Prostitution of the pen and the dark side of the free market

[fpb]

Four years ago, the government of the French Republic took the lead in refusing to support the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. The French, who had taken a very active and successful part in the first Iraq war, simply did not think that an invasion followed by the occupation of an Arab country was a good idea. That was their prerogative (see

Comments

[jordan179]

Leave us to worry about Sicily.

We very well may, if the French get their way. That's my point.

You have clearly not understood the nature of this conflict. There is no army to be defeated in battle: time and time again, the enemy has proved itself unable to withstand any modern army - not even that of Ethiopia, let alone that of the US.

In some phases of this conflict, there have been main forces; in others guerillas; in others terrorists. Simply because we have forced the enemy down the ladder of dispersal to pure terrorist operations does not mean that some Great Mystical Law decrees that they shall forever be limited to such operations, save by our continuously applied strength.

If we stopped applying force against the enemy, where they live, the terrorist groups would coalesce into guerilla bands, and the guerilla bands into main-force armies. They had both in Afghanistan and Iraq, before we destroyed them.

But there are a minimum of one billion Muslims. Each of them may at any minute become a jihadist, without consulting anyone except the books of his faith ...

Oddly enough, very few actual terrorists work that way. Most work as parts of larger organizations who train, supply, and dispatch them. Terror campaigns, like any others, must be coordinated from some center or centers.

We must steadfastly apply the laws, refuse fear and flattery, continue in our belief that our society is better than theirs, defend our ways in everything we do in our ordinary life.

I agree, as far as the threat from infiltrators posing as civilians (or mad civilians, for that matter) is concerned, but that is not enough to defeat all the levels of threat. You may "apply the laws" as you will, but a re-entering ballistic missile will ignore all man-made laws. Or, for that matter, conventional torpedo-firing submarines, or small bands of raiders landed by rubber rafts, or ... any of the other possible ways the Terrorists could strike.

But fantasies of facing and destroying big univocal enemies in grand battles are really escapism, attempts to avoid the enduring and grinding effort that awaits us.

The existence of terrorist teams does not render the existence of Terrorist State armies imaginary. We defeated one such army in 2003 -- we may have to defeat another such army in this current year.

The war must be fought at all levels.

[kulibali]

Neither the Barbary pirates nor the slave traders of the early 19th century had an army to be defeated in battle, yet both the US and Britain succeeded in their "War on Piracy" and "War on Slavery".

[fpb]

If we stopped applying force against the enemy, where they live, the terrorist groups would coalesce into guerilla bands, and the guerilla bands into main-force armies. They had both in Afghanistan and Iraq, before we destroyed them.
It seems necessary to repeat myself. These bands have shown, time and again, that they are incapable of facing a decent army on the battlefield. Not only Americans in Afghanistan, but Russians in Chechnya and Ethiopians in Somalia, have carved through their defences like butter. Hence it is literally impossible for their guerrilla operations to consolidate into an armed force as the Yugoslav partisans did in World War Two. Any time they start establishing themselves as a power with a definite territory, they become nothing more than targets for their enemies. And this is not a coincidence: it is a function of the kind of fighter a mujahid is. A million more Somalias and Afghanistans would only result in a million more three-week smashdowns.
Indeed, these things are not even relevant. Once the mujahid is smashed off from his impossible attempt to become a regular soldier, he reverts to his original bandit guise, with much more success. He is incapable of holding Kabul or Mogadiscio in front of a determined effort by a regular army, but he is capable, and eagerly willing, to kill at random whenever he can, to make the work of administering a country as impossible for others as it is for himself. He is a mere agent of ruin; which is one reason why this conflict is unlike any war in history.
Oddly enough, very few actual terrorists work that way.
Oddly enough, enormous numbers do. They are just not reported that way, thanks to the incompetence, cowardice and compromise of the Western media. When the Algerian Mark Levine went on a rampage in Quebec, killing fourteen young women, nobody reported that he was a Muslim angry at the status of women in the West. When a gang of Lebanese terrorized Sydney by a series of brutal rapes, it was only their own testimony in court that put on the record the fact that assaulting "uncovered" western women was religiously justified for them. Why do you think that Western jails are disproportionately full of Muslims - from thirty to eighty per cent according to country? Because one can justify just about any kind of violence against infidels from passages from the Qur'an or the Ahadith. You may take their property and their women, for all property belongs to Allah and infidels have no right to them. You can terrify them; indeed, it is your duty to. You can kill them whenever you find them. And the only thing you need to allow you to do so is a fatwa from a recognized religious authority, ruling that a state of war in a particular area exists. And even if you don't find the compliant religious authority (like the Algerian terrorists, who equipped themselves with a fatwa from the monstrous Jordanian sheikh Abu Qattada before they began the killing of about 150.000 fellow citizens, all Muslim), you often just set out on your own. Murderous lone wolves are not rare. You ought to read Jihadwatch or Little Green Footballs. They have even a word for it: Sudden Jihad Syndrome.

