Ahh, Cocaine. How can I count the ways.
The narcotics situation in Colombia has become notorious around the world as an intricate network of corruption, crime, and control that seems to have equal power to that of the valid government. In the late twentieth century the illegal activities have escalated from small underground trafficking to a large-scale operation that has overwhelming influence on the politics, economy, and society of Colombia. Drug Lords now use their power to fuel assassinations, skew income patterns, and purchase key cornerstones of society that change the way Colombians live. With no clear path to control in sight, the modern day narcotics networks can utilize their vast bank accounts in order to fund acts of terrorism in an effort to force their ideal society onto the rest of the nation.
Although the narcotics cultivation and trafficking did not evolve into a major detriment to the Colombian society until after the major increase of United States demand in the second half of the twentieth century, the roots of marijuana and cocaine in Colombian agriculture much earlier in historical sources. Indigenous inhabitants were known to chew the coca leaves in Pre-Colombian *that is, before the arrival of European Civilization* centuries, as a means of a painkiller. Cannabis growth on the other hand did not occur until arriving from Panama in the first decade of the twentieth century. Soon after its introduction into the country a small criminal population began cultivating the new crop of marijuana. This was shortly before the Second World War during the 1930’s. At the onset of the war, the number of marijuana crops was expanded due to government experiments that tested the viability of hemp as a usable fiber for the war. Prior the Bipartisan Political Agreement in March of 1958, the government was blind to any growth of the industry, due to increased violent attacks of political basis.
The production of either marijuana or cocaine was minimal until the 1960’s, when the anti-establishment youth culture of the United States greatly increased demand for the import of narcotics into America. The marijuana trade grew significantly, especially in the Guajira Peninsula, and allowed Colombian port cities to gain a stable but illegal income that many of its citizens had not enjoyed. The sale of cocaine to the United States was beginning in the late 1960’s via a network of crime centered in Miami, Florida. The amount of smuggled cocaine sharply rose through this syndicate, though the number of crops remained in control of small Native Indians on their small land plots. The export of Colombian narcotics depended on small units, usually a few kilos at a time being smuggled in by a single person. The person smuggling, known as the “mule”, would conceal the narcotics on their personal belongings or on their body and sneak these narcotics past customs inspectors and law enforcement. The Colombian government did little to stop these illegal activities in the 1960’s due to the fact they were locked in many other political struggles that had spawned other violence within the country. Conservative and Liberal political parties were set in many struggles known as “La Violencia” (The Violence) from 1948 to 1966. The two major political parties separated the country with many violent uprisings primarily in rural areas of the country. Even with the Nation Front beginning in 1966, political views were still averted from using funding to put up a resistance against the drug trade. Political groups such as FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional - National Liberation Army) disagreed with the national political situation. These guerilla factions and their violent deeds were far more urgent situations that needed to be dealt with. Colombian democracy faced many more perils associated with the Pro-Communist factions that needed to be addressed before the government officials could commit more military units and funding to dissolving a still small and developing narcotics trafficking system. This was the policy during the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, from 1966-77, who assigned the armed forces to the primary objective of quelling guerilla violence in the countryside.
