Tactics of War, Monday, 6 - 8 PM
Honor stood at the front of the classroom, once again leant against the larger desk at the front of the room. Her arms were crossed across her chest, and Nimitz was perched in his usual position over her shoulder. Both watched the students file in with a twinkle in their eyes as they watched the students file in. After a few moments, Honor glanced up at the clock and cleared her throat.
Okay, it’s a few minutes after six, so let’s be about it.
Last week, we discussed the basics of intelligence and the importance of intelligence in tactical planning. From it, you can gather your opponent’s order of battle, the topography of the land, technical specifications, and numerous other things, factoring them into your own battle plan.
Despite any advantage that intelligence might provide, it would be a mistake to fall in love with one's own cleverness in attempting to manipulate one's enemy. Intelligence must be used judiciously, protecting both your assets and your forces because the most dangerous tactical surprise of all is the one you suffer when you suddenly discover that your opponent has seen through your own deception and turned the tables on you. One of the most outstanding examples of this can be found during the Terran World War II, at a place called Midway. [1]
In the late 1800s, a theorist by the name of Alfred Thayer Mahan published a volume titled, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. You should recognize this book from your recommended reading list. Key to Mahan’s theory was the idea of expanding territory and providing a "sphere of influence" for the forward deployment of naval forces. Coming as it did at the end of the age of sail and the birth of the steamship, it was certainly a more plausible strategy for execution. Strangely, the strategy was slow to be accepted in the West; the Japanese, however, latched on to it almost immediately. It began to shape their own grand strategy as early as the 1900s.
Now fast forward, oh, about forty years. Massive advancements in naval technology were embodied in the existing fleets for the Japanese, the British, the Americans, and the Germans, all key players in World War II. There were now diesel-powered ships with electricity generators; aircraft carriers; fighter planes; and the Allies - America and Britain chief among them - had developed early radar systems as well. Fighting wars now took fuel and forward deployment became even more important. To that end, the Japanese - fighting with Germany as the "Axis Powers" - sought to expand their influence even further.
Enter Midway Island.
Here, she paused, and turned. She powered up a small device on the desk behind her and picked up a remote control. A map is displayed in mid-air, showing the Hawaiian Islands, and a small atoll marked "Midway."
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Midway was viewed as a vital "sentry for Hawaii", and the Japanese knew a serious assault on it would almost certainly produce a major naval battle. After suffering losses and an attack on their own mainland, the Japanese admiral, Isaroku Yamamoto, sought to eliminate the U.S. Pacific fleet as an important threat, perhaps leading to the negotiated peace that was, at the time, Japan's "exit strategy". [2]
Honor stepped back further, fingers working the remote. The map zoomed out, focusing on a larger area which showed the Pacific Rim. Key areas were then highlighted in red as she spoke.
Admiral Yamamoto then began a concerted campaign of deception. He dispatched a portion of his fleet to provide an attack on the Aleutian Islands, expanding from the Alaskan coast. The rest of his fleet was then steamed ahead toward Midway.
The Japanese planned a three-pronged attack to capture Midway in early June. In the van of the assault would be Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's aircraft carrier force, which would approach from the northwest, supress Midway's defenses and provide long-range striking power for dealing with American warships. A few hundred miles behind Nagumo would come a battleship force under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto that would contain most of the operation's heavy gun power. Coming in from the West and Southwest, forces under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo would actually capture Midway. Kondo's battleships and cruisers represented additional capabilities for fighting a surface action.
Needless to say, the Japanese were very confident of victory at Midway.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, two things went wrong even before the Midway operation began. Two of Nagumo's six carriers were sent on a mission that resulted in the Battle of Coral Sea. One was badly damaged, and the other suffered heavy casualties to her air group. Neither would be available for Midway. [3]
Also by this time, the United States had established two listening posts in the Pacific: one in Melbourne, Australia, and the other at Pearl Harbor. The two listening posts intercepted and analyzed the outpouring of Japanese radio traffic. In May 1942, these posts managed to break the Japanese Navy General-Purpose code, JN25, and with it, was able to identify Midway as a target. Breaking this code gave the Americans a serious advantage: they had not only the target, but also the order of battle, and the invasion schedule. Admiral Nimitz set to scramble any forces he could find to reinforce the tiny island.
