The open secret of Judith Butler
Judith Butler has, of late, become a significant figure in the public consciousness; largely because of the influence she is believed to have on the ghastly fad of trans subjectivism. She has even had to try and defend it in a book (Who's afraid of gender?) that proves that, alas, the illustrious professor is not at home with arguing matters in a clear style for ordinary readers.
For Professor Butler is celebrated for the intense obscurity of her style. One passage, in particular, has been frequently quoted as pretty much the limit to which obscure professorial English can reach. Now, I think that is actually quite unfair, and I want to try and show that, properly read, it is full of meaning and has important things to tell us.
- “...The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power...”
Now let us do the thing that her school has familiarized the world with, and deconstruct this passage.
1) She is speaking of a move from one position to another. Obviously this "move" is metaphoric: in this case, a move from one group of ideas, of ways to see and understand, to another.
1a)The first position, the one that she says is being abandoned, is "a structuralist account" or description. Description of what? The text is not entirely clear, but it means either a description of society, or a description of the culture that dominates and structures society. This description, this account, understands "capital... to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways." That is, in this "structuralist" description, wealth, capital, the power of money, shapes society, or culture, in fairly easily described ways, with not much by way of variation. All the ways in which capital "structures" society, or culture, are "relatively homologous", relatively of one kind. And this asks the question: relatively, as compared to what?
1b) The answer comes in the second part of the sentence, the description of the metaphoric place to which we are moving. This is "a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation." Let us notice, for a start, that all of a sudden, and with no explanation, the thing that shapes society and/or culture is no longer "capital", but "hegemony": a much less clearly defined concept. Capital is the power of money, more or less without qualification. Hegemony is any kind of leadership or dominant position. And this hegemony is not even itself clearly defined, but to the contrary is "subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation". I will not, myself, bother to wonder just how precise is this choice of three ways to alter something, or whether they are just a rhetorical way to expand the concept of alteration and change. What is clear is that the concept to which we are supposed to move, from the "relatively homologous" ways to structure social relationships that she ascribes to an earlier "structuralist account," and one that is not only much less clearly defined, but naturally harder to define.
The text informs us that this philosophical move is connected with "the question of temporality." In and of itself, this is nothing strange. It is in fact a relatively practical issue, an issue of interpretation with which historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and language scholars, are familiar. Many interpretations of society and/or of culture tend to ignore the dimension of time, and are questioned, or even ruled out, by careful inspection of how time changes or denies them. There are even two widely used terms for descriptions that ignore or use the dimension of time: they are "synchronic" and "diachronic". But Butler's formulation is odd. It is not the consideration of time that calls into question, or disqualifies, and at any rate forces us to move from, the "structuralist account" to that messy "view of hegemony". Apparently, the move to the "view of hegemony" comes first, and brings "the question of temporality into the thinking of structure." Which leaves it unclear exactly what caused this move, which is the subject of the whole paragraph.
Let us move on. The move which is the subject of the paragraph "marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power." This sequence repeats the structure of the previous one in that it falls into two parts, which describe (sort of) the previous and abandoned position, and the position we are now taking.
The first is "a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects." What does this mean? Well, for a start, the use of the name of Marxist theorist Louis Althusser to qualify a structuralist account is kind of weird, since Althusser loudly and repeatedly disclaimed any sympathy with Structuralism. In his time (Althusser died in 1990, though he had lost his eminence, and indeed published nothing, since he murdered his wife in 1979), Structuralism was a leading intellectual current in France, and Althusser was the most notable of many authors who had been forced to deny belonging to it. What Althusser was, was a strong and mentally ruthless Marxist, and this agrees with the fact that "position one", "in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways," is quite clearly Marxism.
So, Marxism, orthodox Marxism, is being abandoned, at least as far as it "takes structural totalities as theoretical objects." I will admit that these few words are the height of that manner that has been universally described as incomprehensible, but I think there is something there that can be grasped. "Theoretical objects" probably depends - at least, that is the best I can make of it - on the ancient Greek meaning of theoria as contemplation, object of study. So the objects of study of orthodox or Althusserian Marxism are "structural totalities". And this kind of theoria is being abandoned in favour of "one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power." That is, having such "insights into the contingent possibility of structure" allows you to reach "a renewed conception of hegemony." Do note the very positive overtones of those words "inaugurate" and "renewed": the idea is that something like a new life is being, not just started, but almost celebrated - an inauguration is the celebration of a beginning. There is no doubt that Professor Butler feels very positively about this "conception of hegemony as bound uph the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power."
