RELIGION SECONDARY TO SOCIETY::
Not nearly anywhere near my better work. Some day I will begin to proof read these things... but here it is...
The narrow frame of reference which the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is often held almost exclusively to the realm of religion in Iran. Likewise, some view the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s within a similarly limited historical setting. It is often seen that the war was in consequence to a clash of divisions in Islam. However, when reflecting on the underlying factors of the two events, it becomes clear that religion did not have the first hand role that these constricted interpretations allow. Rather, it was a subordinate priority that grew with importance as a result of other forces such as political maneuvers and trends in society.
The initial events that led to Khomeini’s advance were mostly matters not even of his own doing. After he was solidified in the Revolution, then there were more proactive movements on his part. Essentially Khomeini was positioned directly opposite the failing Shah, who in the end did little more than structure his own demise. However insightful or productive anything he wanted for the Revolution he tried to construct around himself could have been, he failed to understand essential elements of the Iranian society he was working in. In the Shah’s attempt to reinvent the Iranian society and history, he could not translate his ideals to the people. The gap between the Shah’s ideas and the reality of Iran widened, making the Shah ever more alienated from it. He ended up worsening his situation with every attempt to rectify it. This reinventing of the society did not correspond to what Iranian society was based on. The coming together of the Left groups and religious groups was pushed along by the actions of Reza Shah as he increasingly suppressed the left. In consequence, Khomeini’s offerings grew more appealing. Revolution in Iran was in need of a moral component, which was so generously provided by Khomeini. (Ansari, 200) What ever it was that the Shah could not provide to Iranian society, or whatever it was that the Shah was taking away, it became ever clearer that Khomeini was the person who could provide all of those things. The two men became polar opposites. Furthermore, Khomeini was able to come across to the people of Iran with legitimacy that the Shah did not enjoy.
Essentially, the Shah handed over his political power because of his sense of exclusivity, while Khomeini filled this vacuum with his overwhelming sense of inclusiveness. Even though the groups which came together under Khomeini did not usually have such an alliance, there were common denominators which facilitated their joining. In this, Khomeini was adept at allowing this union as he built his political base, then allowing him to move forward with his own agenda that was more religious than and not as pluralistic as it originally was. The Shah’s ill-advised and almost mindless political maneuvers in his own agenda were just the same as political suicide with each and every action. The embarrassing list of political mistakes that the Shah made while he attempted reform only facilitated the changes that awarded Khomeini his victories. As he alienated large parts of the society, they fused together to form his opposition. This came in the form of a coalition of the left wing groups and the religious and traditional groups. For their differences, there was plenty which would bring them together under one cause for the meantime. What groups came together were able to not only because of the inclusive nature of Khomeini’s initial agenda but also because of varying interpretations they employed. (Ansari, 220)
As Khomeini was doing this, he was aware of how it was necessary. There were a swelling number of people who were dissatisfied with what secular nationalism had to offer. The Revolution was in need of a more moral base in order to progress. Already present trends in society were to hand over that facet. (Ansari, 200) Khomeini was one to understand what politics in Iran was all about. He was able to see the social trends fold and unfold.
Even though the inclusive nature of the Revolution brought together union for those who sat in opposition to the Shah from varying perspectives, generally there was more of a soundly joined grouping that was inherently traditional. The left did certainly enjoy a fairly sturdy base of support, but it was not what the traditionalists had. (Ansari, 220, 221) The ultimate consequence of the traditionalist in society winning over the Left was largely because of aspects of society already present. It would only be appropriate that someone such as Khomeini would be more apt to be the leader of the Revolution, as opposed to moderate President Bani-Sadr. And this is to say nothing even of Khomeini’s ability to truly conceive of politics in Iran; something that much of his opposition lacked.
