A Moral Hypothesis...
So, I have this... concept, this... principle, that came to me once upon a time, and (naturally, being mine) I rather like it:
"Harm no other living thing except in need."
Slightly tongue-in-cheek, I tend to refer to this as the "Prime Directive". As fond as I am of this principle, I am certainly sensitive to the question: can it be justified? Obviously, nobody should expect anybody else to accept a moral principle simply because it's catchy.
Can it be justified, or at least supported? Well, morality has an awkward tendency to be subjective and fluid (see note below), but I believe a plausibility argument in its support can be sketched out - based primarily on three steps.
HARM TO LIVING THINGS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL ISSUE:
Our moral system is a kind of instruction set that guides our actions, and in particular the part of our rules or principles that extend beyond self-interest, practicality and survival. But when we consider the scope of the rules that we consider morality, do we not find that they are all in fact related to the potential for harming some other living thing? Perhaps our moral system focuses on humans, or extends to includes animals but not plants; no matter. If our universe included no living things, we would not need a moral system: if we go to smash a rock into bits, there is no basis for assigning a moral value to the act; we might as well be improving its situation as harming it. It is only when the impact on living organisms becomes a factor that the consequences of our actions assume a moral dimension. So it is perhaps reasonable that a fundamental principle of morality address the broad question of harming living things.
REFRAINING FROM HARM AS THE DEFAULT:
What is to be our "default" position on the harming of living things? Either harming living things is allowable except where specifically forbidden, or it is disallowed except where specified.
I probably cannot defend the choice absolutely, but I feel there is reasonable basis for assuming the latter. Consider the fact that our perspective on moral situations can change, either as a result of new information, or because we have refined our thinking; in addition, there are others who may judge us by their own moral systems, and their opinions and perspectives may even lead us to change our own thinking.
Which is preferable, if we are uncertain or unclear: to do harm, and later revise our thinking and wish we hadn't, or to refrain from doing harm, and later realize that it would have been acceptable? From a moral perspective, I think it is reasonable to choose refraining from harm as our default.
NEED AS THE PRIMARY BASIS FOR JUSTIFICATION:
When can we justify harming another living thing? Let us suppose that we have been called to account for an action, and consider the kinds of reason, justification, or rationalization that might be presented; some of those lines of argument will incorporate need, and others will not.
Again, I am in territory that I feel sounds relatively sound but that I don't see a way to prove rigorously, but I propose to you this: need is a legitimate basis for a "prima facie defense"; we are entitled to have needs, and we are entitled to try to fulfill them and to try to survive. If we suggest that our action was based on need, the judge and jury, whoever they are, may feel that our need was not adequate to justify our act, or that our logic was flawed, but need is typically a sound starting point for a justification.
On the other hand, how can we justify any harm to any other living thing without need? Regardless of who gave us permission or why we thought it was acceptable, does it not automatically become barely tenable to justify a harmful act that isn't based on need? "I strangled the kitten because I just felt like it, and after all, it's not against the law..." (Without delving too deeply here, need I point out that, simply because something has not be made illegal, it is still easily possible for it to be immoral?) Basically, without need, we are hard pressed to create a justification or a defense.
So I think that on the whole, the "Prime Directive" actually does a reasonable job of encapsulating the fundamental scope of morality (discussing harm to living things), the basic default approach (avoid harm), and the primary basis for exceptions from the default (need). And I therefore find myself coming back again to:
"Harm no other living thing except in need."
Note: Why say morality is subjective and fluid? This seems highly undesirable, opening the door to moral relativism; don't we want people ultimately to be more moral rather than less?
One of the huge problems with morality has always been what to use as a bedrock to set it on. To my eye, no attempt yet to anchor a moral system to either a religious doctrine, "natural law", or overpowering logic, has been truly successful: there are always people who have different religions, construe natural law differently, or disagree with the logic.
Ultimately, moral argument seems to wind up being about persuasion - unlike physics or mathematics, there are no rigid proofs or conclusive experiments.
In fact, a multitude of possible moral systems can be conceived - not all equally good, of course, but potentially a large number that are pretty viable - but they will have different properties. How does one choose between the several possibilities?
The problem with moral systems is that, without having chosen one, we do not have it to use as the basis for selecting a morality; we cannot choose one moral system over another because one is "good" and another is "bad".
We must make the decision based on some other criteria, and that's where there would seem to be unlimited grounds for argument and subjective choice; ultimately, I can argue that a moral system has preferable qualities, but you may simply disagree. Thus I say that morality is subjective. And without a fixed basis or foundation (such as "Natural Law" was hoped to provide), it can also continue to permute and evolve as our thinking evolves, and is unlikely to ever truly be "finished" - hence I say that it is fluid.
