Two Months to Doomsday
So, today should be (if I time this right), November 9th. In case you don't obsessively remember strange numbers, that means that in two months it will be January 9th, 2011, the date on which the Southern Sudan Independence Referendum should take place, as specified by the peace agreement that ended (for a certain value of 'ended') the Sudanese Civil War.
Studies, polls, and anecdotal evidence indicates that the inhabitants of Southern Sudan are unimpressed with President al-Bashir's campaign promise to kill all the men and rape all the women, and are likely to vote for independence. And of course, al-Bashir will be totally happy to let the people of Southern Sudan walk away from their former country happily and peacefully into the sunset with a majority of Sudan's five billion barrels of oil reserves.
And if you believe that, I have a bridge to sell you. On the Moon.
So here are some uneducated and ignorant possibilities of what happens next:
1) First, the independence process will take a long time. Certainly Sudan will basically lose all authority once the results are proclaimed, but they don't have any real authority over the south; that's in the hands of the SPLM. Endless wrangling will begin over border control, over political cooperation, and most importantly over whether Sudan will tax the shit out of the south's oil production, because the south, being landlocked, ships its oil through Sudan to the Red Sea.
At the same time, the SPLM will have to deal with being a poor landlocked country with no economy other then oil and agriculture, no services, and so little government that even Tea Party Libertarians would feel nervous. They'll be surrounded by other nations who will only be too happy to treat the new kid on the block to a free dinner, in exchange for some of that oil wealth for starters. And, of course, they'll have their own internal divisions as various people fight for slices of the oil money pie. Controlling it will be a government that doesn't have reliable branches, reliable officers, or even a name.
2) Having nothing better to do with their lives, the government in Khartoum will have the opportunity to meddle in the south, supporting those various factions that are contending with whoever's in control in Juba at the moment. In a country as unorganized as the south will be, money from something like oil belongs to those factions that have enough men with guns to be sitting at the table when they divide up the pie. Getting those guns means finding someone willing to fund you, and Khartoum will only be too willing to fund groups in exchange for a better share of the oil money, a more firm controlling interest in government, or even a cup of sugar. Khartoum has no interest in having an organized government run by the SPLM (who hate them) next door, and funding their rivals will instigate a low-key civil war that will prevent that.
Of course, the south can retaliate by providing safe havens, weapons, and oil money to the rebels in Sudan's eastern region and in Darfur. There's not as much money in it, but it will be an expensive problems for Khartoum. So instead of a north-south civil war, you could have a north-east-west civil war, and a south-south civil war and fight the whole thing out via diplomatically acceptable proxies. It's likely that at least some of this will happen, but it could be kept to a very low level, depending on how oil negotiations go.
3) In a very unlikely case, should fighting a proxy war fail to achieve al-Bashir's goals (a bigger share of the oil wealth, control of southern Sudan, or getting laid), he can always resort to invasion. Finding an appropriate southern rebel group he can co-opt, he can reinforce their ranks with regular Sudanese troops with tanks and air support, turning the war into a rehash of the Sudanese Civil War, except with Sudan's soldiers wearing different colors. Of course, he might not want to win this one, because even if he does he'll be right back where Sudan was when this all started. This is unlikely and extremely risky, because if he gets too obvious about how many Sudanese troops are involved, he might end up with:
4) International intervention. Sudan is surrounded by countries that, thanks to long years of dealing with Sudan, are not necessarily friendly. Chad and Uganda have fought against Sudan and Sudanese influence recently, and Kenya and Ethiopia might not look benignly on as a self-identified “Arab” regime conquers an independent African nation. Of course, those countries have their own enemies. Too much overt presence could result in an AU intervention, a regional intervention, an EU intervention, or, God forbid, a Third Congo War, as Sudanese and Congolese troops attempt to dislodge Ugandan territory in Congo and set the whole continent on fire. Again.
I'd rate this as unlikely. The truth is that the rest of the world just doesn't care that much about Sudan, north or south, unless Khartoum is stupid enough to invade openly, or to take over the whole country after some “rebel” group moves in. Ironically, the only first world leader with an excuse to take an aggressive stance in Africa is too distracted by Afghanistan to do anything about it, and the up-and-comers, China, India, and Brazil, are either too apathetic, or lack the capabilities to intervene. France and Germany just don't seem to have it in them to haul the whole EU in with them, unless the Sudanese start kicking puppies on international TV.
