Esthetics
I have a fairly broad definition of esthetics (or aesthetics for ye olde schoole folks). It is essentially anything that is a matter of taste, it is any factor in a decision that is neither a form of biological or social pressure nor a verifiable postulate about the laws of nature. An esthetic judgment is a valuation of a real or hypothetical state of affairs by which it can be ranked against other real or hypothetical situations.
My intuition about the mechanics of esthetics is pretty dodgy, but as far as I can tell I'm on no worse footing in this regard than anyone else. Despite my opening paragraph, esthetics seems to me to have its origin in both the biological and the social. In its unsophisticated forms the esthetically pleasing is always attractive to the senses (and even with the intervention of training and experience this often remains the case). Among the classical objects of esthetic adulation we find: the human body (especially the young and healthy body), fine foods, flowing music and memorable spoken passages. A love of some of these is of obvious biological significance, a love of others promises advantages for a social community. But esthetic judgment does not seem to stop where sensory perception ends: in the abstract realm of mathematics we can still speak of elegant solutions vs. dirty or ugly ones; we can judge the beauty of the content of stories, of the sequences of events described, beyond simply the surface encoding of these events. And although there is a correspondence in the domain of sensory perception between physiological pleasure and esthetic value, it is not the case that pleasure always leads to strong esthetic valuation (a spoonful of sugar may not be ranked above a delightfully prepared dessert, for instance). Certainly, in all of this there is some cultural filtration which draws our attention to some elements of a situation: these aspects are judged, while other are not. But in my view there is a further mechanism at work...
Many years ago, I decided that esthetic appreciation leans heavily on the interplay between raw power and apparent fragility. By raw power I mean "simple" forces of great import: entropy, gravity, the flow of great rivers, the destructive capabilities of armies, etc... By fragility I mean structures (usually very intricate and complex ones) that somehow manage to persist despite the ravages of the great forces. Our appreciation of beauty is a sort of predisposition towards taking note of surprising complexity. In an intellectual time and place where every proposed human proclivity must be justified by a claim of some evolutionary advantage, perhaps I can stave off the inevitable collapse of my grand scheme by pointing out that being able to recognize forms of complexity that withstand time and the elements is of great value in the development of novel technologies, organizational structures and physical constructions. And so we value more highly a food in which several flavours support one another in a delicate gastronomical dance. We appreciate more highly music performed with great difficulty. In assessing human beauty we look not only for physiological features, but also for grooming and cloathing that is at once culturally accessible and yet surprising (this is non-trivial to achieve, an effort can easily be destroyed by a shift in fashion that removes the element of surprise, or by the introduction of a novel element which others cannot relate to previous fashion experiences). In some artistic traditions (for instance Romantic ones), the raw power against which lighter elements are contrasted is made explicit, while in other traditions the complexity is emphasized. But in any case I feel that there must always be in the mind of the esthetic appreciator something fragile existing in an environment inimical to the growth and survival of delicacy.
I have previously suggested that esthetics may provide a foundation for ethical thought. It is clearly relevant to moral thought, by my definition of esthetics as a valuation scheme and by my definition of morality as having only private scope. But ethics relates to matters of public concern, and ethical rules ideally should be of universal import and should be universally acceptable. I have not made any broad claims that esthetic judgments will be universal (indeed it would be absurd to do so, not that that seems to stop anyone). By allowing that cultural influences will highlight only some features of a situation while leaving others in the dark, I have virtually guaranteed that differences of opinion in any particular situation will arise: different judges are in fact not judging the same things, and are not judging them in the context of the same perceived forces.
Despite this, there is some hope for approximate agreement in some areas: the human organism, human communities and human civilization are all examples of resilient complexity in which the vast majority of people have some direct interest. Even if there exist cultural (perhaps even biological) obstacles to perceiving strangers from other cultures as entirely human (commonly called racism or xenophobia), there is likely to exist at least a starting point from which some weak concept of humanism (a belief in the inherent value of people) can be universally negotiated.
Furthermore (and this is the contribution of libertarians), given that esthetic judgments will not be agreed upon in general, and that no individual or group is likely to achieve and maintain dominance over all others through the fullness of time, it is rational for all of us to conclude that our own interests are best served when the private (non-ethical) sphere is expanded to its maximum possible extent: when we can make decisions on the basis of our own esthetics rather than being potentially forced to abide by the judgments of others. The libertarians highlight the universal desirability of limiting outside interference in each individual's private life, but this may only be one element of the equation: for if an individual can expect to have so few resources as to be completely unable to make any decisions at all, perhaps that individual will opt support an expansion of publicly enforceable norms. In any event, here too there is potential for universal agreement: some proposable ethical rules clearly limit maximally expanded private autonomy, and it should be relatively easy to achieve agreement that these rules should be discarded from consideration.
