May 11, 2011 17:31
Diamond’s lecture concerns the global phenomenon of third wave democracy that has expanded dramatically in the world since 1974. He asks if any country can become a democracy and substantiates the question with a thorough overview of the growth in electoral democracies worldwide-what is called the third wave of democratization. By 1987, democratization had spread to all of Western Europe, much of Asia, and most of Latin American; Eastern Europe and Africa began to democratize, leaving only the Middle East out of the loop. Using quantitative analysis of the newly democratized states, Diamond’s tables present extensive findings on the characteristics of third wave states that serve to qualify his primary determination in the text: “the overwhelming bulk of states that have become democratic during the third wave have remained so, even in countries lacking virtually all of the supposed ‘conditions’ for democracy” (Diamond 2003; 3). His data repeatedly amasses findings that demonstrate the predominance of democracy in the world, nearly three-fifths of the world’s states are democracies, and overall only 14 of the 125 democracies existing since the third wave have regressed back to authoritarianism (although many of the listed states only democratized since 1990) (Diamond 2003; 6). Using annual freedom ratings and the always-empirically-popular public opinion survey, Diamond further supports his argument for democratization and democracy as a widely accepted universal value. Diamond uses findings to mandate the prospects for democracy in the Mid East, yet without considering the higher level of secularization in many of the non-Arab states with Muslim majorities that he cites. Overall, Diamond’s evidence overwhelmingly supports his theory, however, his statistics neglects to consider harder to quantify realities that the other texts explore: the longevity involved in true democratization for the new democracies, the foundational conditions for democratic culture in each state, the quality and levels of accountability in each new democracy, and the level of international democratic assistance received by what are mostly dependent democratizating states.
Eckstein’s essay uses a historical-comparative perspective to compare the first wave of democratization occurring in the late nineteenth century with the third wave of democratization of the late twentieth century. A key difference between the waves is the direction of political inclusion: the first wave of Anglo-American countries developed mature institutions of representative government before large scale political inclusion, or the extension of citizen-rights to all citizens. Arguing that the loss of traditional legitimacy of the old order occurred during socio-economic changes that coincided with the corruption and decay of an established order, a parallel can be made between this and the forces currently underlying the third wave of democratization. Eckstein’s basic argument for both waves essentially maintains that effective democratization requires far more than a process of formal inclusion and constitutional/institutional design; it requires the proper managing of democratic transition, which can take an indefinite amount of time and essentially hinges on the foundations for a democratic culture and the perception of regime-crisis (Eckstein 1996; 1). By transition-management, the author means a regime-crisis of the established authoritarian order must be present with the societal perception of its bankruptcy (Eckstein 1996; 8). Mutual reconciliation between the old, bankrupt order and the new one is needed if democratic transitions are to survive. He renders the debate between economic liberalization and democracy tenuous, as something that should develop gradually and adaptively over time. Another criterion above and beyond the formal-legalism perspective of democratization involves the gradual, incremental, and syncretic change needed for effective democratization: social transformation can only be accomplished successfully if the transition is gradual, sequential, and grafted to what already exists in society, without destroying and excluding old or marginalized parties (Eckstein 1996; 12).
Rakner’s brief on international democratic assistance summarizes the main challenges and recommendations for democratic assistance and processes in the developing world. She advocates self-generating democracy from within with the assistance of international donors, recommending that donors support political parties and the political nature of assistance; fashion the right institutions and reforms to the context and realities of recipient countries; counter executive dominance by strengthening instrastate accountability and continued progress and long-term commitment beyond the founding elections; reaching out and working with civil society across all levels (central, regional, local); and the need for donor alignment with a country’s priorities and needs to strengthen the effectiveness of the aid. Like Eckstein, Rakner further argues that the outcome of democracy promotion is difficult to assess due to the long-term nature of the effects, the multiple and varying internal and external influences, the interlinked democratic processes with social, economic, political and historical conditions, and the limited picture of reality that quantitative indictors provide (Rakner 2007).
Mainwaring’s introductory chapter presents a compare and contrast literature review of works regarding democratic accountability in Latin America and competing conceptions of accountability. Accountability, one of the key problems and barriers to democratic legitimacy in most of the region, is defined as the legalized authority of an actor to request answerability by way of imposing sanctions on public officials. Two kinds of accountability are then defined: electoral (vertical) accountability between elected public officials and voters and intrastate (horizontal) accountability between state agencies and public officials and bureaucracies (Mainwaring 2003; 8). Accountability, as a concept, additionally helps to explain the difference between third wave democracies and advanced industrial “polyarchies” (Mainwaring 2003; 6). He renders the debate between electoral and intrastate accountability to be mutually interactive and reinforcing rather than either/or. Lastly, Mainwaring discusses the state of intrastate accountability in Latin America and ways to repair the deficiencies in the mechanisms of oversight and corruption.
Suhrke’s article gives a context to the third wave of democratization with the example of Afghanistan. As a dependent, fledgling democracy Suhrke shows the missteps taken by the U.S., international donors, and international organizations that led to foreign dependence, political exclusion and an institutional design that lacked sovereignty and legitimacy (Suhrke 2007; 2). Critical decisions were openly made by the U.S. to back Karzai as interim president of the transitional government and the loya jirga confirmed the decision, a presidential rather than parliamentary system was chosen with considerable U.S. influence along with a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) election system that allowed for individual candidates to be chosen in multi-member districts (some of which were war criminals or associated with armed groups) and barred the established 60 registered political parties from representing constituents in parliament (Suhrke 2007). Furthermore, the legitimacy of the newly established democracy was further undermined due to the government’s dependence on foreign economic and military assistance which limited the parliament’s ability to make independent decisions (Suhrke 2007; 14).
Suhrke’s study gives a clear context to the difficulties inherent in democratic transitioning and nation-building. Rakner’s recommendations for effective democratic assistance demonstrate some of the limitations and faults committed by the international support and highlights where and how improvements could be made. It also speaks to the inflated prospects for democracy demonstrated in Diamond article, in that it insufficiently explains the discretion needed and contextual attention involved in democratization. The U.S.’s influence over Afghanistan’s democratization process effectively denied a voice to the old order and ethnic minorities in the political arena, at the interim stage, during the formulating of the constitution, and at the electoral level. “How to democratize at a proper pace, on a proper scale and in a sensible sequence” (Eckstein 1996; 17) seems to be one of the key questions aside from the most effective constitutional and electoral design for a given country.
Works Cited
Diamond, Larry. 2003. “Democracy” UC Irvine Center for Democracy. 1-26.
Eckstein, Harry. 1996. “Lessons for the “Third Wave” from the First: An Essay on Democratization.” UC Irvine Center for Democracy. 1-28.
Mainwaring, Scott. 2003. “Introduction: Democratic Accountability in Latin America.” Democratic Accountability in Latin America. Oxford University Press. 3-33
Rakner, Lise. 2007. “International Democracy Assistance: Key Lessons.” CMI Brief.
Suhrke, Astri. 2007. “Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan.” CMI Working Paper. 1-15.