Interstellar Relations, Monday, 5th Period
Professor Roslin sat at the desk in the front of the room, glasses perched on her nose, scrawling notes onto a pad of paper. She occasionally glanced to the source material at her elbow, but appeared to be pulling together her own thoughts based on the text. Over the rims of her glasses, she watched as the students filed in and took their seats. She offered a quick smile to those who might have caught her as she looked up.
"Okay," she said, lowering her pen, "last week, I asked you to do some homework -- to look up current issues, leaders; take a look at leadership styles. I want you to keep all that information in the back of your mind as we talk today about another key element of our upcoming classes: the security dilemma. We've mentioned this before, but today, we're going to be looking at some approaches to managing a security dilemma...and the pros and cons of collective security."
Palms flat on the desk, she pushed herself to her feet. She then removed her glasses and hooked them on the button placket of her blouse, folding her arms across her chest. "As previously mentioned, a security dilemma requires that as one state increases security, the security of another state must decrease; it's a constant give-and-take in the international community. One author I've recently read puts it fairly well: 'a security dilemma results in a permanent condition of tension and power conflicts among states.'
"There are at least five approaches to managing this type of security crisis. For the interests of this class, we'll be examining three of the five. The first approaches managing security by placing faith in individual state power. One example of this is the balance of power system, one that worked fairly well for Europe during the 1800s. Those supporting this theory suppose that states make 'rational and calculated evaluations' regarding their roles in the system. They might ask whether they should increase their power base by seeking out new allies, or if someone else is altering the balance of power, thus affecting their own standing in the system."
Laura smiled slightly. "When I think about this system, I always picture some sort of see-saw effect, everyone shifting just a little bit, and the lever tilts ever-so-slightly up or down, depending on the movement. When there's a sudden movement" -- she clapped her hands together -- "it falls, sort of like a house of cards in a gust of wind."
A wry grin twisted her lips as she slipped her glasses back on. "In an historical context, you might think of that gust of wind as being, well, either Bismarck or Wilhelm; we pretty much see the demise of the balance of power system with the outbreak of World War I.
"After World War I, there seemed to be the emergence of our second approach -- collective security theory. The charge was led by American President Woodrow Wilson, who developed 'fourteen points' he believed should be the basis of international relations. His fourteenth point called for the development of a 'general assembly' of nations, eventually called the League of Nations."
Rounding the corner of the desk, she picked up a marker and began writing on the board. She scrawled notes as she continued the lecture. "Going down this path makes a few assumptions: One, that 'although wars can occur, they should be prevented, and they are prevented by restraint of military action.' Basically, it assumes that wars will not occur if parties exercise restraint." There may have been a hit of sarcasm in her tone before she was able to squash it.
"The second assumption is that aggressors should be stopped. This, of course, works only if the aggressor can be easily identified. The waters get a little muddier when you have trouble identifying the victim and the aggressor. If the aggressor is identified, then the collective system assumes moral clarity -- or, more simply put, once the aggressor is identified, he -- or she -- is wrong because 'all aggressors are morally wrong, and all those who are right must act in unison to meet the aggression.'
"The last, and probably most important assumption regarding collective security, is the assumption that, when an aggressive state has been identified, the international community will act to punish them in a proportionate response."
Laura turned away from her notes on the board and regarded the class. "Looking at these assumptions, who can tell me some of the weaknesses of the collective security approach?"
She smiled as the discussion began, and continued for a few minutes. She then launched into the last portion of her lecture. "The last management approach we'll examine" -- her eyes flitted to the clock -- "briefly, is the idea of peacekeeping. Now, peacekeeping is sort of a...step-child -- a half-way point between the two ideas. It usually involves a multilateral organization -- that collective security aspect, draws troops from member states to supervise armistices, maintain cease-fires, maybe create a buffer zone between warring parties. But even this isn't without its caveats. Key among those caveats is that the parties involved have to consent to the purpose of the force. And that, in the middle of a war zone, is probably a little trickier than you think."
Continuing handwavily on for a few minutes, Roslin finally wrapped the class up. "Okay, for next week -- we start getting our hands dirty. Bring notes if you wish, but just be prepared to, ah, improvise as needed." She smiled. "Class dismissed."