[jordan179]

It seems necessary to repeat myself. These bands have shown, time and again, that they are incapable of facing a decent army on the battlefield. Not only Americans in Afghanistan, but Russians in Chechnya and Ethiopians in Somalia, have carved through their defences like butter. Hence it is literally impossible for their guerrilla operations to consolidate into an armed force as the Yugoslav partisans did in World War Two. Any time they start establishing themselves as a power with a definite territory, they become nothing more than targets for their enemies. And this is not a coincidence: it is a function of the kind of fighter a mujahid is. A million more Somalias and Afghanistans would only result in a million more three-week smashdowns.

This is true for "mujahideen" and it is true against Western armies. Your argument however only applies in the case of mujahideen fighting Western armies, which is not the only situation we need to worry about.

First of all, when an Islamic Fundamentalist faction seizes control of a state (or large enough region within a state), it is no longer limited to deploying "mujahideen," it acquires the capability to field regular forces. If we were to go to war with Iran tomorrow, for instance, we would find ourselves facing regular troops, warplanes and warships on the field of battle; if we were to wait to go to war with Iran until 5-10 years from now, we would also be facing nuclear missiles.

Secondly, though this isn't reported much by a media that cares little about anything not involving the First World, Islamic forces are not only facing Western armies, they are also facing Eastern (Pact-style) and African (hopeless bad-comedy style) armies, and in some cases guerillas or militias. In Darfur, for example, the Sudanese regular (though very inept) army has been fighting anti-Muslim militias in the south. In Africa in general, Islam is expanding, in part due to Muslim armies and in part to Muslim militias and guerillas (more so than terrorists). Ethiopia's local reversal of this trend in Somalia is encouraging, but only the east flank of a struggle stretching across the breadth of Africa.

Indeed, these things are not even relevant. Once the mujahid is smashed off from his impossible attempt to become a regular soldier, he reverts to his original bandit guise, with much more success. He is incapable of holding Kabul or Mogadiscio in front of a determined effort by a regular army, but he is capable, and eagerly willing, to kill at random whenever he can, to make the work of administering a country as impossible for others as it is for himself. He is a mere agent of ruin; which is one reason why this conflict is unlike any war in history.

The insurgent level you are describing is "guerilla," and far from being "unlike any war in history," this sort of conflict is very common in history. Guerilla forces cannot effectively resist regular armies but they can resist paramilitary and police forces, enabling them to prevent the proper administration of an area. They can be knocked down to terrorist level operations by resolute and numerous patrols and garrisons; if left to fester they build to main force strength, creating a "liberated zone." This is all very standard insurgency / counter-insurgency theory, and practice.

In fact, it's older than main force warfare -- this sort of raiding / counter-raiding activity is what pitched battles evolved from.

[fpb]

No, no, no, no, no, no. You simply refuse to see the obvious difference between then and now. Historically, the purpose of guerrilla warfare from King David (who was a guerrilla leader in his early days) to Josip Broz Tito was always to create large haven territories in which increasing masses of armed men could form real armies and sweep into the plains or the cities or whatever, eventually turning guerrilla warfare into war proper. This was guerrilla as practiced by Giuseppe Garibaldi or Pancho Villa. The purpose was always, one, to engage the enemy militarily, and two, to fight and win a war. The purpose of the modern mujahid is simply to cause chaos. The terrorist intends to blackmail society at large to prove that it cannot go on functioning unless it appeases him; an ambition that Emiliano Zapata or General Giap would have despised. He is not a soldier; he is a blackmailer. And modern terrorism, do not forget, is a Palestinian invention, began by Arafat after the catastrophe of 1967 proved once and for all that the most elaborate and massively armed Arab armies could not stand up to Israeli skill and discipline. The strategy shifted from fighting a war to making life impossible for the enemy. And the sad thing is that it seems to be paying.

[jordan179]

I believe that the ambitions of Al Qaeda and its allies reach farther than you imply. Yes, extortion of tribute, or of favorable diplomatic, political or social changes is one of their tactics and strategices, but it is not the only one; nor are terrorist teams their only type of forces.

