Nothing at all
again..
"Does a woman’s partial responsibility for a fetus’ being inside of her give it the right to use her body? Does this mean that a fetus whose existence is due to rape has no right to use his mother’s body?" Regarding this: A Defense of Abortion by Judy Jarvis Thomson
*this is quite a bit longer than the last paper, however, paragraph four gives you the jist of what it addresses.
My thoughts:
Somewhat contrary to the position of the average pro-choice activist, as is pointed our in A Defense of Abortion, Judy Jarvis Thomson presumes that a fetus, from the moment of conception, is a person. A debated presumption that generally has much to do with the personal beliefs of the responding individual, this seemingly anti-choice assumption is of great necessity to the argument that Thomson makes for her defense of Abortion. With this presumption, the author can use an example of any actual person, in this case an adult violinist, and their right to use a woman’s body. This question of whether this person has the right to use its mother’s body, in several situations, is an issue that is questioned and several answers are provided. There is a distinction that is included, which discusses the rights of a fetus that is the product of rape versus a fetus that is a result of consensual intercourse. Thomson decides that the answer to the question of a general right to use the mother’s body should be left open, as her conclusions at least infer that all abortions are not necessarily unjust killing (Minas, 406). What the author does clearly state however, is that a fetus that is a result of rape does not necessarily have the right to use its mother’s body (Minas, 405).
It seems however, that while Thomson provides a very clear and interesting argument, there is no necessity to distinguish between the origins of any pregnancy. Does anyone have the right to another’s body, ever? Thomson’s argument is very compelling to this idea - were others entitled to use the bodies of others, our bodies might quickly become anything but our own. Whether a product of rape or a product of consensual sex, no one but the individual herself has the right to use her own body. Of course, if the body is no longer necessary for viability, in the case of pregnancy, and the fetus is carried to that point, and as such the process of a late term abortion was under consideration, it seems that there would not be much of a reason to not attempt to remove the fetus while preserving its potential life. However, the ultimate choices over what one does to their own body, ought to be up to that individual. Surely it is more humane to end the potential personhood of a fetus, rather than dictate an already existing life and sensual body.
I always wonder how many “pro-life” activists are on means of birth control similar to that of depo-provera - where eggs can be fertilized and as such conception does occur, but where the hormones in the drug merely create an unsuitable environment in which the embryo can implant itself. If life begins at conception, millions of women - from fear of pregnancy, or disagreement with abortion, are flushing babies down the toilet, quite possibly every month. It seems then that we must either be abstinent or give birth - but this only brings us back to whether an individual’s body is indeed their own property.
It must be mentioned that where one has a right, another has a duty to not interfere. As such, if a woman has a right to control her own body - just as any man has the right to comb his hair, then a fetus, has no right to interfere - if the mother considers the pregnancy a hindrance. Likewise, if a fetus has a right to life, then a woman ought not to interfere. So, it must be weighed then, does a potential person have more of a right than the woman? It would seem that when a fetus is not viable without its mother, its body is not completely its own - it requires another’s individual liberty to assist it. As such, the woman who provides it with life ought to be able to make decisions, as her body is her own, viable with or without an implanted egg. Until that fetus can live without interfering upon another and as such has no individual right, it would seem, that the choice in question is a choice for the mother to decide what is best for her life and her body. When that fetus is viable without her, its body would seem to become its own and like its mother, it then ought to be the one in control if its fate, or at least free from interference upon its life from any other individual. It seems absurd to think that something that does not completely exist is an entity with any right that supercedes a right of an unquestionably existing individual.
Thomson’s example of a plugged in concert violinist is thus quite useful - reasonable people generally want control over their own bodies; to brush their hair, go for a walk, to not be abused, etc. This implies a desire to be free from force. But again, while it would seem even more necessary for a right to choice in the case of rape, in any other case, the woman’s body is still her body and hers alone. Telling a woman when choices over her body are hers appears to be conducive to a slippery slope where women obtain more duties only minimizing their already weak worldly position, even more. Women are the victims of powerlessness enough, more control over our bodies does not need to be exerted.
Minas, Anne, ed. Gender Basics, 2nd edition. Toronto: Wadsworth, 2000.
