100 Years Ago - Брусиловський прорив, №2
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-russian-offensive-an-eye-witness-description-35nwsdl95
The Russian offensive, an eye-witness description
July 7, 1916
About midnight the hurricane of fire of our batteries converted the German trenches into a veritable inferno
(From Our Petrograd Correspondent.)
By the courtesy of General Headquarters, I have been privileged to witness the initial stages of the offensive which was begun yesterday by General Evert’s armies, and am proceeding to join the Army Corps to which I am to be attached during the ensuing operations.
The front immediately involved extends, roughly speaking, from the positions facing Baranovitchi to those to the east of Vilna. The names of these places are eloquent enough in themselves. They recall memories of the heroic retreat of our armies a year ago. The gallant corps which then fought against most frightful odds has now started on the journey back, filled with the greatest ardour and determination to drive the foe beyond the Niemen and the borders. Baranovitchi and Vilna are now the watchwords of our advancing infantry. Along the historic highways which traverse this land of rolling plains and wooded heights, notably the great broad route which carried Napoleon’s legions in the surge and ebb of invasion, likewise along the newly constructed railways, huge masses of men, guns, and transport have been moving to take up their appointed places in the second act of the great war - an act in which the Allies are striking the foe simultaneously on all sides, giving him no opportunity to shuttlecock his troops from front to front or to wrest the initiative from General Brusiloff. Henceforth he must fight as and where he stands.
From a convenient height in advance of our batteries I observed the artillery preparation of our offensive. Speaking only for what I noted personally, I can bear witness to the efficacy of the Russian system of cutting lanes through the consecutive lines of barbed wire. The system is as effective as it is economical.
SILENT GERMAN BATTERIES
The German gunners were strangely silent. Presumably much of their artillery has gone south and is not so plentiful as formerly. As it was, we almost monopolized the gunnery proceedings of the day. About midnight the hurricane of fire of our batteries converted the German trenches into a veritable inferno.
From my point of vantage I could see the horizon from Smorgon to Krevo almost uninterruptedly illuminated by the flashes of our pieces, while the din and roar of the batteries which were sending shell and shrapnel over my head were indescribable. Under the curtain of fire which held the German reserves in their shelters our men reached the enemy’s first iines, securing prisoners and demolishing the defences. At this stage word came to the artillery observers that the enemy was counter-attacking an outlying section, and asking for help. Within a few seconds an order was telephoned to the batteries, and immediately afterwards shells began tearing on their way towards the German skirmishing lines, quickly causing them to retreat.
We have outfought the enemy and taken several thousand prisoners and some guns. It is a good beginning.
Such brilliant results are unattainable without losses, and the Army mourns four gallant colonels, who fell leading their men. Unbounded satisfaction is expressed over the news of the British and French offensive.
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/renaissance-of-the-army-0mn8p8tqk
Renaissance of the Army
July 20, 1916
The Russians by July of last year were short of almost everything that an Army needs. We who were with these heroic troops during the Galician campaign, the taking of Warsaw, and the great retreat, know that their only assets were their leadership and the character of the troops themselves
From Stanley Washburn. (The Times Special Correspondent with the Russian Forces.)
HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT, June 19.
In order that we may fully appreciate the achievement of the Russian Army in the first two weeks of its great offensive, it is perhaps worthwhile to mention briefly the background of previous events, for without the realization of what has gone before it is impossible to do the Russians full credit.
Russia, as indeed was the case with every other party to this conflict, except Germany, had never prepared for a war on any such scale as this. By May 1, 1915, its Army had all but run through the resources which had been deemed sufficient for any foreseen crisis. Just as this fact began to dawn on the Russians there came the Germans’ great Galician drive, followed by the movement which resulted in the capture of Warsaw and culminated in the great retreat into the heart of Russia itself. The period from May to October last year is one which must, I believe, give Russia the greatest credit which she will ever attain in tlis war.
