Оперативное искусство

[fat_yankey]

Понятие "оперативное искусство" - отечественное открытие. Можно было бы написать "советское", но эмигрантская военная мысль тоже им занималась. До появления массовых армий военное искусство довольно естественно делилось на тактику и стратегию. В полевой войне (опуская осады) армии долго шли, потом недолго бились, потом опять долго шли. Управление

Comments

[naval_manual]

>Хуба Васс де Цеге родился в Венгрии в семье известного писателя

Потрясающе. Главным двигателем идеи "оперативного искусства" в американском флоте является Милан Вего - бывший офицер югославского флота, получивший убежище в 1976 г.

В предисловии к изданию его Major Naval Operartions 2008 г. тогдашний директор американского ВМ-колледжа написал:

The term “operational art” is apt to be unfamiliar to most Americans. American military officers encounter it routinely as a fixture of contemporary joint military doctrine, but even today the concept has substantially less traction within the U.S. Navy than it does in the other services. The reason is plainly that its origins are in land warfare- specifically, in large-scale land warfare as theorized by the German and (especially) Soviet militaries during the interwar period and practiced by these countries in World War II. From the latter, it migrated to the U.S. Army in the late 1970s, as the Army sought novel ways to grapple with the increasingly formidable prospect of a Soviet ground assault against Western Europe. Essentially, “operational art” refers to a level of command intermediate between the tactical and the strategic, one associated with ground command at the level of field army or corps and with the conduct of “campaigns” that unfold as a series of interconnected battles over time. That many naval officers remain unconvinced of its applicability to their own domain is not surprising, given the narrowly tactical focus of much naval warfare of the past. (Wayne Hughes’s classic treatise Fleet Tactics, for example, begins by dismissing the utility of the concept of operational-level warfare for naval combat.) On the other hand, it is difficult to deny that naval command and control doctrine and practice today are insufficiently attentive to what in Army parlance would be called a “combined arms” approach to warfare. The tenuous relationship between the three principal naval warfare communities remains the strongest argument for a serious reconsideration by the Navy of major naval operations and operational art.

Положа руку на сердце, прямого отрицания Хьюзом (а первое издание его книги - 1986 г.) полезности "оперативного искусства" я не припомнил. И сходу, перелистав, не нашёл. Но при определении тактики он пользуется классическим вариантом а-ля Клацузевиц, это так: "... strategists plan, tacticians do".