HISTORY: Freedom, Free Will, and the Scope of Philosophical History
Freedom, Free Will, and the Scope of Philosophical History
by Anjali Pai, 6 December 2007
The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, desire, passion - pertaining to the particular individual as such - a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a fettering of Freedom. We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and the State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized. -- G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, p.41.
The tension between Freedom and freedom (the free will of the individual) plays a pivotal role in Hegel's model for the continued evolution of humankind through history. While the concept of Freedom does not change, since it is an Absolute, how it is seen in any given period of time, i.e. freedom or free will, does. This creates an unrest that ultimately pushes forward the development of man and allows Spirit to overcome itself and achieve its Ideal (55). Hegel's three branches of history - Original, Reflective, and Philosophical - demonstrate three different stages of man's understanding of the world. The first two are based on contingency, incorporating the Spirit of the time in which the history was written, while the last demonstrates a larger, absolute understanding of the progression of mankind. Original and Reflective history are both limited by their view of what freedom is, since the conceptions of freedom in limited histories are shaped by the mindset of the time, and with every destruction of an actualised State, those conceptions become dated. It is only by abstracting the patterns seen in specific events and thought paradigms to the general level that the concept of Freedom will emerge. However, since the abstraction is uncovered by means of progression through the specific, comparing freedom and Freedom becomes a central theme in the movement of Spirit toward actualisation.
The slave living in an age of despotism, by observing the despot, was able to understand that one is free. The Greeks and Romans reached an age of enlightenment in which they learned that some are free. Only under the influence of Christianity and the absolution of freedom as a universal paradigm did mankind, via the Germans, learn that man as such is free (18). The prerequisite for this understanding, therefore, is a complexity of State, and an order and restrictiveness to society, wherein man is subject to an entity higher than himself. Hegel states that pre-rationality, man is brutish and is therefore innocent, as his decisions are not made based on reason but rather on instinct (34). Freedom is not an issue to the primitive man, since he is a slave to his instincts and, furthermore, to his passions and selfish desires. However, even with the organisation of a State and the use of Reason, understanding the difference between Freedom and freedom does not happen automatically. The early Germans, though first to acknowledge freedom as a right of man, did not possess the idea of duty, or Objective Freedom; they understood only subjective choice, and a condition of unrest was required to demonstrate the necessity of a powerful State, and of relinquishing one's own caprice for the good of mankind (369). Following Charlemagne's death, the uprising of individuals against the authority of law, demanding freedom at the individual level, led to the turmoil that then pushed the empire toward a greater understanding of what Freedom entails. It is this ultimate goal of Spirit, to maximise consciousness of Freedom and thereby actualise Freedom itself, which drives the progression of history toward its end.
Hegel defines Freedom as self-knowledge and self-awareness, and the prevailing of the Absolute over contingency. He also requires contingency in order for the self-realisation of Freedom to continue. History is not all-encompassing, since not all historical events and facts can fit within the dialectic, so the progression of history must be seen as conditional. This tension as well, between the general and the specific, the conceptual and the actual, the macro and the micro, is central to his argument regarding the evolution and realisation of Spirit. Though seemingly a paradoxical statement, the continued presence of contingency is a result of the advancement of Spirit as practised within the bounds of humanity. In other words, it is necessary for specifics to exist in order to invoke the use of subjective will, but it is the collective actions of many subjective wills within a community that defines the universal will of that state. While not all individual actions and ideals will fit into the framework of action that will eventually go on to make up a part of the main historical trend, they cannot be dismissed altogether. Hegel explains this as a necessity as well. In order for Spirit to prevail, it must present itself as the Absolute by transcending contingency, because contingency provides the yoke from which Spirit attains its freedom (46).
This concept of triumph over the specifics is echoed in the analysis of good and evil. If both possibilities are not presented, as was the case when man was still barbarous (or, to use Hegel's example, before Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil), then there is no triumph, because there is no tension. Man makes decisions based on instinct and sensual signals, and whether they are the "correct" decisions or not, they do nothing to advance Spirit. Evil lies in consciousness, and in man's ability to make a conscious decision that separates him from the Universal by means of his Ego (321). However, so too does Good. This is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man - that he knows what is good and what is evil; that his Destiny is his very ability to will either good or evil - in one word, that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not only of evil, but of good; and not only concerning this or that particular matter, and all that happens ab extra, but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom. (34)
Again Hegel mentions the importance of individual freedom, indicating that freedom must align with Freedom in order to actualise the potential of Spirit. This cannot be attained by pure chance or by lack of knowledge; individual freedom, while based on whim, still requires thought, and through that thought, man as an individual can advance man as a species.