"Harm no other living thing except in need."
Slightly tongue-in-cheek, I tend to refer to this as the "Prime Directive". As fond as I am of this principle, I am certainly sensitive to the question: can it be justified? Obviously, nobody should expect anybody else to accept a moral principle simply because it's catchy.
Can it be justified, or at least supported? Well, morality has an awkward tendency to be subjective and fluid (see note below), but I believe a plausibility argument in its support can be sketched out - based primarily on three steps.
HARM TO LIVING THINGS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL ISSUE:
Our moral system is a kind of instruction set that guides our actions, and in particular the part of our rules or principles that extend beyond self-interest, practicality and survival. But when we consider the scope of the rules that we consider morality, do we not find that they are all in fact related to the potential for harming some other living thing? Perhaps our moral system focuses on humans, or extends to includes animals but not plants; no matter. If our universe included no living things, we would not need a moral system: if we go to smash a rock into bits, there is no basis for assigning a moral value to the act; we might as well be improving its situation as harming it. It is only when the impact on living organisms becomes a factor that the consequences of our actions assume a moral dimension. So it is perhaps reasonable that a fundamental principle of morality address the broad question of harming living things.
REFRAINING FROM HARM AS THE DEFAULT:
What is to be our "default" position on the harming of living things? Either harming living things is allowable except where specifically forbidden, or it is disallowed except where specified.
I probably cannot defend the choice absolutely, but I feel there is reasonable basis for assuming the latter. Consider the fact that our perspective on moral situations can change, either as a result of new information, or because we have refined our thinking; in addition, there are others who may judge us by their own moral systems, and their opinions and perspectives may even lead us to change our own thinking.
Which is preferable, if we are uncertain or unclear: to do harm, and later revise our thinking and wish we hadn't, or to refrain from doing harm, and later realize that it would have been acceptable? From a moral perspective, I think it is reasonable to choose refraining from harm as our default.
NEED AS THE PRIMARY BASIS FOR JUSTIFICATION:
When can we justify harming another living thing? Let us suppose that we have been called to account for an action, and consider the kinds of reason, justification, or rationalization that might be presented; some of those lines of argument will incorporate need, and others will not.
Again, I am in territory that I feel sounds relatively sound but that I don't see a way to prove rigorously, but I propose to you this: need is a legitimate basis for a "prima facie defense"; we are entitled to have needs, and we are entitled to try to fulfill them and to try to survive. If we suggest that our action was based on need, the judge and jury, whoever they are, may feel that our need was not adequate to justify our act, or that our logic was flawed, but need is typically a sound starting point for a justification.
On the other hand, how can we justify any harm to any other living thing without need? Regardless of who gave us permission or why we thought it was acceptable, does it not automatically become barely tenable to justify a harmful act that isn't based on need? "I strangled the kitten because I just felt like it, and after all, it's not against the law..." (Without delving too deeply here, need I point out that, simply because something has not be made illegal, it is still easily possible for it to be immoral?) Basically, without need, we are hard pressed to create a justification or a defense.
So I think that on the whole, the "Prime Directive" actually does a reasonable job of encapsulating the fundamental scope of morality (discussing harm to living things), the basic default approach (avoid harm), and the primary basis for exceptions from the default (need). And I therefore find myself coming back again to:
"Harm no other living thing except in need."
Note: Why say morality is subjective and fluid? This seems highly undesirable, opening the door to moral relativism; don't we want people ultimately to be more moral rather than less?
One of the huge problems with morality has always been what to use as a bedrock to set it on. To my eye, no attempt yet to anchor a moral system to either a religious doctrine, "natural law", or overpowering logic, has been truly successful: there are always people who have different religions, construe natural law differently, or disagree with the logic.
Ultimately, moral argument seems to wind up being about persuasion - unlike physics or mathematics, there are no rigid proofs or conclusive experiments.
In fact, a multitude of possible moral systems can be conceived - not all equally good, of course, but potentially a large number that are pretty viable - but they will have different properties. How does one choose between the several possibilities?
The problem with moral systems is that, without having chosen one, we do not have it to use as the basis for selecting a morality; we cannot choose one moral system over another because one is "good" and another is "bad".
We must make the decision based on some other criteria, and that's where there would seem to be unlimited grounds for argument and subjective choice; ultimately, I can argue that a moral system has preferable qualities, but you may simply disagree. Thus I say that morality is subjective. And without a fixed basis or foundation (such as "Natural Law" was hoped to provide), it can also continue to permute and evolve as our thinking evolves, and is unlikely to ever truly be "finished" - hence I say that it is fluid.