The image blinked, and was replaced by a map, which showed a diagram of the battle. [4]
While the battle was costly to both sides, it was considered a victory for the Americans. Yamamoto, so sure that he had been able to deceive his enemy and draw his forces north, toward the Aleutians, met with the combined force of three American aircraft carriers offshore, and a contingent of Marines waiting on shore. [5]
Honor allowed the image to remain up briefly, then powered down the display. She then resumed her position at the front of the classroom.
Now, you’ve heard what happened to the Japanese...but what the Americans were able to accomplish wasn’t simply a result of tactical prowess and use of intelligence. Does anyone know what else contributed to the success at Midway? How about any other examples in which overconfidence cost someone a battle they should have won?
Allowing the students to take their cue, she paused at the front of the room, engaging in the discussion as necessary. She briefly took a seat among the students, Nimitz scrambling down her arm and to a perch at the front of the room. Before she returned to lecture mode, she moved back toward the front of the room.
What I hope you get out of this lesson is that while it's always worthwhile to convince your opponent to underestimate you or to misinterpret what they see, you should never rely on having done that. Work for every advantage you can provide yourself, but base your planning on the assumption that the enemy will make one hundred percent correct deductions from his or her own instruments. [6]
For homework, I’d like for you to review The Prince, chapters 15 through 17; The Newburgh Address; The Farewell Address; and Chapters 18 and 22 in The Modern Prince. As you read these, think about the differences and similarities in the leadership styles prescribed.
As you depart, please leave your written assignments on the desk. Nimitz and I will see that they are graded by this Friday. I’ll be available between 6 and 7 PM, so feel free to stop by my office to pick them up.
She smiled.
Class dismissed.
[1. Cribbed from canon, with some editing, courtesy Ashes of Victory, by David Weber.
2. Cribbed, with a little editing by me, courtesy the USN.
3. Ibid.
4. From the CV6 website.
5. Courtesy the USN.
6. Cribbed from canon, with some editing, courtesy Ashes of Victory by David Weber.]
[OCD threads coming up. OCD threads up.
Apologies for not getting the readings up as planned. Rebuilding my PC is taking a bit longer than I anticipated. What is it about first plans of attack and contact with the enemy? Anyway, for those of you actually skimming the readings, most of the ones for this week are on the web.
Apologies also for the late posting. Between a migraine and power outages, I just wasn’t destined to get this thing posted last night...]
Okay, it’s a few minutes after six, so let’s be about it.
Last week, we discussed the basics of intelligence and the importance of intelligence in tactical planning. From it, you can gather your opponent’s order of battle, the topography of the land, technical specifications, and numerous other things, factoring them into your own battle plan.
Despite any advantage that intelligence might provide, it would be a mistake to fall in love with one's own cleverness in attempting to manipulate one's enemy. Intelligence must be used judiciously, protecting both your assets and your forces because the most dangerous tactical surprise of all is the one you suffer when you suddenly discover that your opponent has seen through your own deception and turned the tables on you. One of the most outstanding examples of this can be found during the Terran World War II, at a place called Midway. [1]
In the late 1800s, a theorist by the name of Alfred Thayer Mahan published a volume titled, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. You should recognize this book from your recommended reading list. Key to Mahan’s theory was the idea of expanding territory and providing a "sphere of influence" for the forward deployment of naval forces. Coming as it did at the end of the age of sail and the birth of the steamship, it was certainly a more plausible strategy for execution. Strangely, the strategy was slow to be accepted in the West; the Japanese, however, latched on to it almost immediately. It began to shape their own grand strategy as early as the 1900s.
Now fast forward, oh, about forty years. Massive advancements in naval technology were embodied in the existing fleets for the Japanese, the British, the Americans, and the Germans, all key players in World War II. There were now diesel-powered ships with electricity generators; aircraft carriers; fighter planes; and the Allies - America and Britain chief among them - had developed early radar systems as well. Fighting wars now took fuel and forward deployment became even more important. To that end, the Japanese - fighting with Germany as the "Axis Powers" - sought to expand their influence even further.
Enter Midway Island.
Here, she paused, and turned. She powered up a small device on the desk behind her and picked up a remote control. A map is displayed in mid-air, showing the Hawaiian Islands, and a small atoll marked "Midway."