During the next decade the nature of the narcotics traffickers developed into a larger scale underground operation that wielded vast economic power in the country through the use of millions of dollars. This change began to occur early in the 1970’s, with the transition from a large marijuana trade to a more lucrative cocaine production syndicate. The cities of Medellin and Cali became large economic centers for the new system of cocaine trafficking. The new operation began in Bolivia and Peru with the harvest of coca paste that was then shipped to the drug lord's laboratories in Colombia to be refined. Shipment to the United States was then enacted in many ways, the earliest method was using commercial jets to smuggle kilograms at a time that then evolved into large-scale private air transport operations. This evolution was led by the creation of a network of privately owned small aircraft, such as a single propeller Cessna, flying to south Florida or the Bahamas with a large cargo of drugs. This system of transportation was first used by former U.S. marijuana dealers, George Jung and his partner Carlos Lehder, in the 1970’s. Jung soon became a very wealthy man and spawned a cocaine subculture in the United States, as portrayed in the 2001 cinematic feature Blow. Jung’s new means of transporting cocaine allowed him to come into contact with Pablo Escobar, the man known as El Patron (the father) of the Medellin Cartel. Tons at a time, rather than kilos, could be smuggled in one shipment, allowing for a gigantic development of the exports of cocaine out of Colombia. Soon many other such air transporters began business, creating further problems for both the United States and Colombia. Large amounts of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, were also smuggled by sea via boats. Colombian narcotics dealers were soon the main source for both cocaine and marijuana in the United States. This was due in part to strict U.S-Mexico border control updates in the early seventies. This slowed Mexican drug exports into the United States, allowing Colombian narcotics networks an opportunity to increase exports. After the enactment of this border control, nearly fifty thousand Caribbean coast farmers depended on marijuana cultivation for income. Another fifty thousand Colombian citizens gained some type of income from casually growing marijuana. With the large influx of drug money into the country, Colombians involved became incredibly wealthy. Their large amassed funds had several effects on the economy. While the increased wealth of the narcotics trade did aid Colombian economic growth, the majority of the growth was an illusion based in industries that were used to easily launder money. The spending was primarily in the real estate and construction sectors of the economy, due to their ability to conceal the illegally received currency. A second effect on the economy was the inflation of Colombian currency. This was due to the increased flow of American dollars into the economy. In addition, the legal food production economy suffered at the hands of marijuana production. President Turbay had to increase the national debt by taking out foreign loans. Not only did drug cultivators commit tens of thousands of hectares to marijuana production, they also used slash-and-burn clearing tactics. The destruction of the environment decreased land area for food production while simultaneously creating food importation necessities. Drug traffickers had so much economic control by the end of the seventies that they also had ownership of several areas of the legal economy.
The corruption of the Colombian economy through increased drug sales started to draw political attention and action in the mid-to-late seventies. Although the government put forth small effort under the Misael Pastrana Borrero in the early seventies, large efforts did not occur until the late seventies. This occurred when the people of Colombia became disconnected with the elite social class and the political power in the period directly following the National Front administrations. Suspected secret deals between drug lords and certain political figures, coupled with growing distaste that the government could not improve the economic condition, made the post National Front government the symbol of mediocrity and weakness in the eyes of the public. The first president of the post-National Front period, President Lopez Michelson, began to resolve the inflation issues caused by the coffee boom and the illegal drug trade after his election in 1974. Michelsen's economic policy, the "To Close the Gap" plan, declared the economy in a state of emergency and was concerned primarily with tax reform and increased production and employment. However, Michelsen's administration did realize the fact that the drug trade was having destructive consequences on the economy and Colombia as a whole. Most of those who did see the disease that narcotics were on society would not speak out, fearing the retribution of traffickers. The narcotics traffickers had become so wealthy that they could buy political office in local or state offices. Much of the political system had been corrupted either out of the fear of the "sicarios", the assassins hired to intimidate officials, or by large payoffs. Prior to 1978 direct military involvement had been opposed by General Varon Valencia. With the inauguration of President Julio Turbay Ayala in 1978, the military's role within the country expanded to cover the narcotics problems. Turbay committed the defense minister, General Camacho Levya, to assuming a more active role in the internal security and justice administration. A "crusade" to end crime, rebellion, and other "subversive activities" began by transferring much of former National Police jurisdiction over to military and military courts. The army began to actively pursue criminals linked with a wider variety of offenses, including those defined as terrorism. Turbay officially declared a state of siege in November of 1978 with the dispatch of the military, resulting in the near militarization of the Guajira Peninsula. Within the sixteen months, twelve thousand military personnel were dispatched to eliminate marijuana cultivation fields and other drug related activities. The navy set up a blockade along the Caribbean coastline in order to confiscate all shipments headed to the United States. However, within less that one-year of the beginning of the campaign, military personnel began protesting the high cost of attempting to suppress the drug trade. Troop morale began to fall sharply, and those men on the "front line" were being easily corrupted by the lure of money offered by traffickers. The legal economy of the Guajira Peninsula also began to fall due to the state of siege. Turbay eventually started to transfer military power in the Guajira Peninsula to special units of the National Police by the end of the seventies.
