Barr v. Mateo, and put into great effect in Iowa, Nebraska, Oregon, Ohio, Missouri, Maine, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and elsewhere. My perference, in summation, was that the immunity of absolute privilege not extend to “inferior deliberative bodies”.
That same bias left me, as a fledgling scholar, incredulous of the merits of absolute privilege in general (an embarrassing indication of my ignorance of the complexity of the issue). Absolute privilege serves an amazing purpose in many aspects of the law, from judicial proceedings to allowing state legislators the peace of mind to communicate their ideas and beliefs openly and for the sake of their constituents. Of course, any research can demonstrate that in practicality this is not always the case, but that does not diminish the fact that the aims of the immunity are almost always effectively realized by the actions they protect, and therefore pragmatically of great value to society.
Still, as I learned more and began to understand the scope of the intentions of the legislation, the initial hypothetical of a city councilman being able to maliciously, knowingly, intentionally defame another for personal or political reasons stuck with me. Was this really the case? Was this absolutely consistent with case law in Florida?
“Statements made by officials of all branches of government in connection with their official duties are absolutely privileged.” This is from Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So.2d 6 Fla.,1970. Then there was McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla.1966), which more than any other case established the totalitarian nature of this entrenched doctrine.
“It seems to be well settled in this State that words spoken or written by public servants in judicial and legislative activities are protected by absolute privilege from liability for defamation. However false or malicious or badly motivated the accusation may be, no action will lie therefor in this State. Nor is it questioned that such absolute immunity in this State extends to county and municipal officials in legislative or quasi-legislative activities as well as to members of the State Legislature and activities connected with State legislation,” (italics added for emphasis).
In Saxon v. Knowles, 185 So.2d 194 Fla.App.4.Dist.,1966 it was established that “Any defamatory publications made by city manager acting within scope of his employment, regardless of whether they were intentionally or negligently made, were absolutely privileged as publications made by executive governmental official in connection with performance of duties and responsibilities of his office.” This has the unfortunate consequence of establishing the legal notion that inherent to the nature of this city manager’s duties and responsibilities is the ability to be intentionally defamatory and negligent. One cannot have it both ways when it comes to absolute privilege, clearly. The almost offensive freedom from defamation that is afforded by this privilege is therefore something that, to our minds, should be limited to those most in position to make use of it for social good. At a time when the internet can broadcast something defamatory around the globe in seconds, and television signals are sent into the depth’s of space and time, someone’s reputation can clearly by ruined with great effectiveness by an intentionally malicious and vindictive council member.