Thoughts on the McChrystal Firing
I had promised a friend I'd write my thoughts about General McChrystal's firing "in a few days". Okay, it's been a couple of weeks. I've been on vacation. Sue me. It's not like anyone is paying to read my blog anyway (although you can - it's available on the Kindle). I also know it is probably old news, obe by now. I don't really care. I haven't been following the news all that closely for the past couple of weeks anyway, and I still think it is relevant. I'm writing this on the airplane ride home from Germany, so please excuse the bumpy writing.
Let me start by admitting my biases: I like General McChyrstal. I worked for him in (indirectly) Iraq, and saw him on a daily basis. I respected him as one of the finest, most professional soldiers I have ever had the pleasure to meet. I knew just how dangerous he was to our enemies.
That said, I also acknowledge that no one is perfect. I am well aware of his role in the Pat Tillman incident (maybe better than some, as I have actually talked to some of the people in Tillman's unit). But that is a separate issue.
So let's establish a few things here as given:
- No one gets four stars without being political
- General McChrystal is not an idiot
- General McChrystal was most likely no big fan of President Obama
- General McChrystal knew his staff's opinions pretty well
- General McChrystal, not being an idiot, knew the Rolling Stone's bias
- General McChrystal is unusually outspoken for a general officer. He encourages his staff to speak their minds
So, McChrystal gets buddy-buddy with a Rolling Stone reporter and allows him "unprecedented access" to himself and his staff for an extended period of time. Fair enough. We're trying to make points back home about the war. There's already a huge amount of apathy and indifference, if not downright hostility about the war back in the states. The old Iraq Porta-Jon graffiti: "The Army is at war, America is at the mall" isn't exactly new. The biggest (and frankly only) parallel to Vietnam and the GWOT is the public sentiment back home. Yeah, I'm saying that unless you are personally involved in the GWOT, serve, have served or have a close friend or family member who serves, chances are pretty good you don't really give a shit about the war. Most peoples' "I Support the Troops" sentiment extends only as far as the rear bumper of their car. I get it. We need to increase awareness back home. This isn't WWII. Nobody in the states (except in the above categories) are making any sacrifices.
So was that McChrystal's motivation for the "unprecedented access", to get the word out? Maybe in part. But that certainly wasn't the only reason.
I think that, after the little pow-wow the general had with Big O on Air Force One, he knew exactly what the score was with the CinC. I think there was a lot of political savvy in the whole thing. I think he had a pretty good idea what the reaction to the RS article would be. I haven't read the article, but I understand that it really wasn't all that divisive. But I believe there was calculated effect. At first I thought that, though I am certain, McChrystal was not about to fall on his own sword for this administration, he may have been willing to get himself fired to help out the war somewhat - i.e. allow Big O to display his "leadership" abilities as the civilian commander of the Armed Forces - to be another Truman perhaps - so there might be some credibility lent to the whole situation. I realize this view is hopelessly naive and as my friend Steve pointed out, it doesn't really take any leadership to fire someone who disagrees with you.
However, by all reports, the RS article did come very close disrespecting one's CinC, which is a big no-no and can in fact get you fired especially if your boss might be a little sensitive about his ability to meaningfully lead troops.
General McChrystal wrote the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual along with General Petraeus. He really knows what he is doing, and was one of two men in the military fully capable of winning the war. So far we have been fighting it not to lose. This administration hasn't shown any particular interest or ability to actually win - aside from assigning General McChrystal to command the ISAF in Afghanistan. But I believe that at the end of a long and distinguished military career, it is possible that General McChystal may not have wanted to be in command of forces who were just going to ultimately be withdrawn from the battlefield without being allowed victory. Shades of helicopters on a rooftop in Saigon definitely appear on the horizon, while our civilian leadership apologizes to the world for attempting to win.
So maybe it was a little of both. Perhaps it was partly a matter of not wanting to be on the non-winning team at the end of a career but at the same time set the example of stepping down with honor while passing the reigns to one of the few other generals capable of understanding COIN fully. The timing was just too good. One year as commander of ISAF in Afghanistan was just enough time establish new policies and tactics. Then find a way to get yourself removed from the job before someone in Washington decides to try to exercise their vast amounts of military expertise and leadership in Afghanistan after the dust clears from the drawdowns in Iraq. Eventually, McChrystal would not have been allowed to exercise command in Afghanistan. As soon as the administration is rid of what they perceive as the distraction of Iraq they will turn their full attention to Afghanistan - which in all likelihood will inevitably end up as a soup-sandwich. Who will history remember as the one who failed in Afghanistan? Will it be the hugely popular President who inherited a bad war and did everything he could to achieve peace, or the general who had a history of disagreeing with that administration?
