Spinoza Essay.
The Nature of God as an Extended Thing
Submitted by: Joshua Weltch
Philosophy 25B: Modern Philosophy
Professor Ginsborg
GSI: Jack Huguley
March 21, 2007
In Proposition 2 of Part II of Spinoza’s Ethics, asserts that “God is an extended thing.” To understand how he arrived at this conclusion, and also to understand exactly what he means by it, it is necessary to understand a few key terms, those being attributes, modes, and substance (or nature, or god, all of which are synonymous for Spinoza). First I will discuss the relatively simple concepts of attributes and modes, then I will delve into the complex nature of substance, after which I will explain how these concepts come together to prove (for Spinoza) that God is an extended thing.
The easiest term to understand is attribute, which refers to the essence of a substance, the very nature of a substance. The attributes of a thing x function as the answer to the question: “What is the nature of x?” There is, in fact, no real distinction between a substance and its attributes, but the term is useful in order to gain a better grasp of the nature of substance. Put simply, attributes can be referred to in order to identify a substance. Taking myself as an example (assuming for the sake of argument that I am a substance), my thinking mind could be considered one of my attributes. My thoughts are an essential part of my being and identity, and are a way of identifying my essence. Another attribute of me is my body. It is an essential part of my being and identity and is a way of identifying my essence.
A mode, as Spinoza uses the term, can be better understood if we first consider the common definition of the word. Mode usually means a manner of acting or doing. As an example, we refer to modes of transportation; by this we mean the many ways of traveling-by car, by train, by plane, on foot, by boat, et cetera. For Spinoza, a mode of a substance is a way in which a substance is being expressed. For example, a mode of me (assuming I’m a substance), could be one of my thoughts or my position in space, depending on how we are viewing my essential nature (that is, depending on whether we are considering my nature to be a thinking thing, or an extended, physical thing). Affections express roughly the same thing as modes, and therefore will be considered equal for the purposes of this paper, though it is useful to note that there is actually a slight variance in meaning between them.
Last, we have substance. Spinoza spends a lot of time expanding on the nature of substance, beginning with the somewhat complicated definition that substance is “that which is in itself and conceived through itself” (Part I, Definition 3). What he means is that when considering the idea of substance, it needn’t possess any particular mode in order to be understood. Taking myself as an example again, it doesn’t matter what modes I possess at any particular time in order to understand/conceive of my nature/essence. I could be thinking or doing anything, but my nature as a substance is unchanged throughout. A substance, therefore, refers to a thing which has modes, but is prior to them (Part I, Proposition 1).
In subsequent proofs, Spinoza explicates various other properties of substance, namely that substance is infinite (Part I, Proposition 8), that it must exist (Part I, Proposition 7), God is a substance and therefore must exist (Part I, Proposition 11), and in fact there can be no other substance but God (Part I, Proposition 14), so God and substance are synonymous. Further, God, or infinite substance, is indivisible (Part I, Proposition 13), so in the previous examples, it was not accurate to consider myself a substance (since that would be dividing god into a finite part, i.e. me), rather my mind and thoughts are modes/affections of God, as are my physical characteristics and properties.
In Part II, Spinoza attempts to determine the attributes of God, and discovers that “[t]hought is an attribute of God [and therefore] God is a thinking thing” (Part II, Proposition 1). He arrives at this conclusion by citing the corollary of Part I, Proposition 25 which is, “particular things are nothing but affections [or modes] of the attributes of God.” So all individual thoughts (particular things) are modes of some attribute of God, therefore there is some attribute of God that is responsible for these particular affections/modes (individual thoughts). Therefore God has an attribute/essence of infinite thought, which has these individual thoughts as its modes. From this, the transition from thought being an attribute of God to God being a thinking thing should be clear: if God has thought as an attribute, then thought is the very essence of God, therefore God IS a thing which has thought as its essence, therefore God is a thinking thing.
In much the same way, he proves that God is an extended thing. Individual physical objects are modes of some (infinite) attribute of God, which is to say there is some infinite attribute that has individual physical objects as its modes. Infinite extension is therefore an attribute of God. God has extension as an attribute, therefore God is an extended thing.
Spinoza therefore postulates a monist view of God and the Universe: There is only one thing, and that is substance, or God. God can be understood in terms of thought, or in terms of extension, or in terms of an infinite number of other attributes, but that does not mean that thought and extension are different things. Thought and extension are both attributes of God, and therefore both ARE God. Everything is the same thing: God.
This view therefore avoids Descartes’ dualist mind-body problem: Descartes postulated that mind and body were separate substances, which lead his contemporaries to wonder how mind and body could possibly interact-that is, how is it that I am able to make my body move as I will it to move? For Descartes and his contemporaries, the answers were complicated and for the most part dissatisfying, ranging from the mind being able to subtly effect the hypothalamus to control the body-which doesn’t solve the problem at all, since the mind still must interact with a physical thing-to God moving the bodies of every thinking being in the universe in the way that they will their own bodies to move-in which case they aren’t really moving their bodies at all and God is doing a lot of work.
Spinoza has no such problem. God, thought, and body (extension) are all synonymous. It is therefore no surprise that the actions of the body and the mind seem related. They are related in the closest manner possible: They are identical. To wonder how the mind could interact with the body would be to wonder how God, an infinite substance, is able to express itself in a particular manner-it would be to ask how God could have a particular mode. That question is absurd. Since God is an infinite substance possessing infinite attributes and expressing itself in infinite ways (therefore possessing infinite modes), there should be no reason whatsoever to wonder how God can possess a particular mode or affection. The answer is clear: God is infinite.
Works Cited
Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics: Treatise on The Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters. Second edition. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1992.
