(no subject)
Second paper for college... and it's a do-sey
Evan Lauteria
UF ID 1081-0145
SYG2000, Section 5284
Global Terrorism: Application of Social Theory
We can begin our discussion of application of sociology, the scientific method, and social theories to the study of international terrorism by highlighting key points in the article written by Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo in 2004: International Terrorism and the World-System. To begin, this article delves into the idea that, until recently, sociology hasn’t really been applied to terrorism for two reasons: difficulty to acquire data and a lack of urgency or necessity to study the subject. The lack of data arises from the notion that terrorism is a “scattered and random event performed by clandestine groups of often very small numbers.” Gathering data on such a temporal and impermanent set of events is difficult, and thus it is difficult to study. The lack of consistency behind terrorism has given rise to the idea that it does little to social change and lacks any application of importance to sociology. The events of September 11, 2001, however, may have greatly changed the lack of interest in terrorism as a sociological study. International Terrorism and the World-System, in response, tries to lay out a basic system for studying terrorism on a global level, and begins to apply these theories in an historical study in attempts to prove the validity of these ideas.
To begin, we look at the stated means of viewing terrorism. For the sake of validity and reliability in future studies, the article begins with a clean-cut definition. Terrorism, for the purposes of the article and this essay, is defined as “‘the premeditated use of violence by a nonstate group to obtain a political, religious, or social objective through fear or intimidation directed at a large audience’” (page 39). Although this article deals largely with international terrorism, and, subsequently, one may feel it best to analyze this largely on the globological level (Durkheim’s understanding that social events have sociological explanations; global should have globological), Bergesen and Lizardo state that this is not the only level on which one can analyze the topic. Verily, analysis of terrorism solely on the global level would provide a very close-minded and likely false notion of the topic. Instead, one should analyze terrorism on 4 other separate levels: the individual, social, national, and historical.
The individual level is a basic examination of psychological factors, an analysis of a single terrorist and the workings of his/her mind. Because this is largely psychological and not as sociological, little is discussed in the article. However, the article does make note of the importance of this level when viewing world leaders and terrorist organizers, and provides a reference to examine (“see the extensive review in Hudson 1999”, page 39).
The second level deals with groups of individuals, and we begin to see more of a sociologically applicable set of studies. This level deals with a range of topics, from issues, tactics, and training to networking and tactical organization. Terrorism and terrorist organizations can be viewed and analyzed in a similar fashion as social movements and their organizations, but currently most literature “tends to meld terrorist acts in with other forms of collective violence” (page 40). The negatives of this are…? Simply, it groups terrorism together with race riots, violent protests, and violent management/labor disputes. Analysis of structural hierarchies, social factors, tactics, and the functional aspects of terrorist groups opens a more enlightened view of the topic; it is apparent that terrorism is not the same as a violent protest. Too many factors are involved and more effort is required behind terrorist activity. Thus, we have to analyze social factors and group systematics as well as national factors.
National factors are not the same as cultural, though. We place cultural aspects of a terrorist group’s nation of origin under its social factors; on a national level, we look more at state policies and finances influencing the terrorist groups. Religion is now becoming of key importance in this level. This level also includes international factors, examining the policies and politics of the target nation that make it that very target.
Lastly, we have the historical level, which is of key importance in the article. By comparing modern terrorism to past terrorism (and what may have been previously been referred to as warfare and rebellion), we notice key changes in organization, terrorist demands, bases for terrorism, geographical areas of focus, and technique. Terrorist groups show a less distinct form of hierarchy and central command. Fewer groups identify themselves as the attackers, and, subsequently, do not make demands clear. Religion has become a key aspect of terrorism; we’ve seen a rising of Islamic, Christian, Messianic Zion, and Aum Shinrikyo (mixture of Buddhism and Hindu based in Japan) terrorist groups (it would appear that crusades and missionary movements are using far more global and violent techniques). On that note, terrorism is being dispersed more globally. Africa, South America, and North America are modern targets; prior, it seemed almost reserved for Europe and the Middle East. Lastly, we have seen a lack of discrimination behind attacks. That is, attacks no longer hit a building or single group; attacks hit the surrounding areas in the process without remorse, thought to possibly express a disregard for national boundaries and a resultant growing of global character, rather than national, behind terrorism.