During the 1980's the narcotics trade in Colombia became startlingly more notorious, vicious, and violent not only within the bounds of the country, but also worldwide. The legitimate Colombian economy became depleted, due to the complete domination of resources by the illegal drug economy. A reason for the sudden growth in the productivity in the Colombian narcotics trade is derived from the end of violence between the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Medellin Cartel in 1981. The end of the violence brought forth the beginning of the Medellin Cartel, lead by Pablo Escobar. The loose unification of traffickers allowed the men to expand on their network, replacing the old network in Miami with their own men. This created more profits by eliminating the need for a “middle man” in order to vend narcotics to U.S. residents. The Medellin Cartel, which emerged from the seventies as the primary narcotics provider, gained access to more refined and cutting edge technology in order to smuggle their drugs into foreign countries. The higher payroll of the cartel allowed it to purchase larger aircraft and watercraft, along with better methods of communication to ensure that the new transports could arrive at their destination unaffected by law enforcement. Due to the overwhelming growth of income associated with cocaine sales, the marijuana trade became practically obsolete. Trading cocaine was far more lucrative and the Colombians had a monopoly on South American production methods. Cartels encountered less interference from any governmental narcotics control as they were routinely bribed or threatened. This of course further increased the cash flow to the cartel leaders, spreading the trade into more areas of Colombian economy. With the unprecedented development of the illegal drug trade as the only part of national economy to have a stable income source, many Colombian farmers and laborers were lured into joining the criminal activities centered in Medellin. At the time, the business owners in Colombia were being pressured into economic reforms by union leaders to accommodate for the high cost of living in the country. However, the proprietors of these businesses could not offer many of the minimum wage, benefits, and vacation requests of the people. Thus this led to almost half of the labor force being employ in the “informal” economy during the 1980’s. The members of this divided “informal” economy included not only undereducated employees of legitimate business, but also of those involved in the narcotics trade.
Along with controlling most of the laborers during the eighties, the narcotics cartels began to seize control large amounts of land acreage for production of the prohibited crops. Overall production of marijuana began to slip in the 1980’s, but cannabis was still grown on over thirteen thousand hectares of land, or approximately thirty-five thousand acres in 1986. Farmers could harvest over fourteen thousand tons nationwide, equating to almost eight hundred pounds per acre on average. All of this growth, an estimated sixty-two percent, occurred after governmental attempts to eliminate all marijuana crops in the Guajira Peninsula. In response to these attacks, cultivators moved their crops from tradition growing areas in the northeastern mountains, to central Colombian areas. The coca plant cultivation held even more land mass in the Colombian landscape, in the secluded regions of the Amazon River Basin. After cocaine had become the more popular of the two narcotics crops within the 1980’s, the coca plant required for the production of cocaine had over twenty-five thousand hectares of land dedicated to its growth. Due to steps taken to conceal the production of the plant, coca plant production did not achieve the same ratio of pounds per acre as the cannabis production. The growth in secluded areas and on smaller parcels of land led to a yield of only 1.6 kilograms of cocaine base per hectare. Even with smaller partitions of land, the total annual production of 1986 was close to twenty-seven tons. This reduced productivity contributed to the high price of cocaine sales in the United States, which Colombia controlled seventy-five percent of all South American shipments. Colombia’s profit margins on the sale of cocaine, while not officially able to be tracked, were over two thousand percent. This profit is primarily a factor of Colombia’s ability to refine the coca leaf into a useable narcotic form of cocaine. While the production of these drugs constituted a large part of the national income throughout the 1980’s, precisely what percentage cannot be calculated because illegal transactions are not recorded on GNP (Gross National Product).
