I disagree, at least on some points. The regular wellhead equipment seems to be compatible with the hydrates. Hydrates also form at smaller depths and down under the seafloor. The problem wasn't that the pressures from that exceeded the wellhead equipment, it's that they got up to areas they shouldn't have.
The problem with hydrate ice forming was on a stopgap well cover that Wild Well Inc. built for BP. It's not all that surprising that you'd miss even a pretty major design problem on a rush job like that. It was something to try, it didn't work.
It looks like they had safety procedures available that were pretty good, but that instead they violated them at least in spirit, if not letter, at every turn.
They'd had trouble with this well "kicking" (pressure fluctuations from down the well) from the start according to interviews I've heard with some of the rig personnel. This had gotten them behind, and put them under time pressure.
They had a ship waiting to take off their drilling mud, they were behind schedule and a ship on standby costs money.
Letting yourself get under time pressure is a clear safety problem, and it led them to take shortcuts.
They were apparently trying a new quick setting cement that released more heat when curing (not a problem in itself, but a reason to be more cautious than usual).
While they were pulling out the drill mud, they had pressure indications that there was a problem with the sealing that the cement had done. They stopped, but then opted to go on regardless. They didn't top plug the well before replacing the mud with seawater as they had the option to do.
They had previously modified the blowout preventer and not documented it well (this lesson was supposedly learned at least as far back as the Piper Alpha disaster). That led to a day wasted trying to close a non-operating ram. Maintenance hadn't been done on it or some of its control systems.
No one was in clear charge of the firefighting operations to the extent that they kept pouring water on the rig regardless of the danger of that contributing to its sinking. That led to the well pipe breeches that are leaking oil, and the tangle of debris on the bottom.
etc, etc.
Even the best safety guidelines and procedures are useless if you don't follow them.
Well, the depth does make a big difference in how fast the methane hydrates form at the temperature of the ocean. Add in a little bit of heat from the oil itself, and it becomes very difficult for them to form above this depth. Sure, they can form in cold, undisturbed seabed over a long period of time at much shallower depths, but that's not the situation here.
But you know, its funny. While they are drilling the well, the talk is all about how this is all new and cutting edge technology on the frontier. But once there are some major gaffes after an accident, and all of a sudden its about how there are no actual gaps in their knowledge at all, they've drilled like this before, and there should be no problems in the future if they do things right, none at all. Right, I understand.
The truth is that like all human endeavours that push the limits, we are just making this up as we go along and learning from mistakes along the way. What happens if most future wells in this area to this total depth or deeper are similarly "gassy"? Quite frankly, I'd pin the odds of them NOT redesigning anything in their basic equipment directly because of this accident to be about the same as the odds that Congress won't pass onerous and expensive requirements for safety devices on future offshore drilling rigs.
The disturbing thing about all of it is that though the safety problems may have been made more problematic because of the depth and greater pressure, they were all things that would have been safety hazards on any well.
When you find a brake failure due to poor maintenance on a truck that runs away in mountainous terrain, it's probably good to check what the maintenance is like in the ones running on the plain too.
The problem with hydrate ice forming was on a stopgap well cover that Wild Well Inc. built for BP. It's not all that surprising that you'd miss even a pretty major design problem on a rush job like that. It was something to try, it didn't work.
It looks like they had safety procedures available that were pretty good, but that instead they violated them at least in spirit, if not letter, at every turn.
They'd had trouble with this well "kicking" (pressure fluctuations from down the well) from the start according to interviews I've heard with some of the rig personnel. This had gotten them behind, and put them under time pressure.
They had a ship waiting to take off their drilling mud, they were behind schedule and a ship on standby costs money.
Letting yourself get under time pressure is a clear safety problem, and it led them to take shortcuts.
They were apparently trying a new quick setting cement that released more heat when curing (not a problem in itself, but a reason to be more cautious than usual).
While they were pulling out the drill mud, they had pressure indications that there was a problem with the sealing that the cement had done. They stopped, but then opted to go on regardless. They didn't top plug the well before replacing the mud with seawater as they had the option to do.
They had previously modified the blowout preventer and not documented it well (this lesson was supposedly learned at least as far back as the Piper Alpha disaster). That led to a day wasted trying to close a non-operating ram. Maintenance hadn't been done on it or some of its control systems.
No one was in clear charge of the firefighting operations to the extent that they kept pouring water on the rig regardless of the danger of that contributing to its sinking. That led to the well pipe breeches that are leaking oil, and the tangle of debris on the bottom.
etc, etc.
Even the best safety guidelines and procedures are useless if you don't follow them.
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But you know, its funny. While they are drilling the well, the talk is all about how this is all new and cutting edge technology on the frontier. But once there are some major gaffes after an accident, and all of a sudden its about how there are no actual gaps in their knowledge at all, they've drilled like this before, and there should be no problems in the future if they do things right, none at all. Right, I understand.
The truth is that like all human endeavours that push the limits, we are just making this up as we go along and learning from mistakes along the way. What happens if most future wells in this area to this total depth or deeper are similarly "gassy"? Quite frankly, I'd pin the odds of them NOT redesigning anything in their basic equipment directly because of this accident to be about the same as the odds that Congress won't pass onerous and expensive requirements for safety devices on future offshore drilling rigs.
Reply
When you find a brake failure due to poor maintenance on a truck that runs away in mountainous terrain, it's probably good to check what the maintenance is like in the ones running on the plain too.
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