While these other factors are important, we still need to refer to the Durkheimian notion that, because terrorism is global, we need to look at it on a globological level. Three theories are stated: World-System, World-Society/Policy, and Blowback. The World System theory states that these new religious undertones have to do with the overall changes in the world; religion counteracts the new “liberal”, almost sinful nature the world seems to be heading to. World Society/Policy theory places the causes behind terrorism within the structural, cultural, and political aspects of the terrorist’s country of origin. Globalization [should] cause “equal empowerment”, a dispersion of feelings across the world. If there is anger, it should be spread; if there is acting out (terrorism), it is resulting from the fact that the nation of origin lacks tools to keep this anger an inward problem (policy). The Blowback theory is of especial import, though, as it delves into the ideas of empire and hegemonic decline (refer to below). The breakdown of this theory is that terrorist groups are raising defiant and revolutionary fists to the “American Empire”.
So we have all of these analyses, but how can we really view terrorism? A comparison of the two recent “waves of terrorism” suggests 4 common conditions: globalization, empire/colonial competition, hegemonic decline, and terrorist origination in autocratic semiperipheral world-system zones. Globalization is the effect of the technological revolution in today’s society (travel in the past); empire and colonial competition is almost metaphorical compared to the past (America does not “own” colonies, but certainly has military and political “control” over much of the world). Hegemonic decline simply means a weakening of the authority and power of the leading nation in the world (currently/recently America). During this time, the leading nation may be forced to resort to military power to reassert their authority (Bush’s attacks and the war on the Middle East). As stated so clearly in the article, “hegemonic decline destabilizes the global order, and outbreaks of international terrorism seem to serve as an indicator of growing international instability” (page 49). The last factor is more of a statement and reiteration of data: “terrorism tends to break out in the world-system’s more semiperipheral zones” (page 50). Simply, outlying areas that feel the effects and strains of contending states tend to resort to terrorism to state their points as a result of their weak political, diplomatic, and military powers.
The breakdown of these theories and factors would, logically, make it easier to understand terrorism. America seems to have this notion that terrorism is more of angry nations merely trying to push their largely-non-existent weights around. The attacks of September 11th did bring America closer together as a nation (by consensus), but America did not learn much from its history. Firstly, we, just as we did following the attack on Pearl Harbor, imprisoned people thought to be a part of the attacks largely on the basis of race-ethnicity. Secondly, rather than resorting to diplomacy and peaceful means of terrorist suppression, the government sought to destroy the organization labeled as the attacker (again, like World War II: the atom bombings). The article states that groups tend to have less of a desire to claim responsibility. Is this truly the case? From the get-go, Americans were ready to strike back. Why state claim to the attacks and make demands if it is apparent they will never be met? America never took the time to think that perhaps other groups had something to say; terrorism is, in American thought, senseless destruction. On a symbolic level, it’s no surprise; by labeling it “terrorism”, we define it as senseless. A similar attack (bombing a city), if labeled an act of war, is viewed as such: an act of war. There must be reason behind it, whether we want to hear it or not. More often than not we don’t, but it is not disputed that there are reasons behind acts of war, tactical, social, and political; the same is not held true of terrorist attacks. To certain countries, there is an acknowledgement that a terrorist to one is a freedom fighter to another. It is almost mind-boggling that a nation born of fighting for freedom does not seem to hold this same view. This article, however, does provide that perspective; while it does not provide this notion for the “common American”, it does clearly lay out techniques for analysis of the topic in a largely unbiased and scholarly system of study.
Negatives of this set of analysis techniques must arise, though, and one I, personally, cannot seem to acknowledge as being entire correct is the statement that the four international conditions give rise to terrorism. Firstly, hegemonic decline and empire/colonial struggle do not go hand-in-hand. Colonial competition would require more than one world power struggling for territory or the colony in discussion desiring freedom or independence. The later situation would, first off, deny the idea of semiperipheral zones being the source of terrorism; a colony is a direct zone in control of the world power (although this is debatable in modern “colonization” and political control). The earlier situation shows that there would not be hegemonic decline but rather a struggle for power between rivaling nations. In the 16th century, although the article states Spain was in power, there was not the same notion of a single world-power like America as there was back then. Great Britain, France, and Spain seemed to be in constant rivalry during the colonial power, and, until the American Revolution, their power was on a balance, albeit not stable. In this world of three balancing world powers, there is a lack of hegemonic decline as there is no hegemony, yet terrorism exists.
So, what does this come down to? Simply, the article provides a good basis for analysis of terrorism on a sociological level, but because of a lack of data and previous disinterest in the topic, the theories and techniques for analysis probably need work. The section dealing with the international conditions leading to subtly seems to support this; it is titled “Toward a Globological Model of Terrorism”, not “The Globological Model of Terrorism”. Unfortunately, the article does not clearly state it needs development, leaving a sense of biased propaganda behind the article. The ideas, theories, and techniques are entirely valid by the article’s examples, but attacks like the Munich Olympic killings were left out since they do not support the ideas entirely. This technique of card stacking should be reserved for modern politics, not scholastic analysis.