Khomeini fused different elements of Iranian society together to make the Revolution. There was the move away from the West, the Leftist element that was needed for the coalition against the monarchy, the modern element which was needed with the new education in society, and there was the nationalist element. This also had several interpretations but because of the special role of Islam that could not be divorced from Iranian society, the blend of Islamic nationalism became the winning nationalistic ideology in the Revolution. (Ansari, 222) Then for sure, the placement of religion in the Revolution was secure. However, up until then the role of religion had not confirmed, even if it was resolved long before that there was a place for it somewhere. (Ansari, 224)
It was not until then that the shape of Iran’s political establishment was figured out. For whatever definition the Revolution had gotten prior to that, it was only a base on which the new special emphasis on religion sat. This is reflective in the rewriting of the constitution. It had already been mapped out. In its revision, religion was institutionalized more, while the republican aspects inspired by the Fifth Republic in France and the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 in Iran. (Ansari, 222, 225) Illustrated in these contrasting constitutions drawn out is the before and after. It signifies that the Revolution did not begin as a religious movement, but rather as a shift in society helped pushed by politics which was in massive change itself. As said, there was a religious tone to it before the second draft of constitution, but it was present because of already prevalent elements inherent within Iranian society. What is most intriguing about the new constitution, with its measure of religion embedded, is that Pan-Islam became the official ideology of Iran (as opposed to Iranian nationalism). (Oschenwald, 517) This surely illustrates the added magnitude of religion. Undoubtedly, as the revolution progressed the emphasis on religion grew. Once he was able to collect the different factions of Iranian society and then establish himself within in the political order with overwhelming power, Khomeini was able to then effectively remove his opposition.
In Khomeini’s understanding of politics in Iran, he was aware of what kinds of progress had to be made and when, and what conditions would facilitate achieving goals. Once he was able to set up a transitional revolutionary government, he requested that the people remain in a state of peace. The call was not placed for religious reasoning. This was because then the movement would not degenerate beneath him as he secured his placement. However, this would not last since he was cognizant of the fact that the movement of the Revolution was going to be hampered if they did not have an oppositional player to focus against, thus making their own objectives defined. (Ansari, 212) This became the so-called ‘third party.’ It was of perfect timing that the U.S. Embassy was said to be taking in the Shah for medical attention and that students decided to invade the Embassy. The occupation accomplished what Khomeini had in the first place; precise definition joined with direction. That direction was to be the moving away from the West. (Ansari, 227, 228)
The subsequent fall of the Left was all too reminiscent of the political and social melt down the Shah experienced. Just the same, in light of these downfalls, the traditionalists looked more meritorious. Correlation between the two is warranted due to the fact that the downfall was their own doing. President Bani-Sadr had not set positive feeling within the Iranian people by the way that he carried on the war with Iraq. (Ansari, 234) As he found himself and his left supporters blocked consistently, Islamists seemed to be a more viable option; extensive support and the fact that they were permitted to use the ‘reign of terror’ because of the war itself aside. This full alienation of the Left was due to the new direction to the Revolution, defined in term more on religious bases. Of course, Khomeini did have a substantial role in his downfall as the reign of terror was executed, resulting in Bani-Sadr and his followers fleeing the country. (Oschenwald, 517)
The Iran-Iraq War did not begin because of Iranian revolutionaries’ zeal to conquer lands abroad and enlarge the physical scope of the revolution. Instead, they desired to spread the word of their revolution. The initial intentions were to inform people outside of Iran of the revolution in nonviolent ways. (Ansari, 229) Despite the allegations that the war was one for religion, both sides had their own political aims which underlined the whole eight years.
In Iraq the start of the war was more for political reason than it was for religious aims. Saddam Hussein had objectives that were, in part, to rectify a bone of contention of his that had been brewing for almost five years. The Algiers Agreement was signed in 1975, leaving Saddam to feel crushed because of the provisioned border agreement not particularly in his favor. Through the Iran-Iraq War he was looking to regain those borders, and his pride. In addition to this, Saddam’s prestige was had the opportunity of being heightened, if he were to win the war. Within the Arab world, he could then be a leader. (Oschenwald, 658) The objective closest to religion for Saddam was that he wanted to pivot the Revolution’s attention from Iraq. But this had nothing to do with preserving his Sunni majority against the Shii majority in Iran, but from the political upheaval it had the potential of causing. Consequently, Saddam destroyed the Agreement and proceeded with his invasion. (Ansari, 230, 231)
To say that Iranians were defending Islam would not be entirely accurate. They were defending their uniquely Iranian culture and society. (Ansari, 231) Naturally this had something to do with Islam, but in no way was it the entire picture. Nationalism in Iran was not an absent sentiment, and this is the reason why the vehement opposition to Iraq exposed itself the way that it did. However, the war has particular strategic importance to Khomeini, who saw great convenience to use it for his goals. This fulfilled several aims for him. The war proved to be a perfect way for his movement to diminish the power of the Left groups. In doing this it would automatically augment his power and the progress of Islamisation would lean more in his favor. (Ansari, 232) To accomplish it, the Iran-Iraq War was dubbed a ‘holy war’ for his intensive purposes. Such a label resonated more with the broader support he already enjoyed, thus allowing for action all the more passionate. In addition, he was able to amass greater power by centralizing the government further. Identifying the country as ‘sacred’ boosted the link between the religious aspect and Iranian nationalism. The prospect of this was to ultimately aid in instilling purpose, direction, focus, and the mobilization of people to fight. In effect, religion was not only an element to the ideology, but it was also a tool for the aims Khomeini had in mind. This decreases the weight of religion in the larger picture. This is in no way to make light of, or down play the role of religion, it is certainly to place it within a context of purpose for who had a heavy hand in shaping the direction of the war. As far as the masses, religion had a more important role.
