War links
A complexity analysis of (pdf) the decisive American victory at Midway:
Spruance thus accepted the risk of a less than fully massed attack and relied on self-synchronization and the adaptability of his air groups to carry the day. Nagumo insisted on complete synchronization, with disastrous results.
About the disappearance of grand strategy in US thinking and the attempt of (pdf) the Yale Strategy Seminar to revive it:
These days, however, the academic landscape strikes me as resembling the medieval landscape, and I don’t just mean the architecture. I’m talking about the existence of castles, each of them equipped with high walls, deep moats, and bristling armaments, the purpose of which appears to be to repel raids from, or even commerce with, the departments just down the street. Attempts to break through these defenses, I’ve learned on more than one occasion, can echo the exploits of Don Quixote, who should perhaps become the patron saint of interdisciplinary studies.
About the liberal romance of small wars. And the limitations of moral perspectives in international affairs.
Retired US Colonel running for Congress being very blunt at a panel discussion about jihadi motivations.
About Britain’s new type 45 destroyers. But British military capacity continues to shrink. Dramatisation of the sinking of HMS Coventry during the Falklands.
Iran’s Supreme Leader makes it clear that they are not having any of this engagement with the US nonsense.
Looking at Israel’s long term options. Canada’s Foreign Minister makes an unusually strong statement of support for Israel.
Hamas’s military leader killed in a hotel room in Dubai.
CIA historian says that waterboarding was not even close to being the CIA’s most successful intelligence operation. Arguing that the greatly increased use of drone strikes means less captured terrorist leaders to interrogate. (Not that that seems to bother the Israelis.) Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is being decimated by drone strikes.
The Taliban’s top military commander has been captured in Pakistan. The US has been putting pressure on Pakistan:
U.S. officials have in the past presented the Pakistanis with what they said was proof of ISI ties to the Taliban. American officials said Tuesday they still weren't clear on what prompted Pakistan to finally act.
Suggesting said capture is a by-product of President Obama setting a tentative timetable for US withdrawal. India is feeling a bit hard done by:
Which raises the question: Is the U.S. objective in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban, or is it to secure the country for Pakistan? To New Delhi, the answer looks increasingly like the latter. …
… the Taliban in its current incarnation is not a remnant of the Cold War. It is a creation of Pakistan. It was during the 1990s that the Taliban -- actively backed by Pakistan -- seized control of Kabul. Since then, New Delhi has witnessed Afghanistan become a launching pad for anti-India terrorism. …
… A tiny but vocal band of skeptics in India is already questioning the wisdom of New Delhi's alignment with the United States over the last ten years. Of course, it is unlikely that New Delhi would directly oppose U.S. policy in the region. But in the first year of the Obama administration, much of the progress achieved over a decade of aggressive diplomacy to bring India closer to the United States has been undone.
The Taliban leadership has long operated out of Pakistan. Two very different theories about the capture.
The grubby business of trying to clear the Taliban from Helmiland. Encountering stiff resistance. Arguing that tribal analysis of Afghanistan is dangerously misleading. Another report on getting the “human terrain” wrong.
Spruance thus accepted the risk of a less than fully massed attack and relied on self-synchronization and the adaptability of his air groups to carry the day. Nagumo insisted on complete synchronization, with disastrous results.
About the disappearance of grand strategy in US thinking and the attempt of (pdf) the Yale Strategy Seminar to revive it:
These days, however, the academic landscape strikes me as resembling the medieval landscape, and I don’t just mean the architecture. I’m talking about the existence of castles, each of them equipped with high walls, deep moats, and bristling armaments, the purpose of which appears to be to repel raids from, or even commerce with, the departments just down the street. Attempts to break through these defenses, I’ve learned on more than one occasion, can echo the exploits of Don Quixote, who should perhaps become the patron saint of interdisciplinary studies.
About the liberal romance of small wars. And the limitations of moral perspectives in international affairs.
Retired US Colonel running for Congress being very blunt at a panel discussion about jihadi motivations.
About Britain’s new type 45 destroyers. But British military capacity continues to shrink. Dramatisation of the sinking of HMS Coventry during the Falklands.
Iran’s Supreme Leader makes it clear that they are not having any of this engagement with the US nonsense.
Looking at Israel’s long term options. Canada’s Foreign Minister makes an unusually strong statement of support for Israel.
Hamas’s military leader killed in a hotel room in Dubai.
CIA historian says that waterboarding was not even close to being the CIA’s most successful intelligence operation. Arguing that the greatly increased use of drone strikes means less captured terrorist leaders to interrogate. (Not that that seems to bother the Israelis.) Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is being decimated by drone strikes.
The Taliban’s top military commander has been captured in Pakistan. The US has been putting pressure on Pakistan:
U.S. officials have in the past presented the Pakistanis with what they said was proof of ISI ties to the Taliban. American officials said Tuesday they still weren't clear on what prompted Pakistan to finally act.
Suggesting said capture is a by-product of President Obama setting a tentative timetable for US withdrawal. India is feeling a bit hard done by:
Which raises the question: Is the U.S. objective in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban, or is it to secure the country for Pakistan? To New Delhi, the answer looks increasingly like the latter. …
… the Taliban in its current incarnation is not a remnant of the Cold War. It is a creation of Pakistan. It was during the 1990s that the Taliban -- actively backed by Pakistan -- seized control of Kabul. Since then, New Delhi has witnessed Afghanistan become a launching pad for anti-India terrorism. …
… A tiny but vocal band of skeptics in India is already questioning the wisdom of New Delhi's alignment with the United States over the last ten years. Of course, it is unlikely that New Delhi would directly oppose U.S. policy in the region. But in the first year of the Obama administration, much of the progress achieved over a decade of aggressive diplomacy to bring India closer to the United States has been undone.
The Taliban leadership has long operated out of Pakistan. Two very different theories about the capture.
The grubby business of trying to clear the Taliban from Helmiland. Encountering stiff resistance. Arguing that tribal analysis of Afghanistan is dangerously misleading. Another report on getting the “human terrain” wrong.