Sorry, but a Schiavo-related post, or maybe it's on the nature of consciousness

Mar 29, 2005 12:50

OK, I've stayed pretty quiet through most of the discussions on this, but I gotta say something ( Read more... )

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grendelgongon March 29 2005, 11:38:41 UTC
> I accept that Terry is "no longer home," but was still of the probably
> misinformed opinion that she could still feel pain and hunger. Any living

It sure would look as if she could, but if (and I'll add this as an
if) what I've read about her brain is reasonably accurate (that is,
that the vast majority of the cerebral cortex is just plain gone) it's
pretty clear that there is no she left to act on.

> thing will act as much as possible to avoid pain and hunger, so I didn't
> think Terry wouldn't feel those things, as much as she could. I heard her
> mental state was like that of a young infant. A quick and painless death
> is greatly preferred wherever death is indicated:

I agree that a painless death is indicated whenever the possibility
exists that pain-->suffering (that is, when there is a person to feel
the pain) and that a quick death is indicated whenever a slow death
would cause suffering (for example from anticipation of death)

> a lamb for the dinner
> table, an unwanted fetus, a dangerous killer, a grievously injured or ill
> person or animal who has no chance of recovery. Some people think death
> is never indicated, but even pro-life, anti-death penalty vegans have to
> kill plants to live.

So here I see a problem in that the cases above are not at all
equivalent in the potential reasons *why* it might be wrong to kill in
particular ways and less wrong or not wrong to kill in other ways.

to make this short i see the following categories:
lamb: not a person, can feel pain,
fetus: not a person, (let's assume one pre 5 months so not
controversy) can't feel pain
dangerous killer: person, can feel pain
injured human (no recovery) 1: person, can feel pain
injured human (no recovery) 2: not a person, can't feel pain
injured animal: not a person, can feel pain

let's keep it simple and say that it may be seriously wrong to kill
persons painlessly and is not seriously wrong to kill non-person's
painlessly but may be seriously wrong to kill non-persons in a painful
manner. And by "can feel pain" i mean, "can suffer"

the lamb and injured animal are not persons, so they may be killed,
but they may not be killed painfully. (I'm glossing over this part)

however injured person 2 (say like T.S) can't feel pain in a manner
similar to an early fetus. That is, the pain receptors are there, but
there's no consciousness, no individual (whether a person or not)
capable of receiving and interpreting the response to the pain
stimulus, so there's no intrinsic reason to prefer a painless killing
to a painful one. (again, there may be extrinsic reasons.)

Injured person 1, on the other hand, can feel pain (I'm saying) so it
is clearly wrong to kill them in a painful way for the same reasons it
would be wrong to kil the lamb and injured animal in a painful way.
It may be *additionally* wrong to kill them in a non-painful way, but
that's another question.

Likewise, the killer is a person and can feel pain, so what we believe
with respect to whether it is seriously wrong to kill him is more
complex. We can probably say it is seriously wrong to kill him
painfully, because all else being equal it is seriously wrong to cause
severe pain without reason. (It might not, for instance, be wrong to
kill him painfully if it were not possible to kill him without much
pain, but this is not the case)

So in the cases where can be experienced I totally agree it is wrong
to kill painfully for intrinsic reasons relating to the good of the
object of the killing. Where pain cannot be felt (the fetus, the
first injured person) this just doesn't seem to apply.

(more in a sec)

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