How Wars Are Won - Insurgencies
One will note from yesterday that the Plains Indian wars went on for 30 years. This war was arguably a continuation of a war that started when Europeans first came to this continent. Although WWII was fairly short, history is rife with examples of long term nation-state conflict. For example, France and England were in conflict from around 1300 to 1815, with many wars and cold wars.
In some ways, our recently-ended Cold War is both a good and a bad model for this Long War. However, we have multiple enemies here, so we will have to use different strategies. Part of this is understanding who we’re fighting. We really have four adversaries, three of whom can be considered insurgents. Today's focus is on the insurgents, and Iran will be Monday's discussion topic.
As I see it, we have a nation-state adversary (Iran) and three separate insurgencies (native Iraqi, native Afghan and Al Queda). Before I go there, let’s consider potential threats that haven’t fully engaged yet. Saudi Arabia, Al Queda’s true home, is as constitutionally stable as Bourbon France circa 1788. (The country has only been ruled by sons of Ibin Al-Saud, the last of who are in their 80s. Who will succeed them?) Pakistan has never really been stable since Partition, and the Tribal Regions (AKA “Taliban Central”) were never governed even under the British.
Based on the above and the inherent decentralized nature of insurgencies, there’s every reason to think that this current war could be as long as the Cold War was. The insurgency in Afghanistan is at least partially tribal in nature. It’s doubtful that killing Osama Bin Laden (although A Good Thing) will end Al Queda’s fight. After all, their religious extremism (Wahhabism) got started in the 1700s.
So, whatever we do to fight this long war needs to be sustainable, much like the Cold War efforts. “Emergency appropriations bills” and running troops ragged on multiple deployments is not going to cut it.
During the Cold War, if we contained the Soviets they’d eventually collapse. Since Al Queda thrives in collapsed states, that’s not a good idea. So how do we win against the Al Queda / Taliban? One word - Geronimo.
Geronimo was finally hunted down by what we’d now call a Joint Task Force of US soldiers and Apache Scouts. In other words, his own people. The Indian wars were won by persuading the majority of Indians to be at peace with the white man, and getting some of them to hunt down their extremist fringes.
So, applying the same logic to the multiple insurgencies, what do we do? First, we need to split Al Queda from the other insurgencies. My reading of the Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine suggests we’re doing that in Iraq. In general, there are three things we need to do.
1. Be perceived as “the good guys.” Our lack of honesty caused and extended the Indian wars, and again, from what I’m hearing in Iraq, being better then Al Queda is winning us recruits.
2. Economic development. The foot soldiers of the native insurgents are recruited from the poor and cast-off, so remove their recruiting pool.
3. Political development. Again, the native fighting us are (or perceive themselves to be) politically disenfranchised. Al Queda started out because Bin Laden was cranked at the corrupt Saudi leadership.
It’s also worth noting that insurgents are sensitive to casualties. It’s no accident that the roadside bomb is the weapon of choice in Iraq - it’s the mode of attack least likely to get the insurgent dead. Custer attacked the Indian village at Little Big Horn not to destroy it, but to fix his adversary in place. Indians when faced with regulars usually bugged out. But if you attacked a village, the Indians had to stand long enough to cover the evacuation. The fact that the Indians stood and fought during Custer's campaign was a surprise to not just Custer.
Treating Al-Queda like an insurgency suggests that we'll be at it for a while. Killing one insurgent leader, although necessary, makes room for another one to step up. That's the bad news. But by removing popular support for the insurgency, it will fade away.
In some ways, our recently-ended Cold War is both a good and a bad model for this Long War. However, we have multiple enemies here, so we will have to use different strategies. Part of this is understanding who we’re fighting. We really have four adversaries, three of whom can be considered insurgents. Today's focus is on the insurgents, and Iran will be Monday's discussion topic.
As I see it, we have a nation-state adversary (Iran) and three separate insurgencies (native Iraqi, native Afghan and Al Queda). Before I go there, let’s consider potential threats that haven’t fully engaged yet. Saudi Arabia, Al Queda’s true home, is as constitutionally stable as Bourbon France circa 1788. (The country has only been ruled by sons of Ibin Al-Saud, the last of who are in their 80s. Who will succeed them?) Pakistan has never really been stable since Partition, and the Tribal Regions (AKA “Taliban Central”) were never governed even under the British.
Based on the above and the inherent decentralized nature of insurgencies, there’s every reason to think that this current war could be as long as the Cold War was. The insurgency in Afghanistan is at least partially tribal in nature. It’s doubtful that killing Osama Bin Laden (although A Good Thing) will end Al Queda’s fight. After all, their religious extremism (Wahhabism) got started in the 1700s.
So, whatever we do to fight this long war needs to be sustainable, much like the Cold War efforts. “Emergency appropriations bills” and running troops ragged on multiple deployments is not going to cut it.
During the Cold War, if we contained the Soviets they’d eventually collapse. Since Al Queda thrives in collapsed states, that’s not a good idea. So how do we win against the Al Queda / Taliban? One word - Geronimo.
Geronimo was finally hunted down by what we’d now call a Joint Task Force of US soldiers and Apache Scouts. In other words, his own people. The Indian wars were won by persuading the majority of Indians to be at peace with the white man, and getting some of them to hunt down their extremist fringes.
So, applying the same logic to the multiple insurgencies, what do we do? First, we need to split Al Queda from the other insurgencies. My reading of the Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine suggests we’re doing that in Iraq. In general, there are three things we need to do.
1. Be perceived as “the good guys.” Our lack of honesty caused and extended the Indian wars, and again, from what I’m hearing in Iraq, being better then Al Queda is winning us recruits.
2. Economic development. The foot soldiers of the native insurgents are recruited from the poor and cast-off, so remove their recruiting pool.
3. Political development. Again, the native fighting us are (or perceive themselves to be) politically disenfranchised. Al Queda started out because Bin Laden was cranked at the corrupt Saudi leadership.
It’s also worth noting that insurgents are sensitive to casualties. It’s no accident that the roadside bomb is the weapon of choice in Iraq - it’s the mode of attack least likely to get the insurgent dead. Custer attacked the Indian village at Little Big Horn not to destroy it, but to fix his adversary in place. Indians when faced with regulars usually bugged out. But if you attacked a village, the Indians had to stand long enough to cover the evacuation. The fact that the Indians stood and fought during Custer's campaign was a surprise to not just Custer.
Treating Al-Queda like an insurgency suggests that we'll be at it for a while. Killing one insurgent leader, although necessary, makes room for another one to step up. That's the bad news. But by removing popular support for the insurgency, it will fade away.