(no subject)
First off, I don't get this at all. Maybe some of you smart people out there can help me with it. I posted it more for people like Ryan or Mark, so if you read it, help me out, ok?
How about a little philosophy humor...
Proofs that p
Davidson's proof that p:
Let us make the following bold conjecture: p
Wallace's proof that p:
Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p
Grunbaum:
As I have asserted again and again in previous
publications, p.
Putnam:
Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds
that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the
fallacies in this "argument". (It's really awful, isn't it?)
Therefore p.
Rawls:
It would be nice to have a deductive argument that p from
self-evident premises. Unfortunately I am unable to provide
one. So I will have to rest content with the following
intuitive considerations in its support: p.
Unger:
Suppose it were the case that not-p. It would follow from
this that someone knows that q. But on my view, no one knows
anything whatsoever. Therefore p. (Unger believes that the
louder you say this argument, the more persuasive it becomes).
Katz:
I have seventeen arguments for the claim that p, and I
know of only four for the claim that not-p. Therefore p.
Lewis:
Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious
and when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the
fact that they find not- p obvious is no argument that it is
true; and I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare.
Therefore, p.
Fodor:
My argument for p is based on three premises:
1. q
2. r
and
3. p
From these, the claim that p deductively follows. Some people
may find the third premise controversial, but it is clear that
if we replaced that premise by any other reasonable premise,
the argument would go through just as well.
Sellars' proof that p:
Unfortunately limitations of space prevent it from being
included here, but important parts of the proof can be found in
each of the articles in the attached bibliography.
Earman:
There are solutions to the field equations of general
relativity in which space-time has the structure of a four-
dimensional Klein bottle and in which there is no matter. In
each such space-time, the claim that not-p is false. Therefore p
Goodman:
Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false,
on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so-called
"counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that p in a way
that it was obviously not intended -- for I intended my thesis
to have no counterexamples. Therefore p.
Outline Of A Proof That P (1):
Saul Kripke
Some philosophers have argued that not-p. But none of them
seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the
intuitive view that this is not the case. Therefore, p.
_________________
(1) This outline was prepared hastily -- at the editor's
insistence -- from a taped manuscript of a lecture. Since I was
not even given the opportunity to revise the first draft before
publication, I cannot be held responsible for any lacunae in
the (published version of the) argument, or for any fallacious
or garbled inferences resulting from faulty preparation of the
typescript. Also, the argument now seems to me to have problems
which I did not know when I wrote it, but which I can't discuss
here, and which are completely unrelated to any criticisms
that have appeared in the literature (or that I have seen in
manuscript); all such criticisms misconstrue my argument. It
will be noted that the present version of the argument seems to
presuppose the (intuitionistically unacceptable) law of double
negation. But the argument can easily be reformulated in a way
that avoids employing such an inference rule. I hope to expand
on these matters further in a separate monograph.
Routley and Meyer:
If (q & not-q) is true, then there is a model for p.
Therefore p.
Plantinga:
It is a model theorem that p -> p. Surely its possible
that p must be true. Thus p. But it is a model theorem
that p -> p. Therefore p.
Chisholm:
P-ness is self-presenting. Therefore, p.
Morganbesser:
If not p, what? q maybe?
How about a little philosophy humor...
Proofs that p
Davidson's proof that p:
Let us make the following bold conjecture: p
Wallace's proof that p:
Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p
Grunbaum:
As I have asserted again and again in previous
publications, p.
Putnam:
Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds
that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the
fallacies in this "argument". (It's really awful, isn't it?)
Therefore p.
Rawls:
It would be nice to have a deductive argument that p from
self-evident premises. Unfortunately I am unable to provide
one. So I will have to rest content with the following
intuitive considerations in its support: p.
Unger:
Suppose it were the case that not-p. It would follow from
this that someone knows that q. But on my view, no one knows
anything whatsoever. Therefore p. (Unger believes that the
louder you say this argument, the more persuasive it becomes).
Katz:
I have seventeen arguments for the claim that p, and I
know of only four for the claim that not-p. Therefore p.
Lewis:
Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious
and when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the
fact that they find not- p obvious is no argument that it is
true; and I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare.
Therefore, p.
Fodor:
My argument for p is based on three premises:
1. q
2. r
and
3. p
From these, the claim that p deductively follows. Some people
may find the third premise controversial, but it is clear that
if we replaced that premise by any other reasonable premise,
the argument would go through just as well.
Sellars' proof that p:
Unfortunately limitations of space prevent it from being
included here, but important parts of the proof can be found in
each of the articles in the attached bibliography.
Earman:
There are solutions to the field equations of general
relativity in which space-time has the structure of a four-
dimensional Klein bottle and in which there is no matter. In
each such space-time, the claim that not-p is false. Therefore p
Goodman:
Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false,
on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so-called
"counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that p in a way
that it was obviously not intended -- for I intended my thesis
to have no counterexamples. Therefore p.
Outline Of A Proof That P (1):
Saul Kripke
Some philosophers have argued that not-p. But none of them
seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the
intuitive view that this is not the case. Therefore, p.
_________________
(1) This outline was prepared hastily -- at the editor's
insistence -- from a taped manuscript of a lecture. Since I was
not even given the opportunity to revise the first draft before
publication, I cannot be held responsible for any lacunae in
the (published version of the) argument, or for any fallacious
or garbled inferences resulting from faulty preparation of the
typescript. Also, the argument now seems to me to have problems
which I did not know when I wrote it, but which I can't discuss
here, and which are completely unrelated to any criticisms
that have appeared in the literature (or that I have seen in
manuscript); all such criticisms misconstrue my argument. It
will be noted that the present version of the argument seems to
presuppose the (intuitionistically unacceptable) law of double
negation. But the argument can easily be reformulated in a way
that avoids employing such an inference rule. I hope to expand
on these matters further in a separate monograph.
Routley and Meyer:
If (q & not-q) is true, then there is a model for p.
Therefore p.
Plantinga:
It is a model theorem that p -> p. Surely its possible
that p must be true. Thus p. But it is a model theorem
that p -> p. Therefore p.
Chisholm:
P-ness is self-presenting. Therefore, p.
Morganbesser:
If not p, what? q maybe?