Evan Lauteria
UF ID 1081-0145
SYG2000, Section 5284
Global Terrorism: Application of Social Theory
We can begin our discussion of application of sociology, the scientific method, and social theories to the study of international terrorism by highlighting key points in the article written by Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo in 2004: International Terrorism and the World-System. To begin, this article delves into the idea that, until recently, sociology hasn’t really been applied to terrorism for two reasons: difficulty to acquire data and a lack of urgency or necessity to study the subject. The lack of data arises from the notion that terrorism is a “scattered and random event performed by clandestine groups of often very small numbers.” Gathering data on such a temporal and impermanent set of events is difficult, and thus it is difficult to study. The lack of consistency behind terrorism has given rise to the idea that it does little to social change and lacks any application of importance to sociology. The events of September 11, 2001, however, may have greatly changed the lack of interest in terrorism as a sociological study. International Terrorism and the World-System, in response, tries to lay out a basic system for studying terrorism on a global level, and begins to apply these theories in an historical study in attempts to prove the validity of these ideas.
To begin, we look at the stated means of viewing terrorism. For the sake of validity and reliability in future studies, the article begins with a clean-cut definition. Terrorism, for the purposes of the article and this essay, is defined as “‘the premeditated use of violence by a nonstate group to obtain a political, religious, or social objective through fear or intimidation directed at a large audience’” (page 39). Although this article deals largely with international terrorism, and, subsequently, one may feel it best to analyze this largely on the globological level (Durkheim’s understanding that social events have sociological explanations; global should have globological), Bergesen and Lizardo state that this is not the only level on which one can analyze the topic. Verily, analysis of terrorism solely on the global level would provide a very close-minded and likely false notion of the topic. Instead, one should analyze terrorism on 4 other separate levels: the individual, social, national, and historical.
The individual level is a basic examination of psychological factors, an analysis of a single terrorist and the workings of his/her mind. Because this is largely psychological and not as sociological, little is discussed in the article. However, the article does make note of the importance of this level when viewing world leaders and terrorist organizers, and provides a reference to examine (“see the extensive review in Hudson 1999”, page 39).
The second level deals with groups of individuals, and we begin to see more of a sociologically applicable set of studies. This level deals with a range of topics, from issues, tactics, and training to networking and tactical organization. Terrorism and terrorist organizations can be viewed and analyzed in a similar fashion as social movements and their organizations, but currently most literature “tends to meld terrorist acts in with other forms of collective violence” (page 40). The negatives of this are…? Simply, it groups terrorism together with race riots, violent protests, and violent management/labor disputes. Analysis of structural hierarchies, social factors, tactics, and the functional aspects of terrorist groups opens a more enlightened view of the topic; it is apparent that terrorism is not the same as a violent protest. Too many factors are involved and more effort is required behind terrorist activity. Thus, we have to analyze social factors and group systematics as well as national factors.
National factors are not the same as cultural, though. We place cultural aspects of a terrorist group’s nation of origin under its social factors; on a national level, we look more at state policies and finances influencing the terrorist groups. Religion is now becoming of key importance in this level. This level also includes international factors, examining the policies and politics of the target nation that make it that very target.
Lastly, we have the historical level, which is of key importance in the article. By comparing modern terrorism to past terrorism (and what may have been previously been referred to as warfare and rebellion), we notice key changes in organization, terrorist demands, bases for terrorism, geographical areas of focus, and technique. Terrorist groups show a less distinct form of hierarchy and central command. Fewer groups identify themselves as the attackers, and, subsequently, do not make demands clear. Religion has become a key aspect of terrorism; we’ve seen a rising of Islamic, Christian, Messianic Zion, and Aum Shinrikyo (mixture of Buddhism and Hindu based in Japan) terrorist groups (it would appear that crusades and missionary movements are using far more global and violent techniques). On that note, terrorism is being dispersed more globally. Africa, South America, and North America are modern targets; prior, it seemed almost reserved for Europe and the Middle East. Lastly, we have seen a lack of discrimination behind attacks. That is, attacks no longer hit a building or single group; attacks hit the surrounding areas in the process without remorse, thought to possibly express a disregard for national boundaries and a resultant growing of global character, rather than national, behind terrorism.