Let me start by admitting my biases: I like General McChyrstal. I worked for him in (indirectly) Iraq, and saw him on a daily basis. I respected him as one of the finest, most professional soldiers I have ever had the pleasure to meet. I knew just how dangerous he was to our enemies.
That said, I also acknowledge that no one is perfect. I am well aware of his role in the Pat Tillman incident (maybe better than some, as I have actually talked to some of the people in Tillman's unit). But that is a separate issue.
So let's establish a few things here as given:
- No one gets four stars without being political
- General McChrystal is not an idiot
- General McChrystal was most likely no big fan of President Obama
- General McChrystal knew his staff's opinions pretty well
- General McChrystal, not being an idiot, knew the Rolling Stone's bias
- General McChrystal is unusually outspoken for a general officer. He encourages his staff to speak their minds
So, McChrystal gets buddy-buddy with a Rolling Stone reporter and allows him "unprecedented access" to himself and his staff for an extended period of time. Fair enough. We're trying to make points back home about the war. There's already a huge amount of apathy and indifference, if not downright hostility about the war back in the states. The old Iraq Porta-Jon graffiti: "The Army is at war, America is at the mall" isn't exactly new. The biggest (and frankly only) parallel to Vietnam and the GWOT is the public sentiment back home. Yeah, I'm saying that unless you are personally involved in the GWOT, serve, have served or have a close friend or family member who serves, chances are pretty good you don't really give a shit about the war. Most peoples' "I Support the Troops" sentiment extends only as far as the rear bumper of their car. I get it. We need to increase awareness back home. This isn't WWII. Nobody in the states (except in the above categories) are making any sacrifices.
So was that McChrystal's motivation for the "unprecedented access", to get the word out? Maybe in part. But that certainly wasn't the only reason.
I think that, after the little pow-wow the general had with Big O on Air Force One, he knew exactly what the score was with the CinC. I think there was a lot of political savvy in the whole thing. I think he had a pretty good idea what the reaction to the RS article would be. I haven't read the article, but I understand that it really wasn't all that divisive. But I believe there was calculated effect. At first I thought that, though I am certain, McChrystal was not about to fall on his own sword for this administration, he may have been willing to get himself fired to help out the war somewhat - i.e. allow Big O to display his "leadership" abilities as the civilian commander of the Armed Forces - to be another Truman perhaps - so there might be some credibility lent to the whole situation. I realize this view is hopelessly naive and as my friend Steve pointed out, it doesn't really take any leadership to fire someone who disagrees with you.
However, by all reports, the RS article did come very close disrespecting one's CinC, which is a big no-no and can in fact get you fired especially if your boss might be a little sensitive about his ability to meaningfully lead troops.
General McChrystal wrote the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual along with General Petraeus. He really knows what he is doing, and was one of two men in the military fully capable of winning the war. So far we have been fighting it not to lose. This administration hasn't shown any particular interest or ability to actually win - aside from assigning General McChrystal to command the ISAF in Afghanistan. But I believe that at the end of a long and distinguished military career, it is possible that General McChystal may not have wanted to be in command of forces who were just going to ultimately be withdrawn from the battlefield without being allowed victory. Shades of helicopters on a rooftop in Saigon definitely appear on the horizon, while our civilian leadership apologizes to the world for attempting to win.
So maybe it was a little of both. Perhaps it was partly a matter of not wanting to be on the non-winning team at the end of a career but at the same time set the example of stepping down with honor while passing the reigns to one of the few other generals capable of understanding COIN fully. The timing was just too good. One year as commander of ISAF in Afghanistan was just enough time establish new policies and tactics. Then find a way to get yourself removed from the job before someone in Washington decides to try to exercise their vast amounts of military expertise and leadership in Afghanistan after the dust clears from the drawdowns in Iraq. Eventually, McChrystal would not have been allowed to exercise command in Afghanistan. As soon as the administration is rid of what they perceive as the distraction of Iraq they will turn their full attention to Afghanistan - which in all likelihood will inevitably end up as a soup-sandwich. Who will history remember as the one who failed in Afghanistan? Will it be the hugely popular President who inherited a bad war and did everything he could to achieve peace, or the general who had a history of disagreeing with that administration?