Moral and endurance are natural in success, no matter how heavy may be the sacrifices, but moral in defeat is the true test of the character of an Army and of a nation. The Russians by July of last year were short of almost everything that an Army needs. We who were with these heroic troops during the Galician campaign, the taking of Warsaw, and the great retreat, know that their only assets were their leadership and the character of the troops themselves. Rifles were lacking; shells had run so short that Warsaw was untenable. Communications were so hacked to pieces by the advancing enemy that such material things as the Russians had were frequently delayed or unattainable. Yet for nearly six months, day in and day out, they fought their heartbreaking battles, always retiring, never in equal numbers, and suffering from almost every material want. And yet, alter six months, they brought to a final standstill in the barren wastes of their own country the most efficient Army that the world has ever known.
THE REORGANIZATION
By October, 1915, according to every rule of war, the Russians had been overwhelmingly defeated, and it is not difficult to see why the Germans believed that they had won the war and that Russia would make peace forthwith. From every material point of view, Russia had lost. But, unfortunately for the enemy, it is not only the material that wins in War, for while by October they had won overwhelmingly from this standpoint, they had, as a matter of fact, barely started the war with Russia and the Russian people, who for the first time were fully alive to the issues at stake and finally and wholeheartedly behind the war.
On the basis of a year of disaster was laid the foundation of the great offensive of this year. Alexeieff, in supreme command, only subordinate to the Tsar himself, began to reorganise the Army from one end of his huge line to the other. Hardly a month passed without offensives of varying degrees of importance being tried in some quarter of the line to test the working of the rapidly growing and increasingly efficient machine. Each bore its lessons for better success next time.
A general movement in the early weeks of the year in the far south showed that the Russians were already recuperating and improving in their technique and general capacity to adapt themselves to the modern conditions of warfare. Later in the year a more ambitious offensive was tried on the northern front, which, though yielding little in territory won, may perhaps have paid for itself in more knowledge gained as to the rules of success. Never discouraged, patient, and self-sacrificing, the Russians were preparing day by day to put their newly learned theories to the test.
GENERAL BRUSILOFF.
On this front the chief command is now in the hands of General Brusiloff, a man whose record has been one of almost universal success in this war. It was his army that, in the first months of the war, swept into Galicia and made possible the taking of Lemberg 30 days after the declaration of hostilities. it was again his army that penetrated the Dukla Pass and was already pushing into the Hungarian plain, throwing the Dual Monarchy into political chaos and the big cities into panic, when the German drive on the Dunajec and the destruction of the neighbouring army, left his right flank exposed to the attacks of limitless numbers of Germans pouring through the hole in the line like water through a leak in a dyke. In spite of superior forces, lack of ammunition, and difficulties of terrain, Brusiloff withdrew his army in good order and, with the assistance of reserves hurried up, was able to check the Germans on the San, after which the Russian retreat was definitely a rearguard action and not in any way a precipitate retreat.
Brusiloff himself is a man of the very highest type of intellect and the ideal of a soldier who is equally good at attack or defence. When one meets him one feels that one is in the presence of the highest product of culture and of a long line of ancestors who have bred a specimen that can be relied on to show the last degree of mettle in an emergency. With finely moulded features, long tapering fingers, steady grey eyes, Brusiloff is at the first glance a thoroughbred.
No man in the Russian Army knew Galicia more intimately than he, and no man had a finer record, and when Ivanoff became confidential adviser to the Emperor in his personal suite, Brusiloff was his natural successor in the command on this important front. His first act after taking over the command was to make a personal inspection of all his armies at the front, and before the present movement began he knew personally exactly what to expect from almost every unit, while his intimate knowledge of the country and of the psychology of the enemy gave him the background of understanding for the planning and carrying forward of the whole campaign.
Brusiloff himself has his staff in a certain little town amidst the waving wheat fields of Southern Russia, where he is as detached from the turmoil and confusion of warfare as though he were ten thousand miles away. This particular town was never, I think, noted for its luxuries. Certainly there were here no sumptuous villas or country houses in which a general might establish himself. In any case, Brusiloff is not that kind of general. In a small, barely furnished room he is directing the vast campaign which is raging over a front of hundreds of miles in length.
