The five realms of moral judgement
Various academics have come up with a striking analysis of the way human moral judgements work.
They class moral judgements into five realms: harm, reciprocity, ingroup, hierarchy and purity. They adduce evidence that Westerners, particularly liberal Westerners, tend to have their moral judgements much more narrowly based on the first two moral realms (harm and reciprocity) than conservative Westerners and non-Westerners generally whose moral judgements tend to be much more evenly based on all five realms. Which, they suggest, leads to a lot of the moral misunderstandings that occur. (The paper is very much framed in terms of the American “culture wars”.)
There is a sense in which it is very odd to make both of these two claims:
(1) human moral judgements are based on five realms (due to general human psychology), but
(2) we have a group who largely base their moral judgements only on two of those realms.
Clearly, there is something going on, because of the results of the studies on use of moral judgements. Still, it is an odd juxtaposition to make. In fact, the claim about human moral judgements being based on five realms would be much strengthened if there was not this weird exceptional group. That is, the evidence for (1) would be stronger if even folk who seemed to base their moral judgements largely on only two realms were, in fact, shown to be using all five too.
Which is clearly the case, they are just more applied to public discourse than as overt moral principle applicable to public policy.
Consider purity, based on the emotion of disgust. Western progressivists (“liberals” in the American parlance) regularly display judgements of moral disgust based on purity considerations. Disgust at improper use of language breaching the boundaries of linguistic purity. Disgust at improper opinions breaching the boundaries of opinion purity. Western progressivists display great, and clearly moral, concern for linguistic and opinion purity. Thus the development of rednecks have no speech rights jurisprudence is the result of much more deep-seated patterns. Which, for example, show up in the development of campus speech codes in the US. And all the attempts to police public speech.
Then there is ingroup. Western progressivists show a serious propensity to engage in moral judgements based on opinion ingroups (and outgroups). It is taken as read that, for example, good intentions are effectively a monopoly of folk with the correct opinions. ‘Conservative’ is every bit as much a label of abuse and denigration as any racial epithet. ‘Neoconservative’ is a mark of extreme perdition.
As for hierarchy, there is the patently strong concern for, and strong sense of, moral status. Not merely in the ingroup-outgroup sense, but in the sense of a more pervasive claim of moral superiority. There is also a very strong sense of the authority of approved opinion. The high level of conformity on a startling range of opinions amongst progressivists has often been noted.
The paper cited above explains part of how the “culture wars” work as conservatives having moral reactions to public policy that liberals treat as invalid-indeed oppressive. This is because conservatives apply moral concerns based on purity, ingroup and hierarchy concerns to public policy as well as those based on harm and reciprocity, while progressivists only acknowledge as being moral concerns those based on harm and reciprocity. So progressivists dismiss conservative concerns derived from purity, ingroup or hierarchy as being “obviously” not based on moral considerations, and look for other reasons to explain them.
I would argue that what also happens is that progressivists have moral reactions to public discourse that conservatives treat as invalid-indeed oppressive. Not given an overt role as grounds on which to morally appraise public policy, moral judgements by progressivists based on purity, ingroup and hierarchy turn up elsewhere-in moral responses to public discourse itself. Which typically strikes non-progressivists as illegitimate attempts to police public discourse.
Which, of course, it largely (though not entirely) is. It is not entirely illegitimate because there are moral issues about the use of language. Making bigoted collective abuse more problematic is not much of a loss.
It is largely illegitimate because the policing is done in a generally self-serving way and undermines public discourse keeping to its appropriate purposes-being a vehicle for communication of information (especially confronting information), being a common resource, clarity, truthfulness, etc.
So, the above writers make a powerful case that human moral judgements are based on five realms grounded in human psychology. So powerful that the group they label an exception-Westerners, particularly “liberal" Westerners-are, in fact, not so. They just largely apply only two of the realms as moral grounds of public policy and the other three to public discourse.
They class moral judgements into five realms: harm, reciprocity, ingroup, hierarchy and purity. They adduce evidence that Westerners, particularly liberal Westerners, tend to have their moral judgements much more narrowly based on the first two moral realms (harm and reciprocity) than conservative Westerners and non-Westerners generally whose moral judgements tend to be much more evenly based on all five realms. Which, they suggest, leads to a lot of the moral misunderstandings that occur. (The paper is very much framed in terms of the American “culture wars”.)
There is a sense in which it is very odd to make both of these two claims:
(1) human moral judgements are based on five realms (due to general human psychology), but
(2) we have a group who largely base their moral judgements only on two of those realms.
Clearly, there is something going on, because of the results of the studies on use of moral judgements. Still, it is an odd juxtaposition to make. In fact, the claim about human moral judgements being based on five realms would be much strengthened if there was not this weird exceptional group. That is, the evidence for (1) would be stronger if even folk who seemed to base their moral judgements largely on only two realms were, in fact, shown to be using all five too.
Which is clearly the case, they are just more applied to public discourse than as overt moral principle applicable to public policy.
Consider purity, based on the emotion of disgust. Western progressivists (“liberals” in the American parlance) regularly display judgements of moral disgust based on purity considerations. Disgust at improper use of language breaching the boundaries of linguistic purity. Disgust at improper opinions breaching the boundaries of opinion purity. Western progressivists display great, and clearly moral, concern for linguistic and opinion purity. Thus the development of rednecks have no speech rights jurisprudence is the result of much more deep-seated patterns. Which, for example, show up in the development of campus speech codes in the US. And all the attempts to police public speech.
Then there is ingroup. Western progressivists show a serious propensity to engage in moral judgements based on opinion ingroups (and outgroups). It is taken as read that, for example, good intentions are effectively a monopoly of folk with the correct opinions. ‘Conservative’ is every bit as much a label of abuse and denigration as any racial epithet. ‘Neoconservative’ is a mark of extreme perdition.
As for hierarchy, there is the patently strong concern for, and strong sense of, moral status. Not merely in the ingroup-outgroup sense, but in the sense of a more pervasive claim of moral superiority. There is also a very strong sense of the authority of approved opinion. The high level of conformity on a startling range of opinions amongst progressivists has often been noted.
The paper cited above explains part of how the “culture wars” work as conservatives having moral reactions to public policy that liberals treat as invalid-indeed oppressive. This is because conservatives apply moral concerns based on purity, ingroup and hierarchy concerns to public policy as well as those based on harm and reciprocity, while progressivists only acknowledge as being moral concerns those based on harm and reciprocity. So progressivists dismiss conservative concerns derived from purity, ingroup or hierarchy as being “obviously” not based on moral considerations, and look for other reasons to explain them.
I would argue that what also happens is that progressivists have moral reactions to public discourse that conservatives treat as invalid-indeed oppressive. Not given an overt role as grounds on which to morally appraise public policy, moral judgements by progressivists based on purity, ingroup and hierarchy turn up elsewhere-in moral responses to public discourse itself. Which typically strikes non-progressivists as illegitimate attempts to police public discourse.
Which, of course, it largely (though not entirely) is. It is not entirely illegitimate because there are moral issues about the use of language. Making bigoted collective abuse more problematic is not much of a loss.
It is largely illegitimate because the policing is done in a generally self-serving way and undermines public discourse keeping to its appropriate purposes-being a vehicle for communication of information (especially confronting information), being a common resource, clarity, truthfulness, etc.
So, the above writers make a powerful case that human moral judgements are based on five realms grounded in human psychology. So powerful that the group they label an exception-Westerners, particularly “liberal" Westerners-are, in fact, not so. They just largely apply only two of the realms as moral grounds of public policy and the other three to public discourse.