100 Years Ago - THE GERMAN PEACE CAMPAIGN OF DECEMBER, 1916
M. BRIAND PRESENTING TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE BELGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE REPLY OF THE ALLIES TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE.
THE KAISER, HINDENBURG AND LUDENDORFF IN CONFERENCE.
THE KAISER'S "PEACE" VISIT TO KING OF BAVARIA AT MUNICH, DECEMBER 12, 1916.
THE DEPORTATION OF BELGIANS TO WORK FOR GERMANY.
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/president-wilson-and-peace-p8bc9l0j7
President Wilson and Peace
Mr Wilson admits that he finds the appearance of his “suggestion” immediately after the German “overtures” somewhat embarrassing. It is, he sees, open to misconstruction, and we are afraid that it may he misconstrued in more quarters than one.
December 22, 1916
President Wilson has sent to all the belligerent Powers a lengthy Note, which practically invites them to state their peace terms. We do not for a moment question the sincerity of his statement that the suggestion is made “in the most friendly spirit,” but we cannot escape some misgivings as to whether his aspiration that this spirit, and the objects which he seeks “may be understood by all concerned,” will be everywhere fulfilled.
Our sympathetic understanding in this country of certain manifestations of American idealism is not universally shared, and Mr Wilson himself admits that he finds the appearance of his “suggestion” immediately after the German “overtures” somewhat embarrassing. It is, he sees, open to misconstruction, and we are afraid that it may he misconstrued in more quarters than one. He assures us - and of course we do not question his assurance - that he has long had the offer of this suggestion in mind, that it has not been prompted by the action of the Central Powers, and is not in any way associated with their recent step; but it will be hard for those who are not so familiar as we are with the workings of particular types of the American mind to comply with his request that the invitation should be considered “as if it had been made in other circumstances.”
The circumstances, unfortunately, in which such an invitation is given inevitably colour the reception which it is likely to meet. We have no doubt whatever as to the substance of the reception which this document will have at the hands of every one of the Allied nations and Governments. They will all unquestionably treat it as President Lincoln and Mr Seward, supported by the judgment and the sentiment of the American democracy, treated all suggestions of European interference in thc Civil War. The Central Powers, the Bulgarians, and the Turks will presumably welcome it, since it recommends the very course of action to which thev have just summoned the Entente Powers. That is clear on a comparison of the German and the American Notes - to say nothing of the astonishingly prophetic passage about “Wilson’s dilemma” which we reproduce this morning from the Cologne Gazette. The Prime Ministers of England, France, Italy, and Russia have declared in the plainest and the most vigorous terms their independent decision that this course is utterly inadmissible. They have stated their reasons, and these reasons have been approved by overwhelming majorities of the legislatures they addressed and of their countrymen out of doors. Any variation from this attitude out of deference to Mr Wilson’s views is, it need hardly be said, altogether unthinkable.
Surprise, we should imagine, will be the predominant feeling caused in this country by Mr Wilson’s unexpected step - a surprise which will be intensified by the contrast between the state of mind reflected in his Note and the chorus of approbation with which only yesterday the chief organs of American opinion were hailing Mr Lloyd George’s rejection of the German “peace proposals.” The striking difference between them cannot but suggest that in thus supporting the German scheme Mr Wilson so may have failed to gauge the trend of all the best American opinion. His offer to take the initiative himself may perhaps reflect inappropriate reminiscences of the part which, under wholly different conditions, President Roosevelt played in the negotiations for the Treaty of Portsmouth.
The American newspapers gave a wholehearted approval to Mr Lloyd George’s description of the conflicting objects pursued by the two groups of belligerents. Mr Wilson, by some curious process of thought, has reached the conclusion that they are “virtually the same”. His development of this theory is more astonishing still. Each side, he says, desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure as those of the greatest nations. The present plight of Belgium - whose starving people are living upon American alms - of Poland, and of Serbia, is difficult to reconcile with this confiding trust in German “scraps of paper.” But Mr Wilson does not intimate any doubt as to the possibility of rearing a mini vernal millennium of peace and goodwill upon this precarious foundation. All the Powers, he thinks, are “ready to consider the foundation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world.”