Submitted by: Joshua Weltch
Philosophy 25B: Modern Philosophy
Professor Ginsborg
GSI: Jack Huguley
March 21, 2007
In Proposition 2 of Part II of Spinoza’s Ethics, asserts that “God is an extended thing.” To understand how he arrived at this conclusion, and also to understand exactly what he means by it, it is necessary to understand a few key terms, those being attributes, modes, and substance (or nature, or god, all of which are synonymous for Spinoza). First I will discuss the relatively simple concepts of attributes and modes, then I will delve into the complex nature of substance, after which I will explain how these concepts come together to prove (for Spinoza) that God is an extended thing.
The easiest term to understand is attribute, which refers to the essence of a substance, the very nature of a substance. The attributes of a thing x function as the answer to the question: “What is the nature of x?” There is, in fact, no real distinction between a substance and its attributes, but the term is useful in order to gain a better grasp of the nature of substance. Put simply, attributes can be referred to in order to identify a substance. Taking myself as an example (assuming for the sake of argument that I am a substance), my thinking mind could be considered one of my attributes. My thoughts are an essential part of my being and identity, and are a way of identifying my essence. Another attribute of me is my body. It is an essential part of my being and identity and is a way of identifying my essence.
A mode, as Spinoza uses the term, can be better understood if we first consider the common definition of the word. Mode usually means a manner of acting or doing. As an example, we refer to modes of transportation; by this we mean the many ways of traveling-by car, by train, by plane, on foot, by boat, et cetera. For Spinoza, a mode of a substance is a way in which a substance is being expressed. For example, a mode of me (assuming I’m a substance), could be one of my thoughts or my position in space, depending on how we are viewing my essential nature (that is, depending on whether we are considering my nature to be a thinking thing, or an extended, physical thing). Affections express roughly the same thing as modes, and therefore will be considered equal for the purposes of this paper, though it is useful to note that there is actually a slight variance in meaning between them.
Last, we have substance. Spinoza spends a lot of time expanding on the nature of substance, beginning with the somewhat complicated definition that substance is “that which is in itself and conceived through itself” (Part I, Definition 3). What he means is that when considering the idea of substance, it needn’t possess any particular mode in order to be understood. Taking myself as an example again, it doesn’t matter what modes I possess at any particular time in order to understand/conceive of my nature/essence. I could be thinking or doing anything, but my nature as a substance is unchanged throughout. A substance, therefore, refers to a thing which has modes, but is prior to them (Part I, Proposition 1).
In subsequent proofs, Spinoza explicates various other properties of substance, namely that substance is infinite (Part I, Proposition 8), that it must exist (Part I, Proposition 7), God is a substance and therefore must exist (Part I, Proposition 11), and in fact there can be no other substance but God (Part I, Proposition 14), so God and substance are synonymous. Further, God, or infinite substance, is indivisible (Part I, Proposition 13), so in the previous examples, it was not accurate to consider myself a substance (since that would be dividing god into a finite part, i.e. me), rather my mind and thoughts are modes/affections of God, as are my physical characteristics and properties.
In Part II, Spinoza attempts to determine the attributes of God, and discovers that “[t]hought is an attribute of God [and therefore] God is a thinking thing” (Part II, Proposition 1). He arrives at this conclusion by citing the corollary of Part I, Proposition 25 which is, “particular things are nothing but affections [or modes] of the attributes of God.” So all individual thoughts (particular things) are modes of some attribute of God, therefore there is some attribute of God that is responsible for these particular affections/modes (individual thoughts). Therefore God has an attribute/essence of infinite thought, which has these individual thoughts as its modes. From this, the transition from thought being an attribute of God to God being a thinking thing should be clear: if God has thought as an attribute, then thought is the very essence of God, therefore God IS a thing which has thought as its essence, therefore God is a thinking thing.
In much the same way, he proves that God is an extended thing. Individual physical objects are modes of some (infinite) attribute of God, which is to say there is some infinite attribute that has individual physical objects as its modes. Infinite extension is therefore an attribute of God. God has extension as an attribute, therefore God is an extended thing.
Spinoza therefore postulates a monist view of God and the Universe: There is only one thing, and that is substance, or God. God can be understood in terms of thought, or in terms of extension, or in terms of an infinite number of other attributes, but that does not mean that thought and extension are different things. Thought and extension are both attributes of God, and therefore both ARE God. Everything is the same thing: God.
This view therefore avoids Descartes’ dualist mind-body problem: Descartes postulated that mind and body were separate substances, which lead his contemporaries to wonder how mind and body could possibly interact-that is, how is it that I am able to make my body move as I will it to move? For Descartes and his contemporaries, the answers were complicated and for the most part dissatisfying, ranging from the mind being able to subtly effect the hypothalamus to control the body-which doesn’t solve the problem at all, since the mind still must interact with a physical thing-to God moving the bodies of every thinking being in the universe in the way that they will their own bodies to move-in which case they aren’t really moving their bodies at all and God is doing a lot of work.
Spinoza has no such problem. God, thought, and body (extension) are all synonymous. It is therefore no surprise that the actions of the body and the mind seem related. They are related in the closest manner possible: They are identical. To wonder how the mind could interact with the body would be to wonder how God, an infinite substance, is able to express itself in a particular manner-it would be to ask how God could have a particular mode. That question is absurd. Since God is an infinite substance possessing infinite attributes and expressing itself in infinite ways (therefore possessing infinite modes), there should be no reason whatsoever to wonder how God can possess a particular mode or affection. The answer is clear: God is infinite.
Works Cited
Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics: Treatise on The Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters. Second edition. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1992.