Still, when it came down to the war, the prevalence of national identity outside of religion maintained itself. As the Iran-Iraq War progressed and Iran finally made way into Iraq’s borders in 1984, the Shiites in Iraq continued to fight on the side of Iraq, and not with the Shiites from Iran, where they were a majority. It was a matter of Arab Iraqis against the Persian Iranians. (Oschenwald, 658) Nationalist sentiments won the war over religious affiliations. This is quite interesting considering that Khomeini said that the Revolution was one for all Muslims regardless of sect. (Ansari, 229) This further illustrates that religion was not the end all, be all of the war for Iranians (and Iraqis, too). It had definite political aims for the individual countries.
Islam was not the focal point of the revolution. Rather it was an aspect which had to be included because of its importance within Iran, but certainly not at all the most important part of it. The political reasoning for the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War had more significance in the overall picture. It is true that as each event progressed, the religious rhetoric from leaders and the zeal from citizens were augmented. By the end, they seemed have play a more pivotal role than they did on the onset. However the process played out, it is certain that Islam had a very important role in shaping where each country was headed in domestic as well as international policy.
The narrow frame of reference which the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is often held almost exclusively to the realm of religion in Iran. Likewise, some view the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s within a similarly limited historical setting. It is often seen that the war was in consequence to a clash of divisions in Islam. However, when reflecting on the underlying factors of the two events, it becomes clear that religion did not have the first hand role that these constricted interpretations allow. Rather, it was a subordinate priority that grew with importance as a result of other forces such as political maneuvers and trends in society.
The initial events that led to Khomeini’s advance were mostly matters not even of his own doing. After he was solidified in the Revolution, then there were more proactive movements on his part. Essentially Khomeini was positioned directly opposite the failing Shah, who in the end did little more than structure his own demise. However insightful or productive anything he wanted for the Revolution he tried to construct around himself could have been, he failed to understand essential elements of the Iranian society he was working in. In the Shah’s attempt to reinvent the Iranian society and history, he could not translate his ideals to the people. The gap between the Shah’s ideas and the reality of Iran widened, making the Shah ever more alienated from it. He ended up worsening his situation with every attempt to rectify it. This reinventing of the society did not correspond to what Iranian society was based on. The coming together of the Left groups and religious groups was pushed along by the actions of Reza Shah as he increasingly suppressed the left. In consequence, Khomeini’s offerings grew more appealing. Revolution in Iran was in need of a moral component, which was so generously provided by Khomeini. (Ansari, 200) What ever it was that the Shah could not provide to Iranian society, or whatever it was that the Shah was taking away, it became ever clearer that Khomeini was the person who could provide all of those things. The two men became polar opposites. Furthermore, Khomeini was able to come across to the people of Iran with legitimacy that the Shah did not enjoy.
