Philosophy links
Nice comedy skit on why meat-eating is ethical (and vegetarianism is not).
Nice discussion of the difference between fact and opinion.
An appreciation of philosophers Stephen Toulmin, a professor at the University of Southern California's Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies, and John Edwin Smith.
Review of a book of interviews by a philosophy of researchers in moral psychology.
About Aristotle on money, justice and virtue (pdf). Aristotle as sociologist. Critiquing the Aristotelian themes in (pdf) Marx’s economic thought.
Excerpts from Stoic Roman philosopher Musonius Rufus, an early advocate of female equality.
About claims about Greek philosophy, use of language, academics as expert witnesses and a controversial court case.
Series of articles on the philosophy of private property.
Philosopher Ben Shapiro on why the welfare state (as defined) is probably not justified.
On taking science seriously. Arguing that is begging the question and evading a longstanding critique.
About freedom of religion and offence:
We need freedom of speech because none of us is morally good enough to choose for others what to say and think. And that's a basis for free speech which believers and unbelievers alike can accept.
Making a further point:
It’s not that the cartoon gave offence so the offended man got angry and attacked (even if that’s what the attacker himself honestly believes). It’s that the cartoon offered the opportunity to construct a pretext for violence and intimidation, and the taking of offence is part of that construct. There is a deeply dishonest and sinister, and extremely broad and radical, agenda behind the attack on Westergaard. And that is true even if the attacker, in his foot-soldier childishness, really thinks that he was acting alone and purely out of his own personal anger. If he thinks that, then he is simply unaware of the degree to which he had already been taught and conditioned to do violence.
About intentionality and potentiality:
Now here is a tough question: are dispositionality and intentionality merely analogous, or can we take it a step further and say that utimately there is no difference between dispositionality and intentionality? If that case could be made, then Brentano would be shown to be wrong in his claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental. For if the three characteristics of intentionality mentioned above are found below the level of mind in the physical world, then it looks as if intentionality cannot be the mark of the mental. Or should we stay instead that, since intentionality is the mark of the mental, and intentionality is found in nature below the level of mind, that there is something mind-like about all of nature?
I can see the desire to “disenchant” the world naturalistically so intentionality is driven out and there is no space for religion. I can see the religious impulse wanting to extend intentionality so as to “enchant” the world. But, given our cognitive bias to see motive and intention, we should be wary of the latter extension in particular.
Nice post on political labels and their use for psychological rather than analytical reasons:
The impulse to label an opponent as an extremist is a common and tempting one. It is a very easy thing to do, provided that you are not concerned with accuracy or persuading undecided and unaffiliated people that you are right. These labels are not descriptive. They are a way to express the extent of one’s discontent and disaffection with the other side in a debate. When some Republican says that Obama and his party have been governing from “the left,” he might even believe it inasmuch as Obama and his party are to his left politically, but what he really means is that he strongly disapproves of how Obama and his party have been governing. He may or may not have a coherent reason for this disapproval, but declaring it to be leftist or radical leftist conveys the depth of his displeasure. That is, it is not analysis of political reality. It is therapy for the person making the statement.
The same thing goes for progressives who were trying to find words to express how outraged they were by Bush. Inevitably, many resorted to using labels such as theocrat, extreme right, radical right and the like. These did not correctly describe the content of Bush’s politics, but they did express the critics’ feelings of disgust and loathing for Bush’s politics. That doesn’t mean they weren’t right to be disgusted and outraged, but the words they used to express these sentiments typically had no relationship to the substance of what Bush was actually doing.
SF writer and futurologist David Brin on cheerful libertarianism and doctrine versus pragmatism with a great title.
Bertrand Russel’s view of Arabic philosophy. Suggesting that the hard left’s view of radical Islam reflects a deeper lack of realism.
SF writer Steve Barnes on the difference between being Awake, Adult and Enlightened.
Nice discussion of the difference between fact and opinion.
An appreciation of philosophers Stephen Toulmin, a professor at the University of Southern California's Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies, and John Edwin Smith.
Review of a book of interviews by a philosophy of researchers in moral psychology.
About Aristotle on money, justice and virtue (pdf). Aristotle as sociologist. Critiquing the Aristotelian themes in (pdf) Marx’s economic thought.
Excerpts from Stoic Roman philosopher Musonius Rufus, an early advocate of female equality.
About claims about Greek philosophy, use of language, academics as expert witnesses and a controversial court case.
Series of articles on the philosophy of private property.
Philosopher Ben Shapiro on why the welfare state (as defined) is probably not justified.
On taking science seriously. Arguing that is begging the question and evading a longstanding critique.
About freedom of religion and offence:
We need freedom of speech because none of us is morally good enough to choose for others what to say and think. And that's a basis for free speech which believers and unbelievers alike can accept.
Making a further point:
It’s not that the cartoon gave offence so the offended man got angry and attacked (even if that’s what the attacker himself honestly believes). It’s that the cartoon offered the opportunity to construct a pretext for violence and intimidation, and the taking of offence is part of that construct. There is a deeply dishonest and sinister, and extremely broad and radical, agenda behind the attack on Westergaard. And that is true even if the attacker, in his foot-soldier childishness, really thinks that he was acting alone and purely out of his own personal anger. If he thinks that, then he is simply unaware of the degree to which he had already been taught and conditioned to do violence.
About intentionality and potentiality:
Now here is a tough question: are dispositionality and intentionality merely analogous, or can we take it a step further and say that utimately there is no difference between dispositionality and intentionality? If that case could be made, then Brentano would be shown to be wrong in his claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental. For if the three characteristics of intentionality mentioned above are found below the level of mind in the physical world, then it looks as if intentionality cannot be the mark of the mental. Or should we stay instead that, since intentionality is the mark of the mental, and intentionality is found in nature below the level of mind, that there is something mind-like about all of nature?
I can see the desire to “disenchant” the world naturalistically so intentionality is driven out and there is no space for religion. I can see the religious impulse wanting to extend intentionality so as to “enchant” the world. But, given our cognitive bias to see motive and intention, we should be wary of the latter extension in particular.
Nice post on political labels and their use for psychological rather than analytical reasons:
The impulse to label an opponent as an extremist is a common and tempting one. It is a very easy thing to do, provided that you are not concerned with accuracy or persuading undecided and unaffiliated people that you are right. These labels are not descriptive. They are a way to express the extent of one’s discontent and disaffection with the other side in a debate. When some Republican says that Obama and his party have been governing from “the left,” he might even believe it inasmuch as Obama and his party are to his left politically, but what he really means is that he strongly disapproves of how Obama and his party have been governing. He may or may not have a coherent reason for this disapproval, but declaring it to be leftist or radical leftist conveys the depth of his displeasure. That is, it is not analysis of political reality. It is therapy for the person making the statement.
The same thing goes for progressives who were trying to find words to express how outraged they were by Bush. Inevitably, many resorted to using labels such as theocrat, extreme right, radical right and the like. These did not correctly describe the content of Bush’s politics, but they did express the critics’ feelings of disgust and loathing for Bush’s politics. That doesn’t mean they weren’t right to be disgusted and outraged, but the words they used to express these sentiments typically had no relationship to the substance of what Bush was actually doing.
SF writer and futurologist David Brin on cheerful libertarianism and doctrine versus pragmatism with a great title.
Bertrand Russel’s view of Arabic philosophy. Suggesting that the hard left’s view of radical Islam reflects a deeper lack of realism.
SF writer Steve Barnes on the difference between being Awake, Adult and Enlightened.