From Realpolitik to Real Politics
Статья директора Центра стратегических исследований Бегина-Садата и профессора политических наук Университета Бар-Илана в The Jerusalem Post. В ней Эфраим Инбар "покушается" на священную корову realpolitik-ов - убеждённость в приверженности России к нераспространению ядерного оружия.
Инбар указывает, что стратегической целью России является сокращение влияния США в мире. Критически важным инструментом для успеха этой стратегии является усиления контроля над источниками и путями доставки на Запад энергоносителей и недавнее вторжение в Грузию является сигналом для таких соседей России, как Туркменистан и Азербайджан.
Однако, помимо запугивания соседей (что само по себе вполне в традиции московского империализма), другим важным составляющим политики России является влияние на Иран. Именно ради включения такого игрока в про-московский энергетический альянс Кремль готов принять возможный приобретения Ираном ядерного оружия.
Russia's refusal to cooperate with the West in isolating Iran in order to curb its nuclear ambitions has remained an enigma to realpolitik observers, who expect it to prefer non-proliferation. Yet, if Russia's grand strategy is to challenge the US, then one of its main tools is the political economy of energy. With a much greater nuclear arsenal, Russia is ready to tolerate a nuclear Iran. It believes it is strong enough to deter the ayatollahs if they can be harnessed under Russian grand strategy.
Moscow nourishes hopes of coordinating anti-Western policies with oil-rich Iran. A nuclear Iran may serve the Russian interest in detaching Gulf oil from American influence. This had been a long-standing goal of the Soviet Union. Facing an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, most oil producing countries in the Gulf will slither into the Iranian orbit. The Shi'ite areas are most vulnerable to Iranian influence. Noteworthy, the southern portion of Iraq as well as the northern province of Saudi Arabia, where significant amounts of oil are located, are heavily populated by Shi'ites (as is Iran).
A NUCLEAR Iran will also dominate the Persian Gulf and its energy output. A nuclear Iran may also destabilize Turkey, which serves as an energy corridor for the West. An emboldened Iran will be less reluctant to meddle in Turkish affairs and help the Islamic radical elements to create political turmoil and even an Islamic takeover of Turkey. Secular Turkey has been an anathema to the ayatollahs.
Надежда на то, что Россия способна изменить эту анти-американскую стратегию - иллюзия, ибо даже нынешнее расширение НАТО и ЕС, с точки зрения России, зашло слишком далеко. Поэтому Запад должен действовать уже сегодня, расчитывая не только на т.н. "мягкую силу", но и не исключая применения силы военной, в том числе и для завоевания нефтеносных районов.
Therefore, if the West does not want to succumb to dependence upon a Russian-led energy coalition, it has to act as soon as possible. Alternatives sources of energy should be explored. Conserving energy is similarly important. At the same time, Western leaders should be aware that what Kissinger called in the mid-1970s "economic strangulation" might also require military responses. Soft power may not be sufficient to prevent the rise of an effective anti-Western energy coalition.
The West must be prepared to defend countries such as Georgia or Azerbaijan to prevent their falling into the Russian orbit. The West cannot afford procrastinating regarding Iran to ensure Teheran does not acquire the bomb. Finally, Washington ought to update its contingency plans for conquering the oil fields if necessary.
Инбар указывает, что стратегической целью России является сокращение влияния США в мире. Критически важным инструментом для успеха этой стратегии является усиления контроля над источниками и путями доставки на Запад энергоносителей и недавнее вторжение в Грузию является сигналом для таких соседей России, как Туркменистан и Азербайджан.
Однако, помимо запугивания соседей (что само по себе вполне в традиции московского империализма), другим важным составляющим политики России является влияние на Иран. Именно ради включения такого игрока в про-московский энергетический альянс Кремль готов принять возможный приобретения Ираном ядерного оружия.
Russia's refusal to cooperate with the West in isolating Iran in order to curb its nuclear ambitions has remained an enigma to realpolitik observers, who expect it to prefer non-proliferation. Yet, if Russia's grand strategy is to challenge the US, then one of its main tools is the political economy of energy. With a much greater nuclear arsenal, Russia is ready to tolerate a nuclear Iran. It believes it is strong enough to deter the ayatollahs if they can be harnessed under Russian grand strategy.
Moscow nourishes hopes of coordinating anti-Western policies with oil-rich Iran. A nuclear Iran may serve the Russian interest in detaching Gulf oil from American influence. This had been a long-standing goal of the Soviet Union. Facing an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, most oil producing countries in the Gulf will slither into the Iranian orbit. The Shi'ite areas are most vulnerable to Iranian influence. Noteworthy, the southern portion of Iraq as well as the northern province of Saudi Arabia, where significant amounts of oil are located, are heavily populated by Shi'ites (as is Iran).
A NUCLEAR Iran will also dominate the Persian Gulf and its energy output. A nuclear Iran may also destabilize Turkey, which serves as an energy corridor for the West. An emboldened Iran will be less reluctant to meddle in Turkish affairs and help the Islamic radical elements to create political turmoil and even an Islamic takeover of Turkey. Secular Turkey has been an anathema to the ayatollahs.
Надежда на то, что Россия способна изменить эту анти-американскую стратегию - иллюзия, ибо даже нынешнее расширение НАТО и ЕС, с точки зрения России, зашло слишком далеко. Поэтому Запад должен действовать уже сегодня, расчитывая не только на т.н. "мягкую силу", но и не исключая применения силы военной, в том числе и для завоевания нефтеносных районов.
Therefore, if the West does not want to succumb to dependence upon a Russian-led energy coalition, it has to act as soon as possible. Alternatives sources of energy should be explored. Conserving energy is similarly important. At the same time, Western leaders should be aware that what Kissinger called in the mid-1970s "economic strangulation" might also require military responses. Soft power may not be sufficient to prevent the rise of an effective anti-Western energy coalition.
The West must be prepared to defend countries such as Georgia or Azerbaijan to prevent their falling into the Russian orbit. The West cannot afford procrastinating regarding Iran to ensure Teheran does not acquire the bomb. Finally, Washington ought to update its contingency plans for conquering the oil fields if necessary.