Essentially, the Shah handed over his political power because of his sense of exclusivity, while Khomeini filled this vacuum with his overwhelming sense of inclusiveness. Even though the groups which came together under Khomeini did not usually have such an alliance, there were common denominators which facilitated their joining. In this, Khomeini was adept at allowing this union as he built his political base, then allowing him to move forward with his own agenda that was more religious than and not as pluralistic as it originally was. The Shah’s ill-advised and almost mindless political maneuvers in his own agenda were just the same as political suicide with each and every action. The embarrassing list of political mistakes that the Shah made while he attempted reform only facilitated the changes that awarded Khomeini his victories. As he alienated large parts of the society, they fused together to form his opposition. This came in the form of a coalition of the left wing groups and the religious and traditional groups. For their differences, there was plenty which would bring them together under one cause for the meantime. What groups came together were able to not only because of the inclusive nature of Khomeini’s initial agenda but also because of varying interpretations they employed. (Ansari, 220)
As Khomeini was doing this, he was aware of how it was necessary. There were a swelling number of people who were dissatisfied with what secular nationalism had to offer. The Revolution was in need of a more moral base in order to progress. Already present trends in society were to hand over that facet. (Ansari, 200) Khomeini was one to understand what politics in Iran was all about. He was able to see the social trends fold and unfold.
Even though the inclusive nature of the Revolution brought together union for those who sat in opposition to the Shah from varying perspectives, generally there was more of a soundly joined grouping that was inherently traditional. The left did certainly enjoy a fairly sturdy base of support, but it was not what the traditionalists had. (Ansari, 220, 221) The ultimate consequence of the traditionalist in society winning over the Left was largely because of aspects of society already present. It would only be appropriate that someone such as Khomeini would be more apt to be the leader of the Revolution, as opposed to moderate President Bani-Sadr. And this is to say nothing even of Khomeini’s ability to truly conceive of politics in Iran; something that much of his opposition lacked.
Khomeini fused different elements of Iranian society together to make the Revolution. There was the move away from the West, the Leftist element that was needed for the coalition against the monarchy, the modern element which was needed with the new education in society, and there was the nationalist element. This also had several interpretations but because of the special role of Islam that could not be divorced from Iranian society, the blend of Islamic nationalism became the winning nationalistic ideology in the Revolution. (Ansari, 222) Then for sure, the placement of religion in the Revolution was secure. However, up until then the role of religion had not confirmed, even if it was resolved long before that there was a place for it somewhere. (Ansari, 224)
It was not until then that the shape of Iran’s political establishment was figured out. For whatever definition the Revolution had gotten prior to that, it was only a base on which the new special emphasis on religion sat. This is reflective in the rewriting of the constitution. It had already been mapped out. In its revision, religion was institutionalized more, while the republican aspects inspired by the Fifth Republic in France and the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 in Iran. (Ansari, 222, 225) Illustrated in these contrasting constitutions drawn out is the before and after. It signifies that the Revolution did not begin as a religious movement, but rather as a shift in society helped pushed by politics which was in massive change itself. As said, there was a religious tone to it before the second draft of constitution, but it was present because of already prevalent elements inherent within Iranian society. What is most intriguing about the new constitution, with its measure of religion embedded, is that Pan-Islam became the official ideology of Iran (as opposed to Iranian nationalism). (Oschenwald, 517) This surely illustrates the added magnitude of religion. Undoubtedly, as the revolution progressed the emphasis on religion grew. Once he was able to collect the different factions of Iranian society and then establish himself within in the political order with overwhelming power, Khomeini was able to then effectively remove his opposition.
In Khomeini’s understanding of politics in Iran, he was aware of what kinds of progress had to be made and when, and what conditions would facilitate achieving goals. Once he was able to set up a transitional revolutionary government, he requested that the people remain in a state of peace. The call was not placed for religious reasoning. This was because then the movement would not degenerate beneath him as he secured his placement. However, this would not last since he was cognizant of the fact that the movement of the Revolution was going to be hampered if they did not have an oppositional player to focus against, thus making their own objectives defined. (Ansari, 212) This became the so-called ‘third party.’ It was of perfect timing that the U.S. Embassy was said to be taking in the Shah for medical attention and that students decided to invade the Embassy. The occupation accomplished what Khomeini had in the first place; precise definition joined with direction. That direction was to be the moving away from the West. (Ansari, 227, 228)
The subsequent fall of the Left was all too reminiscent of the political and social melt down the Shah experienced. Just the same, in light of these downfalls, the traditionalists looked more meritorious. Correlation between the two is warranted due to the fact that the downfall was their own doing. President Bani-Sadr had not set positive feeling within the Iranian people by the way that he carried on the war with Iraq. (Ansari, 234) As he found himself and his left supporters blocked consistently, Islamists seemed to be a more viable option; extensive support and the fact that they were permitted to use the ‘reign of terror’ because of the war itself aside. This full alienation of the Left was due to the new direction to the Revolution, defined in term more on religious bases. Of course, Khomeini did have a substantial role in his downfall as the reign of terror was executed, resulting in Bani-Sadr and his followers fleeing the country. (Oschenwald, 517)
The Iran-Iraq War did not begin because of Iranian revolutionaries’ zeal to conquer lands abroad and enlarge the physical scope of the revolution. Instead, they desired to spread the word of their revolution. The initial intentions were to inform people outside of Iran of the revolution in nonviolent ways. (Ansari, 229) Despite the allegations that the war was one for religion, both sides had their own political aims which underlined the whole eight years.
