I'm tired
To give you an idea of how tired I am: Becky sang a note, and it took me
int 2((integral (e^(x/pi) dx)[arctan 1 < x < arctan 3^-2])^-1)
times to sing the corresponding note to form a tritone. Now, I leave it up to you to decide if I am more tired under these circumstances or under those discussed in my last entry (when Barbara Streisand was not believed to be Jewish).
EDITOR'S NOTE: I now preempt the inevitable criticism I will receive from the mathematical community for the outermost set of parentheses, which is not necessary. However, on the grounds of clarity, I defend my decision to employ it, especially in consideration of my audience.
I have spent the final days of vacation researching a topic whose appeal continues to grow on me. Our next debate topic is resolved, that peacable religious conduct ought to be allowed to violate local law. Most of my research was on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. I uncovered much of the history of the clause's interpretation, the most intriguing of my findings being the recent disagreement between the legislative and judicial branches on its meaning. In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in its decision in Employment Division v. Smith that religious conduct could not violate a law of "general applicability." Many religious citizens feared that as a result of this decision they would lose their seemingly constitutional right to cite religion as an excuse for flouting certain local laws. In response to the lobbying of many faith-based groups, Congress passed in 1993 the ironically titled Religious Freedom RESTORATION Act (RFRA). RFRA stipulates that religious conduct can be limited by a law of general applicability only when in persuance of a compelling state objective. Furthermore, the limit of religious conduct must be the least restrictive means of achieving this objective. The question of the constitutionality of RFRA raises many significan issues of constitutional law. In 1997, in Boernes v. Flores , the Supreme Court rendered RFRA unconstitutional for many reasons, one of which was that Congress does not have the power to enforce such legislation on the state level (despite that federal counselors had claimed this right under section 5 of the 14th Amendment). But more relevant to my research, the Flores decision was based upon the religion clauses in the 1st Amendment. Justice Breyer asserted that RFRA favored religion over irreligion, thus furthering the institution of religion and violating the Establishment Clause. In response to this decision, numerous states, including Connecticut, passed into law mini-RFRAs, whose constitutionality is yet to be litigated. Furthermore, in 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which essentially is RFRA applied in two special cases - zoning and prison. It may seem intuitive that RLUIPA is unconstitutional, since RFRA is unconstitutional. However, RLUIPA bases its authority on the expansive Commerce Clause of the constitution. Interestingly, the constitutionality of RLUIPA is contested among the various federal circuit appelate courts. Almost certainly then will one case contesting the constitutionality of RLUIPA reach the highest court of the land. The issue at hand in this debate is closely related to the impact of these laws and court decisions.
I realize that the above paragraph likely bored readers to the point that they are inclined to remove me from their friend lists. However, before you take such brash action, allow me to defend my actions. First of all, it is 4:30 in the morning. Second of all, it is 4:31 in the morning. Third of all, doesn't anyone else find constitutional law interesting?
In truth, I posted this brief tidbit of my research because I find it interesting and hope that others will as well. If you do not, I'm sorry to have bored you. Actually, I'm not sorry. Exposure to new ideas is not something to be apologized for.
That's all for now, folks. Comment away!
int 2((integral (e^(x/pi) dx)[arctan 1 < x < arctan 3^-2])^-1)
times to sing the corresponding note to form a tritone. Now, I leave it up to you to decide if I am more tired under these circumstances or under those discussed in my last entry (when Barbara Streisand was not believed to be Jewish).
EDITOR'S NOTE: I now preempt the inevitable criticism I will receive from the mathematical community for the outermost set of parentheses, which is not necessary. However, on the grounds of clarity, I defend my decision to employ it, especially in consideration of my audience.
I have spent the final days of vacation researching a topic whose appeal continues to grow on me. Our next debate topic is resolved, that peacable religious conduct ought to be allowed to violate local law. Most of my research was on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. I uncovered much of the history of the clause's interpretation, the most intriguing of my findings being the recent disagreement between the legislative and judicial branches on its meaning. In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in its decision in Employment Division v. Smith that religious conduct could not violate a law of "general applicability." Many religious citizens feared that as a result of this decision they would lose their seemingly constitutional right to cite religion as an excuse for flouting certain local laws. In response to the lobbying of many faith-based groups, Congress passed in 1993 the ironically titled Religious Freedom RESTORATION Act (RFRA). RFRA stipulates that religious conduct can be limited by a law of general applicability only when in persuance of a compelling state objective. Furthermore, the limit of religious conduct must be the least restrictive means of achieving this objective. The question of the constitutionality of RFRA raises many significan issues of constitutional law. In 1997, in Boernes v. Flores , the Supreme Court rendered RFRA unconstitutional for many reasons, one of which was that Congress does not have the power to enforce such legislation on the state level (despite that federal counselors had claimed this right under section 5 of the 14th Amendment). But more relevant to my research, the Flores decision was based upon the religion clauses in the 1st Amendment. Justice Breyer asserted that RFRA favored religion over irreligion, thus furthering the institution of religion and violating the Establishment Clause. In response to this decision, numerous states, including Connecticut, passed into law mini-RFRAs, whose constitutionality is yet to be litigated. Furthermore, in 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which essentially is RFRA applied in two special cases - zoning and prison. It may seem intuitive that RLUIPA is unconstitutional, since RFRA is unconstitutional. However, RLUIPA bases its authority on the expansive Commerce Clause of the constitution. Interestingly, the constitutionality of RLUIPA is contested among the various federal circuit appelate courts. Almost certainly then will one case contesting the constitutionality of RLUIPA reach the highest court of the land. The issue at hand in this debate is closely related to the impact of these laws and court decisions.
I realize that the above paragraph likely bored readers to the point that they are inclined to remove me from their friend lists. However, before you take such brash action, allow me to defend my actions. First of all, it is 4:30 in the morning. Second of all, it is 4:31 in the morning. Third of all, doesn't anyone else find constitutional law interesting?
In truth, I posted this brief tidbit of my research because I find it interesting and hope that others will as well. If you do not, I'm sorry to have bored you. Actually, I'm not sorry. Exposure to new ideas is not something to be apologized for.
That's all for now, folks. Comment away!