Brusiloff himself has changed greatly since I saw him in Brody a year ago this month. His hair has turned perceptibly and he looks at least 10 years older. His face is deeply lined and his mien sober and serious, while his sensitive mouth has grown stern and unyielding in its lines. Only the twinkle in his deep grey eyes show the humour and the perpetual youth which are among the dominant characteristics of the man himself. From his map-strewn desk he can look out across the deep wheat fields which from the window stretch beneath like the expanse of the sea, as the soft southern wind sweeps across their swaying acres. Surrounded by a picked staff, each man chosen for his efficiency, Brusiloff today represents about the best that Russia has yet produced in the way of a strictly fighting soldier.
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/what-brusiloff-has-done-3t3ngptpw
What Brusiloff has done
August 9, 1916
I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that the Russians could bear double this summer’s losses for five consecutive years without apprehension of running short of men, while another such blow as Brusiloff’s would undoubtedly utterly finish Austria
From Stanley Washburn. (The Times Special Correspondent with the Russian Forces.)
HEADQUARTERS, SW FRONT, AUG. 4.
Exactly two months have elapsed since the beginning of what must be considered the most remarkable Allied movement since the beginning of the war. These operations, extending over a wide front much of which is the most difficult terrain imaginable, viewed broadly, have continued practically without intermission for more than 60 days, which is a greater period of ceaseless fighting than any offensive except that of the Germans against Verdun, which is not a proper analogy. Even the German drive in Galicia last year, backed by an intricate system of railways and limitless troops and munitions, was obliged to ease off active operations after retaking Lemberg in June until the prepared blow again fell on the Cholm-Lublin line nearly three weeks later; while nearly two months elapsed between the termination of the East Prussian campaign in the spring of 1915 and the opening of the enemy’s Galician campaign in May. The Russians have already been going forward on the south-western front for more than 60 days, and the battles and the taking of trophies still continue, first in one sector,then in another.
RESULTS REVIEWED.
It seems proper at this time to summarize what this achievement up to date represents. Most important of all, it has definitely resulted in taking away the initiative from the Germans and Austrians on all fronts, and utterly destroying whatever programme they had planned for this summer. It has caused the diversion towards Russia of troops from the Italian and French fronts, laying the foundation for opportunities elsewhere; it has brought about great defeats of the Austrians, and it has convinced the Germans that their boasted superiority has finally vanished. They are now obliged to fight approximately on equal terms with the Russians, their single remaining assets being their superiority in guns, munitions, and railway facilities, all of which will have evaporated within another six months, excepting only the last, which must always be considered.
The recapitulation of the Russian captures makes it possible to form some estimate of what these past two months have done for the Allied cause. At a time when the Germans and Austrians are beginning to feel a scarcity of men, and especially of officers, the Russians in their advance, which at certain points approximates 55 miles, have taken three generals, 7,067 officers, 330,000 soldiers, and 504 guns, including over 50 heavy guns, 1,200 machine-guns, and miscellaneous war booty too great to enumerate. At a conservative estimate this represents, including killed, casualties, missing, and losses from other causes, approximately three-quarters of a million of the enemy’s organized effectives, with the enemy still struggling frantically on all fronts to bring the Russian advances to a halt, even if but temporarily.
It is impossible for me to state the Russian losses, except to say that from the strictly military point of view they can have no effect whatever on the Russian cause. I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that the Russians could bear double this summer’s losses for five consecutive years without apprehension of running short of men, while another such blow as Brusiloff’s would undoubtedly utterly finish Austria and further reduce Germany’s visible supply, which already seems to have shrunk to a point where future sustained offensives will be difficult, if not impossible.
AUSTRIA FAILING, BUT GERMANY STRONG.
After being nearly two months continually on this front I have reached two conclusions regarding the enemy. The first is that, with one more sweeping movement, an optimist may fairly hope that Austria will be forced to collapse; the second is that the Germans are not near collapse, and though they may lose Kovel, Brest-Litowsk, Warsaw, and even all Poland, there may well remain a year of bitter fighting. It is true the Germans have lost some of their arrogance, and their confidence in themselves is somewhat reduced, but they are still a long way from collapse - at any rate, from any military point of view - and if such a collapse is coming from internal political causes, it is impossible to express any opinion upon that here.