In Iraq the start of the war was more for political reason than it was for religious aims. Saddam Hussein had objectives that were, in part, to rectify a bone of contention of his that had been brewing for almost five years. The Algiers Agreement was signed in 1975, leaving Saddam to feel crushed because of the provisioned border agreement not particularly in his favor. Through the Iran-Iraq War he was looking to regain those borders, and his pride. In addition to this, Saddam’s prestige was had the opportunity of being heightened, if he were to win the war. Within the Arab world, he could then be a leader. (Oschenwald, 658) The objective closest to religion for Saddam was that he wanted to pivot the Revolution’s attention from Iraq. But this had nothing to do with preserving his Sunni majority against the Shii majority in Iran, but from the political upheaval it had the potential of causing. Consequently, Saddam destroyed the Agreement and proceeded with his invasion. (Ansari, 230, 231)
To say that Iranians were defending Islam would not be entirely accurate. They were defending their uniquely Iranian culture and society. (Ansari, 231) Naturally this had something to do with Islam, but in no way was it the entire picture. Nationalism in Iran was not an absent sentiment, and this is the reason why the vehement opposition to Iraq exposed itself the way that it did. However, the war has particular strategic importance to Khomeini, who saw great convenience to use it for his goals. This fulfilled several aims for him. The war proved to be a perfect way for his movement to diminish the power of the Left groups. In doing this it would automatically augment his power and the progress of Islamisation would lean more in his favor. (Ansari, 232) To accomplish it, the Iran-Iraq War was dubbed a ‘holy war’ for his intensive purposes. Such a label resonated more with the broader support he already enjoyed, thus allowing for action all the more passionate. In addition, he was able to amass greater power by centralizing the government further. Identifying the country as ‘sacred’ boosted the link between the religious aspect and Iranian nationalism. The prospect of this was to ultimately aid in instilling purpose, direction, focus, and the mobilization of people to fight. In effect, religion was not only an element to the ideology, but it was also a tool for the aims Khomeini had in mind. This decreases the weight of religion in the larger picture. This is in no way to make light of, or down play the role of religion, it is certainly to place it within a context of purpose for who had a heavy hand in shaping the direction of the war. As far as the masses, religion had a more important role.
Still, when it came down to the war, the prevalence of national identity outside of religion maintained itself. As the Iran-Iraq War progressed and Iran finally made way into Iraq’s borders in 1984, the Shiites in Iraq continued to fight on the side of Iraq, and not with the Shiites from Iran, where they were a majority. It was a matter of Arab Iraqis against the Persian Iranians. (Oschenwald, 658) Nationalist sentiments won the war over religious affiliations. This is quite interesting considering that Khomeini said that the Revolution was one for all Muslims regardless of sect. (Ansari, 229) This further illustrates that religion was not the end all, be all of the war for Iranians (and Iraqis, too). It had definite political aims for the individual countries.
Islam was not the focal point of the revolution. Rather it was an aspect which had to be included because of its importance within Iran, but certainly not at all the most important part of it. The political reasoning for the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War had more significance in the overall picture. It is true that as each event progressed, the religious rhetoric from leaders and the zeal from citizens were augmented. By the end, they seemed have play a more pivotal role than they did on the onset. However the process played out, it is certain that Islam had a very important role in shaping where each country was headed in domestic as well as international policy.