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Midway was viewed as a vital "sentry for Hawaii", and the Japanese knew a serious assault on it would almost certainly produce a major naval battle. After suffering losses and an attack on their own mainland, the Japanese admiral, Isaroku Yamamoto, sought to eliminate the U.S. Pacific fleet as an important threat, perhaps leading to the negotiated peace that was, at the time, Japan's "exit strategy". [2]
Honor stepped back further, fingers working the remote. The map zoomed out, focusing on a larger area which showed the Pacific Rim. Key areas were then highlighted in red as she spoke.
Admiral Yamamoto then began a concerted campaign of deception. He dispatched a portion of his fleet to provide an attack on the Aleutian Islands, expanding from the Alaskan coast. The rest of his fleet was then steamed ahead toward Midway.
The Japanese planned a three-pronged attack to capture Midway in early June. In the van of the assault would be Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's aircraft carrier force, which would approach from the northwest, supress Midway's defenses and provide long-range striking power for dealing with American warships. A few hundred miles behind Nagumo would come a battleship force under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto that would contain most of the operation's heavy gun power. Coming in from the West and Southwest, forces under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo would actually capture Midway. Kondo's battleships and cruisers represented additional capabilities for fighting a surface action.
Needless to say, the Japanese were very confident of victory at Midway.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, two things went wrong even before the Midway operation began. Two of Nagumo's six carriers were sent on a mission that resulted in the Battle of Coral Sea. One was badly damaged, and the other suffered heavy casualties to her air group. Neither would be available for Midway. [3]
Also by this time, the United States had established two listening posts in the Pacific: one in Melbourne, Australia, and the other at Pearl Harbor. The two listening posts intercepted and analyzed the outpouring of Japanese radio traffic. In May 1942, these posts managed to break the Japanese Navy General-Purpose code, JN25, and with it, was able to identify Midway as a target. Breaking this code gave the Americans a serious advantage: they had not only the target, but also the order of battle, and the invasion schedule. Admiral Nimitz set to scramble any forces he could find to reinforce the tiny island.
The image blinked, and was replaced by a map, which showed a diagram of the battle. [4]
While the battle was costly to both sides, it was considered a victory for the Americans. Yamamoto, so sure that he had been able to deceive his enemy and draw his forces north, toward the Aleutians, met with the combined force of three American aircraft carriers offshore, and a contingent of Marines waiting on shore. [5]
Honor allowed the image to remain up briefly, then powered down the display. She then resumed her position at the front of the classroom.
Now, you’ve heard what happened to the Japanese...but what the Americans were able to accomplish wasn’t simply a result of tactical prowess and use of intelligence. Does anyone know what else contributed to the success at Midway? How about any other examples in which overconfidence cost someone a battle they should have won?
Allowing the students to take their cue, she paused at the front of the room, engaging in the discussion as necessary. She briefly took a seat among the students, Nimitz scrambling down her arm and to a perch at the front of the room. Before she returned to lecture mode, she moved back toward the front of the room.
What I hope you get out of this lesson is that while it's always worthwhile to convince your opponent to underestimate you or to misinterpret what they see, you should never rely on having done that. Work for every advantage you can provide yourself, but base your planning on the assumption that the enemy will make one hundred percent correct deductions from his or her own instruments. [6]
For homework, I’d like for you to review The Prince, chapters 15 through 17; The Newburgh Address; The Farewell Address; and Chapters 18 and 22 in The Modern Prince. As you read these, think about the differences and similarities in the leadership styles prescribed.
As you depart, please leave your written assignments on the desk. Nimitz and I will see that they are graded by this Friday. I’ll be available between 6 and 7 PM, so feel free to stop by my office to pick them up.
She smiled.
Class dismissed.
[1. Cribbed from canon, with some editing, courtesy Ashes of Victory, by David Weber.
2. Cribbed, with a little editing by me, courtesy the USN.
3. Ibid.
4. From the CV6 website.
5. Courtesy the USN.
6. Cribbed from canon, with some editing, courtesy Ashes of Victory by David Weber.]
[OCD threads coming up. OCD threads up.
Apologies for not getting the readings up as planned. Rebuilding my PC is taking a bit longer than I anticipated. What is it about first plans of attack and contact with the enemy? Anyway, for those of you actually skimming the readings, most of the ones for this week are on the web.
Apologies also for the late posting. Between a migraine and power outages, I just wasn’t destined to get this thing posted last night...]