The Terrorists do have national armies on their side; at present in the Mideast, the armies of Iran, Syria and the Sudan. Before our campaigns from 2001 to 2003, this included the armies of Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. The Terrorists field various guerilla as well as terrorist units; the reason why you have seen more use of terrorism than of guerilla or main force enemy operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars is not because of some doctrinal avoidance of guerilla or main force operations, but rather because our forces have been so active and competent in the field that the enemy has found any concentration of his own forces, even into guerilla bands, to be near-suicidal.

There have been periods of more traditional guerilla operations, by the way. In Afghanistan, where Allied forces are thin on the ground; in Pakistan, where a treacherous "ally" is providing a sanctuary (aided in this perfidy by the very main-force element of nuclear missiles); and at points in the Iraq campaign itself, when the Terorists tried to create a "liberated zone" in Fallujah (and did successfully coalesce into urban guerillas and small main force formations).

And modern terrorism, do not forget, is a Palestinian invention, began by Arafat after the catastrophe of 1967 proved once and for all that the most elaborate and massively armed Arab armies could not stand up to Israeli skill and discipline.

Note that the Palestinians climbed the insurgency ladder to guerilla and have now reached main force levels, as soon as they safely could. There are advantages to being higher on the ladder: main forces can do things that guerillas cannot; and guerillas things that terrorists cannot; what is more, higher-stage forces can always detach elements to carry out lower-stage missions, while the reverse is not true.

The strategy shifted from fighting a war to making life impossible for the enemy. And the sad thing is that it seems to be paying.

The point at which the payoff comes is when it induces withdrawal of our own forces -- letting the enemy build guerilla and main force units. Without main force units, in particular, the enemy cannot capture (or in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, recapture) any countries, to use as bases for further operations.

[fpb]

Yeah, right, and the Iraqi and Afghan armies have been so brilliant on the field. The truth is that the terrorist strategy is natural to the Muslim because (though they will never admit it) bitter experience has taught them that they cannot cope with regular troops. Pakistan is a peculiar case: the army is the central institution of the country, in a way that it is in no other Muslim country - not even Turkey or Egypt - and this for two interconnected reasons. First, Pakistan is part of the former Indian Empire, and shares with India the basic historical experience of watching immense Indian armies torn apart again and again by British armies one-tenth their size. This historical shock, whose force never abated down the centuries, has shaped the minds of both countries, in different ways; it was especially significant since most of the time the victorious British armies were only officered by native Britons, and most of their soldiery was Indian. The lesson was burned into local memories, and meant that when two new states coalesced out of the abandoned Empire, they both adopted wholesale Western instintutions. IN India, it was the whole structure of a Western country, with federal democratic institutions, and - much against Hindu traditions - equality before the law. In Pakistan, it was the Army, with army and staff colleges, barracks, iron discipline, and all the peculiar features of western military life. And, second point, this army found itself facing a similar but vastly stronger army on the Indian side, against which it lost a number of wars. Purely in order to survive, the Pakistani army had to preserve its basically Western traditions. The trainees of the staff colleges at Islamabad and Rawalpindi know too much to presume that mere popular anger of the kind that makes mujaheddeen could stand a chance against disciplined and prepared Indian troops. However, beneath the army is an immense, undereducated populace, whose natural leadership is not the Army but the mullahs. It is for their own survival as much as to make trouble for opponents, that the Army has allowed thousands of mujaheddeen down the years to cross over into Kashmir and Afghanistan: this relieves the pressure against the Army from below, which would otherwise lead to civil war and even possibly to the collapse of Pakistan. It is typical of the absolutely peculiar position of Pakistan in the Muslim world that it has been the only country capable of successfully producing an atom bomb (we are still to see whether Iran will be able to, even with massive Russian help).

[fpb]