In his discussion of World-historical figures, Hegel implies that individual freedom is paramount to the movement toward Freedom and the realisation of Spirit. However, he clearly states that a World-historical figure cannot be conscious of the bigger picture (30). The figure's function within his time is to drive the spirit of that time to fruition, and it is by doing so that he drives Spirit forward to the next stage. These Heroes "are great men, because they willed and accomplished something great; not a mere fancy, a mere intention, but that which met the case and fell in with the needs of the age (31)." It is when his choice to do so, his caprice, his individual freedom, lines up with the Freedom of Spirit that an advance is made. Again, the interplay becomes apparent: man does not have the ability to make a conscious decision regarding the next step in the Big Picture of Spirit or Freedom, but he can make a conscious decision on the smaller scale, adhering to the demands of the time, which in turn are concomitant with the demands of the Big Picture. His role as a World-historical figure, therefore, is the immediate result of his ability to judge necessity and make a conscious choice accordingly, but the extended result of the inextricable link between the spirit of a given epoch and World Spirit as an absolute.
Though it is clear that understanding Freedom is only possible by observing the individual freedoms of World-historical figures and analysing how their decisions fit into the course of history, is it possible that the perception of Freedom Hegel discusses is also a product of his time rather than being Universal? Hegel's philosophy is ground-breaking, thus setting him up in the role of World-historical figure, but is there a way for his contemporaries to know whether Freedom is as Hegel conceived it? The difficulty with history seems to be that all forms of history, including Philosophical history, must have some element of influence from the time in which the work was being written. Philosophical history is the most removed from this variability, since it seeks out overarching ideals instead of specific examples, but this returns me to the point I raised in my previous paper, namely that there is no way for us to be certain the sampling of history we have taken is sufficiently broad. Granted, Western history spans the better part of three thousand years, which seems as though it would be more than enough to judge trends and plot a line of best fit, but doing so could also be restrictive. If the whole of Western human history ends up spanning twenty thousand years, for example, then three thousand years is not nearly enough data to create an accurate picture of what the Universal is.
Hegel allows for some uncertainty in his discussion of contingency, suggesting that the best a philosopher can do is examine trends based on history to that point, and then use that to develop theories regarding the Absolutes. Moreover, it is true that the larger the amount of data collected, the less affected it will be by disparities, such as the individual actions Hegel mentions, which may or may not have any place in the activity of the Spirit. However, it seems as though extrapolating the events that are in line with Spirit's movement toward Freedom suffers from the same problems as Original and Reflective history. With Original history, the historian is entrenched in the events and the mindset of the time, and is unable to attain objectivity. With Reflective history, everything from the thought processes used to compile history or select a specialisation to the ideology and subjectivity present in pragmatic or critical history are ultimately reflective of the mindset of the historian, and thus the spirit of the time in which the historian is writing. Likewise, for Philosophical history, determining the characteristics of Spirit in order to apply said characteristics to the events of history would seem to have at least some element of time-bounded mentality. If the history of Western civilisation proves to cover only six thousand years, then we are currently more than two thirds of the way through the period, and thus have a good idea of what Spirit is, based on the last four thousand years of observation. However, if the history of Western civilisation has barely just begun, then our current conception of Spirit, and thus of Freedom, could be as limited as the works of Thucydides, which were being written from within the period about which he was writing. It is of course possible that Hegel's ideas are in line with Spirit, but there is no definitive way for us to know that.
When Spirit finds conformity with its essence, only then can Freedom be achieved, but to reach this conformity, mankind must progress through each epoch, struggling against its nature in order to find greater self-awareness and thus the unfolding of history. It is this tension between the freedoms at the individual level and those at the Universal level that allows history to progress. The principles behind this theory seem sound; that is, the axioms Hegel presents allow his argument to progress smoothly and logically. The specifics, however, namely Hegel's suggestion that we can know the nature of Spirit ,which we then search for in past events in order to create a Philosophical history, seem flawed. The implication that we are approaching or have arrived at the ultimate era of human development is unnecessarily restrictive, and would seem more akin to exercising individual freedom rather than true, absolute Freedom. Perhaps, however, this groundwork is exactly what was needed to create the tension that will allow us to progress to the next step in the philosophy of history.
by Anjali Pai, 6 December 2007
The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, desire, passion - pertaining to the particular individual as such - a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a fettering of Freedom. We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and the State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized. -- G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, p.41.