Unlike the attempt at political control of the narcotics situation that occurred during the 1970’s, the drug cartels of the 1980’s had the upper hand by the use of violence, terrorism, and bribery. With the official end of President Turbay’s use of the army to quell drug production and exportation in 1981, the government was forced to use other methods to suppress narcotics cartels. In December of 1980, Colombia attempted at combining efforts with the United States in Operation Tiburon. Operation Tiburon helped authorities confiscate two thousand seven hundred tons of marijuana en route to the U.S. President Turbay then made agreements with the United States to extradite Colombia traffickers accused of crimes in America. Turbay also instated the Judicial Police in order to aid in the investigation of drug related offenses. However, when Belisario Betancur assumed the presidency he did not pursue a solution to the narcotics condition. It is at this point that the traffickers became more politically violent and powerful, taking advantage of circumstances in society that they could easily manipulate. Some traffickers, such as Jaime Guillot Lara, began funding politically charged guerilla groups by providing arms and money for these groups. Jaime Guillot Lara was found to have received aid in trafficking drugs to the United States from Cubans, in return for passing guns on to the M-19 guerillas in Colombia. In contrast, the cartels also formed anti-guerilla death squads, such as the 1981 founding of the Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores - MAS), in retribution to the guerilla’s kidnapping family of the traffickers for ransom. These anti-guerilla groups eventually evolved into pawns of the cartels used to eliminate political enemies and intimidating judicial authorities. Groups such as these are suspected to be responsible for the death of Betancur’s Minister of Justice. Betancur declined the extradition agreement because he did not want criminals shipped elsewhere, and opposed the spraying of chemicals that would destroy marijuana crops. On the other hand, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Betancur’s Minister of Justice, took a hard stance against traffickers. He approved assaults on the Medellin Cartel and their plants, where the primary processing of the coca paste took place. Within a month of his successful raid he fell victim to the sicarios. This inspired Betancur to become aggressive against the narcotic problems, declaring a state of siege in 1984. Betancur utilized the extradition treaty by sending thirteen traffickers to the United States. Assassinations continued throughout the eighties, allegedly killing an attorney general and twelve Supreme Court judges as well.
In 1988, under the guidance of President Barco, the Colombian Army began a campaign reminiscent of the crusade of Turbay. The military began destroying processing plants and vital crops, while committing themselves to arresting those identified as traffickers. This only served as a catalyst for traffickers to increase violence and death threats. Fears again rose that those in charge of military forces might be bought away by the cartels. These fears were confirmed by reports that military officials helped in the processing of U.S. bound narcotics. Increased military support could not suppress the assassinations either. This demonstrated with the deaths of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos Jimenez and Governor of the Antioquia Department Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, between 1988-89. These murders encouraged further action by Barco to step up military action. In November of 1989 Barco and his administration passed many amendments to the “state of siege” terms of the Constitution. These amendments allowed for the seizure of private property belonging to traffickers. Also, suspects could now be detained for up to seven days, allowing for the extradition to the United States. Colombia received the addition of US$ 65 million of military equipment, the extradition of five traffickers, and the narcotics dealers’ transports and laboratories. Despite this, two of the largest traffickers, Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gaucha, escaped persecution. When President Barco declined an agreement designed by the Medellin Cartel, they bombed several locations in Bogota and Medellin. The Medellin Cartel also committed many more political assassinations. Narcotics terrorism spread to car bombs and plane crashes in late 1989, although they did pause action with the Colombian Police’s killing of the Medellin Cartel’s Rodriguez Gaucha. This came as a result of a firefight between Rodriguez Guacha and the elite police unit on December 15, 1989. This assassination brought forth another proposed agreement by the traffickers. After another Barco decline, the narcotics dealers resumed the violence, quickly killing presidential candidates Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa and Carlos Pizarro Leon-Gomez in 1990. Even with the election of equally harsh presidents, the narcotics dealers continued to kill key figures throughout the end of the 1990’s. However, the increased awareness of the drug problem by both Colombian military forces and foreign powers concerned about the export of cocaine and marijuana led to many developments in apprehending or assassinating many important traffickers. In the late 1980’s, both key pilots responsible for the export of cocaine to North America, mainly the United States, were dealt with. George Jung was arrested multiple times and finally given a long term sentence. Carlos Lehder was shot and killed in 1987 in the jungles of South America. The most significant move made was in 1993, with the killing of Pablo Escobar, the cornerstone of the Medellin Cartel. The struggle of many separate forces have combined to slow much of the drug exportation, however many of the traffickers began to effectively arm themselves in retaliation against officials. This escalation of force on both sides has not led to a completely successful end to narcotics problems, and the situation still remains dire on a world level.
The evolution of the narcotics trade over the twentieth century in Colombia has brought about much violence and controversy not only nationally, but also worldwide. From humble beginnings as marijuana grown on the Caribbean coasts, the drug trade changed relatively quickly into a lucrative, but extremely dangerous business. The large wealth that could be accumulated tempted thousands of Colombians to participate in the illegal drug trade. However, when this way of life was confronted, the Cartels began to rebel and fight against the legitimate law in an attempt to create their own. With the endless demand for cocaine and other illicit drugs, there seems to be no end to those willing to do what is necessary to produce them. This has caused tremendous conflict in Colombia in the past, and will continue to do so until some cure is found for the plague that is the drug trade in the world today.
