(no subject)
Hayley Lapalme
POLI 346 Paper Proposal
January 28, 2008
Clinton’s Intervention in Haiti: Presidential Internationalism or Defensive Realism?
I propose to examine the conditions that led President Clinton to use force in Haiti to reinstate President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was toppled in 1991 by a military faction. The military regime ruled Haiti until 1993, when President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” (CRS Report 2007), used American ships to patrol the island’s waters and enforce a United Nations embargo against Haiti, without the approval of Congress. From the use of naval forces to the goal of “spreading democracy,” Clinton’s role as President and authority as Commander in Chief were used to justify his conduct of foreign policy in Haiti independent from Congressional approval. Clinton pursued a doctrine of interventionism and internationalism when Congress presented a clear agreement that the US should not intervene.
Michael Nelson offers a discussion about the office and the President, to explore whether Clinton’s forceful intervention abroad was a function of his presonal “background, personality, and leaderships skills,” or of the office. Nelson examines how the office of the President best suits the Head of State to act “as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations” due to their proximity to information, policy tools, and ability to deploy an expedient foreign policy mission, relative to Congress. I will explore if Clinton’s intervention was a product of the office’s concern with state security or if it was the exercise of the President’s decision-making power, articulated by Clinton as American internationalism.
The question whether it was Presidential internationalist initiative or the office’s concern with state security that compelled the Haitian intervention is made more interesting because Clinton did not have Congressional support. Whatever prompted the action, the controversy of it required Clinton to gain support for his foreign policy. This presents an opportunity to examine how Clinton governed “by means of direct rhetorical appeal,” departing from the traditional system of checks and balances provided by the division of power between three separate branches of the federal government (CRS Report 2007). I will also consider how the “rally around the flag” effect affected Clinton’s ability to bypass Congress in his Haitian foreign policy. Both Ian Martin and Witkopf present interesting discussion about why the American public will support a foreign policy initiative.
Clinton intervened because the American Presidency is foremost concerned with ensuring state security, mitigating disturbances to the quality of life of the American polity, and is symbolic of democracy (and its spread). Before acknowledging the influence of Clinton’s personal characteristics in deciding upon intervention, I will examine the systemic level features that called him to act. Unlike Mearsheimer’s proposal that Clinton sought to intervene as a product of “offensive realism,” I will explore how his intervention was a function of “defensive realism,” as explained by Waltz. Clinton sought to regulate the flow of northward flowing refugees from Haiti that he feared would disrupt the American stability, he rationalized intervention to protect Americans abroad, and he justified it according to a willing obligation to spread democracy. Unlike Mearsheimer’s prediction, Clinton’s foreign policy did not pursue an overwhelming preponderance of power in anarchic system. Instead, Clinton sought to secure the safety and security of the American state by stabilizing Haiti.
Admittedly, these realists explanations of state security may not be the only factors influencing Clinton’s intervention. An American, or Presidential, spirit of internationalism can also be observed in Clinton’s action. Here the President himself and social values become relevant. I will consider theories related to the influence of societal variables on foreign policymaking, as described by Wittkopf. Clinton’s 26 February 1999 declaration can be retrospectively taken as an indication of humanitarian undercurrents in Clinton’s foreign policy:
“The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of
letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.”
Here we can observe an internationalist conviction that America should intervene beyond its borders to take in active role in world affairs. But this retrospective statement may also be indicative of Clinton’s post-Rwanda reflection on his policy of non-intervention during this East African genocide. Therefore, the final component of the paper will explore why Clinton chose to intervene in Haiti, but not in Rwanda - both which are cases that compel humanitarian intervention. This will bring the discussion full circle to Waltz’s “defensive realism” rationale for intervention in Haiti. I will conclude by looking at whether Clinton’s decision to intervene in Haiti was prompted by the geographic proximity of the crisis (which directly affected American security), whereas even a President who demonstrated his spirit of internationalism in Sudan and Yugoslavia could dismiss the humanitarian urgency of Rwanda. Presumably, Rwanda posed less of a security threat to the American polity than did Haiti.
Bibliography and New Sources to explore:
Brune, Lester H. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton
in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992-1998. Claremont, Calif., 1998.
CRS Report for Congress. The War Powers Resolution: After 33 Years. May 1, 2007.
Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde,
and Fredrik Logevall, eds. 2nd ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002. 1887
pp. 3 vols. Some articles I have already read: “Dissent in Wars,” “Intervention and
Nonintervetion,” “Humanitarian Intervention,” “Presidential Power.”
Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. Lawrence, Kan. : University Press of Kansas,
1995.
Haitian frustrations : dilemmas for U.S. policy. Washington, D.C. : Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1995.
Hyland, William. Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4. (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 626-628.
Irons, Peter H. War powers : how the imperial presidency hijacked the Constitution. New
York : Metropolitan Books, 2005.
Koh, Harold Hongju. The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy. The
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 8, Symposium: The Informal Economy. (Jun.,
1994), pp. 2391-2435.
Martin, Ian. Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism. Foreign Policy, No. 95. (Summer, 1994),
pp. 72-89.
Rotberg, Robert. Clinton Was Right. Foreign Policy, No. 102. (Spring, 1996), pp. 135-
141.
Soderberg, Nancy E. The superpower myth : the use and misuse of American might.
Hoboken, N.J. : John Wiley, c2005.
Philip R. Trimble. The President's Constitutional Authority to Use Limited Military
Force. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 1995),
pp. 84-87.
Williams, John. Why We Go to War - the Haitian Intervention: A Case Study in US
Decisionmaking. Marine Corps University, 1995
Woods, Thomas E. Jr. Presidential War Powers. LewRockwell.com
POLI 346 Paper Proposal
January 28, 2008
Clinton’s Intervention in Haiti: Presidential Internationalism or Defensive Realism?