"Does a woman’s partial responsibility for a fetus’ being inside of her give it the right to use her body? Does this mean that a fetus whose existence is due to rape has no right to use his mother’s body?" Regarding this: A Defense of Abortion by Judy Jarvis Thomson
*this is quite a bit longer than the last paper, however, paragraph four gives you the jist of what it addresses.
My thoughts:
Somewhat contrary to the position of the average pro-choice activist, as is pointed our in A Defense of Abortion, Judy Jarvis Thomson presumes that a fetus, from the moment of conception, is a person. A debated presumption that generally has much to do with the personal beliefs of the responding individual, this seemingly anti-choice assumption is of great necessity to the argument that Thomson makes for her defense of Abortion. With this presumption, the author can use an example of any actual person, in this case an adult violinist, and their right to use a woman’s body. This question of whether this person has the right to use its mother’s body, in several situations, is an issue that is questioned and several answers are provided. There is a distinction that is included, which discusses the rights of a fetus that is the product of rape versus a fetus that is a result of consensual intercourse. Thomson decides that the answer to the question of a general right to use the mother’s body should be left open, as her conclusions at least infer that all abortions are not necessarily unjust killing (Minas, 406). What the author does clearly state however, is that a fetus that is a result of rape does not necessarily have the right to use its mother’s body (Minas, 405).
It seems however, that while Thomson provides a very clear and interesting argument, there is no necessity to distinguish between the origins of any pregnancy. Does anyone have the right to another’s body, ever? Thomson’s argument is very compelling to this idea - were others entitled to use the bodies of others, our bodies might quickly become anything but our own. Whether a product of rape or a product of consensual sex, no one but the individual herself has the right to use her own body. Of course, if the body is no longer necessary for viability, in the case of pregnancy, and the fetus is carried to that point, and as such the process of a late term abortion was under consideration, it seems that there would not be much of a reason to not attempt to remove the fetus while preserving its potential life. However, the ultimate choices over what one does to their own body, ought to be up to that individual. Surely it is more humane to end the potential personhood of a fetus, rather than dictate an already existing life and sensual body.
I always wonder how many “pro-life” activists are on means of birth control similar to that of depo-provera - where eggs can be fertilized and as such conception does occur, but where the hormones in the drug merely create an unsuitable environment in which the embryo can implant itself. If life begins at conception, millions of women - from fear of pregnancy, or disagreement with abortion, are flushing babies down the toilet, quite possibly every month. It seems then that we must either be abstinent or give birth - but this only brings us back to whether an individual’s body is indeed their own property.
It must be mentioned that where one has a right, another has a duty to not interfere. As such, if a woman has a right to control her own body - just as any man has the right to comb his hair, then a fetus, has no right to interfere - if the mother considers the pregnancy a hindrance. Likewise, if a fetus has a right to life, then a woman ought not to interfere. So, it must be weighed then, does a potential person have more of a right than the woman? It would seem that when a fetus is not viable without its mother, its body is not completely its own - it requires another’s individual liberty to assist it. As such, the woman who provides it with life ought to be able to make decisions, as her body is her own, viable with or without an implanted egg. Until that fetus can live without interfering upon another and as such has no individual right, it would seem, that the choice in question is a choice for the mother to decide what is best for her life and her body. When that fetus is viable without her, its body would seem to become its own and like its mother, it then ought to be the one in control if its fate, or at least free from interference upon its life from any other individual. It seems absurd to think that something that does not completely exist is an entity with any right that supercedes a right of an unquestionably existing individual.
Thomson’s example of a plugged in concert violinist is thus quite useful - reasonable people generally want control over their own bodies; to brush their hair, go for a walk, to not be abused, etc. This implies a desire to be free from force. But again, while it would seem even more necessary for a right to choice in the case of rape, in any other case, the woman’s body is still her body and hers alone. Telling a woman when choices over her body are hers appears to be conducive to a slippery slope where women obtain more duties only minimizing their already weak worldly position, even more. Women are the victims of powerlessness enough, more control over our bodies does not need to be exerted.
Minas, Anne, ed. Gender Basics, 2nd edition. Toronto: Wadsworth, 2000.