Only the war stands in the way of this blessed consummation, in which the United States, despite their dislike of “entangling alliances,” would apparently take part. At all events, they are declared to be as vitally and directly interested in it as the belIigerents, and it is added that their interest in the protection of the smaller and weaker peoples is as quick and ardent as that of any other nation or Government. It is as a necessary preliminary at “these ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world” that Mr Wilson feels called upon to request the belligerents to define the objects for which they are at war. “Stated in general terms,” he says, “they seem the same on both sides.”
The same? We should have supposed that by this time the irreconcilable conflict between the objects of the Allies and the objects of the Central Powers was plain to all mankind. Our aims have never changed from the day when Germany began hacking her way through neutral Belgium until this hour. Mr Asquith has stated them, Viscount Grey has stated them, Mr Lloyd George has stated them, and last night Mr Bonar Law referred to them again. He said that if he saw the least prospect of attaining them, he would eagerly welcome peace. So would the whole nation and the whole Empire. We share to the full Mr Wilson’s humanitarian feelings; we are even fighting for them. But, while we are fighting for peace, we are determined that it shall be a just and a lasting peace, and we see no hope of such a peace until Prussian “militarism” has been laid low on the field of battle.
The enemy are posing as victorious aggressors in the very document in which they condescendingly summon the Allies to negotiation. To negotiate under such conditions would be a crime against our dead and against future generations. To parley with wrong while it arrogantly claims to be victorious would be to be false to the right, to acknowledge the definite triumph of “militarism,” and to confess the failure of democracy. For these reasons amongst others we cannot listen to Mr Wilson’s pleading. We trust that it will be treated by all the Allies with the civility which it deserves, but it will not stay the hand of any one of them for a moment in vindicating the liberty of the nations.
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-reply-to-the-wilson-note-q8x0nx60z
The Reply to the Wilson Note
The peace which the Allies desire is a peace founded on those doctrines of liberty, justice, and inviolable fidelity to international engagements which Americans have always cherished and revered.
January 12, 1917
Eminently courteous and friendly in tone, clear and positive in statement, closely reasoned, and animated by the lofty ideals of politics and of morals to which the people of the United States have always paid homage, the Reply of the Allies to Mr Wilson’s Note must command the assent and approbation of the great nation across the Atlantic who have inherited, assimilated, and developed the best principles and traditions of Western civilization.
The German Government hastened to avail themselves of a phrase which they picked out in the President’s Note in order curtly to refuse him the information for which he asked. They made no “avowal of their views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded,” and they told him, in substance, that he had mistaken the road to peace. The Allies do not pretend to be at present in a position to state all their war aims in detail. These cannot be set out in full until the moment for negotiation has been reached. But they declare their general objects with more amplitude and more precision than in any statement they have yet made to their own countrymen.
These objects have been known as necessary consequences of the principles the Allies have proclaimed, and some of them have been repeatedly announced. They have never before been brought forward and authoritatively defined as a whole. First among them, it need hardly be said, ranks the restoration of the small nations whom Germany has trodden under her heel. Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro must be set free, with the compensations which are owed them. The liberation of the occupied portions of France, Russia, and Rumania, with reparation for the damage done them, is equally imperative.
These are preliminaries to the main object on which the Allies rely to protect them and their children from renewed contests with “the covetous brutality of Prussian militarism.” They disavow absolutely any intention to bring about “the extermination or the political disappearance of the Germanic peoples.” Such a design would stand in flagrant contradiction to the very principle of nationalities which is a corner-stone of their policy.
The peace which they desire is a peace founded on those doctrines of liberty, justice, and inviolable fidelity to international engagements which Americans have always cherished and revered. It must be based not only on respect for nationalities, but also on the right of “all peoples, small and great,” to full security and to liberty of economic development. It must be secured by territorial conventions and international settlements which will prevent such deeds as the violation of Belgium. It must provide for the restoration of provinces torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of the inhabitants - a clear reference to Alsace-Lorraine. It must ensure the liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign dominion and the risorgimento of Poland; while, finally, it must free the populations under Turkish tyranny and end for ever the rule of the Ottoman in Europe.
