Proxy Wars
Regarding http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26warlogs.html?ref=wikileaks
I’d long suspected that we were in two proxy wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) rather than a conflict with a terrorist organization and Baathists. The way I see it, nations were more or less cool with the US being the only super power during the Clinton years because our interests seemed to be in maintaining stability, assisting smooth transitions to democracy, and promoting worldwide capitalism. Our goals seemed to more or less coincide with those of most nations so they were able to ignore the standard political principle of "balance of power". In other words that whenever one nation becomes overwhelmingly powerful, all of its neighbors should ally together against it lest they be individually conquered.
But after 9/11 the US started acting more like a standard imperial power, invading two weak countries without getting all the major players to agree on the action. Nations who didn't see themselves as invadable might ignore the change, but weak, undemocratic countries might easily conclude that it would only be a matter of time before they were invaded. The best way to stop an aggressive imperial power is to provide them with a Vietnam style quagmire.
So I’d long suspected that probably a number of countries were providing funding for various insurgencies. The game theory gets a little tricky there. In this type of situation, it's in everyone (but the US's) interest for the US to suffer a quagmire, but it's also in the interest of individual nations to let someone else pay the bill for this to happen. For example, while it's likely in the interest of say the democratic republic of Congo for the US to suffer a quagmire, they're better off if someone else pays for it. Another complicating factor is that getting caught funding the enemies of the US moves you up the hit list. So if you think you're at the top of the hit list, or think you are unassailable for some other reason (say you have nuclear weapons) then you're not at much risk for getting caught. But if you're fairly low on the list, then getting caught would be a big penalty.
This would seem to suggest that it's in North Korea’s interest to provide major support to enemy combatants. They’re at the top of the list, but are unassailable due to their nuclear weapons and massive artillery aimed at South Korea. Getting caught providing funding wouldn't be good, but the risk is worth it.
Iran has a huge incentive to see Iraq destabilized. This makes the Iraqi Shia majority dependent on Iranian funding, thus giving Iran leverage over the Iraqi government. Iran is also at the top of the hit list, but has no nuclear weapons. They could reasonably expect that as soon as Iraq and Afghanistan are stabilized, Iran would be invaded. So the way I see it, it's in Iran’s interest to provide major funding to enemy combatants, primarily in Iraq, but as the US pulls out of Iraq, then increasingly in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is in an odd situation. Afghanistan could easily be made into a puppet state of Pakistan, which is what they had tried to accomplish with the Taliban the first time. Through monumental stupidity, Pakistan managed to pull defeat from the jaws of victory by allowing the Taliban to harbor Al Queda, even after the 9/11 attacks made it clear that the US would invade should Al Queda not be handed over. Pakistan should have done whatever it took to prevent the US from invading, but for whatever reason (likely internal divisions in government) it failed to do so. As a result, they lost control of Afghanistan. Regaining control is a high priority for them, but complicating this is that the US is paying Pakistan a huge amount of money, ostensibly to attack the Taliban and Al Queda in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan could legitimately consider itself fairly high on the US hit list, although likely fairly safe due to its nuclear weapons. (I say this because Pakistan suffers military coupes and thus is not really a democracy, is a hot bed of Islamic extremism, exports nuclear weapons technology, and is constantly provoking neighboring democracy and major US trading partner, India.) The game theory for Pakistani politicians seems very unstable, with minor changes on the ground causing large changes in their motivation, but it doesn’t seem possible that Pakistan’s interests can ever be aligned with ours, and it seems to usually be in Pakistan’s interest to heavily fund enemy combatants in Afghanistan.
I’d long suspected that we were in two proxy wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) rather than a conflict with a terrorist organization and Baathists. The way I see it, nations were more or less cool with the US being the only super power during the Clinton years because our interests seemed to be in maintaining stability, assisting smooth transitions to democracy, and promoting worldwide capitalism. Our goals seemed to more or less coincide with those of most nations so they were able to ignore the standard political principle of "balance of power". In other words that whenever one nation becomes overwhelmingly powerful, all of its neighbors should ally together against it lest they be individually conquered.
But after 9/11 the US started acting more like a standard imperial power, invading two weak countries without getting all the major players to agree on the action. Nations who didn't see themselves as invadable might ignore the change, but weak, undemocratic countries might easily conclude that it would only be a matter of time before they were invaded. The best way to stop an aggressive imperial power is to provide them with a Vietnam style quagmire.
So I’d long suspected that probably a number of countries were providing funding for various insurgencies. The game theory gets a little tricky there. In this type of situation, it's in everyone (but the US's) interest for the US to suffer a quagmire, but it's also in the interest of individual nations to let someone else pay the bill for this to happen. For example, while it's likely in the interest of say the democratic republic of Congo for the US to suffer a quagmire, they're better off if someone else pays for it. Another complicating factor is that getting caught funding the enemies of the US moves you up the hit list. So if you think you're at the top of the hit list, or think you are unassailable for some other reason (say you have nuclear weapons) then you're not at much risk for getting caught. But if you're fairly low on the list, then getting caught would be a big penalty.
This would seem to suggest that it's in North Korea’s interest to provide major support to enemy combatants. They’re at the top of the list, but are unassailable due to their nuclear weapons and massive artillery aimed at South Korea. Getting caught providing funding wouldn't be good, but the risk is worth it.
Iran has a huge incentive to see Iraq destabilized. This makes the Iraqi Shia majority dependent on Iranian funding, thus giving Iran leverage over the Iraqi government. Iran is also at the top of the hit list, but has no nuclear weapons. They could reasonably expect that as soon as Iraq and Afghanistan are stabilized, Iran would be invaded. So the way I see it, it's in Iran’s interest to provide major funding to enemy combatants, primarily in Iraq, but as the US pulls out of Iraq, then increasingly in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is in an odd situation. Afghanistan could easily be made into a puppet state of Pakistan, which is what they had tried to accomplish with the Taliban the first time. Through monumental stupidity, Pakistan managed to pull defeat from the jaws of victory by allowing the Taliban to harbor Al Queda, even after the 9/11 attacks made it clear that the US would invade should Al Queda not be handed over. Pakistan should have done whatever it took to prevent the US from invading, but for whatever reason (likely internal divisions in government) it failed to do so. As a result, they lost control of Afghanistan. Regaining control is a high priority for them, but complicating this is that the US is paying Pakistan a huge amount of money, ostensibly to attack the Taliban and Al Queda in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan could legitimately consider itself fairly high on the US hit list, although likely fairly safe due to its nuclear weapons. (I say this because Pakistan suffers military coupes and thus is not really a democracy, is a hot bed of Islamic extremism, exports nuclear weapons technology, and is constantly provoking neighboring democracy and major US trading partner, India.) The game theory for Pakistani politicians seems very unstable, with minor changes on the ground causing large changes in their motivation, but it doesn’t seem possible that Pakistan’s interests can ever be aligned with ours, and it seems to usually be in Pakistan’s interest to heavily fund enemy combatants in Afghanistan.