The tension between Freedom and freedom (the free will of the individual) plays a pivotal role in Hegel's model for the continued evolution of humankind through history. While the concept of Freedom does not change, since it is an Absolute, how it is seen in any given period of time, i.e. freedom or free will, does. This creates an unrest that ultimately pushes forward the development of man and allows Spirit to overcome itself and achieve its Ideal (55). Hegel's three branches of history - Original, Reflective, and Philosophical - demonstrate three different stages of man's understanding of the world. The first two are based on contingency, incorporating the Spirit of the time in which the history was written, while the last demonstrates a larger, absolute understanding of the progression of mankind. Original and Reflective history are both limited by their view of what freedom is, since the conceptions of freedom in limited histories are shaped by the mindset of the time, and with every destruction of an actualised State, those conceptions become dated. It is only by abstracting the patterns seen in specific events and thought paradigms to the general level that the concept of Freedom will emerge. However, since the abstraction is uncovered by means of progression through the specific, comparing freedom and Freedom becomes a central theme in the movement of Spirit toward actualisation.
The slave living in an age of despotism, by observing the despot, was able to understand that one is free. The Greeks and Romans reached an age of enlightenment in which they learned that some are free. Only under the influence of Christianity and the absolution of freedom as a universal paradigm did mankind, via the Germans, learn that man as such is free (18). The prerequisite for this understanding, therefore, is a complexity of State, and an order and restrictiveness to society, wherein man is subject to an entity higher than himself. Hegel states that pre-rationality, man is brutish and is therefore innocent, as his decisions are not made based on reason but rather on instinct (34). Freedom is not an issue to the primitive man, since he is a slave to his instincts and, furthermore, to his passions and selfish desires. However, even with the organisation of a State and the use of Reason, understanding the difference between Freedom and freedom does not happen automatically. The early Germans, though first to acknowledge freedom as a right of man, did not possess the idea of duty, or Objective Freedom; they understood only subjective choice, and a condition of unrest was required to demonstrate the necessity of a powerful State, and of relinquishing one's own caprice for the good of mankind (369). Following Charlemagne's death, the uprising of individuals against the authority of law, demanding freedom at the individual level, led to the turmoil that then pushed the empire toward a greater understanding of what Freedom entails. It is this ultimate goal of Spirit, to maximise consciousness of Freedom and thereby actualise Freedom itself, which drives the progression of history toward its end.
Hegel defines Freedom as self-knowledge and self-awareness, and the prevailing of the Absolute over contingency. He also requires contingency in order for the self-realisation of Freedom to continue. History is not all-encompassing, since not all historical events and facts can fit within the dialectic, so the progression of history must be seen as conditional. This tension as well, between the general and the specific, the conceptual and the actual, the macro and the micro, is central to his argument regarding the evolution and realisation of Spirit. Though seemingly a paradoxical statement, the continued presence of contingency is a result of the advancement of Spirit as practised within the bounds of humanity. In other words, it is necessary for specifics to exist in order to invoke the use of subjective will, but it is the collective actions of many subjective wills within a community that defines the universal will of that state. While not all individual actions and ideals will fit into the framework of action that will eventually go on to make up a part of the main historical trend, they cannot be dismissed altogether. Hegel explains this as a necessity as well. In order for Spirit to prevail, it must present itself as the Absolute by transcending contingency, because contingency provides the yoke from which Spirit attains its freedom (46).
This concept of triumph over the specifics is echoed in the analysis of good and evil. If both possibilities are not presented, as was the case when man was still barbarous (or, to use Hegel's example, before Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil), then there is no triumph, because there is no tension. Man makes decisions based on instinct and sensual signals, and whether they are the "correct" decisions or not, they do nothing to advance Spirit. Evil lies in consciousness, and in man's ability to make a conscious decision that separates him from the Universal by means of his Ego (321). However, so too does Good. This is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man - that he knows what is good and what is evil; that his Destiny is his very ability to will either good or evil - in one word, that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not only of evil, but of good; and not only concerning this or that particular matter, and all that happens ab extra, but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom. (34)
Again Hegel mentions the importance of individual freedom, indicating that freedom must align with Freedom in order to actualise the potential of Spirit. This cannot be attained by pure chance or by lack of knowledge; individual freedom, while based on whim, still requires thought, and through that thought, man as an individual can advance man as a species.
