Почему QE не работает
Я часто утверждаю, что QE сработало только в 2009 г., когда остановило проблемы с ликвидностью на межбанке. Потом все, бесполезная программа и даже вредоносная. Что хорошего в финансовом коммунизме? Отличная статья ниже. Некоторые куски придется нарезать на английском.
Но суть следующая:
QE изобрели в 60-е годы для рынков 30-х годов. Она работает для депозитарной системы (vertical), а сейчас мы уже давно (с 80-х) имеем wholesale банковскую систему (horizontal). В самом первом своем посте на этом блоге я об этом писал.
Поэтому QE не вызывает инфляцию в экономике, только на рынках. Все, что делал Бернанк, Абе, Драги и ко. бесполезно, и рост экономик за последние 8 лет это подтверждает (а японский опыт так и с 90-х). Сколько доказательств им надо? В какой-то момент понимание придет- если уже не пришло. Основной вопрос теперь- как изымать всю эту бесполезную гору напечатанных денег и что это будет означать для рынков и, в конечном счете, для экономики, которую они так глупо и безрезультатно пытались накачать?
http://www.alhambrapartners.com/2016/11/25/a-brief-history-of-money-part-3-quotation-marks-of-dimensional-expansion/
"Thus, the wholesale system that is dominated in the dollar denomination (eurodollar) is not a means to deliver actual dollars to depositors eventually, rather it is a system of standards loosely associated with the dollar (by convention) by which banks can transact with each other with regard to global financial objectives. From this view you can (hopefully) far better appreciate what happened in 2008; the vertical “multiplier” section was almost completely untouched with the exception of a few jurisdictions where depositor insurance was less than 100%. There were minor queues at ATM’s in the UK after Northern Rock, for example, with people seeking convertibility of deposit accounts into pounds cash, but apart from that the panic was entirely contained within just the horizontal.
And even then it was never going to be settled with actual dollars demanded from among the interbank counterparties. What happened more closely resembled simple doubt; whereas before August 2007, most participants had few misgivings about claiming to be able to obtain dollars, afterward more participants became shy about it - not that anyone ever actually forced convertibility from their interbank counterparties. Banks within the global wholesale system still claimed to be able to produce dollars, they just did so with much less enthusiasm and at much greater costs as a result.
Less enthusiasm in the interbank market did not translate into public/depositor doubts about being able to access deposit account holdings (vertical multiplier) as it did in 1929 because the horizontal had almost entirely delinked from the vertical; they were to a very high degree separate and distinct monetary and credit systems. With fewer intense and fluid dollar promises, it was the non-money wholesale system that was forced to contract (the horizontal “multiplier” alone in reverse)."
Но суть следующая:
QE изобрели в 60-е годы для рынков 30-х годов. Она работает для депозитарной системы (vertical), а сейчас мы уже давно (с 80-х) имеем wholesale банковскую систему (horizontal). В самом первом своем посте на этом блоге я об этом писал.
Поэтому QE не вызывает инфляцию в экономике, только на рынках. Все, что делал Бернанк, Абе, Драги и ко. бесполезно, и рост экономик за последние 8 лет это подтверждает (а японский опыт так и с 90-х). Сколько доказательств им надо? В какой-то момент понимание придет- если уже не пришло. Основной вопрос теперь- как изымать всю эту бесполезную гору напечатанных денег и что это будет означать для рынков и, в конечном счете, для экономики, которую они так глупо и безрезультатно пытались накачать?
http://www.alhambrapartners.com/2016/11/25/a-brief-history-of-money-part-3-quotation-marks-of-dimensional-expansion/
"Thus, the wholesale system that is dominated in the dollar denomination (eurodollar) is not a means to deliver actual dollars to depositors eventually, rather it is a system of standards loosely associated with the dollar (by convention) by which banks can transact with each other with regard to global financial objectives. From this view you can (hopefully) far better appreciate what happened in 2008; the vertical “multiplier” section was almost completely untouched with the exception of a few jurisdictions where depositor insurance was less than 100%. There were minor queues at ATM’s in the UK after Northern Rock, for example, with people seeking convertibility of deposit accounts into pounds cash, but apart from that the panic was entirely contained within just the horizontal.
And even then it was never going to be settled with actual dollars demanded from among the interbank counterparties. What happened more closely resembled simple doubt; whereas before August 2007, most participants had few misgivings about claiming to be able to obtain dollars, afterward more participants became shy about it - not that anyone ever actually forced convertibility from their interbank counterparties. Banks within the global wholesale system still claimed to be able to produce dollars, they just did so with much less enthusiasm and at much greater costs as a result.
Less enthusiasm in the interbank market did not translate into public/depositor doubts about being able to access deposit account holdings (vertical multiplier) as it did in 1929 because the horizontal had almost entirely delinked from the vertical; they were to a very high degree separate and distinct monetary and credit systems. With fewer intense and fluid dollar promises, it was the non-money wholesale system that was forced to contract (the horizontal “multiplier” alone in reverse)."