Although the narcotics cultivation and trafficking did not evolve into a major detriment to the Colombian society until after the major increase of United States demand in the second half of the twentieth century, the roots of marijuana and cocaine in Colombian agriculture much earlier in historical sources. Indigenous inhabitants were known to chew the coca leaves in Pre-Colombian *that is, before the arrival of European Civilization* centuries, as a means of a painkiller. Cannabis growth on the other hand did not occur until arriving from Panama in the first decade of the twentieth century. Soon after its introduction into the country a small criminal population began cultivating the new crop of marijuana. This was shortly before the Second World War during the 1930’s. At the onset of the war, the number of marijuana crops was expanded due to government experiments that tested the viability of hemp as a usable fiber for the war. Prior the Bipartisan Political Agreement in March of 1958, the government was blind to any growth of the industry, due to increased violent attacks of political basis.
The production of either marijuana or cocaine was minimal until the 1960’s, when the anti-establishment youth culture of the United States greatly increased demand for the import of narcotics into America. The marijuana trade grew significantly, especially in the Guajira Peninsula, and allowed Colombian port cities to gain a stable but illegal income that many of its citizens had not enjoyed. The sale of cocaine to the United States was beginning in the late 1960’s via a network of crime centered in Miami, Florida. The amount of smuggled cocaine sharply rose through this syndicate, though the number of crops remained in control of small Native Indians on their small land plots. The export of Colombian narcotics depended on small units, usually a few kilos at a time being smuggled in by a single person. The person smuggling, known as the “mule”, would conceal the narcotics on their personal belongings or on their body and sneak these narcotics past customs inspectors and law enforcement. The Colombian government did little to stop these illegal activities in the 1960’s due to the fact they were locked in many other political struggles that had spawned other violence within the country. Conservative and Liberal political parties were set in many struggles known as “La Violencia” (The Violence) from 1948 to 1966. The two major political parties separated the country with many violent uprisings primarily in rural areas of the country. Even with the Nation Front beginning in 1966, political views were still averted from using funding to put up a resistance against the drug trade. Political groups such as FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional - National Liberation Army) disagreed with the national political situation. These guerilla factions and their violent deeds were far more urgent situations that needed to be dealt with. Colombian democracy faced many more perils associated with the Pro-Communist factions that needed to be addressed before the government officials could commit more military units and funding to dissolving a still small and developing narcotics trafficking system. This was the policy during the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, from 1966-77, who assigned the armed forces to the primary objective of quelling guerilla violence in the countryside.
During the next decade the nature of the narcotics traffickers developed into a larger scale underground operation that wielded vast economic power in the country through the use of millions of dollars. This change began to occur early in the 1970’s, with the transition from a large marijuana trade to a more lucrative cocaine production syndicate. The cities of Medellin and Cali became large economic centers for the new system of cocaine trafficking. The new operation began in Bolivia and Peru with the harvest of coca paste that was then shipped to the drug lord's laboratories in Colombia to be refined. Shipment to the United States was then enacted in many ways, the earliest method was using commercial jets to smuggle kilograms at a time that then evolved into large-scale private air transport operations. This evolution was led by the creation of a network of privately owned small aircraft, such as a single propeller Cessna, flying to south Florida or the Bahamas with a large cargo of drugs. This system of transportation was first used by former U.S. marijuana dealers, George Jung and his partner Carlos Lehder, in the 1970’s. Jung soon became a very wealthy man and spawned a cocaine subculture in the United States, as portrayed in the 2001 cinematic feature Blow. Jung’s new means of transporting cocaine allowed him to come into contact with Pablo Escobar, the man known as El Patron (the father) of the Medellin Cartel. Tons at a time, rather than kilos, could be smuggled in one shipment, allowing for a gigantic development of the exports of cocaine out of Colombia. Soon many other such air transporters began business, creating further problems for both the United States and Colombia. Large amounts of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, were