What she is saying is: Marxists (Althusser was an extreme Marxist) understood cultural “hegemony”, the power of culture over thought, as a “relatively homologous” set of facts; that is, they had clear terms to determine the power relationships within culture. But we have happily now inaugurated a novel world, moving from “capital” to “hegemony”. And this “hegemony” is “subject to repetition, convergence and re-articulation.”
And here and now I say that this passage is much worse than most people seem to think. It's not just bad and pretentious. It is frequently unclear even to the most strict analysis, right from the beginning. What is it that we are talking about - society as such, or society's dominant culture? The question is not merely theoretical. Then there is expression "structuralist account" and what is hard to see as anything but a deliberate avoidance of the term Marxism. Why does Butler want to avoid the statement that orthodox Marxism is what she believes she is abandoning? And what has caused this "move", if the issue of time and temporaility is not its cause, but its consequence? Indeed, in what way does a re-evaluation of the issue of time and temporality, in what way does it arise from such a move? The one thing, the one thing, that everybody knows about Marxism, is that it has a central time dimension - dour past, grim present, inevitable revolution, glorious future. And what are these "insights into the contingent possibility of structure" for whose sake we are to abandon it?
I could go on, but I will stop here. It will be clear that Professor Butler has been unclear on half a dozen key points. And in at least one point, I feel sure that the lack of clarity is deliberate: she imputes the views she is abandoning to Structuralism because she has no intention of saying that she is forswearing orthodox Marxism. That being the case, we have to suspect that the lack of clarity elsewhere is equally purposeful.
The key words are “hegemony” and “capital”. “Capital,” in the end, is clear enough; it is easy to locate it in society, to see who has and who doesn’t; and to determine, to a considerable extent, what it does and how it affects people. “Hegemony” in the abstract, on the other hand, can only be located, at best, by its effects; that is, whatever has an effect on society can be said to be a hegemony. More to the point, I think, whatever can be said to have an effect on society - that is, whatever I the writer can point to as having an effect on society - is a hegemony. And here we see why she is embarrassed to admit that she is moving away from orthodox Marxism; because the word "hegemony", especially in the meaning she gives it, is itself a part of the Marxist world-view, and you could not develop the kind of argument she is developing unless you were taking some Marxist and post-Marxist assumptions as granted.
And this leads us to another point. The passage contains what is in effect a one-on-one correspondence between “capital” and “hegemony.” What she is saying is that the position of “capital” within the Marxist scheme of things has been taken, in hers, by “hegemony.” But, quite apart from the fact that in Marxism capital is itself a product of social processes, that is to some extent a contingent rather than eternal category, the role of “capital” in practically all Marxism, vulgar and otherwise, is negative and to be opposed. Marxist morality begins with a rejection of the moral effects of capital. To place “hegemony” in place of “capital” in this uncritical, one-on-one way, is to imply that “hegemony” is bad. And this is not just unacceptable (is the “hegemony” of the opposition to paedophilia a bad thing?), but contains a hideous intellectual temptation; because, as I just pointed out, a hegemony, being so subjected to “repetition, convergence and re-articulation,” can be located practically anywhere in society. In other words, I the writer am going to determine “hegemony” any way I damn well please, because I can find it in all sorts of different places and ways. It is bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power. For instance, taking it purely in theory, it might be that I, a powerful and privileged academic, can cast myself as a victim of a “hegemony” if I can locate it smartly enough on a map of the “rearticulation of power.”
This is the practical sense and utility of Ms.Butler’s s style. It is that of the stage magician’s hand-waving, trying not to make you see what the other hand is doing. It does indeed have a content: one that sane people would reject, if it was stated in a sane style. Marxism is not defensible, but the clarity of its categories is a defence against worse things, and Judith Butler has removed that defence. She keeps the bad Marxist idea of “hegemony”, whereby the features of a culture are purely determined by economic and power relationships - that is, the culture is essentially a justification of existing power structures - but removes the objective (and useful) view of economic power within society. Anything can be an oppressive hegemony. And there is a hilarious corollary to this. Ask yourself: who, in recent years, has shown, in spite of a privileged background and even more privileged social position, a practically infinite ability to consider himelf oppressed by all sorts of wicked hegemonies? That’s right. Professor Butler is the spiritual mother of Donald Trump.