Problem of Evil
I've been reading up on gnosticism a lot lately. If anyone knowns much about it I really want to find someone to discuss it with.
I found this and I think it is kinda interesting
from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil
if you go to the link it adresses criticisms
One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil may be schematized as follows:
1. If God exists, then there would be no evil in the world.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Other logical forms of arguments articulating the problem follow.
Logical problem of evil
1. God is omnipotent (premise)
2. God is benevolent (premise)
3. Benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise)
4. God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 2 and 3)
5. God can eliminate evil completely. (conclusion from 1)
1. Whatever end result of suffering, God can bring about by ways which do not include suffering. (conclusion from 1)
2. God has no reason not to eliminate evil (conclusion from 5.1)
6. God will eliminate evil completely. (conclusion from 4, 5 and 5.2)
7. Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
8. Items 6 and 7 are contradictory; therefore the premises are wrong
9. Therefore, premises are false, or God does not exist.
Evidential problem of evil
1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. Gratuitous evils are incompatible with the existence of a god (omnipotent, omniscient, all-good).
3. Therefore, no god exists.
Argument from evil natural laws
1. A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent.
2. If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural law.
3. The laws of predation are ultimately evil.
4. There are instances of the laws of predation.
5. Therefore, no god exists.
Moral argument from evil
1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.
2. If a god exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil (even if no-one intervenes to prevent that evil).
1. For any possible world W, if a god exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
2. If a god exists, then there is an objective justification for every actual instance of evil, (including those evils where there is a witness).
3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as defined above) are theists who know (2).
4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur. (from 4 and 5)
7. If the most rational theists know that a god exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur. (from 1 to 6)
8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know 2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
9. Even the most rational theists do not know that a god exists. (from 7 and 8)
10. If the most rational theists do not know that a god exists, then no theist knows that a god exists.
11. No theist knows that a god exists. (from 9 and 10)
12. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified.
13. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists.
14. If a god exists, then no theist has a false belief that a god exists.
15. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. (from 13 and 14)
16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that a god exists. (from 12)
17. No god exists. (from 15 and 16)
Inductive argument from evil
1. All evil in the kinds of created entities are the result of the fallibility of one or more of its creators. (Premise)
2. The universe is a created entity. (Premise)
3. The universe contains evil. (Premise)
4. Evil is the result of the actions of a fallible creator(s) or is not the result of any creator(s). (From 1, 2 and 3 by predictive inference)
5. If god created the universe, then he is fallible. (From 4)
6. Therefore, god did not create the universe, is imperfect, or does not exist. (From 5)
Argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure
1. Consider the following observations:
* Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.
* Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.
* Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.
2. The observations in 1 are more probably the result of natural law than a god.
3. Therefore, probably no god exists.
I found this and I think it is kinda interesting
from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil
if you go to the link it adresses criticisms
One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil may be schematized as follows:
1. If God exists, then there would be no evil in the world.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Other logical forms of arguments articulating the problem follow.
Logical problem of evil
1. God is omnipotent (premise)
2. God is benevolent (premise)
3. Benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise)
4. God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 2 and 3)
5. God can eliminate evil completely. (conclusion from 1)
1. Whatever end result of suffering, God can bring about by ways which do not include suffering. (conclusion from 1)
2. God has no reason not to eliminate evil (conclusion from 5.1)
6. God will eliminate evil completely. (conclusion from 4, 5 and 5.2)
7. Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
8. Items 6 and 7 are contradictory; therefore the premises are wrong
9. Therefore, premises are false, or God does not exist.
Evidential problem of evil
1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. Gratuitous evils are incompatible with the existence of a god (omnipotent, omniscient, all-good).
3. Therefore, no god exists.
Argument from evil natural laws
1. A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent.
2. If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural law.
3. The laws of predation are ultimately evil.
4. There are instances of the laws of predation.
5. Therefore, no god exists.
Moral argument from evil
1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.
2. If a god exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil (even if no-one intervenes to prevent that evil).
1. For any possible world W, if a god exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
2. If a god exists, then there is an objective justification for every actual instance of evil, (including those evils where there is a witness).
3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as defined above) are theists who know (2).
4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur. (from 4 and 5)
7. If the most rational theists know that a god exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur. (from 1 to 6)
8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know 2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
9. Even the most rational theists do not know that a god exists. (from 7 and 8)
10. If the most rational theists do not know that a god exists, then no theist knows that a god exists.
11. No theist knows that a god exists. (from 9 and 10)
12. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified.
13. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists.
14. If a god exists, then no theist has a false belief that a god exists.
15. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. (from 13 and 14)
16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that a god exists. (from 12)
17. No god exists. (from 15 and 16)
Inductive argument from evil
1. All evil in the kinds of created entities are the result of the fallibility of one or more of its creators. (Premise)
2. The universe is a created entity. (Premise)
3. The universe contains evil. (Premise)
4. Evil is the result of the actions of a fallible creator(s) or is not the result of any creator(s). (From 1, 2 and 3 by predictive inference)
5. If god created the universe, then he is fallible. (From 4)
6. Therefore, god did not create the universe, is imperfect, or does not exist. (From 5)
Argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure
1. Consider the following observations:
* Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.
* Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.
* Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.
2. The observations in 1 are more probably the result of natural law than a god.
3. Therefore, probably no god exists.