also smuggled by sea via boats. Colombian narcotics dealers were soon the main source for both cocaine and marijuana in the United States. This was due in part to strict U.S-Mexico border control updates in the early seventies. This slowed Mexican drug exports into the United States, allowing Colombian narcotics networks an opportunity to increase exports. After the enactment of this border control, nearly fifty thousand Caribbean coast farmers depended on marijuana cultivation for income. Another fifty thousand Colombian citizens gained some type of income from casually growing marijuana. With the large influx of drug money into the country, Colombians involved became incredibly wealthy. Their large amassed funds had several effects on the economy. While the increased wealth of the narcotics trade did aid Colombian economic growth, the majority of the growth was an illusion based in industries that were used to easily launder money. The spending was primarily in the real estate and construction sectors of the economy, due to their ability to conceal the illegally received currency. A second effect on the economy was the inflation of Colombian currency. This was due to the increased flow of American dollars into the economy. In addition, the legal food production economy suffered at the hands of marijuana production. President Turbay had to increase the national debt by taking out foreign loans. Not only did drug cultivators commit tens of thousands of hectares to marijuana production, they also used slash-and-burn clearing tactics. The destruction of the environment decreased land area for food production while simultaneously creating food importation necessities. Drug traffickers had so much economic control by the end of the seventies that they also had ownership of several areas of the legal economy.
The corruption of the Colombian economy through increased drug sales started to draw political attention and action in the mid-to-late seventies. Although the government put forth small effort under the Misael Pastrana Borrero in the early seventies, large efforts did not occur until the late seventies. This occurred when the people of Colombia became disconnected with the elite social class and the political power in the period directly following the National Front administrations. Suspected secret deals between drug lords and certain political figures, coupled with growing distaste that the government could not improve the economic condition, made the post National Front government the symbol of mediocrity and weakness in the eyes of the public. The first president of the post-National Front period, President Lopez Michelson, began to resolve the inflation issues caused by the coffee boom and the illegal drug trade after his election in 1974. Michelsen's economic policy, the "To Close the Gap" plan, declared the economy in a state of emergency and was concerned primarily with tax reform and increased production and employment. However, Michelsen's administration did realize the fact that the drug trade was having destructive consequences on the economy and Colombia as a whole. Most of those who did see the disease that narcotics were on society would not speak out, fearing the retribution of traffickers. The narcotics traffickers had become so wealthy that they could buy political office in local or state offices. Much of the political system had been corrupted either out of the fear of the "sicarios", the assassins hired to intimidate officials, or by large payoffs. Prior to 1978 direct military involvement had been opposed by General Varon Valencia. With the inauguration of President Julio Turbay Ayala in 1978, the military's role within the country expanded to cover the narcotics problems. Turbay committed the defense minister, General Camacho Levya, to assuming a more active role in the internal security and justice administration. A "crusade" to end crime, rebellion, and other "subversive activities" began by transferring much of former National Police jurisdiction over to military and military courts. The army began to actively pursue criminals linked with a wider variety of offenses, including those defined as terrorism. Turbay officially declared a state of siege in November of 1978 with the dispatch of the military, resulting in the near militarization of the Guajira Peninsula. Within the sixteen months, twelve thousand military personnel were dispatched to eliminate marijuana cultivation fields and other drug related activities. The navy set up a blockade along the Caribbean coastline in order to confiscate all shipments headed to the United States. However, within less that one-year of the beginning of the campaign, military personnel began protesting the high cost of attempting to suppress the drug trade. Troop morale began to fall sharply, and those men on the "front line" were being easily corrupted by the lure of money offered by traffickers. The legal economy of the Guajira Peninsula also began to fall due to the state of siege. Turbay eventually started to transfer military power in the Guajira Peninsula to special units of the National Police by the end of the seventies.