In his discussion of World-historical figures, Hegel implies that individual freedom is paramount to the movement toward Freedom and the realisation of Spirit. However, he clearly states that a World-historical figure cannot be conscious of the bigger picture (30). The figure's function within his time is to drive the spirit of that time to fruition, and it is by doing so that he drives Spirit forward to the next stage. These Heroes "are great men, because they willed and accomplished something great; not a mere fancy, a mere intention, but that which met the case and fell in with the needs of the age (31)." It is when his choice to do so, his caprice, his individual freedom, lines up with the Freedom of Spirit that an advance is made. Again, the interplay becomes apparent: man does not have the ability to make a conscious decision regarding the next step in the Big Picture of Spirit or Freedom, but he can make a conscious decision on the smaller scale, adhering to the demands of the time, which in turn are concomitant with the demands of the Big Picture. His role as a World-historical figure, therefore, is the immediate result of his ability to judge necessity and make a conscious choice accordingly, but the extended result of the inextricable link between the spirit of a given epoch and World Spirit as an absolute.
Though it is clear that understanding Freedom is only possible by observing the individual freedoms of World-historical figures and analysing how their decisions fit into the course of history, is it possible that the perception of Freedom Hegel discusses is also a product of his time rather than being Universal? Hegel's philosophy is ground-breaking, thus setting him up in the role of World-historical figure, but is there a way for his contemporaries to know whether Freedom is as Hegel conceived it? The difficulty with history seems to be that all forms of history, including Philosophical history, must have some element of influence from the time in which the work was being written. Philosophical history is the most removed from this variability, since it seeks out overarching ideals instead of specific examples, but this returns me to the point I raised in my previous paper, namely that there is no way for us to be certain the sampling of history we have taken is sufficiently broad. Granted, Western history spans the better part of three thousand years, which seems as though it would be more than enough to judge trends and plot a line of best fit, but doing so could also be restrictive. If the whole of Western human history ends up spanning twenty thousand years, for example, then three thousand years is not nearly enough data to create an accurate picture of what the Universal is.
Hegel allows for some uncertainty in his discussion of contingency, suggesting that the best a philosopher can do is examine trends based on history to that point, and then use that to develop theories regarding the Absolutes. Moreover, it is true that the larger the amount of data collected, the less affected it will be by disparities, such as the individual actions Hegel mentions, which may or may not have any place in the activity of the Spirit. However, it seems as though extrapolating the events that are in line with Spirit's movement toward Freedom suffers from the same problems as Original and Reflective history. With Original history, the historian is entrenched in the events and the mindset of the time, and is unable to attain objectivity. With Reflective history, everything from the thought processes used to compile history or select a specialisation to the ideology and subjectivity present in pragmatic or critical history are ultimately reflective of the mindset of the historian, and thus the spirit of the time in which the historian is writing. Likewise, for Philosophical history, determining the characteristics of Spirit in order to apply said characteristics to the events of history would seem to have at least some element of time-bounded mentality. If the history of Western civilisation proves to cover only six thousand years, then we are currently more than two thirds of the way through the period, and thus have a good idea of what Spirit is, based on the last four thousand years of observation. However, if the history of Western civilisation has barely just begun, then our current conception of Spirit, and thus of Freedom, could be as limited as the works of Thucydides, which were being written from within the period about which he was writing. It is of course possible that Hegel's ideas are in line with Spirit, but there is no definitive way for us to know that.
When Spirit finds conformity with its essence, only then can Freedom be achieved, but to reach this conformity, mankind must progress through each epoch, struggling against its nature in order to find greater self-awareness and thus the unfolding of history. It is this tension between the freedoms at the individual level and those at the Universal level that allows history to progress. The principles behind this theory seem sound; that is, the axioms Hegel presents allow his argument to progress smoothly and logically. The specifics, however, namely Hegel's suggestion that we can know the nature of Spirit ,which we then search for in past events in order to create a Philosophical history, seem flawed. The implication that we are approaching or have arrived at the ultimate era of human development is unnecessarily restrictive, and would seem more akin to exercising individual freedom rather than true, absolute Freedom. Perhaps, however, this groundwork is exactly what was needed to create the tension that will allow us to progress to the next step in the philosophy of history.