These are the views of the Allies as to the terms of peace. That is the peace for which, once again, they declare that they are determined to fight on with their whole strength and at any sacrifice, because they are convinced that upon its attainment depend their own welfare and the future of civilization. They appreciate the lofty sentiments which make the United States eager to cooperate, as Mr Wilson declares, in considering the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world. They heartily associate themselves with the plan, but they point out that discussion of it presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the war, and that arrangements of the kind ought to be accompanied by the sanctions necessary to secure their, execution - points on both of which we have more than once insisted.
Anxious as they are for peace, and for the subsequent conclusion of such arrangements, they sadly acknowledge that thoy are at present unable to see any prospect of bringing about the only kind of peace they can accept. They are fighting, above all, “to safeguard the independence of peoples, right and humanity.” These things cannot be safeguarded without securing the reparation, the restitution, and the guarantees which they claim.
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/us-welcome-to-allies-note-vnzplnfsx
US welcome to Allies’ Note
The Kaiser himself proclaims the burning indignation and holy wrath of the German people at the rejection of his peace offer, and asserts, that the Germans are ready for all sacrifices.
January 15, 1917
The reply of the Allies to President Wilson’s Note has received a most cordial welcome in the United States. Its idealism, which is extolled by the Press, has made a strong appeal to the public.
An explosion of wrath in the German Press has been caused by the war aims of the Allies as set forth in the Note to Mr Wilson. The Kaiser himself proclaims the burning indignation and holy wrath of the German people at the rejection of his peace offer, and asserts, that the Germans are ready for all sacrifices.
Washington. There is no need to modify the description of the effect of our Note to the United States, which I telegraphed on Friday. As far as public opinion here is concerned, it is without doubt the most effective document that the Allies have yet put forth. From California to Maine it is proclaimed as a frank and friendly effort to meet the President’s demand for adequate information regarding the causes of the war. Many newspapers call it the first full official statement yet made in that regard. Its liberalism makes a great appeal. If its aspirations can be fulfilled, says one commentator, it will be known as the European Declaration of Independence.
Even those who want peace at almost any price are not altogether disappointed. It is believed that in two important respects it should turn the thoughts of the German people towards peace. It shows, first, that the Allies are not bent upon destroying the German nation; secondly, that Berlin’s talk about British ambitions is all moonshine. This theory finds expression in military circles in Washington. While judgment is reserved as to our capabilities of carrying out our programme, it is believed that our evident determination to fight to a finish will dishearten the Germans at least as much as it will imbue them with the courage of desperation.
The drawn war theory, upon which the Prussian peace propagandists had been banking so heavily, has, in fact, been badly shaken. Germany’s evident desire for peace prompts speculation as to whether the Central Powers are really quite so strong as they make out. In these circumstances the voices of Hearst and other German agents are as those of a people crying in the wilderness when they demand that our “insolent” rejection of Mr Wilson’s peace suggestions should be met by steps to make us end the war, such as an embargo on munitions.
We have, in fact, handsomely won the first round of the game which the President’s Note inaugurated. Our aims have never been so well understood or our determination to continue never more sympathized with, and if anything more were needed to help us it is to be found in the Kaiser’s proclamation, the blatant hypocrisy of which has not escaped the American humorist.
If Germany wishes to give proof of her sincerity she must now, it is almost gratuitously pointed out, come through with terms as explicit as ours. Talk about secret conferences means nothing, or less than nothing, but merely a manifestation of that malign underground diplomacy which the average American believes to be largely responsible for wars in general and this war in particular. It is well that we should have scored so heavily. It is feared here that there are difficult times ahead for the United States. Possibly the President may have something more to say about peace - the present situation is that he has not yet made up his mind and not even discussed the matter with the Cabinet; so speculation is premature and dangerous - but few believe that anything that he can do will, have any tangible effect for some time to come, unless, of course, Germany is much weaker than is generally supposed.
The possibility of those dangers to American neutrality, which the President is believed to have had in mind when he penned the first Note, cannot, therefore, be ignored. Count Bernstorff is already talking of a resumption of a ruthless submarine campaign. He does not, of course, put it in that way. Germany, he says, will respect merchant ships - only merchant ships must not be too heavily, armed and must be free from the suspicion of being public vessels. He hopes, first, to embroil us with the United States should we arm our vessels more adequately, or put them under Government control, and, secondly, to find an excuse for sinking more vessels. In the past Germany had some success in campaigns of this kind. She avoided serious trouble with the United States, and more than once nearly produced strained relations between us and the United States.