During the early part of this campaign their greatest cause for anxiety was the food situation within Germany, but with this year’s crop harvested this problem will be dissipated, and will probably not again be an important consideration before next spring. It must be remembered that the Germans, even if forced this year to retire from Galicia and Poland, will already have harvested all the crops, and if they retire they will undoubtedly take with them all the meat supplies likewise. It seems logical to believe then that the war must be ended on the battlefields by unremitting efforts and slow but steady advances, until the enemy is exhausted and no longer able to fill up with men. The Russian and the Western advances have shown clearly that the Germans can be digested step by step, but they cannot be swept aside, as has been the case with the Austrians. The surest means of ensuring victory, and that which will most utterly discourage the Germans, is for preparations to be made to continue the war for two more years, if necessary.
ALEXEIEFF’S GREAT WORK.
From the point of view of generalship both the higher and the subordinate commands of the enemy have been completely outclassed since the beginning of the move. The role in this past year of General Alexeieff must not be forgotten. When in command of the Warsaw Army in 1915 he was in a position which the Germans considered would result in the destruction of the army and an independent peace with Russia. From this position with steady hand General Alexeieff withdrew with consummate skill, and he did the same at Vilia in the late autumn, utterly checking the advance of the strongest army the world has ever seen. His only assets were his own clever brain and the character of his people. Since obtaining the higher command he has reorganized and prepared the Army for the present offensive operation. Lastly, his regime gave to Russia Brusiloff in a high command, and the capacity of that commander speaks for itself.
During this entire movement General Alexeieff has managed the operations on the whole front, now here, now there, with such skill that lie has prevented the enemy, to the utmost possible extent, from shifting his reserves as he did last year. General Brusiloff. commanding in the south, has similarly kept the enemy doing the same locally for nearly two months.
It becomes perfectly clear that the Germans are incapable under present conditions of formulating new plans suddenly. Their two hurriedly planned offensives to check the Russian advance have failed utterly, and it is only now, after two months, that they have been able to shift enough troops and redistribute their men sufficiently to slow down the Russian advance in the direction of Kovel. Such delays as they have been able to impose have been due entirely to the strength of their position, to superiority in the number and calibre of their guns, and especially to the network of railways which enables them to concentrate suddenly at threatened points.
KOVEL AND LEMBURG.
The heavy rains of mid-July, together with the flooding of the Stokhod swamps, have given the enemy opportunities to create what is probably the strongest natural position they have ever had on the Eastern front. Otherwise the Russians would undoubtedly have taken Kovel before this. It is useless to speculate on the future, except to state that the world must not expect even the superb Russian infantry to overrun in a few days a position which has been strengthened tenfold by the untimely rains.
There are no important changes to record in the past few days in the position of the armies facing the Stokhod and Vladimir Volhynsk other than tactical readjustments of the line here and there, digging in, and throwing back German counter-attacks, which are now raging intermittently at different points of the line. The armies more to the south are painstakingly digesting their tasks. Now that the enemy has had an opportunity to readjust his organization to meet the conditions it is rather unwise to expect such spectacular movements as characterized the last two months. There still remain the lines of works separating the army of Sakharoff from Lemberg - the present one, which is reported to be extremely strong, and the historic Krasne-Busk-Kamionka line, which, from last year’s experience of the Galician movements, is even stronger. The extraordinary skill and finesse which has characterized the movements on the south- western front should gradually eat away these defences, though it would be unwise to anticipate a sudden sweep, as the Austro-German command is staking its destiny - largely perhaps on account of Rumania - on holding Lemberg and Kovel, and is making every effort within its capacity to save those two important points.
In the meantime General Lechitsky is moving slowly and sanely in the south. All the Generals here indicate that the Russians are learning the lessons of the Galician and Carpathian campaign, as England and France learned their lessons in the West, and are not counting on a few striking coups to reduce an enemy whose persistence, intelligence, and capacity to fight stubbornly to the last-ditch are not in the least minimized in Russia.