As for the terrible Muslim regular armies, can you point me at a single war since 1689 in which Western armies or navies have met Muslim forces without ripping them apart? Muslims are bad soldiers, because they are only willing to die. A good soldier is willing to fight and win; death is not something he wishes for, but something he is willing to risk in the pursuit of victory. And if there is one thing that history proves over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again, it is that the educated soldier inevitably has the edge over the illiterate one, however obedient and brave. Illiteracy and ignorance are so widespread in the Muslim world that Muslim soldiers remain hopeless human material. It is largely because of the enormously higher educational level - allowing greater flexibility at all levels, a clearer understanding of specific goals, and more effective use of tools and weapons - that Israel has consistently overcome much larger Muslim armies. You can put a Muslim in a tank, but you cannot make him an engineer. And as for that dreadful Iranian army, what does it say about its real potential, that Iran is actually incapable to refine enough oil for its own use, and has to import petrol and other fuels from abroad? Not only is petrol, as the Nazis found out, of some importance in modern war, but a country that is so incapable of satisfying its basic needs cannot possibly have enough educated and trained men to take its army to a Western level. The same goes for the Muslim armies in Africa. The only successes they have achieved are in places like Sudan, when they were already in control of the state machinery and went after helpless iron-age villagers who started the war with old British Lee-Enfield rifles. And even so, Col.Garang's rebels, in spite of their isolation, poverty and lack of starting military resources, managed to give such a hard time to the government forces, that they were forced to reach a peace deal with the South (in spite of Garang's own mysterious death) which has not yet been breached. And believe me, if they felt strong enough to be able to breach it, they would. The truth is that the tribal southerners, starting with nothing but their courage, have thumped the Hell out of Khartoum Arabs with tanks and planes.

[bufo_viridis]

can you point me at a single war since 1689 in which Western armies or navies have met Muslim forces without ripping them apart?

Gallipolli?

[fpb]

War, not battle. Turkish troops distinguished themselves both in the Russian war of 1877 and in WWI, where they trashed the British not only at Gallipoli but at Kut-el-Amarah and in Palestine, but they ended up suffering total annihilating defeat. Besides, Gallipoli was a poorly chosen object. Only three years before, the Italian Navy had successfully stormed the Straits and bombed Gallipoli to put an end to the Italian-Turkish war (in which Italy conquered Lybya and Rhodes). Gallipoli and the Straits generally were an obvious target.

[jordan179]

Oddly enough, enormous numbers do. They are just not reported that way, thanks to the incompetence, cowardice and compromise of the Western media.

Ok, if you want to classify things like the rape epidemics as "terrorism" (which makes some sense) the solution is to come down hard, using the criminal system, on those who commit and also those who inspire those crimes. The rapists, etc. should be sentenced to maximum consecutive terms; the clerics should be prosecuted under ever "incitement" statute you can dig up; and any claims based on religion should be treated as aggravating rather than mitigating factors.

I do not, unfortunately, at present see much sign that the European Union countries are doing this. Instead they seem to be accepting "cultural" excuses as mitigating factors and trying to keep the crime wave secret to avoid Alarming the Populace.

And I know this is one aspect of the topic on which we are in agreement.

[fpb]

People in Europe are still unhappy about singling out Muslims for special punishment, since it contrasts badly with the principle that The law is the same for all. Indeed, I doubt that using religious motivation as an aggravating circumstance would even be legal under the Italian constitution. And the principles of the law are things that we should not lightly leave behind, since if we are not fighting for them, what are we fighting for? But other than that, you underrate the effort of the State authorities in most European countries to both encourage and compel local Muslims to respect the law. The very fact that jails are swollen with Muslim prisoners hardly suggests that we do not take them seriously.

[jordan179]

People in Europe are still unhappy about singling out Muslims for special punishment, since it contrasts badly with the principle that The law is the same for all.

You wouldn't really have to "single them out" for special punishment though -- just stop singling them out for special tolerance. Treat aggressive madmen inciting violence and their dupes the same way that you would treat any such individuals, and don't let them plead the Koran as an excuse for their actions. Surely no one has special rights to kill, rape, assault or vandalize because of his faith, right?

The very fact that jails are swollen with Muslim prisoners hardly suggests that we do not take them seriously.

But for how long are you keeping them? Are you willing to go after the inciters and accessories, as well as the (duped) principals? And are you willing to expand your prisons if need be?

There is a lot at stake here. If the Muslims are allowed to build a shadow state alongside your own states, ruled by shari'a, then there will be no assimilation of the large Muslim immigrant populations, because those who try to assimilate will be forced off this path by the shadow state. And the creation of such a shadow state is an explicit aim of the radical Muslim clerics.

Futhermore, you are quite right that you should not abandon your own constitutional principles. But if the state, acting under these principles, fails to deal with the threat of a massive, violent unassimilated Muslim population attempting to force the rest of the population into dhimmitude, then the peoples of your countries will probably rise up, vote some sort of Fascist governments into office, and deal with the Muslims in a far less gentle fashion -- one likely to cause suffering to the innocent as well as the criminal.

And even that would be better than the Orson Scott Card future in which your lands become "Eurabia," your peoples living in servile fear, and your ancient cultures and traditions ruthlessly trampled by alien conquerors. Which is a very real possibility, if neither liberalism nor fascism finds a solution.