The What Is Philosophy saga continues
This week: deontology versus consequentialism. Today, Nagel on Nozick. Nozick would like us to believe that there are a set of rights which can be treated as "side constraints" on action, i.e., there's no utilitarian tradeoff allowable, do not pass Go, do not collect 200 fauns. So, far, sounds like a standard deontological setup, no problems necessarily. Nagel cries foul when Nozick tries to include both things like the right not to be killed and the right to property into this category of inviolable rights. He makes a division of rights relating to personal agency (I'm not one hundred percent clear on this) such as the right not to be killed, and rights reflecting societal structures such as the right to property. While the former rights may act as side constraints, the latter, while still rights, may be overridden in the quest for sufficient social value.
So far, so good. Only this claim that you can have "rights" in a deontological sense which may still be overridden for goals of sufficient utility nags at me. When you say "override for sufficient utility" I hear one of "high valuation" or "fuzzy reasoning". If the former, how can you claim not to be consequentialist? If the latter, I have no respect for you, your family, or your pets.
Our intrepid professor saved the day (or did he?) by appealing to the logic of deontologists in extrema. According to him, a deontologist who believes in an absolute prohibition on torture has a dilemma when asked to weigh that prohibition against the possibility of saving the world. Either he can say that the case is ridiculous and ignore it (or otherwise attack the structure of the hypothetical), concede that in such a case he would allow consequentialist considerations to override his strictures, or bite the bullet and let the world burn. I don't consider the first response adequate to all cases. Monsieur le Professeur believes that even a deontologist must select the second, else deontology is ridiculous. I am inclined to say rather that deontologists lack the courage of their convictions if they admit this; there seems a kind of intellectual fraud in claiming an absolute law and then admitting it may be compromised. Else what separates deontology from consequentialism? I think that perhaps deontology IS ridiculous (but not necessarily wrong!), and that any true deontologist must stick to his guns all the way into the Pit.
So far, so good. Only this claim that you can have "rights" in a deontological sense which may still be overridden for goals of sufficient utility nags at me. When you say "override for sufficient utility" I hear one of "high valuation" or "fuzzy reasoning". If the former, how can you claim not to be consequentialist? If the latter, I have no respect for you, your family, or your pets.
Our intrepid professor saved the day (or did he?) by appealing to the logic of deontologists in extrema. According to him, a deontologist who believes in an absolute prohibition on torture has a dilemma when asked to weigh that prohibition against the possibility of saving the world. Either he can say that the case is ridiculous and ignore it (or otherwise attack the structure of the hypothetical), concede that in such a case he would allow consequentialist considerations to override his strictures, or bite the bullet and let the world burn. I don't consider the first response adequate to all cases. Monsieur le Professeur believes that even a deontologist must select the second, else deontology is ridiculous. I am inclined to say rather that deontologists lack the courage of their convictions if they admit this; there seems a kind of intellectual fraud in claiming an absolute law and then admitting it may be compromised. Else what separates deontology from consequentialism? I think that perhaps deontology IS ridiculous (but not necessarily wrong!), and that any true deontologist must stick to his guns all the way into the Pit.