While these other factors are important, we still need to refer to the Durkheimian notion that, because terrorism is global, we need to look at it on a globological level. Three theories are stated: World-System, World-Society/Policy, and Blowback. The World System theory states that these new religious undertones have to do with the overall changes in the world; religion counteracts the new “liberal”, almost sinful nature the world seems to be heading to. World Society/Policy theory places the causes behind terrorism within the structural, cultural, and political aspects of the terrorist’s country of origin. Globalization [should] cause “equal empowerment”, a dispersion of feelings across the world. If there is anger, it should be spread; if there is acting out (terrorism), it is resulting from the fact that the nation of origin lacks tools to keep this anger an inward problem (policy). The Blowback theory is of especial import, though, as it delves into the ideas of empire and hegemonic decline (refer to below). The breakdown of this theory is that terrorist groups are raising defiant and revolutionary fists to the “American Empire”.
So we have all of these analyses, but how can we really view terrorism? A comparison of the two recent “waves of terrorism” suggests 4 common conditions: globalization, empire/colonial competition, hegemonic decline, and terrorist origination in autocratic semiperipheral world-system zones. Globalization is the effect of the technological revolution in today’s society (travel in the past); empire and colonial competition is almost metaphorical compared to the past (America does not “own” colonies, but certainly has military and political “control” over much of the world). Hegemonic decline simply means a weakening of the authority and power of the leading nation in the world (currently/recently America). During this time, the leading nation may be forced to resort to military power to reassert their authority (Bush’s attacks and the war on the Middle East). As stated so clearly in the article, “hegemonic decline destabilizes the global order, and outbreaks of international terrorism seem to serve as an indicator of growing international instability” (page 49). The last factor is more of a statement and reiteration of data: “terrorism tends to break out in the world-system’s more semiperipheral zones” (page 50). Simply, outlying areas that feel the effects and strains of contending states tend to resort to terrorism to state their points as a result of their weak political, diplomatic, and military powers.
The breakdown of these theories and factors would, logically, make it easier to understand terrorism. America seems to have this notion that terrorism is more of angry nations merely trying to push their largely-non-existent weights around. The attacks of September 11th did bring America closer together as a nation (by consensus), but America did not learn much from its history. Firstly, we, just as we did following the attack on Pearl Harbor, imprisoned people thought to be a part of the attacks largely on the basis of race-ethnicity. Secondly, rather than resorting to diplomacy and peaceful means of terrorist suppression, the government sought to destroy the organization labeled as the attacker (again, like World War II: the atom bombings). The article states that groups tend to have less of a desire to claim responsibility. Is this truly the case? From the get-go, Americans were ready to strike back. Why state claim to the attacks and make demands if it is apparent they will never be met? America never took the time to think that perhaps other groups had something to say; terrorism is, in American thought, senseless destruction. On a symbolic level, it’s no surprise; by labeling it “terrorism”, we define it as senseless. A similar attack (bombing a city), if labeled an act of war, is viewed as such: an act of war. There must be reason behind it, whether we want to hear it or not. More often than not we don’t, but it is not disputed that there are reasons behind acts of war, tactical, social, and political; the same is not held true of terrorist attacks. To certain countries, there is an acknowledgement that a terrorist to one is a freedom fighter to another. It is almost mind-boggling that a nation born of fighting for freedom does not seem to hold this same view. This article, however, does provide that perspective; while it does not provide this notion for the “common American”, it does clearly lay out techniques for analysis of the topic in a largely unbiased and scholarly system of study.
Negatives of this set of analysis techniques must arise, though, and one I, personally, cannot seem to acknowledge as being entire correct is the statement that the four international conditions give rise to terrorism. Firstly, hegemonic decline and empire/colonial struggle do not go hand-in-hand. Colonial competition would require more than one world power struggling for territory or the colony in discussion desiring freedom or independence. The later situation would, first off, deny the idea of semiperipheral zones being the source of terrorism; a colony is a direct zone in control of the world power (although this is debatable in modern “colonization” and political control). The earlier situation shows that there would not be hegemonic decline but rather a struggle for power between rivaling nations. In the 16th century, although the article states Spain was in power, there was not the same notion of a single world-power like America as there was back then. Great Britain, France, and Spain seemed to be in constant rivalry during the colonial power, and, until the American Revolution, their power was on a balance, albeit not stable. In this world of three balancing world powers, there is a lack of hegemonic decline as there is no hegemony, yet terrorism exists.
So, what does this come down to? Simply, the article provides a good basis for analysis of terrorism on a sociological level, but because of a lack of data and previous disinterest in the topic, the theories and techniques for analysis probably need work. The section dealing with the international conditions leading to subtly seems to support this; it is titled “Toward a Globological Model of Terrorism”, not “The Globological Model of Terrorism”. Unfortunately, the article does not clearly state it needs development, leaving a sense of biased propaganda behind the article. The ideas, theories, and techniques are entirely valid by the article’s examples, but attacks like the Munich Olympic killings were left out since they do not support the ideas entirely. This technique of card stacking should be reserved for modern politics, not scholastic analysis.