During the 1980's the narcotics trade in Colombia became startlingly more notorious, vicious, and violent not only within the bounds of the country, but also worldwide. The legitimate Colombian economy became depleted, due to the complete domination of resources by the illegal drug economy. A reason for the sudden growth in the productivity in the Colombian narcotics trade is derived from the end of violence between the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Medellin Cartel in 1981. The end of the violence brought forth the beginning of the Medellin Cartel, lead by Pablo Escobar. The loose unification of traffickers allowed the men to expand on their network, replacing the old network in Miami with their own men. This created more profits by eliminating the need for a “middle man” in order to vend narcotics to U.S. residents. The Medellin Cartel, which emerged from the seventies as the primary narcotics provider, gained access to more refined and cutting edge technology in order to smuggle their drugs into foreign countries. The higher payroll of the cartel allowed it to purchase larger aircraft and watercraft, along with better methods of communication to ensure that the new transports could arrive at their destination unaffected by law enforcement. Due to the overwhelming growth of income associated with cocaine sales, the marijuana trade became practically obsolete. Trading cocaine was far more lucrative and the Colombians had a monopoly on South American production methods. Cartels encountered less interference from any governmental narcotics control as they were routinely bribed or threatened. This of course further increased the cash flow to the cartel leaders, spreading the trade into more areas of Colombian economy. With the unprecedented development of the illegal drug trade as the only part of national economy to have a stable income source, many Colombian farmers and laborers were lured into joining the criminal activities centered in Medellin. At the time, the business owners in Colombia were being pressured into economic reforms by union leaders to accommodate for the high cost of living in the country. However, the proprietors of these businesses could not offer many of the minimum wage, benefits, and vacation requests of the people. Thus this led to almost half of the labor force being employ in the “informal” economy during the 1980’s. The members of this divided “informal” economy included not only undereducated employees of legitimate business, but also of those involved in the narcotics trade.
Along with controlling most of the laborers during the eighties, the narcotics cartels began to seize control large amounts of land acreage for production of the prohibited crops. Overall production of marijuana began to slip in the 1980’s, but cannabis was still grown on over thirteen thousand hectares of land, or approximately thirty-five thousand acres in 1986. Farmers could harvest over fourteen thousand tons nationwide, equating to almost eight hundred pounds per acre on average. All of this growth, an estimated sixty-two percent, occurred after governmental attempts to eliminate all marijuana crops in the Guajira Peninsula. In response to these attacks, cultivators moved their crops from tradition growing areas in the northeastern mountains, to central Colombian areas. The coca plant cultivation held even more land mass in the Colombian landscape, in the secluded regions of the Amazon River Basin. After cocaine had become the more popular of the two narcotics crops within the 1980’s, the coca plant required for the production of cocaine had over twenty-five thousand hectares of land dedicated to its growth. Due to steps taken to conceal the production of the plant, coca plant production did not achieve the same ratio of pounds per acre as the cannabis production. The growth in secluded areas and on smaller parcels of land led to a yield of only 1.6 kilograms of cocaine base per hectare. Even with smaller partitions of land, the total annual production of 1986 was close to twenty-seven tons. This reduced productivity contributed to the high price of cocaine sales in the United States, which Colombia controlled seventy-five percent of all South American shipments. Colombia’s profit margins on the sale of cocaine, while not officially able to be tracked, were over two thousand percent. This profit is primarily a factor of Colombia’s ability to refine the coca leaf into a useable narcotic form of cocaine. While the production of these drugs constituted a large part of the national income throughout the 1980’s, precisely what percentage cannot be calculated because illegal transactions are not recorded on GNP (Gross National Product).
Unlike the attempt at political control of the narcotics situation that occurred during the 1970’s, the drug cartels of the 1980’s had the upper hand by the use of violence, terrorism, and bribery. With the official end of President Turbay’s use of the army to quell drug production and exportation in 1981, the government was forced to use other methods to suppress narcotics cartels. In December of 1980, Colombia attempted at combining efforts with the United States in Operation Tiburon. Operation Tiburon helped authorities confiscate two thousand seven hundred tons of marijuana en route to the U.S. President Turbay then made agreements with the United States to extradite Colombia traffickers accused of crimes in America. Turbay also instated the Judicial Police in order to aid in the investigation of drug related offenses. However, when Belisario Betancur assumed the presidency he did not pursue a solution to the narcotics condition. It is at this point that the traffickers became more politically violent and powerful, taking advantage of circumstances in society that they could easily manipulate. Some traffickers, such as Jaime Guillot Lara, began funding politically charged guerilla groups by providing arms and money for these groups. Jaime Guillot Lara was found to have received aid in trafficking drugs to the United States from Cubans, in return for passing guns on to the M-19 guerillas in Colombia. In contrast, the cartels also formed anti-guerilla death squads, such as the 1981 founding of the Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores - MAS), in retribution to the guerilla’s kidnapping family of the traffickers for ransom. These anti-guerilla groups eventually evolved into pawns of the cartels used to eliminate political enemies and intimidating judicial authorities. Groups such as these are suspected to be responsible for the death of Betancur’s Minister of Justice. Betancur declined the extradition agreement because he did not want criminals shipped elsewhere, and opposed the spraying of chemicals that would destroy marijuana crops. On the other hand, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Betancur’s Minister of Justice, took a hard stance against traffickers. He approved assaults on the Medellin Cartel and their plants, where the primary processing of the coca paste took place. Within a month of his successful raid he fell victim to the sicarios. This inspired Betancur to become aggressive against the narcotic problems, declaring a state of siege in 1984. Betancur utilized the extradition treaty by sending thirteen traffickers to the United States. Assassinations continued throughout the eighties, allegedly killing an attorney general and twelve Supreme Court judges as well.