[OOC: May or may not be available for play tomorrow, but will be tomorrow evening. OCD threads coming up.]
"Okay," she said, lowering her pen, "last week, I asked you to do some homework -- to look up current issues, leaders; take a look at leadership styles. I want you to keep all that information in the back of your mind as we talk today about another key element of our upcoming classes: the security dilemma. We've mentioned this before, but today, we're going to be looking at some approaches to managing a security dilemma...and the pros and cons of collective security."
Palms flat on the desk, she pushed herself to her feet. She then removed her glasses and hooked them on the button placket of her blouse, folding her arms across her chest. "As previously mentioned, a security dilemma requires that as one state increases security, the security of another state must decrease; it's a constant give-and-take in the international community. One author I've recently read puts it fairly well: 'a security dilemma results in a permanent condition of tension and power conflicts among states.'
"There are at least five approaches to managing this type of security crisis. For the interests of this class, we'll be examining three of the five. The first approaches managing security by placing faith in individual state power. One example of this is the balance of power system, one that worked fairly well for Europe during the 1800s. Those supporting this theory suppose that states make 'rational and calculated evaluations' regarding their roles in the system. They might ask whether they should increase their power base by seeking out new allies, or if someone else is altering the balance of power, thus affecting their own standing in the system."
Laura smiled slightly. "When I think about this system, I always picture some sort of see-saw effect, everyone shifting just a little bit, and the lever tilts ever-so-slightly up or down, depending on the movement. When there's a sudden movement" -- she clapped her hands together -- "it falls, sort of like a house of cards in a gust of wind."
A wry grin twisted her lips as she slipped her glasses back on. "In an historical context, you might think of that gust of wind as being, well, either Bismarck or Wilhelm; we pretty much see the demise of the balance of power system with the outbreak of World War I.
"After World War I, there seemed to be the emergence of our second approach -- collective security theory. The charge was led by American President Woodrow Wilson, who developed 'fourteen points' he believed should be the basis of international relations. His fourteenth point called for the development of a 'general assembly' of nations, eventually called the League of Nations."
Rounding the corner of the desk, she picked up a marker and began writing on the board. She scrawled notes as she continued the lecture. "Going down this path makes a few assumptions: One, that 'although wars can occur, they should be prevented, and they are prevented by restraint of military action.' Basically, it assumes that wars will not occur if parties exercise restraint." There may have been a hit of sarcasm in her tone before she was able to squash it.
"The second assumption is that aggressors should be stopped. This, of course, works only if the aggressor can be easily identified. The waters get a little muddier when you have trouble identifying the victim and the aggressor. If the aggressor is identified, then the collective system assumes moral clarity -- or, more simply put, once the aggressor is identified, he -- or she -- is wrong because 'all aggressors are morally wrong, and all those who are right must act in unison to meet the aggression.'
"The last, and probably most important assumption regarding collective security, is the assumption that, when an aggressive state has been identified, the international community will act to punish them in a proportionate response."
Laura turned away from her notes on the board and regarded the class. "Looking at these assumptions, who can tell me some of the weaknesses of the collective security approach?"
She smiled as the discussion began, and continued for a few minutes. She then launched into the last portion of her lecture. "The last management approach we'll examine" -- her eyes flitted to the clock -- "briefly, is the idea of peacekeeping. Now, peacekeeping is sort of a...step-child -- a half-way point between the two ideas. It usually involves a multilateral organization -- that collective security aspect, draws troops from member states to supervise armistices, maintain cease-fires, maybe create a buffer zone between warring parties. But even this isn't without its caveats. Key among those caveats is that the parties involved have to consent to the purpose of the force. And that, in the middle of a war zone, is probably a little trickier than you think."
Continuing handwavily on for a few minutes, Roslin finally wrapped the class up. "Okay, for next week -- we start getting our hands dirty. Bring notes if you wish, but just be prepared to, ah, improvise as needed." She smiled. "Class dismissed."
[OOC: May or may not be available for play tomorrow, but will be tomorrow evening. OCD threads coming up.]