Gender Trouble - Judith Butler
notes:
1. "Women" as the subject of Feminism
Judith Butler claims, in this first chapter, that the fact that Feminism needs to define "women", as the subject that it will then represent, is consistent with the current judicial structures and forces the theory into a conformist, exclusionary movement. I agree, that by trying to differentiate "women", Feminism further distances itself from its own goal of equality. It is consistent with my thesis, that claims that Feminism is an exclusionary, self-defeating and reactionary mechanism.
At the end of the chapter, she quickly drops two suggestions, without going into any detail, which makes me believe this chapter to simply be a critic. First, she suggests "a radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity" in order to "formulate representational politics" and which "might revive feminism". Such a course of thought can generate another decade of philosophy, but would inevitably result in the same sex/nature/gender/culture problematic. Second, she offers to free feminist theory from the necessity of defining it's subject altogether. While it is very pleasing that this suggestion is, indeed, defying the judicial representation's narrow brackets, we quickly come to the conclusion that it is infeasible. Not because current structures cannot be broken or modified, but because the word itself -"Feminism"- is gendered.
2. The Compulsory order of Sex/Gender/Desire & 3. Gender: The circular ruins of Contemporary debate
Already in Ch 2, Mrs. Butler uses the "chicken and egg" concept and circular arguments (perhaps to prove a point. What comes first, gender or sex? Is one or the other or both culturally defined? How are they constructed, where do they come from?
In my opinion, there is no particular reason for both of these terms to exist, other than to CREATE those circular debates. There is are anatomical differences between the two major, but not exclusive categories: male and female. Everything else is Identity. There is no reason to further characterize Identity as "Gender Identity", "Class Identity". What needs to be understood, is that gender is nothing more than self-perception, identity and that sex is nothing more than a "situation". Both of these, from a "historical present" perspective, can be modified at will.
On this subject, I agree with Simone De Beauvoir's sentence: "One is not born a woman, one becomes a woman." But rather than BECOMING, one simply IMAGINES ITSELF TO BE.
It seems that with the analysis of gender and sex, we are further complicating our discourse and the same problem as the one described in Ch 1 occurs: That is we are forced, yet again, to formulate and reformulate all the binary terms we use. What we should really ask ourselves is why we determine sex at birth in the first place, and restrict the use of male/female only to discourses where these characteristics are necessary. Instead of concentrating on where is gender/sex useful and necessary, we should eliminate this patriarchal binary mode of self-determination, as much as possible, from our culture. It is hard to imagine today a world where "person" is used instead of "man/woman" and where everyone is free to pick and choose from a whole array of identity characteristics, currently associated with masculinity and femininity, but that world is possible. Since culture and upbringing has a tremendous effect on person's identity - the end result of minimizing exposure to sex-terms and gender-terms will be the escape of the sex-identity from the binary system and self-eradication the gender concept.
1. "Women" as the subject of Feminism
Judith Butler claims, in this first chapter, that the fact that Feminism needs to define "women", as the subject that it will then represent, is consistent with the current judicial structures and forces the theory into a conformist, exclusionary movement. I agree, that by trying to differentiate "women", Feminism further distances itself from its own goal of equality. It is consistent with my thesis, that claims that Feminism is an exclusionary, self-defeating and reactionary mechanism.
At the end of the chapter, she quickly drops two suggestions, without going into any detail, which makes me believe this chapter to simply be a critic. First, she suggests "a radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity" in order to "formulate representational politics" and which "might revive feminism". Such a course of thought can generate another decade of philosophy, but would inevitably result in the same sex/nature/gender/culture problematic. Second, she offers to free feminist theory from the necessity of defining it's subject altogether. While it is very pleasing that this suggestion is, indeed, defying the judicial representation's narrow brackets, we quickly come to the conclusion that it is infeasible. Not because current structures cannot be broken or modified, but because the word itself -"Feminism"- is gendered.
2. The Compulsory order of Sex/Gender/Desire & 3. Gender: The circular ruins of Contemporary debate
Already in Ch 2, Mrs. Butler uses the "chicken and egg" concept and circular arguments (perhaps to prove a point. What comes first, gender or sex? Is one or the other or both culturally defined? How are they constructed, where do they come from?
In my opinion, there is no particular reason for both of these terms to exist, other than to CREATE those circular debates. There is are anatomical differences between the two major, but not exclusive categories: male and female. Everything else is Identity. There is no reason to further characterize Identity as "Gender Identity", "Class Identity". What needs to be understood, is that gender is nothing more than self-perception, identity and that sex is nothing more than a "situation". Both of these, from a "historical present" perspective, can be modified at will.
On this subject, I agree with Simone De Beauvoir's sentence: "One is not born a woman, one becomes a woman." But rather than BECOMING, one simply IMAGINES ITSELF TO BE.
It seems that with the analysis of gender and sex, we are further complicating our discourse and the same problem as the one described in Ch 1 occurs: That is we are forced, yet again, to formulate and reformulate all the binary terms we use. What we should really ask ourselves is why we determine sex at birth in the first place, and restrict the use of male/female only to discourses where these characteristics are necessary. Instead of concentrating on where is gender/sex useful and necessary, we should eliminate this patriarchal binary mode of self-determination, as much as possible, from our culture. It is hard to imagine today a world where "person" is used instead of "man/woman" and where everyone is free to pick and choose from a whole array of identity characteristics, currently associated with masculinity and femininity, but that world is possible. Since culture and upbringing has a tremendous effect on person's identity - the end result of minimizing exposure to sex-terms and gender-terms will be the escape of the sex-identity from the binary system and self-eradication the gender concept.