I wrote this last year for the Crusade and Jihad take-home exam. I wrote another essay too, on Saladin's strategy during the period post-Hattin, but it's nothing special. I think this one is pretty good though - any comments would be appreciated. There's one footnote in the original text (because it's a take-home exam, not a formal essay), which I've converted to *shudder* in-text, because there's not really any other options.
Anyway, let me know what you think.
(Cross-posted from
Blogger)
The Crusader states in the Levant were always precariously placed; with hostile neighbours to the south and east and limited support from Europe, they relied on the careful use of both castles and field armies. The different tactics of Muslim forces and the geography of the Levant required different methods to those employed in Europe and so the Crusader states made a number of developments which pre-dated similar shifts in the West or were entirely peculiar to their circumstances. In particular, the blurring of offensive and defensive activities yielded a unique attitude of active defence and a tendency toward mobile warfare.
In controlling territories constantly threatened by war, castles were of inestimable value. This had become apparent in Europe since the time of Charlemagne, but the Crusader states went beyond the traditional uses of castles. Rather than acting simply as a base from which the local lord could control his subjects, collect taxes and defend his lands, Crusader castles were used aggressively to claim territory, particularly in border regions, asserting control of new territory as opposed to simply consolidating power. This use of castles was later seen in Europe, but not until almost a century later during the English conquest of Wales.
Aggressive border castles, then, represented a new attitude to the use of fortifications as not simply defensive but also as a method of conquest. By the same token, field armies had to be used in entirely different ways. The Crusader states were inevitably short of manpower, thanks to their isolation, so they had to rely on tactics and skill for victory. Frankish knights had established their dominance on the field during the First Crusade, with the dry, flat plains of the Levant allowing cavalry charges on a scale rarely possible on European battlefields, but they also faced a different type of enemy. Muslim armies were capable of putting large numbers of light cavalry into the field, especially in the form of cavalry archers. These forces were capable of avoiding the famous Frankish charge and could cut formations of knights to pieces with near-constant volleys of arrows. The armies of the Crusader states had to adapt their own tactics to face this and their solution was a very close interaction between cavalry and infantry forces.
Rather than treat cavalry, melee and ranged infantry as separate forces, the armies of the Crusader states integrated them to a remarkable degree. Combined infantry forces of shield-carrying spearmen and crossbowmen could hold off cavalry archers, using shield walls and volleys of crossbow bolts which were devastating to those lightly armoured forces. Meanwhile the knights, guarded by this infantry wall, could answer a Muslim attack, including a cavalry charge - Arabic forces in particular were noted for their own heavy cavalry - with their own; in almost every case, a successful Frankish charge would break its target.
This tactic evolved even further into a way of negotiating the often hostile and almost never secure lands that the Crusaders had conquered in the form of the so-called 'fighting march' (Smail, R. C. Crusading Warfare 1097-1193, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972, pp. 156-7). In this formation, the army marched with the knights surrounded by the infantry, providing the same mutual support on the march as on the battlefield. Doing so must have required an intense discipline, especially since medieval accounts refer to these columns fighting while on the march without breaking formation. This adaptation of a defensive tactic into an aggressive manoeuvre was closely linked to the aggressive use of castles, providing a mobile balance to the static power of fortified positions.
This balance of static and mobile power was the expression of the Crusader states' need for an active defensive force. Castles, once constructed, could not simply be garrisoned and expected to dominate their surroundings but were instead operational bases and supply points. In an emergency a field force could certainly fall back to a castle to avoid total destruction but this was usually a dangerous move; by staying in the field, the force was able to restrict the mobility of attackers, constantly threatening them, while the castle remained as an obstacle which usually controlled a commanding position. An enemy who ignored this risked having their supply lines cut or a rear attack and the ability of a mobile force to cut its opponents off from water was a major factor, as seen at the battle of Hattin.
The relationship between castles and the various branches of field armies in the Crusader states was profoundly inter-dependent, with a degree of interaction that was not seen in the West for well over a century. Ideas which developed slowly in the West were by necessity explored much earlier, from the aggressive use of castles to the combined-arms tactics of the fighting march and the mass cavalry charge, which was not seen in Europe until the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Innovation and integration were the corner-stones of this system and, when used properly, it showed itself to be highly effective.