In 1988, under the guidance of President Barco, the Colombian Army began a campaign reminiscent of the crusade of Turbay. The military began destroying processing plants and vital crops, while committing themselves to arresting those identified as traffickers. This only served as a catalyst for traffickers to increase violence and death threats. Fears again rose that those in charge of military forces might be bought away by the cartels. These fears were confirmed by reports that military officials helped in the processing of U.S. bound narcotics. Increased military support could not suppress the assassinations either. This demonstrated with the deaths of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos Jimenez and Governor of the Antioquia Department Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, between 1988-89. These murders encouraged further action by Barco to step up military action. In November of 1989 Barco and his administration passed many amendments to the “state of siege” terms of the Constitution. These amendments allowed for the seizure of private property belonging to traffickers. Also, suspects could now be detained for up to seven days, allowing for the extradition to the United States. Colombia received the addition of US$ 65 million of military equipment, the extradition of five traffickers, and the narcotics dealers’ transports and laboratories. Despite this, two of the largest traffickers, Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gaucha, escaped persecution. When President Barco declined an agreement designed by the Medellin Cartel, they bombed several locations in Bogota and Medellin. The Medellin Cartel also committed many more political assassinations. Narcotics terrorism spread to car bombs and plane crashes in late 1989, although they did pause action with the Colombian Police’s killing of the Medellin Cartel’s Rodriguez Gaucha. This came as a result of a firefight between Rodriguez Guacha and the elite police unit on December 15, 1989. This assassination brought forth another proposed agreement by the traffickers. After another Barco decline, the narcotics dealers resumed the violence, quickly killing presidential candidates Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa and Carlos Pizarro Leon-Gomez in 1990. Even with the election of equally harsh presidents, the narcotics dealers continued to kill key figures throughout the end of the 1990’s. However, the increased awareness of the drug problem by both Colombian military forces and foreign powers concerned about the export of cocaine and marijuana led to many developments in apprehending or assassinating many important traffickers. In the late 1980’s, both key pilots responsible for the export of cocaine to North America, mainly the United States, were dealt with. George Jung was arrested multiple times and finally given a long term sentence. Carlos Lehder was shot and killed in 1987 in the jungles of South America. The most significant move made was in 1993, with the killing of Pablo Escobar, the cornerstone of the Medellin Cartel. The struggle of many separate forces have combined to slow much of the drug exportation, however many of the traffickers began to effectively arm themselves in retaliation against officials. This escalation of force on both sides has not led to a completely successful end to narcotics problems, and the situation still remains dire on a world level.
The evolution of the narcotics trade over the twentieth century in Colombia has brought about much violence and controversy not only nationally, but also worldwide. From humble beginnings as marijuana grown on the Caribbean coasts, the drug trade changed relatively quickly into a lucrative, but extremely dangerous business. The large wealth that could be accumulated tempted thousands of Colombians to participate in the illegal drug trade. However, when this way of life was confronted, the Cartels began to rebel and fight against the legitimate law in an attempt to create their own. With the endless demand for cocaine and other illicit drugs, there seems to be no end to those willing to do what is necessary to produce them. This has caused tremendous conflict in Colombia in the past, and will continue to do so until some cure is found for the plague that is the drug trade in the world today.