Of course, this is Sudan. I've learned that I shouldn't try to predict things like that. They'll probably turn international puppy kicking into the national sport.
Studies, polls, and anecdotal evidence indicates that the inhabitants of Southern Sudan are unimpressed with President al-Bashir's campaign promise to kill all the men and rape all the women, and are likely to vote for independence. And of course, al-Bashir will be totally happy to let the people of Southern Sudan walk away from their former country happily and peacefully into the sunset with a majority of Sudan's five billion barrels of oil reserves.
And if you believe that, I have a bridge to sell you. On the Moon.
So here are some uneducated and ignorant possibilities of what happens next:
1) First, the independence process will take a long time. Certainly Sudan will basically lose all authority once the results are proclaimed, but they don't have any real authority over the south; that's in the hands of the SPLM. Endless wrangling will begin over border control, over political cooperation, and most importantly over whether Sudan will tax the shit out of the south's oil production, because the south, being landlocked, ships its oil through Sudan to the Red Sea.
At the same time, the SPLM will have to deal with being a poor landlocked country with no economy other then oil and agriculture, no services, and so little government that even Tea Party Libertarians would feel nervous. They'll be surrounded by other nations who will only be too happy to treat the new kid on the block to a free dinner, in exchange for some of that oil wealth for starters. And, of course, they'll have their own internal divisions as various people fight for slices of the oil money pie. Controlling it will be a government that doesn't have reliable branches, reliable officers, or even a name.
2) Having nothing better to do with their lives, the government in Khartoum will have the opportunity to meddle in the south, supporting those various factions that are contending with whoever's in control in Juba at the moment. In a country as unorganized as the south will be, money from something like oil belongs to those factions that have enough men with guns to be sitting at the table when they divide up the pie. Getting those guns means finding someone willing to fund you, and Khartoum will only be too willing to fund groups in exchange for a better share of the oil money, a more firm controlling interest in government, or even a cup of sugar. Khartoum has no interest in having an organized government run by the SPLM (who hate them) next door, and funding their rivals will instigate a low-key civil war that will prevent that.
Of course, the south can retaliate by providing safe havens, weapons, and oil money to the rebels in Sudan's eastern region and in Darfur. There's not as much money in it, but it will be an expensive problems for Khartoum. So instead of a north-south civil war, you could have a north-east-west civil war, and a south-south civil war and fight the whole thing out via diplomatically acceptable proxies. It's likely that at least some of this will happen, but it could be kept to a very low level, depending on how oil negotiations go.
3) In a very unlikely case, should fighting a proxy war fail to achieve al-Bashir's goals (a bigger share of the oil wealth, control of southern Sudan, or getting laid), he can always resort to invasion. Finding an appropriate southern rebel group he can co-opt, he can reinforce their ranks with regular Sudanese troops with tanks and air support, turning the war into a rehash of the Sudanese Civil War, except with Sudan's soldiers wearing different colors. Of course, he might not want to win this one, because even if he does he'll be right back where Sudan was when this all started. This is unlikely and extremely risky, because if he gets too obvious about how many Sudanese troops are involved, he might end up with:
4) International intervention. Sudan is surrounded by countries that, thanks to long years of dealing with Sudan, are not necessarily friendly. Chad and Uganda have fought against Sudan and Sudanese influence recently, and Kenya and Ethiopia might not look benignly on as a self-identified “Arab” regime conquers an independent African nation. Of course, those countries have their own enemies. Too much overt presence could result in an AU intervention, a regional intervention, an EU intervention, or, God forbid, a Third Congo War, as Sudanese and Congolese troops attempt to dislodge Ugandan territory in Congo and set the whole continent on fire. Again.
I'd rate this as unlikely. The truth is that the rest of the world just doesn't care that much about Sudan, north or south, unless Khartoum is stupid enough to invade openly, or to take over the whole country after some “rebel” group moves in. Ironically, the only first world leader with an excuse to take an aggressive stance in Africa is too distracted by Afghanistan to do anything about it, and the up-and-comers, China, India, and Brazil, are either too apathetic, or lack the capabilities to intervene. France and Germany just don't seem to have it in them to haul the whole EU in with them, unless the Sudanese start kicking puppies on international TV.
Of course, this is Sudan. I've learned that I shouldn't try to predict things like that. They'll probably turn international puppy kicking into the national sport.