My intuition about the mechanics of esthetics is pretty dodgy, but as far as I can tell I'm on no worse footing in this regard than anyone else. Despite my opening paragraph, esthetics seems to me to have its origin in both the biological and the social. In its unsophisticated forms the esthetically pleasing is always attractive to the senses (and even with the intervention of training and experience this often remains the case). Among the classical objects of esthetic adulation we find: the human body (especially the young and healthy body), fine foods, flowing music and memorable spoken passages. A love of some of these is of obvious biological significance, a love of others promises advantages for a social community. But esthetic judgment does not seem to stop where sensory perception ends: in the abstract realm of mathematics we can still speak of elegant solutions vs. dirty or ugly ones; we can judge the beauty of the content of stories, of the sequences of events described, beyond simply the surface encoding of these events. And although there is a correspondence in the domain of sensory perception between physiological pleasure and esthetic value, it is not the case that pleasure always leads to strong esthetic valuation (a spoonful of sugar may not be ranked above a delightfully prepared dessert, for instance). Certainly, in all of this there is some cultural filtration which draws our attention to some elements of a situation: these aspects are judged, while other are not. But in my view there is a further mechanism at work...
Many years ago, I decided that esthetic appreciation leans heavily on the interplay between raw power and apparent fragility. By raw power I mean "simple" forces of great import: entropy, gravity, the flow of great rivers, the destructive capabilities of armies, etc... By fragility I mean structures (usually very intricate and complex ones) that somehow manage to persist despite the ravages of the great forces. Our appreciation of beauty is a sort of predisposition towards taking note of surprising complexity. In an intellectual time and place where every proposed human proclivity must be justified by a claim of some evolutionary advantage, perhaps I can stave off the inevitable collapse of my grand scheme by pointing out that being able to recognize forms of complexity that withstand time and the elements is of great value in the development of novel technologies, organizational structures and physical constructions. And so we value more highly a food in which several flavours support one another in a delicate gastronomical dance. We appreciate more highly music performed with great difficulty. In assessing human beauty we look not only for physiological features, but also for grooming and cloathing that is at once culturally accessible and yet surprising (this is non-trivial to achieve, an effort can easily be destroyed by a shift in fashion that removes the element of surprise, or by the introduction of a novel element which others cannot relate to previous fashion experiences). In some artistic traditions (for instance Romantic ones), the raw power against which lighter elements are contrasted is made explicit, while in other traditions the complexity is emphasized. But in any case I feel that there must always be in the mind of the esthetic appreciator something fragile existing in an environment inimical to the growth and survival of delicacy.
I have previously suggested that esthetics may provide a foundation for ethical thought. It is clearly relevant to moral thought, by my definition of esthetics as a valuation scheme and by my definition of morality as having only private scope. But ethics relates to matters of public concern, and ethical rules ideally should be of universal import and should be universally acceptable. I have not made any broad claims that esthetic judgments will be universal (indeed it would be absurd to do so, not that that seems to stop anyone). By allowing that cultural influences will highlight only some features of a situation while leaving others in the dark, I have virtually guaranteed that differences of opinion in any particular situation will arise: different judges are in fact not judging the same things, and are not judging them in the context of the same perceived forces.
Despite this, there is some hope for approximate agreement in some areas: the human organism, human communities and human civilization are all examples of resilient complexity in which the vast majority of people have some direct interest. Even if there exist cultural (perhaps even biological) obstacles to perceiving strangers from other cultures as entirely human (commonly called racism or xenophobia), there is likely to exist at least a starting point from which some weak concept of humanism (a belief in the inherent value of people) can be universally negotiated.
Furthermore (and this is the contribution of libertarians), given that esthetic judgments will not be agreed upon in general, and that no individual or group is likely to achieve and maintain dominance over all others through the fullness of time, it is rational for all of us to conclude that our own interests are best served when the private (non-ethical) sphere is expanded to its maximum possible extent: when we can make decisions on the basis of our own esthetics rather than being potentially forced to abide by the judgments of others. The libertarians highlight the universal desirability of limiting outside interference in each individual's private life, but this may only be one element of the equation: for if an individual can expect to have so few resources as to be completely unable to make any decisions at all, perhaps that individual will opt support an expansion of publicly enforceable norms. In any event, here too there is potential for universal agreement: some proposable ethical rules clearly limit maximally expanded private autonomy, and it should be relatively easy to achieve agreement that these rules should be discarded from consideration.