I propose to examine the conditions that led President Clinton to use force in Haiti to reinstate President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was toppled in 1991 by a military faction. The military regime ruled Haiti until 1993, when President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” (CRS Report 2007), used American ships to patrol the island’s waters and enforce a United Nations embargo against Haiti, without the approval of Congress. From the use of naval forces to the goal of “spreading democracy,” Clinton’s role as President and authority as Commander in Chief were used to justify his conduct of foreign policy in Haiti independent from Congressional approval. Clinton pursued a doctrine of interventionism and internationalism when Congress presented a clear agreement that the US should not intervene.
Michael Nelson offers a discussion about the office and the President, to explore whether Clinton’s forceful intervention abroad was a function of his presonal “background, personality, and leaderships skills,” or of the office. Nelson examines how the office of the President best suits the Head of State to act “as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations” due to their proximity to information, policy tools, and ability to deploy an expedient foreign policy mission, relative to Congress. I will explore if Clinton’s intervention was a product of the office’s concern with state security or if it was the exercise of the President’s decision-making power, articulated by Clinton as American internationalism.
The question whether it was Presidential internationalist initiative or the office’s concern with state security that compelled the Haitian intervention is made more interesting because Clinton did not have Congressional support. Whatever prompted the action, the controversy of it required Clinton to gain support for his foreign policy. This presents an opportunity to examine how Clinton governed “by means of direct rhetorical appeal,” departing from the traditional system of checks and balances provided by the division of power between three separate branches of the federal government (CRS Report 2007). I will also consider how the “rally around the flag” effect affected Clinton’s ability to bypass Congress in his Haitian foreign policy. Both Ian Martin and Witkopf present interesting discussion about why the American public will support a foreign policy initiative.
Clinton intervened because the American Presidency is foremost concerned with ensuring state security, mitigating disturbances to the quality of life of the American polity, and is symbolic of democracy (and its spread). Before acknowledging the influence of Clinton’s personal characteristics in deciding upon intervention, I will examine the systemic level features that called him to act. Unlike Mearsheimer’s proposal that Clinton sought to intervene as a product of “offensive realism,” I will explore how his intervention was a function of “defensive realism,” as explained by Waltz. Clinton sought to regulate the flow of northward flowing refugees from Haiti that he feared would disrupt the American stability, he rationalized intervention to protect Americans abroad, and he justified it according to a willing obligation to spread democracy. Unlike Mearsheimer’s prediction, Clinton’s foreign policy did not pursue an overwhelming preponderance of power in anarchic system. Instead, Clinton sought to secure the safety and security of the American state by stabilizing Haiti.
Admittedly, these realists explanations of state security may not be the only factors influencing Clinton’s intervention. An American, or Presidential, spirit of internationalism can also be observed in Clinton’s action. Here the President himself and social values become relevant. I will consider theories related to the influence of societal variables on foreign policymaking, as described by Wittkopf. Clinton’s 26 February 1999 declaration can be retrospectively taken as an indication of humanitarian undercurrents in Clinton’s foreign policy:
“The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of
letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.”
Here we can observe an internationalist conviction that America should intervene beyond its borders to take in active role in world affairs. But this retrospective statement may also be indicative of Clinton’s post-Rwanda reflection on his policy of non-intervention during this East African genocide. Therefore, the final component of the paper will explore why Clinton chose to intervene in Haiti, but not in Rwanda - both which are cases that compel humanitarian intervention. This will bring the discussion full circle to Waltz’s “defensive realism” rationale for intervention in Haiti. I will conclude by looking at whether Clinton’s decision to intervene in Haiti was prompted by the geographic proximity of the crisis (which directly affected American security), whereas even a President who demonstrated his spirit of internationalism in Sudan and Yugoslavia could dismiss the humanitarian urgency of Rwanda. Presumably, Rwanda posed less of a security threat to the American polity than did Haiti.
Bibliography and New Sources to explore:
Brune, Lester H. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton
in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992-1998. Claremont, Calif., 1998.
CRS Report for Congress. The War Powers Resolution: After 33 Years. May 1, 2007.
Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde,
and Fredrik Logevall, eds. 2nd ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002. 1887
pp. 3 vols. Some articles I have already read: “Dissent in Wars,” “Intervention and
Nonintervetion,” “Humanitarian Intervention,” “Presidential Power.”
Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. Lawrence, Kan. : University Press of Kansas,
1995.
Haitian frustrations : dilemmas for U.S. policy. Washington, D.C. : Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1995.
Hyland, William. Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4. (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 626-628.
Irons, Peter H. War powers : how the imperial presidency hijacked the Constitution. New
York : Metropolitan Books, 2005.
Koh, Harold Hongju. The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy. The
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 8, Symposium: The Informal Economy. (Jun.,
1994), pp. 2391-2435.
Martin, Ian. Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism. Foreign Policy, No. 95. (Summer, 1994),
pp. 72-89.
Rotberg, Robert. Clinton Was Right. Foreign Policy, No. 102. (Spring, 1996), pp. 135-
141.
Soderberg, Nancy E. The superpower myth : the use and misuse of American might.
Hoboken, N.J. : John Wiley, c2005.
Philip R. Trimble. The President's Constitutional Authority to Use Limited Military
Force. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 1995),
pp. 84-87.
Williams, John. Why We Go to War - the Haitian Intervention: A Case Study in US
Decisionmaking. Marine Corps University, 1995
Woods, Thomas E. Jr. Presidential War Powers. LewRockwell.com